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WORKS
OF
HENRY, LORD BROUGHAM.

RHETORICAL AND LITERARY
DISSERTATIONS AND ADDRESSES.

WORKS

OF

HENRY, LORD BROUGHAM, F.R.S.,

MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, AND OF
THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF NAPLES.

VOL. VII.

LONDON AND GLASGOW:
RICHARD GRIFFIN AND COMPANY,

PUBLISHERS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

1856.

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AND
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DISSERTATION

ON THE

ELOQUENCE OF THE ANCIENTS.

THE most eminent critic and scholar of our times has, in treating of the author's writings upon the subject of Ancient Eloquence, and especially upon the Greek Orators, conferred upon him an honour to which he certainly cannot feel that he is entitled, but for which he must ever be grateful, when describing him as "certainement parmi les Modernes le Meilleur Interprete de Demosthene."—M. Villemain, *Journal des Savants*, 1855.

DISSERTATION.

It is impossible for any but the most careless observer to avoid remarking the great differences which distinguish the Oratory of ancient from that of modern times. The immeasurable superiority of the former is far from being the only or even the principal of these diversities: that proceeds in part from the greater power of the languages (especially the Greek), the instrument wielded by the great masters of diction; and in so far the superiority must remain for ever undiminished by any efforts on the part of modern rhetoricians, although extreme care applied to spoken composition may reduce the other advantages of the ancients within a very narrow compass, and give scope to certain advantages, not unimportant, which are possessed by the moderns. But there are other differences yet more broad between the two kinds of Oratory, and these require to be more minutely examined.

Public speaking among the ancients bore a more important share in the conduct of affairs, and filled a larger space in the eye of the people, than it does now, or indeed ever can again. Another engine has been invented for working upon the popular mind, whether to instruct, to persuade, or to please—an engine, too, of which the powers are not limited in time or in space. The people are now addressed through the Press; and all persons whatever, as well as those whom the bounds

of a public assembly can contain, are thus brought in contact with the teacher, the statesman, and the panegyrist. The orator of old was the Parliamentary debater, the speaker at public meetings, the preacher, the newspaper, the published sermon, the pamphlet, the volume, all in one. When he was to speak, all Greece flocked to Athens;* and his address was the object of anxious expectation for months before, and the subject of warm comment for months after the grand display of his powers. It is true that he sometimes committed his discourses to paper afterwards; but so rarely did this happen, that we have only preserved to us the published speeches of three or four Greek and one Latin orator; but those few which were thus written out could hardly, in the times of manuscript distribution, be said to be published at all; while of anything like the addresses now so frequent upon every occasion of importance, in the form of pamphlets, or other ephemeral productions, any work treating of the topics of the day, or any attempt by writing to influence the public mind for temporary purposes, it does not appear that there ever were examples in ancient times, if we except the speech of Archidamus, and that to Philip, both written by Isocrates. Indeed, the necessarily confined circulation of manuscript compositions, must have rendered it altogether hopeless to produce any immediate effect on the community by such means. Nor is it enough to say that the rostrum of old monopolized in itself all the functions of the press, the senate, the school, and the pulpit, in our days. It was a rival to the stage also. The people, fond as they were of theatrical exhibitions, from having no other intellectual entertainment, were really as much interested in oratorical displays, as sources of recreation. They regarded them, not merely with the interest of citizens hearing state affairs discussed

* Cicero, Brutus, *sub fine*.

in which they took a deep concern, and on which they were called to give an opinion; but as auditors and spectators at a dramatic performance, by which they were to be moved and pleased, and on which they were to exercise their critical faculties, refined by experience, and sharpened by the frequent contemplation of the purest models.

That the orators of Greece and Rome regarded their art as one of eminent display, considered it their province to please as well as to move their audience, and addressed the assembly, not only as hearers who were to be convinced or persuaded, but as critics also who were to judge of rhetorical merit, is clear from numberless considerations, some of which must here be adverted to, in order to show that Ancient Oratory held a place among the Fine Arts properly so called, and was, like them, an appeal to the taste, ending in the mere pleasure of contemplation, as well as an appeal to the reason or the passions, leading to practical consequences, and having action for its result. An attention to this subject will explain many things in the structure of ancient orations, which would otherwise be with difficulty apprehended.

Of the circumstances to which we have adverted as proving the position in question, some belong to the head of internal, others to that of external evidence—the former being discoverable by inspection of the compositions themselves, the latter resting upon historical evidence of facts.

I.—1. The first of the things belonging to the former class which strikes an attentive student of the ancient orators, is the exquisite finish and perfect polish of their compositions. It really seems as if the fit word were always found in the appropriate place; as if, though every topic may not always be the best possible for the orator's purpose, yet everything which he intended to say was said in the best possible manner, and so that no further consideration could ever improve it. “Quæ

ita pura erat, ut nihil liquidius; ita libere fluebat, ut nusquam adhæresceret: nullum, nisi loco positum, et tanquam in vermiculato emblemate, ut ait Lucilius,* structum verbum videres. Nec vero ullum aut durum, aut insolens, aut humile, aut longius ductum;† ac non propria verba rerum, sed pleraque translata; sic tamen, ut ea non irruisse in alienum locum, sed immigrasse in suum diceres. Nec vero hæc soluta, nec diffluentia, sed adstricta numeris, non aperte, nec eodem modo semper, sed varie dissimulanterque conclusis.”‡

But it is also evident, that the exquisite structure of the sentences, the balanced period, the apt and perfect antithesis, the neat and epigrammatic turn, the finished collocation, all indicate an extreme elaboration, and could hardly have been the suggestion of the moment, because the choice of the earlier expressions is often regulated by those which occur subsequently. This fineness of composition must, however, be admitted not to be a perfectly decisive proof of extreme preparation beforehand; both because we can hardly assign any limits to the effects of great practice in giving a power of extemporary composition,—witness the facility of rhyming off-hand acquired by the Italian *improvisatori*,—and also because we cannot be certain that the spoken speech was exactly the same with the one which we now read—“Orationem habuit luculentam, quam postea scriptam edidit”—says Sallust of Cicero’s first Catilinarian, as if insinuating that he spoke one speech and wrote another;—a thing which the readers of modern debates, who happen also to have been the hearers of the same, can well comprehend. Indeed, a

* Cicero here refers to two verses of Lucilius, the diction of which is remarkable,—

Quam lepide lexeis compostæ! ut tessellæ omnes
Arte pavimento, atque emblemate vermiculato;

alluding to the ancient Mosaic.

† As we say, far-fetched.

‡ Cicero, Brutus, c. 79.

passage in one of Cicero's Epistles, shows that he was not very scrupulous as to the accuracy with which his published corresponded with his spoken orations. For he gives as the only reasons why he could not accede to Tubero's request (to have something inserted in his speech *Pro Ligario*) that it was already published, and that he had no mind to defend Tubero's conduct.*

I.—2. The exquisite figures with which the ancient speeches are interspersed, and the highly skilful disposition of their materials, do not perhaps furnish more decisive proofs than the diction. But the exemplary temperance with which topics are used, and the conciseness with which ideas of the most important kind are expressed, and images portrayed, certainly can hardly be the effect of any experience or practical skill. The emptiness and prolixity of *improvisatori*, and other extemporary composers, show that this faculty of condensation is not so easily acquired as that of good and even accurate composition. It must, however, be confessed, that the distinguishing characteristic of ancient composition, spoken as well as written, seems to indicate some change having been made in the spoken discourse, when it was reduced to writing subsequently to delivery. For with all the quickness natural to an Attic audience, and all that expertness which a Roman assembly may be supposed to have acquired from the habit of attentively hearing the finest compositions, it seems difficult to understand how the great passages, delivered in as few words as if attaining the utmost possible conciseness, were the object chiefly in the author's view, could make their due impression upon auditors, who, hearing them for the first time, and having no notice of the idea or the image, till it was at a stroke, as it were, presented to their minds, could have time allowed for apprehending it, or at least for tasting its beauty, or feeling its force.

† *Epp. ad Atticum*, xiii. 2.

The orator often feels that he could add strength to his composition by giving it the concentration of compression, but that if he suddenly presented his ideas to his audience, he would be in the middle of another sentence, or even another topic, before the blow, so rapidly struck, had produced its full impression, and the mind of the hearer would be in the state of confusion in which a bell throws the ear, when struck so rapidly as to make its successive vibrations interfere with one another. He feels that were he writing for the eye, for such deliberate perusal as enables the reader to pause and dwell upon each successive period until it has told, and even to recur in case of imperfect apprehension, he would prefer another and a more concise annunciation of his ideas; but he must needs sacrifice this advantage to make his due impression. Nothing can be more natural, therefore, than that, on reconsidering the subject, and giving his discourse in writing, he should omit some things which are unnecessary to the reader, who has the words *oculis subjecta fidelibus*. Accordingly, when we recollect in how few words some of the most renowned passages in ancient oratory are couched, as for instance, the ὡς περ νέφος itself, it seems very reasonable to suppose that some words have occasionally been omitted by the writer, which the speaker had used; just as mathematicians are known to leave out intermediate steps of their synthetical demonstrations, which, in their analytical investigations, were all gone through by them originally.

I.—3. But another peculiarity in the ancient rhetoric is quite decisive upon the question, both proving how much the productions of the orators were the result of great labour, and showing how much their delivery was regarded as a dramatic display, or at least an exhibition in which the audience was to be pleased, independently of the business intended to be promoted. Passages are very frequently to be found in one oration, sometimes

word for word the same with those contained in another by the same speaker, sometimes varying in certain particulars, and apparently varying because subsequent reflection, perhaps aided by the criticisms of others, or by the effects observed to be produced on the audience, had suggested the change, as an improvement upon the earlier composition. If we only consider how little it is in the natural course of things, that a person addressing perhaps a different audience, nay, still more, the same audience, but certainly upon a different business, should use the very same topics, even the same figures of speech, in the same or nearly the same words, and how likely these must always be, in the active affairs of life, to be inapplicable in one case, precisely because they were applicable in another and a different case, we shall at once perceive that the old orators had other objects in view than the mere furtherance of the matter actually in hand, and that those passages were repeated, rather because they had been found successful in striking and delighting the audience when first pronounced, and were therefore likely to please in the repetition, than because they conduced materially to carry conviction to their minds, and gain their concurrence to a practical proposition. For, certainly, if a person is to be convinced that a certain measure is expedient or necessary, and if the matter addressed to his mind with this view is precisely the topic, illustrated by the metaphors, and in the words, which he distinctly recollects to have been formerly employed for the purpose of making him assent to a wholly different proposition, and support a measure of another kind entirely, nothing can be more likely than that he should at once say, "Why, surely I have heard all this before; you told me the same thing last year, on such a question,—you cannot be in earnest—you are playing upon me, or playing with the subject." Such would be the effect of the repetition, upon an audience who were met merely to transact real business,

to consider on the merits of the case brought before it, and to act, that is, decide, after mature deliberation and making up its mind, upon conviction.

Accordingly, nothing could prove more fatal to the speaker's object than any such attempt in our assemblies; it would be at once confessing that he had some other object in view than to convince his hearers, and some other business to which he sacrificed the concern in hand. But far otherwise is it, if we suppose that the orator has a twofold object, and that the audience is collected for another purpose, as well as that of being convinced.—that he desires to gratify, to please, as well as to persuade, and that they are come to enjoy a critical repast, as well as to “expatiate and discourse their state affairs.” In this case, the repetition would heighten the zest at each time; as they who love music, or take pleasure in dramatic representations, are never so much gratified with the first enjoyment of any fine melody or splendid piece of acting, as with its subsequent exhibition. A nearer view of the practice referred to, will set this in a sufficiently clear light; and will show, that these repetitions are not at all confined to trivial passages, which might be forgotten after having been once heard, but on the contrary, are chiefly to be found in the finer, the more striking, and therefore the more noted passages,—passages which must have been familiar to every hearer. This close examination of the Greek Orations is also highly instructive and curious; for we are thus, as it were, let into the secret of their composition, almost as if the rough draught had been preserved. We don't, perhaps, see the original sketch of the picture, as in examining the designs of some of the great Masters whose works are preserved in their various stages; but we see the discourse from a state with which the orator had, after much labour, at first rested satisfied, and which, but for his exquisite skill, and the fastidiousness which always accompanies genius in judging its own productions,

would have remained, and been deemed perfect, by after ages ; and we can trace the progress of the work from that to its present finished and absolute form. as we can some of the compositions of Pope, from the MS. preserved in the British Museum, and those of Milton, from the MS., far more valuable, in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge.

The repetitions are nowhere to be found so frequent as in the Fourth Philippic, which for this reason has been termed by commentators and critics, the Peroration of the Nine Orations against Philip. Not having, it should seem, considered this subject very attentively, or been aware that numerous repetitions are also to be found in the rest of the lesser orations, they seem to have thought that this notion of a peroration sufficiently explained the whole matter. But in truth the Fourth Philippic is almost entirely a repetition, and chiefly from one of the preceding ones, perhaps the most magnificent of the minor works, that upon the affairs of the Chersonese, sometimes called the Eighth Philippic. If whole passages were to be found in both without any variation, it might be supposed that transcribers had by mistake copied them ; or if nearly the whole of one oration were composed of passages the very same with those which occurred in another, we might suppose that oration to be spurious ; although even then it might be observed, that the learned monks who beguiled their solitude in the middle ages by fabricating ancient works, always displayed their skill in original composition, imitating no doubt the manner of their models, but never resting satisfied with the unambitious task of culling out passages and working them into a *cento*. But in the Fourth Philippic, there are variations and additions which clearly show that the orator sometimes improved upon the first thought, sometimes adapted the original sentence to the new occasion ; and we can often trace the steps of the process, and perceive the precise reasons which guided it. At the same time,

it appears that some sentences are retained in the self-same state in which they originally were ; and this shows that he had at first bestowed so much pains as to bring these to a perfection which satisfied his severe taste, and that, when the same ideas were again to be expressed, he regarded his former selection of words as preferable to any other which he could make. It is a remarkable circumstance that, in these respects, no difference can be traced between the finest passages and those of inferior importance ; in both kinds we observe that sometimes there are variations and improvements, sometimes an exact repetition ; and this plainly demonstrates that all the portions of the work were elaborated with extreme art, no part being carelessly prepared and flung in as a kind of cement to fill up the interstices between less splendid passages. In this, as in so many other particulars, how different is the texture of modern discourse ! Even one of the greatest, in some respects certainly the very greatest orator of recent times, Lord Chatham, used frequently, especially in his latter days, to speak in a careless manner and in an under tone of voice, for a quarter of an hour or more at a time, as if he did not solicit any attention from his audience, and then to break out into one of those brilliant passages which have immortalized his name.

One of the most remarkable parts of the Fourth Philippic, is that highly wrought description of Philip's implacable hatred to Athens, of the reasons upon which that hatred was grounded, and of his policy in over-running Thrace ; and this passage is to be found also in the Oration upon the Chersonese delivered the year before ; but it seems to have been, during the interval, adapted to the circumstances in which the Fourth Philippic was delivered, and to have been somewhat more highly finished. The orator begins by saying in the same words, that the Athenians must first of all dismiss from their minds any doubt of Philip having broken the peace, and of his now waging open war

against them. In the Chersonese Oration, when stating this, he calls upon them to give over their mutual wranglings and recriminations, which is omitted in the Fourth Philippic. He then proceeds in the same words in both orations, Καὶ κακόνους μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐχθρὸς ὅλη τῇ πόλει, καὶ τῇ τῆς πόλεως ἐδάφει,—“he is the deadly enemy (literally evil-disposed and hostile) of the whole city, and of the very ground it stands on;” and then he bursts forth with προσθήσω δὲ,—but in the two orations, this introduces perfectly different matters, and the difference is very remarkable. In the Chersonese, Philip is “the enemy of every creature within the city, and of those too who most flatter themselves that they enjoy his smiles. Do they deny it? Let them look at (the fate of) those Olynthians, Lasthenes, and Euthyrates, who, to all appearance, were his familiar favourites, and no sooner betrayed their country into his hands, than they perished by the most miserable of deaths.”* But in the Fourth Philippic, he adds, after the words προσθήσω δὲ, that Philip is the implacable enemy, not of all the men within the city’s walls, but of the gods in the city; and, by a striking and bold apostrophe, invokes their vengeance upon his head, “καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει θεοῖς, —οἵπερ αὐτὸν ἐξολέσειαν.”†—“He is the enemy of the gods themselves who guard us,—may they utterly destroy him!” The reason of this remarkable variation is plainly to be perceived. Possibly he might think the allusion to the fate and the conduct of the Olynthian chiefs not so appropriate when, after the lapse of another year, these things could not be so fresh in the recollection of his hearers; but this is by

* Προσθήσω δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα οἰομένοις αὐτῷ χαρίζεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σκεψάσθωσαν Εὐθυκράτην καὶ Λασθένην τοὺς Ὀλυνθίους, οἳ δοκοῦντες οἰκιστάς αὐτῷ διακίεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ τὴν πόλιν περιῶσαν, πάντων κάκιστ’ ἀπολώλασιν.—*Oratores Græci*, ed. Reiske, vol. i., p. 99.

† Ibid, vol. i., p. 134.

no means so probable a supposition as that, upon reflection, he had perceived the anticlimax which, it must be confessed, mars the beauty of the passage as given formerly in the Chersonese Oration; where, after describing Philip as the deadly enemy of the very ground the city stands on, he adds, that he is also the enemy of all its inhabitants—a far more mitigated and ordinary species of hostility. True genius may be for a moment at fault; but its characteristic is to derive from failure itself the occasion of new success, and to turn temporary defeat into lasting triumph. Having made Philip the enemy of the ground itself on which Athens was built, he sought about for some stronger description still of his implacable hatred, nor could find it on earth. He therefore must make the Macedonian's enmity war with heaven itself, and from hence he brought out the magnificent apostrophe, which, after the topic it arose out of had thus been wrought up so high, became as natural and easy as it was imposing and grand. After this, the anticlimax would have been of course far greater than ever, of introducing the allusion to the hostility against the inhabitants, and he was compelled, therefore, to sacrifice the fine allusion to Olynthus. Let us here, in passing, remark how groundless the notion is of those critics who have described Demosthenes as never indulging in figures.* No passage can be more figurative than the one we have been contemplating; nor do tropes of a bolder caste occur in any prose composition, we might add, or in any poetry, than the description of a man's enmity reaching at once to the soil and to the gods—"a *solo usque ad cælum*."

The orator goes on, in both orations, in the same words, to affirm that the government or constitution of Athens is the great object of Philip's hatred, and, as

* Of this number assuredly was not Cicero; and yet the Roman orators who affected Attic taste, appear to have deemed plainness, dryness, the *humile dicendi genus*, a characteristic of it.

he says, justly. For this he gives two reasons in the Philippic;—first, because Philip feels those conflicting interests and mutual injuries which must needs make them enemies of each other; and next, because he knows that Athens must always be the refuge of any state which he wishes to subdue, and must ever resist him herself, as long as her democratic government endures. Both these reasons are repetitions, almost in the same words, from former orations; the one is taken from the Second Philippic, delivered three years before, and the other, from the Chersonese Oration. The only material change in the former, is the transposition of the words *βεβαίως* and *ἀσφαλῶς*, apparently in order to obviate the bad effects of the same vowels coming together, as they did in the Second Philippic, *πάντα τ' ἄλλα ἀσφαλῶς κέκτῃται*. Perhaps he also preferred to round the period with *ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ*, rather than to end more abruptly with *οἴκοι*. The sense is not varied here any more than it is by the substitution of *ἡγείται* for *νομίζει* in the Fourth Philippic, a substitution which the orator makes, although the same word *ἡγείται* had ended the clause but one before. The passage taken from the former Philippic is tacked on, as it were, to the one taken from the Chersonese Oration, by the insertion of a few words *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τοσούτοις οὔσιν*.

The changes made in the Chersonese passages are remarkable, because we can easily perceive the reasons that led to them, both as regards the sense and the sound. *Ἔσπε γὰρ ὑμεῖς οὐκ αὐτοὶ πλεονεκτῆσαι καὶ κατασχεῖν ἀρχὴν εὖ πεφυκότες, ἄλλ' ἕτερον λαβεῖν κωλύσαι, καὶ ἔχοντ' ἀφελέσθαι δεινοὶ* (in the Fourth Philippic, *καὶ τὸν ἔχοντ' ἀφελέσθαι*) *καὶ ὕλως ἐνοχλῆσαι τοῖς ἀρχεῖν βουλομένοις, καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἐξαφελέσθαι ἔτοιμοι*, (in the Fourth Philippic, *ἐξαλέσθαι δεινοί*). He evidently now considered *δεινοί* the more powerful word, and fitter to close the period, and he avoided repeating it; he also

preferred ἐξελέσθαι to a compound of the ἀφελέσθαι, which double compound he had used before; and besides gaining the advantage of concluding with δεινοί, he avoided the hiatus occasioned by the αι and ε immediately following each other. Perhaps we may from hence conclude (and other instances will afterwards be pointed out) that sometimes when he allows the same words, or words of the same root, to recur at a very short interval, it is not because he deliberately approves such repetitions, but because he may not have given the diction its last polish. Thus, in the same passage of the Chersonese, a little farther on, we have κατασκευάζεται twice in one period, where the repetition is figurative, or at least intensive, and meant to increase the force of the expression; and immediately after, the same word is employed a third time, but with another added, ἐξαιρεί, where κατασκευάζεται really seems superfluous. Thus, too, in the beautiful description of public and private life, in the peroration of the Fourth Philippic, ἀπράγμονα is twice used. But in many instances the repetition is intensive, both where the whole word is repeated, and where the root only is taken; as in the Chersonese Oration, ταῖς κατηγορίαις ὡς Διοπίθους κατηγοροῦσι; in the Oration against Aristocrates, where he speaks of persons κινδύνους κινδυνεύσαντας; and in the Oration for Ctesippus and others, where he mentions persons, πολέμους πολεμοῦντας. In other instances, where he merely repeats without intension or figure, the fittest word appears to have been selected and employed at first, and the idea recurring, the orator seems to use it a second time as if he did not deign to go out of his way and vary the phrase, and would not, for the mere sake of changing it, use a less appropriate or choice expression.

In the next part of the passages which we are comparing, two instances occur of the orator's using the sentences originally made for one purpose, in such a manner as adapted them to a different state of things.

In the Chersonese Oration, the argument is, that Diopceithes must be supported in his predatory attack upon Thrace, both because it was justified by Philip's intrigues in the Chersonese, and his open assistance to the Cardians; and because, whatever thwarted his policy, furthered that of Athens. "All his operations," says Demosthenes, "and his enterprises, are enterprises against this country; and wheresoever any one attacks him, he attacks him in our defence." In the Fourth Philippic, this last member of the sentence is left out, because it evidently, though stating a general proposition, referred peculiarly to the movements of Diopceithes, which were no longer under discussion. Again, when the Chersonese Oration was delivered, Philip had not as yet taken many of the towns in Upper Thrace; and Demosthenes, in speaking of his campaign there, asks if any one can be so weak as to imagine that he would encounter the toils and the dangers of that winter campaign for the sake of such miserable places as Drongilus, Cabyle, Masteira, καὶ ἂ νῦν ἐξαίρετῇ καὶ κατασκευάζεται. When the Fourth Philippic, however, was delivered, he was believed to be in possession of all Thrace; therefore, this last expression is altered to καὶ ἂ νῦν φασὶν αὐτὸν ἔχειν. He also expands the fine period immediately following, in which he contrasts the importance of Athens with those wretched conquests, in order to demonstrate that Athens alone can be the real object of Philip's attack; and he introduces an apostrophe containing an invocation something like that which he had added to the earlier part of the passage—"Who can suppose that about Athens, her ports, and arsenals, an' navy, and precious mines, and ample revenues, her territory and her renown—which may neither he nor any other conqueror ever tear from our country!—he should be wholly indifferent, and suffer

* The addition is—καὶ τόπων, καὶ δόξης, ὧν μήτ' ἐκείνων, μητ' ἄλλων γίνονται μεθ' ἡμῶν, χερσαίαν τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἡμετέραν, κυριεύσαι.—*Orai. Græc.*, ed. Reiske, vol. i., p. 135.

you to keep quiet possession of them, while, for the millet and rye of the Thracian barns, he is content to bury himself in the winter of that dreary region.”*

The two passages in these two orations the most calculated to make a deep impression upon the audience, are bursts of eloquence not surpassed by any in the Philippics, and, with the exception of a single word, they are the same in each. In one of these passages, the orator appeals with the greatest skill to the people's sense of shame, and artfully rouses their feelings without offending their pride; insinuating, that if they wait for a still more pressing emergency, they will be yielding to the fear of personal violence, by which only slaves are actuated, instead of being moved by a sense of honour.† In the other passage, he appeals with the utmost dignity to the memory of their ancient renown, describing their incapacity to endure subjection, as the ground of Philip's implacable enmity. The effect of both passages, but of the last especially, upon an Athenian assembly, must have been prodigious—οἷδε γὰρ ἀκριβῶς, ὅτι δουλεύειν μὲν ὑμεῖς οὐτ' ἐθελήσετε, οὐτ', ἂν ἐθελήσητε, ἐπίστασθιν ἄρχειν γὰρ εἰώθατε.‡ Now, these three last words, which for dignity and conciseness may be compared with the celebrated ὥσπερ νέφος in the Oration on the Crown, had been used by him for the same purpose, only a few months before, in the hearing of the same assembly; who must all have well remembered them, often repeated them in the interval, much canvassed the merits of the passage, and thus have known that they were coming, as soon as the preceding sentence was begun.

In like manner, there is a repetition, word for word, in the Fourth Philippic, of a most splendid passage in the Chersonese Oration, which forms the continuation of the one we have been contemplating. It is the contrast which the citizens of other States present to

* Literally, “to winter in that dungeon”

† *Orat. Græc.*, ed. Reiske, vol. i., pp. 102, 138.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. i., pp. 104, 148.

the Athenians, in their treatment of traitors. He goes through many of those, indignantly and bitterly affirming that no one durst in *their* hearing have taken the common enemy's part; and he winds up the whole by taunting the traitors with the gains of the preferment to which their disaffection has led, while the country has sunk in proportion as they have risen. This suggests the favourite contrast of Philip's fortunes and their own. "He has become flourishing, and mighty, and formidable to all, both Greeks and Barbarians, while you are become destitute and low—splendid indeed in the abundance of your markets, but in every preparation of any value, utterly ridiculous."* The word "is," (ἔστι) instead of "has become," (γέγονεν) is really the only change made in this very striking passage, the winding up of which must have been foreseen by the audience as soon as the preceding long passage began to be pronounced by the orator. The Fourth Philippic has the peroration and the fine apostrophe to Aristodemus connected with this contrast by a remark, that those who have thus betrayed the country, mete out to her and to themselves a very different measure; recommending peace and quiet to her under injury, while they cannot be quiet though no one is attacking them. In the Chersonese Oration, where the passage respecting the conduct of the friends of submission and apathy occurs close to the peroration, as in the Fourth Philippic, it suggests and introduces the magnificent description of a wise and honest counsellor, contrasted with selfish time-servers, which has been ever so much and so justly admired. In the Fourth Philippic, the conduct of those advocates of Philip being exemplified, peculiarly in the instance of Aristodemus, leads the orator to

* Ὁ μὲν εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ Φίβει'ς πᾶσιν Ἕλλησι καὶ βασιλεύει γέγονεν, ὑμεῖς δ' ἔρημοι καὶ ταπεινοί, τῇ μὲν τῶν ὀνίων ἀρβονία λαμπροί, τῇ δ' ὧν προσήκει παρὰ σευ ἡ καταγίλαστος — *Orat. Græc.*, ed. Reiske, vol. i., p. 106.

that topic which continues till about the close of the whole.

In the Second Olynthiac, there is a very remarkable passage, in which the orator, who has, for the greater part of his discourse, been contending that the foundations of Philip's power are not solid, and has illustrated this position in various ways, comes to speak of the vices of his private life, and adds, that all these defects of his are for the present concealed and cast into the shade by the brilliancy of his successes; *ἐνπραξίαι δεινὰ συγκρύψαι καὶ συσκιᾶσαι τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνείδη*, says he, "if it be the pleasure of the Gods and of yourselves, they will be made to appear before long—for as in our bodies, when one is in good health, the peculiar flaws in the system do not show themselves; but if any malady comes on, then they are all stirred up,—fractures, sprains, and whatever else is faulty; so it is with states and sovereigns."* Now upon this it may be remarked, that it is the first rough sketch of the figure, and is liable to considerable objection; for the subject in hand was not Philip's private vices, but the concealed weakness of his dynasty. The vices are introduced as proof that his nature is rotten, and that his fortune will be evil (*γνώμης καὶ κακοδαιμονίας δείγματα*); but those vices are for the present covered by his successes; nevertheless they will break out when the tide of his fortune turns. Then the simile of the bodily defects is given to illustrate this tendency of misfortune to reveal secret profligacy—not to bring out concealed defects in political strength—and yet his application of the simile is to the structure of states. There must, therefore, be admitted both to be some confusion and some reasoning in a circle throughout the passage, although the simile, if clearly applied,

* "Ὅσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἡμῶν, τίως μὲν ἀν' ἡρώμενος ἢ τις, οὐδὲν ἰπαισθίνονται τῶν καθ' ἑκαστα σα' ῥῶν· ἰπᾶν δὲ ἀβρώστημά τι συμβῆ, πάντα κινῆται, καὶ ἐγγύς, καὶ στρέμμα, καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπερχόντωνσθέρων ἢ.
—*Orat. Græc.*, ed. Reiske, vol. i., p. 24.

would suit both purposes. In the Oration upon the Letter (sometimes called the Eleventh Philippic), the same figure is used, but with the most perfect precision. The alterations made in the structure of the passage are also remarkable.

The argument of the Oration on the Letter is, indeed, throughout, the same with that of the Second Olynthiac; namely, that the real power of Philip is much less formidable than it appears to be—and in pursuing this, he unavoidably falls upon the same topics, sometimes introducing sentences formerly used; but the difference is so considerable, in general, that one should say he might have composed the second speech without having the first under his eye. The contrast between the thirst for glory in Philip, and his people's desire of repose after suffering so much from the war, is finely given in both orations, though in different words, and variously wrought up. It reminds us of the similar topics so often used in the time of Napoleon, for the same purpose, and nearly in the same terms. Reference is also made in the latter Oration, to Philip's personal character; but the general attack on his private life is judiciously omitted; and one part is singled out, which is immediately connected with the argument, because it has a tendency to alienate from him his people, his allies, and his troops—this is his jealousy of all military merit but his own; which made him anxious to monopolize the whole glory of his wars. In the Olynthiac, the Orator had stated, on the authority of a Macedonian worthy of credit (*ὥς ἐγὼ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ γεγενημένων τινὸς ἥκουον, ἀνδρὸς οὐδαμῶς οἴου τε ψεύδεσθαι*), that his body-guard and the foreign troops in his service, though excellent and brave soldiers, are discouraged by his jealousy, which makes him turn his back on any of them who may have distinguished himself. In the Oration upon the letter, he treats this as a well known weakness in Philip's character, quite incontestable, and

avowed by all who approach his person, so that the chiefs who have gained victories are worse treated by him, than those who have sustained defeats. This is all he charges, in that oration, upon his personal character; and then he asks how it happens, that his followers should so long have remained faithful to such a chief. It is in answering this question that he introduces the passage formerly, that is nine years before, used in a somewhat different way in the Second Olynthiac. The words are the same with those which were cited above, substituting τὰς ἁμαρτίας for τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνειδῆ, the latter word clearly applying to the scandalous private life, just before described, but wholly omitted in the latter speech. He proceeds with the simile slightly changed. As it begins with συμβαίνει γὰρ instead of ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, the verb ἀρρώσθησι is used instead of the substantive ἀρρώστημα with συμβῆ, and instead of repeating σαθρὸν after σαθρῶν, as in the Olynthiac, μὴ τελέως ὑγιαῖνον is delicately substituted in the latter oration. There is a material difference too, in the application which follows the simile in the two speeches. In the Olynthiac, it was,—“In like manner, while the war is only carried on abroad, the defects of power in states and monarchies do not appear; but when it comes to the frontiers, then it brings all those faults out.” But in the latter oration it is,—“So in monarchies, and in all states, as long as war is successful, their vices are concealed from every eye; but as soon as a reverse occurs, which it is very likely he should now experience, since he has undertaken things above his strength, then all these embarrassments become manifest to every one.”* It is plain that this application is by no means such a departure from the form and gist of the simile introduced to illustrate a public though personal vice, and a plain source of political weakness, as was the applica-

* *Orat. Græc.*, ed. Reiske, vol. i., p. 156.

tion in the Olynthiac, where the simile had been introduced to illustrate the concealment of Philip's scandalous private life.

Nevertheless, the same figure was destined to be a third time used, and with far more perfect finish and elaboration, though not applied to Philip at all, nor indeed to national resources, nor any state affairs whatsoever, but to Æschines, and to his conduct and public character. In the great oration delivered seven years later, he launches out into a fierce invective against Æschines, distinguished by all the beauties of his fiery and rapid eloquence. Reproaching him with gaining by the misfortunes of his country, he exclaims, "You prove it by all your life, and all you do, and all you say, and all you do not say. Is there anything in agitation for the interest of the state? Æschines is mute. Does anything go wrong and disappoint our expectations? Forth comes Æschines—as old fractures and cramps break out the moment any malady attacks the body."* Beside the great improvement in the diction and in the more perfect application, it is remarkable how much more bold this simile is here, than in its original use on the two former occasions. There, it was less adventurously used to illustrate the breaking out of evils, weaknesses, or vices, to the public view, on any reverse or general blow befalling the state or the individual; here, it is really used in a very strong sense; for the meaning is, that Æschines himself resembles a disease of the state, and breaks out when once general misfortune or malady seizes the body politic.

The passage of which we have just been tracing the history and progress, is certainly one so remarkable,

* Δηλοῖς δὲ καὶ ἔξ ὧν ζῇς, καὶ ποιεῖς, καὶ πολιτεύῃ, καὶ πάλιν οὐ πολιτεύῃ. Πρώττεταί τι τῶν ὑμῶν δοκούντων συμφέρειν; ἄφρωνες Αἰσχίνης. ἀντίκρουσά τι καὶ γίγονεν, ἴσον οὐκ ἔδει; πάρεστιν Αἰσχίνης· ὥστε τὰ ῥήγματα καὶ τὰ σπᾶσματα, ὅταν τι κακὸν τὸ σῶμα λάβῃ, τότε κινεῖται.
—*Orat. Græc.*, ed. Reiske, vol. i., 29±.

that it must have been familiarly known among a people devoted to the enjoyment of public exhibitions, whether political or dramatic; and we may well suppose them to have been acquainted with it, as they were with the more striking passages in the writings of the Tragedians. The famous λέγεται τι καινόν in the first Philippic, is another instance of the same kind; and perhaps was the best known, because the most successful of all the bursts, alike happy and unexpected, in which the lesser orations abound, not to mention that it occurs in the speech in which he first declared war against Philip. Yet we have a repetition of the same burst in the Oration upon the Letter, only applied to that Letter, as well as to the general fact of a Macedonian making war upon Athens. Contrasting their own supineness with their enemy's activity, he exclaims,—“ But we, if you will have the truth told, doing absolutely nothing, sit down, always putting off, and proposing devices, and asking one another in the market-place, if there is anything new. And what can there be more new, than a man of Macedon overawing the Athenians, and daring to send us such letters as you have just heard read.” The two passages are as follows,—the diction being in several parts changed.

In the First Philippic, it is—“*Ἡ βούλεσθε, εἰπέ μοι, περιιόντες αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀγοράν· λέγεται τι καινόν; γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν τι καινότερον, ἢ Μακεδῶν ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίους καταπολεμῶν, καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διοικῶν;*” * In the Oration upon the Letter, it is—“*Ἡμεῖς δὲ (εἰρήσεται γὰρ τὰ ληθεῖς) οὐδὲν ποιοῦντες ἐνθάδε καθήμεθα, μέλλοντες αἰεὶ, καὶ ψηφίζομενοι, καὶ πυνθανόμενοι κατὰ τὴν ἀγοράν, εἴ τι λέγεται νεώτερον. Καίτοι, τί γένοιτ’ ἂν νεώτερον, ἢ Μακεδῶν ἀνὴρ καταφρονῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τολμῶν ἐπιστολὰς πέμπειν τοιαύτας, οἷας ἠκούσατε μικρῷ πρότερον;*” † It must be allowed that the original passage is the more spirited,

* *Orat. Græc.*, ed. Reiske, vol. i., p. 43.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 156.

and on the whole the finer of the two, and that the application of it to the receipt of the letter, in the latter oration, is somewhat flat, after the striking application on the former occasion. It is, however, redeemed by a fine burst which follows, and in which he contrasts the Athenian inaction with Philip's energy and valour—"enamoured with danger, his whole body covered with wounds"—the original idea of the more famous passage in the great Oration on the same subject.

It is worthy of remark, that the perorations, if by this we mean the very concluding sentences of all, in the Greek orations, are calm and tame, compared with the rest of their texture, and especially with their penultimate portions, which rise to the highest pitch of animation. There seems to have been a rule enjoined by the same severe taste which forbade any expression of passion in a statue, that the orator should close his speech in graceful repose. The same principle appears to have been extended to each highly impassioned portion of the discourse: the orator must, it should seem, always show that he was entirely master of himself, and never was run away with by the vehemence of the moment. It appears that the signal failure of Æschines in his great Oration (on the Crown) may be traced to this source. Certain it is, that, had he closed that noble performance before the last sentence, nothing ever was more magnificent than his peroration would have been. The idea is grand, simple, and striking—that of desiring his audience, when his antagonist shall call around him the accomplices of his crimes, to imagine they see surrounding the place he speaks from, all the mighty benefactors of their country—Solon, the wise lawgiver, and Aristides, the pure and disinterested statesman, beseeching the Athenians not to prefer the eloquence of Demosthenes to the laws or their oaths, or to crown him for treasons far greater than made those patriots of old banish for ever far lesser offenders; that they behold Themistocles, and all those who fell

at Marathon and Plataeæ—who never can endure him being honoured by the country who had conspired with the barbarians against Greece. The execution is as fine and majestic as the conception is noble. Every allusion to these ancient worthies is brought to bear on Demosthenes; every expression that is most sonorous, and yet most appropriate and most picturesque, is applied. The concluding sentence of all is bold, yet sustained in the loftiest flight of eloquence. Nothing prevented it from holding for ever the place which the celebrated oath in Demosthenes now holds at the head of all the triumphs of rhetoric, except that it was followed by this divine passage, to which its merit is little inferior, and to which it manifestly gave the hint; for the resemblance is close, in one place, to the very words—“Themistocles, and those who fell at Marathon, and those who fell at Plataeæ, and those tombs of your forefathers—think you not that they will send forth groans when you shall crown him who conspired with the barbarians against the Greeks?”* All this success, which would have been prodigious, was sacrificed apparently to the necessity of closing with a more ordinary and less elevated passage; nor would it have been sacrificed, if that closing passage had strictly followed the rule, and had not contained the absurd and even ludicrous words, invoking the sun, earth, and knowledge—for all the rest is merely tame and correct, like the usual perorations of the Greek orators.

To this rule of calm peroration, however, there are some sufficiently remarkable exceptions. That of Demosthenes’ great Oration is one, as if to show his rival that he could, contrary to the practice, introduce a highly-wrought invocation into the closing period,

* Θειστοκλίας δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι τιλιυτησάντας, καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς τάφους τῶν προγόνων, κ.τ.λ. In Demosthenes we have, τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνύσαντας τῶν προγόνων. καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παραπεταξαμένους, with an allusion immediately following, to their tombs.

and introduce it with vast effect. The Oration upon the Embassy likewise concludes with a most animated declamation. That upon the Liberty of Rhodes affords another instance of an impassioned peroration, and it is a repetition from the Oration upon the Administration of the Commonwealth (*περί Συντάξεως*)* where, in the middle of the speech, a passage is given, repeated in a great measure from the second Olynthiac,† but containing, in words nearly the same with the peroration of the Rhodian Oration,‡ a warning that the men of former times had not left the trophies of their victories as mere objects of fruitless wonder to posterity, but in order that they who gazed might emulate the virtues of those who erected them. This is added in the speech upon the Administration, not being found in the Olynthiac, and it is repeated from the former, in the Rhodian Oration. The date of the Oration upon the Commonwealth is uncertain: but it could not be long before that of the Rhodian speech, which was in the second year of the 107th Olympiad, the First Philippic having been only delivered the year before.

Instances, among others the last given, have been already noted, of the same figure or topic being employed to serve very different purposes, the adaptation being effected by an exceedingly slight alteration in the words. But others are not wanting where the same topic, and nearly in the same words, one or two only being changed, is used for the purpose of enforcing positions of diametrically opposite kinds. One of the most singular of these examples of inconsistency is to be found in the very splendid Oration against Aristocrates, composed, according to Plutarch, when the Orator was only twenty-eight years of age, and certainly delivered when he was only thirty, by Euthycles, for whom it was written. The object of it was to attack a decree denouncing outlawry against any person

* *Orat. Græc.*, ed. Reiske, vol. i., p. 174.

† *Ibid*, vol. i., p. 35.

‡ *Ibid*, vol. i., p. 201.

who should slay Charidemus, as a remuneration for the services of that foreign general. In the beautiful passage to which we are referring, the orator contrasts with this lavish distribution of public honours, nay, this invention of a new privilege, the slowness of their ancestors even to admit that individuals natives of their own country had the merit of saving the state, and the scanty reward which they deemed equivalent to any services a stranger could render. His argument is, that when foreigners had conferred the highest benefits on the state, they never were in return protected by such decrees as the one in favour of Charidemus, but obtained the rights of citizenship, which were not then prostituted, and therefore were deemed of high value; and he names two instances of this judicious system of rewards, in the cases of Menon and Perdiccas. Now, in the Oration upon the Administration of the Commonwealth, he is inveighing against the prostitution of public honours, and particularly that lavish distribution of the rights of citizenship; and he repeats, almost word for word, the passage which he had composed for Euthycles; only that he says their ancestors never thought of giving those rights of citizenship to Menon and Perdiccas, but only an exemption from tribute, deeming the title of citizen to be a reward far greater than any service could justify them in bestowing. In the Oration against Aristocrates, after describing the services rendered by Menon, he says: in return for these benefits, “our ancestors did not pass a decree of outlawry against any one who should attempt Menon’s life, ἀλλὰ πολιτείαν ἔδωσαν—and this honour they deemed an ample compensation.”* But, in the Oration upon the Commonwealth, after describing Menon’s services in the same words, he says, “οὐκ ἐψηφίσαντο πολιτείαν, ἀλλ’ ἀτέλειαν ἔδωκαν μόνον.”† Again, in the two orations, he describes Perdiccas’s services in the

* *Orat. Græc.*, edit. Reiske, vol. i., p. 687. † *Ibid*, vol. i., p. 173.

same words ; but in the one he says, our ancestors did not decree that whoever attempted his life should be outlawed, ἀλλὰ πολιτείαν ἔδωκαν μόνον ; and in the other he says, οὐκ ἐψηφίσαντο πολιτείαν, ἀλλ' ἀτέλειαν ἔδωκαν μόνον, and adds, that they withheld the πολιτεία, "because they deemed their country great, and venerable and glorious, and the privilege of bearing its name far above any stranger's deserts."* Both orations then proceed to complain, but in different language, of the manner in which that title had been prostituted.†

The ultimate judgment pronounced as it were by the orator upon his own compositions, and recorded in the changes which he made when repeating the same passage, has been already adverted to in general terms. It is not perhaps very surprising that we sometimes find this judgment at variance with that of the less refined and severe taste of modern critics. Thus, the Second Olynthiac contains a very well known and most justly admired description of the slippery foundation upon which ill-gotten power rests. If a translation of this be here attempted, it is certainly under a deep conviction how impracticable any approach, in our language, must be to the great original.

"When a confederacy rests upon union of sentiments, and all have one common interest in the war, men take a delight in sharing the same toils, in bearing the same burthens, and in persevering together to the end. But when, by aggression and intrigue, one party, like this Prince, has waxed powerful over the rest, the first pretext, the slightest reverse, shakes off

* It might have been supposed that, in the Oration against Aristocrates, πολιτεία had, by an error, crept into the MSS. instead of ἀτέλεια ; but, beside that the expression ἰκανὴ τιμὴ applied to the reward the first time it is mentioned, would not be justly descriptive of the merely pecuniary exemption in which the ἀτέλεια consisted ; the second instance, that of Perdicas, is immediately followed by the reason, namely, that the τὸ γένεσθαι πολίτας καὶ ὅμῳ was always held a sufficient honour to call forth any services.

† *Edinburgh Review*, vol. xxxvi., pp. 97, 98.

the yoke, and it is gone! For it is not, O men of Athens, it is not in nature, that stability should be given to power by oppression, and falsehood, and perjury. Dominion may for once be thus obtained: it may even endure for a season; and, by the favour of fortune, may present to men's hopes a flourishing aspect; but time will search it, and of itself it must crumble in pieces. For as the lower part of buildings and vessels, and all such structures, should be the most solid, so ought the motives and principles of our actions to be founded in justice and in truth." 11416.

Of this noble passage nearly the whole is repeated in the Oration on the Letter, but with remarkable variations. Instead of *πονηρία*, which perhaps rather describes active, meddling, mischief-making intrigues, than cunning and crafty ones, *ἀπάτη καὶ βία* are used, as better describing force and fraud; and *ἀπειθουλῇ* (treachery) is added to *πλεονεξία*, the *πονηρία* being now dropped to avoid the alliteration. Then the *ἀνεχαίτισε*, which some critics had so much commended, though, be it observed in passing, with considerable discrepancy as to its precise meaning, is wholly left out. It had been taken by its chief admirers as a figure borrowed from a horse shaking off some burthen of which he is impatient. Reiske, a high authority, explains it by the rubbing of an animal's hair in the wrong direction, *i. e.*, from tail to head, and also by the effect of fear in erecting the hairs. Constantine renders it, when neuter, by "*mordere frenum ut equus erectis auribus*," in which Henry Stephens agrees. Hesychius (*cit. Ulpian.*) gives a sense similar to the one in our translation, and the expression is certainly picturesque and striking. Nevertheless, so thought not Demosthenes; for in the repetition he entirely omits the word, and substitutes for it *δίσσεισε*, "*shook to pieces*," or "*shivered*"—a powerful word, but one which is much less figurative than *ἀναχαίτιζω*. The translation of the passage, as ultimately amended and

elaborated by its great author, will therefore stand thus—"When intrigue and ambition have created the dynasty, as his have done, by craft and by violence, the slightest pretext, the most common mischief, shivers it in a moment, and it is gone!"

The examination into which we have entered, though minute, is not more so than was necessary to show the extreme care of composition which guided the workmanship of the Greek orators; to prove that they delivered their orations as finished productions, with the view of satisfying a critical audience; and to illustrate the position, that the audience flocked to hear them, as well for the pleasure of the treat thus afforded to their refined taste, as for the more useful purpose of hearing state affairs practically discussed. There are, however, not wanting circumstances of External Evidence, which prove the same positions as to the pains bestowed upon ancient compositions, and the highly artificial nature of Greek and Latin oratory.

II.—1. The number of speeches written, published, and preserved, and which yet never were spoken, is among the most remarkable of these proofs. Nothing can more strikingly illustrate the difference between Ancient and Modern Rhetoric. With us, a speech written at all before delivery, is regarded as something anomalous, and almost ridiculous; because, the proofs of preparation being inconsistent with the inspiration of the moment and the feelings under which the orator is always supposed to speak, we naturally enough feel that it should be carefully concealed from the eye of the audience, and that their being admitted as it were behind the scenes, at once dispels the illusion so necessary to be kept up. But a speech, written and published, which never was spoken at all, is with us at once given over to extreme ridicule; and a speech intended to have been spoken, is a kind of by-word for something laughable in itself, as describing an incon-

gruous existence. So entirely different was it of old, that five of the seven orations of Cicero against Verres, were never spoken; that the finest of all his orations, the second Philippic against Marc Antony, was never delivered at all;* nay, was composed apparently without the least intention of being spoken; and there are doubts if his next best,† that for Milo, was spoken; it having certainly never been heard by the audience. Yet these orations, both the introduction to the Defence of Milo, and the Philippic in many passages, contain direct references to what could only be known by the speaker when he actually was in the Rostrum; as the alarm occasioned by the crowd of armed men that filled the forum, the attentive demeanour of the audience, and the effect produced on the adversary by the delivery of the preceding passages. Had the orations been delivered, these things might easily have been added before publication; but they were put in at random, on the speculation of something happening to bear them out, in the speech for Milo, which was intended to be spoken; and they were pure fictions with no reference whatever to the fact, in the Speech against Antony, which was composed without any view to being delivered at all. It must be admitted that nothing can possibly be more artificial than a composition purporting to be a speech actually delivered on a particular day, which yet never was intended to be delivered on any day, which yet contains allusions to that particular day as bearing upon the argument, and which not only asserts that certain things spoken must make the object of vituperation feel as if he were torn in pieces, but actually affirms that he is at the moment

* *Epp. ad. Atticum*, lib. xvi., ep. 11.

† The anecdote of Milo, when he read it at Marseilles, jocosely and most unbecomingly remarking, that had it been delivered, he never would have been eating those excellent oysters, is well known; but it is not decisive; and is applicable either to the speech never having been delivered, or not having been heard.

growing pale with fear, and in a state of perspiration.*

The Greek orators have not left us more than one or two examples of the same kind; or if they have, we are too imperfectly acquainted with the history of the speeches, to know whether or not any of them were written only and not spoken. One is Demosthenes' Oration against Midias, who, having given him a blow in the theatre while filling a public office connected with religious rites, was adjudged by the assembly of the people guilty of impiety, and the question was to come before the judges, what fine or damages he should pay. The Orator's speech, and one of his finest, was composed for this occasion; but Æschines openly charges him with having compromised the matter before the argument.† The same fact is stated by Plutarch, but probably from Æschines.‡ This, then, as a speech, was never spoken, but it was composed with the full intention of being delivered. Of orations like the Second Philippic, never intended to be spoken, yet composed in all the form of speeches, we have no instances, at least none that we know of, unless it be the two speeches of Isocrates, one to Philip, and the other by Archidamus, which are professedly fictitious, and rather pamphlets than orations. But we have an instance of much the same description with the Latin unspoken orations, in the speeches written by one person for the purpose of being delivered by another. Thus the Oration against Aristocrates, was written to

* "Hunc unum diem, hunc unum, inquam, hodiernum diem." "Hæc te lacerat, hæc cruentat oratio." "Apparet esse commotum: sudat—pallet—quidlibet, modo ne nauseet, faciat."—Phil ii.

† Κατὰ Κρησιδῶντος. When he says that Demosthenes received thirty minæ for the injury, and for the vote of the people which he had obtained against Midias, he means plainly that the first judgment only had been given, and that the other respecting ἀπερίμνησις, or assessment of fine, remained to be given.

‡ It must be mentioned that Plutarch says it was uncertain whether the Oration of Demosthenes on the Embassy ever was delivered.

be delivered by Euthycles; that against Androtion was composed for and spoken by Diodorous; that against Timocrates also for a person of the name of Diodorous; the two against Aristogeiton (which, however, are supposed to be spurious), for Ariston; leaving only the Oration against Leptines's law, in which Demosthenes seconded Ctesippus, delivered by himself; to say nothing of all the Ἰδιωτικοί, or speeches on Private Causes, which, by the rules of procedure at Athens, must all have been delivered by the parties themselves, the orators writing them, unless where leave was obtained from the Court for a professional orator to follow, support, or second them (συναγορεύειν); so that of the thirty-three Private Orations of Demosthenes, only the five in which he was himself the party, that is, three against Aphobus, and two against Onetor, were delivered by the author. Thus, again, all Isæus's orations were written in the name of the parties, and to be delivered by them. Isocrates, too, is known never to have attempted speaking after his first failure: all his orations, therefore, were written without a view to being spoken by himself.

II.—2. Akin to this, of speeches composed and not delivered by the author, nor ever intended to be delivered at all, is the other fact well known to students of antiquity, that there remain compositions of the greatest of Orators, which were prepared apparently without any subject; we refer to the Προόμια of Demosthenes, of which no less than fifty-six have reached us; and of these only three or four seem to have any connection with any speeches ever made by him. Respecting these Proœmia, there has been some difference among the critics, and an opinion has been started, that they were only parts of speeches which he intended to make, but had not time to compose, except the introductory portion, which, for the purpose of their argument, these critics assume to be the most difficult part. But indepen-

dently of the gratuitous, and indeed erroneous nature of this assumption, the texture of these compositions does not bear out the theory, nor is it consistent with the probabilities of the case. For, *first*, With the exception of a very few, these Introductions are all as general and vague, and bear as little relation to any real question, as Sallust's introductions to his two histories.

Secondly, Some of the Introductions are word for word the same with the Introductions to orations actually pronounced. Of this description are those of the Rhodian Oration, which is the same with the twenty-sixth Proœmium; and the Oration on the Synnoriae, the same with the sixth Proœmium. Why then should these Introductions be preserved among the rest which are not found in any speeches delivered, unless the fact were, that those had been in the collection of ready-made Introductions, and had been used when wanted, but that the others had not?

Thirdly, The Exordium of the Megalopolitan Oration is word for word the same as the seventh in the collection; but it is not in general like the greater number of the Proœmia; being manifestly made for the speech, to the subject of which it particularly relates. It should seem, therefore, that it had found its way by accident among the others. The like may be said of the twenty-third, which relates to the subject of the Rhodian Oration, and was probably composed and intended to be used as the Introduction to that speech, but laid aside, the other and twenty-sixth ready-made one being preferred to it.

Fourthly, The Exordium of the First Philippic agrees in most essential particulars with the beginning of the first in the collection; but above one-half of the latter is wholly omitted in the Exordium of the real oration; only a part of it is, in substance, though in different words, afterwards introduced into the latter part of the speech. Now, whoever shall read this first Proœmium,

will at once perceive that the first few sentences are so general, as to be capable of being used for almost any speech delivered at any time; and that the rest consists of topics which might be used at any time when affairs were going on badly. It is quite plain, then, that this Exordium was intended for pretty general use, and that part of it was used as an Exordium, part introduced in the course of the oration, and the rest never used at all.

Fifthly, It seems contrary to all probability, that there should have been lost no less than fifty-two orations; and equally so, that Demosthenes should have delivered so many without preparing more than the Exordium—yet unless the collection were of ready-made Introductions, one or the other of these things must be supposed.

Lastly, It seems clear, that although by far the greater number of these compositions are intended for Exordiums, some are not—but rather striking passages which had occurred to the orator, either as relating to particular subjects on which he might afterwards compose orations, or as passages not relating to any particular subject, and which might be of general use. The collection, however, is a very remarkable illustration of the extremely artificial texture of the Greek orations, and of the vast pains bestowed upon their compositions by the Attic orators.

The Roman orators furnish us with instances of a similar description. Cicero had a *Liber Exordiorum* also, as we learn from the pleasant anecdote which occurs in his Epistles. He had, it seems, by mistake, sent to Atticus, as the Exordium of his treatise, *De Gloria*, the introduction to the third book of the Academic Questions; and when, in reading the Academics on his voyage to Vibo, he found how he had defrauded his friend of an Exordium—Cicero bids him cancel it and prefix another, which he sends, whether newly made, or from his collection of ready-made

Introductions, does not quite clearly appear. “Id evenit (says he) ob eam rem, quod habeo volumen proœmiorum. Ex eo eligere soleo, cum aliquod σύγγραμμα institui. Itaque jam in Tusculano, qui non meminissem me abusum isto proœmio, conieci id in eum librum quem tibi misi. Cum autem in navi legerem Academicos, agnovi erratum meum. Itaque statim novum proœmium exaravi; tibi misi. Tu illud desecabis, hoc agglutinabis.”* It is clear that such introductions could have no possible connection with the subject-matter, but might, like Sallust’s preliminary chapters on human nature, have suited any one work as well as another.

II.—3. The testimony of ancient historians and other writers, shows us how vast the pains were, and how various, and how unremitting, which the Orators, and indeed all writers, took in elaborating their compositions. Demosthenes especially is well known to have been invincibly averse to extemporaneous speaking. Plutarch relates of him, that he could hardly ever be induced to speak off hand, however often called upon in public assemblies.† He never would trust his “success to fortune,”—that is, to the inspiration of the moment; and some have surmised, not without appearance of truth, that his well known failure before Philip, of which so lively a description has been given by Æschines in his great Oration, was owing to the want of preparation under which he then laboured. An anecdote is related of him, that when Pytheas taunted him with “his speeches smelling of the lamp,” his answer was, “True, but your lamp and mine do not give their perfume to the same labours.” He also was in the habit of defending such preparations by asserting that it evinced more respect for the people, and was

* *Fpp. ad Atticum*, lib. xvi., ep. 6.

† The friends of Monti will here not fail to recollect that great poet’s invincible repugnance to extempore versification.

therefore more becoming a good citizen in a democratic state. Pericles, whom he so greatly admired, had the same aversion to extempore speaking. It is nevertheless recorded of Demosthenes, that when, upon some rare occasions, he trusted to the feeling of the hour, and spoke off-hand, his eloquence was more spirited and bold, and he seemed sometimes to speak "as from a supernatural impulse." The care which Plato took of his diction is equally well known. His copiousness has been the subject of much admiration, and extolled as a kind of natural faculty. "Non hominis ingenio, sed quodam Delphico oraculo instinctus," says Quintilian,* as if he poured forth the flood of his eloquence by a kind of inspiration. Excelling all men, "eloquendi quâdam facultate divinâ," says Cicero.† Nor can any of the littleness, the minuter and miniature ornaments, like the execution of some pictures of the Flemish school, be ascribed to him of whose style it was said, that had the Father of the Gods spoken in Greek, he would have used none other language than Plato's. Nevertheless, we know how exquisitely his diction was wrought, of which the first of ancient critics had said, that it resembled a piece of sculpture or chasing, rather than written composition; — οὐ γραπτοῖς ἀλλὰ γλυπτοῖς καὶ τορευτοῖς εἰκότας λόγους.‡ He continued correcting, and new-moulding, and refining his language to his eightieth year; and after his decease, a note-book was found, in which he had written the first words of his treatise on Government several times over, in different arrangements. The words are, Κατίβην χθες εἰς Πειραιᾷ μετὰ Γλαυκῶνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος. "I went down yesterday to the Piræus with Glaucon the son of Ariston."§ Others relate the circumstance as if all the changes were made on the first four words, which indeed appears to be

* Lib. x., cap. 1, § 81.

† Orat.

‡ Dion. Halicarn. *De Struct.*, Orat. § 25.

§ Dion. Halicarn. *De Struct.*, Orat. § 25.

most probable when we attend to the meaning of the four last.

II.—4. All the accounts which have reached us of the course of training and study which the ancient orators went through previous to venturing upon the formidable scene of rhetorical display, and even after they had begun their career of eloquence, afford additional proofs of the extreme care bestowed upon their art. Demosthenes is supposed to have studied under Plato. “*Lectitavisse Platonem studiose, audivisse etiam Demosthenes dicitur,—idque apparet ex genere et granditate verborum.*”* Plutarch quotes Hermippus for the statement, that he received Isocrates’s rhetorical system from a Syracusan of the name of Callias, and other scholars of that orator, and profited by the study of them.† The pains which he took to cure or subdue his natural defects of voice and utterance, are well known. But he also applied himself diligently to rhetoric under Isæus, the most famous advocate of the day. It is also recorded of him, that he wrote out the whole of Thucydides eight times with his own hand, to impress the vigorous and impressive style of that great historian on his memory; and that he could repeat his works by heart. His study of delivery under the comedian Satyrus is well known;‡ and he is said also to have taken lessons from another actor, named Andronicus.§

Cicero took equal pains in acquiring his art, nor ceased to learn after he had taken his place in the Forum, and even on the Bench. He accustomed himself to translate into Latin the works of the Greek orators, in which exercise he said he resolved “*ut non solum optimis verbis uterer, et tamen usitatis, sed etiam exprimerem quædam verba imitando, quæ nova nostris*

* *Cic. Brut.*, 121.

† *Plut. in Vit. Dem.*

‡ *In Vit. Dem.*

§ *Quint.*, xi. 3, § 7.

essent, dummodo essent idonea.”* Nor did he confine himself to the orators; for Quintilian informs us that he published Latin translations of Plato and Xenophon.† When Molo, the rhetorician of Rhodes, came to Rome, Cicero hastened to study under him. He daily practised declamation, chiefly in Greek, and obtained such readiness in the use of the noblest of all languages, that when he delivered a speech in it before the same Greek rhetorician, upon visiting Rhodes, it is related that the Grecian expressed his sorrow at finding that Rome was now stripping of oratorical fame the country which her arms had in all other respects already subdued. Even after he had distinguished himself at the Bar, he spent some time in Greece, and there attended the Schools of Oratory, again studying under Molo, who had before been his master at Rome. It is well known that, far from being satisfied with his success, which was great, or from deeming, because of it, that he had fallen upon the best style of oratory, his study of the Asian style when he visited Greece, induced him materially to alter his own. The severity with which he, at a maturer age, judged some of the most successful passages of his brilliant orations is well known; and all their success, had his judgment been less severe, and his self-complacency greater, might not have perpetuated his name among orators, any more than the memory of all the principal orators of Quintilian’s age has been preserved, whose very names would have perished but for his once mentioning them, and one only in particular, Trachallus, eulogized by that great critic, and never more heard of.‡ Nay, long after his return to Rome, while actually exercising the high office of Prætor, he frequented the school of Gniphio, a celebrated Rhetorician of that day;§ and while in full practice at the Bar, he continued the habit of declaiming upon supposed questions (*theses*), as if he had been

* *Cic. de Orat.*, i. 34.

† *Quint.*, xii. 5, § 5.

‡ *Lib.* x. 5, § 2.

§ *Sueton. De Ill. Gram.*, cap. 7.

a young student. He is also known to have studied delivery under Roscius and Æsopus, two actors,—the former in comedy, the latter in tragedy.

It is further certain that the ancient orators gave lessons, even the most celebrated of them. Mention has already been made of Molo, Gniphio, and other professors of Rhetoric. But Isocrates, Isæus, and Demosthenes himself, taught their art to those who would excel in forensic pursuits. Isocrates is said to have received twenty pounds from his pupils; but Isæus and Demosthenes, two hundred,—a convincing proof how great a value was set in those times upon the accomplishment of oratory; but a proof also how differently a studious devotion to it was then viewed; for assuredly it would be in the last degree perilous to any modern speaker's success in public, were he to teach rhetoric while he continued to practise it.

II.—5. Nor is it foreign to our present inquiry to remark, that the exquisite taste of the Athenian audience both proved their delight in the pleasures of the Forum, or Ecclesia, so to speak, and showed how well they were trained to a nice discernment of oratorical merit. It may be remarked generally, that a speaker who thinks to lower his composition in order to accommodate himself to the habits and taste of his audience, when addressing the multitude, will find that he commits a grievous mistake. All the highest powers of eloquence consist in producing passages which may at once affect even the most promiscuous assembly; but even the graces of composition are not thrown away upon such auditors. Clear, strong, terse, yet natural and not strained expressions; happy antitheses; apt comparisons; forms of speech that are natural without being obvious; harmonious periods, yet various, spirited, and never monotonous or too regularly balanced;—these are what will be always sure to captivate every audience, and yet in these mainly consists finished, and

elaborate, and felicitous diction. “Mirabile est,” says Cicero, “cum plurimum in faciendo intersit inter doctum et rudem, quam non multum differat in iudicando.”* The best speakers of all times have never failed to find, that they could not speak too well and too carefully to a popular assembly; that if they spoke their best, the best they could address to the most learned and critical assembly, they were sure to succeed; although it may be very true that the converse of the proposition is not equally well founded; for bad diction and false taste will not be so sure to obtain their merited reprobation from a promiscuous auditory. The delight with which certain passages were listened to by the Roman audience, has been recorded by ancient critics and rhetoricians. Two sentences spoken or recorded by Cicero, the one by its fine and dignified composition, the other by its rhythm, are said to have produced an electrical effect; and yet, when we attend to them, we perceive that this could only be in consequence of the very exquisite taste of the audience. The former was his description of Verres: “Stetit soleatus Prætor Populi Romani, cum pallio purpureo, tunicaque talari, mulierculâ nixus, in littore.” The other is given by him as spoken by Carbo:† “Patris dictum sapiens, temeritas filii comprobavit.” But the nicety of the Attic taste seems to have been still more remarkable. It is related of Theophrastus, who had lived many years at Athens, had acquired great fame in eloquence, and valued himself extremely on the purity of his Attic style, that he was much mortified by an old woman, with whom he was cheapening some wares at a stall, detecting his foreign origin, and addressing him, ὦ ξένη. Nor could she give any other reason for it than a word he had used which seemed rather affectedly Attic.‡

There may be added two other peculiarities to

* *De Orat.*, iii. 51.

† *Cic. Orat.*, 63.

‡ Both Cicero (*Brutus*, 46) and Quintilian (viii. 1) mention this anecdote; but the latter alone gives the ground of the old woman's conjecture.

complete the picture of that attention to oratorical composition, and that refinement in the audience which we have been contemplating, and to illustrate the difference in this respect between ancient and modern eloquence. Any merely critical remarks in a modern speech are hardly permitted. It is not a charge which can now-a-days be made against an adversary either at the Bar or in debate, that he has made a bad speech, that his eloquence is defective, that his figures are out of keeping, his tones inharmonious, or his manner awkward. Yet these are topics of ordinary recrimination and abuse between Demosthenes and Æschines. To have argued inconclusively, to counsel badly, to act corruptly, or feebly, or inconsistently, are the charges to which the combatants in the more close and business-like battles of our Senate must confine themselves. With us it is no matter of attack that an adversary's tropes are in bad taste, or his manner inelegant, or his voice unmusical. So we may perceive the exquisite care taken by the ancient orators to strike and to please their audience, in the attention paid by them to the rhythm or numbers of their periods. In the ancient institutes of Rhetoric, that subject forms a separate and important head, which, or even the mention of which, would scarcely be borne among us. It must at the same time be observed, that although we are so suspicious of whatever would give an appearance of theatrical display to the business of debate, our greatest orators nevertheless have excelled by a careful attention to rhythm, and some of the finest passages of modern eloquence owe their unparalleled success undeniably to the adoption of those Iambic measures which thrilled and delighted the Roman Forum, and the Dactylus and Pæonicus, which were the luxury of the Attic Ecclesia.* Witness the

* Examples of this artificial composition occur in every page of the old Orators. See particularly, the famous climax of Demosthenes, in the Oration on the Crown, Appendix, No. V.; and the quotation from the Argument of Cicero *Pro Milone*, Appendix, No. VII.

former in Mr. Erskine's celebrated passage respecting the Indian chief, and the latter in Mr. Grattan's peroration to his speech on Irish independence.*

That the ancients, and particularly the Attic school, were sparing of the more elaborate ornaments of eloquence, figures, is certain; unless indeed we regard as such, enumeration, repetition, antithesis, interrogation, and the other forms of condensed and vigorous expression, which are not to be reckoned tropes at all. But with metaphor, hyperbole, apostrophe, they certainly did not overload their oratory. It is nevertheless quite untrue that Demosthenes has so few as some have represented, although undoubtedly he produces a prodigious effect, enlivens his discourse, awakens and sustains the ready attention, in short, is striking and brilliant, with fewer than would have sufficed to any other man. There are preserved to us three orations supposed to be of Pericles; and Thucydides, who has recorded them, certainly represents himself to have heard generally, the words which he sets down in his history, as well as to have examined the evidence of the facts. The most admired of these speeches is the *Ἐπιτάφιος λόγος*, the Funeral Oration. Its style is unquestionably chaste and noble; it is of a touching simplicity, and from the judicious choice of the topics, as well as their skilful disposition and treatment, the effect must have been great of such an address: it is of a sustained and perfect dignity; indeed its solemnity seems peculiarly suited to the occasion. But notwithstanding the moving nature of that occasion, and although in the epideictic branch of oratory, more figurative display might have been expected than in the ordinary harangues of the Ecclesia, there can be found hardly any tropes at all in the whole compass of the Speech. Only one passage, properly speaking, can be called figurative, — that

* Appendix, No. I.

beautiful one where he says that illustrious men have the whole earth for their tomb.* It may, however, be remarked, that Aristotle mentions another as having been in the oration,—a comparison of the loss occasioned by war to the act of him who should take the Spring out of the year.† But in Thucydides' version no such passage is to be found.

It is impossible to deny that the ancient Orators fall nearly as far short of the modern in the substance of their orations as they surpass them in their composition. Not only were their views far less enlarged, which was the necessary consequence of their more confined knowledge, but they gave much less information to their audience in point of fact, and they applied themselves less strenuously to argument. The assemblies of modern times are eminently places of business; the hearers are met to consider of certain practical questions, and not to have their fancy charmed with choice figures, or their taste gratified with exquisite diction, or their ears tickled with harmonious numbers. They must therefore be convinced; their reason must be addressed by statements which shall prove that the thing propounded is just or expedient, or that it is iniquitous or impolitic. No far-fetched allusions, or vague talk, or pretty conceits, will supply the place of the one thing needful, argument and information. Whatever is beside the question, how gracefully soever it may be said, will only weary the hearer and provoke his impatience; nay, if it be very fine and very far-fetched, will excite his merriment and cover the speaker with ridicule. Ornament of every kind, all manner of embellishment, must be kept within its subordinate

* Ἄνδρῶν γὰρ ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος, καὶ οὐ στηλῶν μόνον ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ σημαίνει ἐπιγραφὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ μὴ προσηκούσῃ ἀγροφῷ: μνημὴ παρ' ἐκαστῷ τῆς γνώμης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ἔργου ἐνδυνάμυνται.—*Thuc.*, ii. 43.

† Τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἠφάνισθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥστε εἴ τις τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἵναι τοῦ ἐξέλαι.—*Arist. Rhet.*, i. 7, iii. 10. Herodotus (vii. 162) puts this figure in the mouth of Gelon.

bounds, and made subservient merely to the main business. It is certain that no perfection of execution, no beauty of workmanship, can make up for the cardinal defect of the material being out of its place, that is, indifferent to the question; and one of the most exquisitely composed of Cicero's orations, the one for Archias, could clearly never have been delivered in any English Court of Justice, where the party was upon his defence against an attempt to treat him as an Alien; though perhaps some of it might have been urged in favour of a relaxation of the law, after his Alienage had been proved, and the whole of it might have been relished by a meeting assembled to do him honour. In fact, not above one-sixth part of the Speech has any bearing whatever upon the question, which was on the construction of a particular law. It is true that Cicero himself appears to be aware how widely he was wandering from the question; for he asks leave to dwell upon literary topics as something unusual in the Forum; but still the argument on the case is wanting, and the dissertation on letters is put in its place. So, when he defends Publius Sextus from a charge of riot, grounded on a special law, of the fifty-six pages which compose the oration, not four are at all to the point in dispute.

It is, however, a great mistake to suppose that Cicero is generally vague and declamatory, or even that he is less argumentative than the generality of the ancient orators. His speech for Milo, and all that remains of his speeches against the Agrarian Law, are fully as much so as any of Demosthenes' most celebrated orations. But in all his judicial Speeches there are considerable portions which consist of matters so foreign to the question, or of arguments so puerile, that they could never be addressed to modern courts; and although the same remark cannot be applied so universally to his political Orations, the declamation of which might be used in our days, yet even in these,

when he reasons, there are almost always portions which could not be made part of a modern speech intended to be argumentative. Thus, among his judicial speeches, that for Cornelius Balbus is as argumentative as any; yet there is about a third part of it composed of panegyric upon Pompey, and other extraneous topics, and of such reasoning as this—that it was not very likely so eminent and experienced a leader as Pompey should have misinterpreted the footing upon which Gades stood, the whole question being, whether a naturalization law had ever been extended to the Gaditani, in favour of one of whom Pompey had exercised the powers of that law. But the defence of Milo is not within the scope of this remark. That truly admirable oration is from first to last closely addressed to the point in issue. It is all either argument to prove that from every circumstance in the case the presumption is that Clodius was the aggressor, or invective against Clodius. A topic is indeed handled of extreme delicacy, and full of danger to the cause,—the vast service rendered to the state, and even to the world at large, by Milo, in putting to death the common enemy, the foe to the peace of society. Nor can all the pains taken to show that Milo had only been enabled to confer this benefit upon mankind, by Clodius making the attack upon him, and that but for this fortunate circumstance he never could have touched him, enable the speaker to escape the conclusion which the audience were sure to draw against the party accused, from such a line of defence. But Cicero probably knew that he addressed judges, not of the Clodian faction, or rather judges among whom the sentiments of the opposite party were prevalent; at any rate, this topic was clearly connected with the question, and though a perilous line of reasoning, it was one which bore immediately upon the subject, and was thus argumentative throughout. There are parts of the speech too, which, for soundness and

clearness of reasoning, may challenge a comparison with any piece of argument in the whole compass of ancient and modern oratory.*

It is a common thing with those who, because Cicero is more ornate, suffers the artifice of his composition to appear more plainly, and indulges more in amplification, imagine that he is less argumentative than the Greek orators, to represent the latter, and especially Demosthenes, as distinguished by great closeness of reasoning. If by this is only meant that he never wanders from the subject, that each remark tells upon the matter in hand, that all his illustrations are brought to bear upon the point, and that he is never found making any step in any direction, which does not advance his main object, and lead towards the conclusion to which he is striving to bring his hearers—the observation is perfectly just; for this is a distinguishing feature in the character of his eloquence. It is not, indeed, his grand excellence, because everything depends upon the manner in which he pursues this course, the course itself being one quite as open to the humblest mediocrity as to the highest genius. But if it is meant to be said that those Attic orators, and especially their great chief, made speeches in which long chains of elaborate reasoning are to be found—nothing can be less like the truth. A variety of topics are handled in succession, all calculated to strike the audience. Passions which predominated in their minds are appealed to—feelings easily excited among them are aroused by skilful allusions—glaring inconsistencies are shown in the advice given by others—sometimes by exhibiting the repugnance of those counsels among themselves, sometimes by contrasting them with other counsels proceeding from the same quarters. The pernicious tendency of certain measures is displayed by referring, sometimes to the general prin-

* Appendix, No. VII.

ciples of human action, and the course which human affairs usually take; more frequently, by a reference to the history of past, and generally of very recent events. Much invective is mixed with these topics, and both the enemy without, and the evil counsellor within the walls, are very unsparingly dealt with. The orator was addressing hearers who were for the most part as intimately acquainted as himself with all the facts of the case, and these lay within a sufficiently narrow compass, being the actual state of public affairs, and the victories or the defeats which had, within the memory of all, attended their arms, or the transactions which had taken place among them in very recent times. No detailed statements were therefore wanted for their information. He was really speaking to them respecting their own affairs, or rather respecting what they had just been doing or witnessing themselves. Hence a very short allusion alone was generally required to raise the idea which he desired to present before his audience. Sometimes a word was enough for his purpose; the naming of a man or a town; the calling to their recollection what had been done by the one, or had happened to the other. The effect produced by such a rapid interchange of ideas and impressions, must have struck every one who has been present at public meetings. He will have remarked that some such apt allusion has a power—produces an electrical effect—not to be reached by any chain of reasoning, however close, and that even the most highly-wrought passages, and the most exquisite composition, fall far short of it in rousing or controlling the minds of a large assembly. Chains of reasoning, examples of fine argumentation, are calculated to produce their effect upon a far nicer, a more confined, and a more select audience. But such apposite allusions—such appropriate topics—such happy hits (to use a homely but expressive phrase), have a sure, an irresistible, a magical effect upon a popular assembly. In

these the Greek oratory abounds, and above all, its greatest Master abounds in them more than all the lesser rhetoricians. They would have been highly successful without the charms of composition; but he also clothes them in the most choice language, arranges them in the most perfect order, and captivates the ear with a music which is fitted at his will to provoke or to soothe, but ever to charm the sense, even were it possible for it to be addressed apart, without the mind too being moved.

Let any one examine the kind of topics upon which those orators dwell, and he will be convinced that close reasoning was not their object—that they were adapting their discourse to the nature of their audience—and that indeed not a few of their topics were such as they would hardly have thought of using, had they been arguing the matter stringently with an antagonist, “hand to hand, and foot to foot;” or, which is the same thing, preparing a demonstration to meet the eye of an unexcited reader. It is certain that some of Demosthenes’ chief topics are exactly those which he would use to convince the calm reason of the most undisturbed listener or reader—such as the dangers of inaction—the formidable, because able and venturous, enemy they had to contend with—the certainty of the peril which is met by procrastination becoming greater after the unprofitable delay. These, however, are the most obvious considerations, and on these he dwells the less because of their being so obvious. But the more striking allusions and illustrations by which he enforces them, are not always such as would bear close examination if considered as arguments, although they are always such as must, in the popular assembly to which he addressed them, have wrought a wondrous effect. Let us take a few instances.

It is a frequent topic with the Orator, that the advisers of peace and quiet while the country is insulted and injured by the common enemy can never

themselves be at rest, though no one is doing them any wrong—"οὐδενὸς ἀδικούντος"—and on one occasion he makes a special application of this topic to Aristodemus, one of the leaders of the Macedonian party. Now, though nothing could be better calculated to succeed as a taunt or personal attack, something (it cannot surely be called some argument) *ad hominem*—it is as certain that no reasoning is involved in such an appeal, and that it does not go beyond a sneer or fling, without any tendency to advance the argument. For surely Aristodemus and others might be quite consistent in pursuing the objects of their personal ambition, and yet conscientiously recommending a pacific policy; nay, in dividing, and even vexing, the public councils with their advice to hold by that peaceful course. The total difference of the two cases—those of the individuals and of the states—is too manifest to escape any calm hearer or sober-minded reader. Again, we have the fate of towns and individuals who had been seduced by Philip and betrayed to him, painted in many passages, and in some of the most striking of all, as a warning to Athens, *e. g.*, in the Third Philippic, δουλευούσιν γε μαστιγούμενοι καὶ στρεβλούμενοι and in the Chersonese Oration, πάντων κάκιστ' ἀπολώλασιν. But to this the answer was quite obvious,—that they who recommended peace did it not only without the least design of betraying the city into Philip's hands, but with the very view of saving it from him. So, when he argues, in the First Philippic, that a good statesman should be always in advance of events, in the same manner that a good general always marches at the head of his troops and in front of them, the fact and reason both alike fail; for neither does a commander always march before his men, nor, when he does, is it in the least degree that he may be prepared to meet and grapple with those men which is the only reason for a statesman being in advance of events. The comparison which follows, of the Athe-

nian tactics with the Barbarian's way of boxing, that is, by preparing to ward off the blow from any quarter after it has fallen there, is truly close and perfect; but it is rather used as an illustration than an argument; and as an illustration of a sarcastic kind it is consummate. In like manner, we may perhaps regard the famous passage in the same Philippic, about Philip's death, as a mere taunt or invective against the Athenians for their being so active in their inquiries after the news about their enemy, and so slow to take measures for opposing him—certainly as an argument nothing can be less effective.

But, passing from the rest of the speech, which is almost wholly made up of explanations of the plan of operations proposed by the orator, let us come to the Second Philippic, so greatly admired by Philip himself, and which, he said, would have convinced him both that war should have been declared against himself, and that Demosthenes should have been made commander-in-chief. He begins by saying that Philip had preferred on all occasions the interests of Thebes to those of Athens, because he knew that the Athenians would always, when it came to the push, declare against his aggressions and in behalf of justice and right; and he maintains that their former glorious history proved him to have formed an accurate estimate of their future conduct. He makes one short allusion to Philip's conduct towards Messene and Argos, in order to show that it was from policy, and not from justice, that he so preferred the Thebans; and that Athens is the great object of his constant enmity. He then recites a speech which he says he made to the Messenians and Argives, warning them against trusting Philip; and here occurs the beautiful passage about mistrust of tyrants being the true bulwark of freedom. He now proposes that they of the Macedonian party should be impeached who had brought about the peace; and he vows solemnly that he gives this

advice, not with the desire of exposing himself to recrimination, by attacking these men, nor yet with the design of enabling them to receive new largesses from Philip, nor merely for the sake of declamatory invectives, but because he apprehends the greatest dangers one day from the enemy; and that then the rage of the people will burst forth, and will fall, not upon the guilty, but upon the innocent—on those whose counsels have been the soundest. The orator concludes with applying this charge particularly to one individual, apparently *Æschines*. Now, though nothing can be more artfully calculated to gain the favour of the Athenians, and also to warn them against Philip's designs, it must at once be admitted, that to describe this celebrated oration as a piece of close reasoning, is an abuse of terms. Eloquent, spirited, effective to its purpose, it unquestionably is. Had argument been required to effect that purpose, there would have been cogent reasoning no doubt used; but the effect is produced by plain statements, or powerful allusions to well-known facts; and of ratiocination, or anything like it, there is none, if we except the answer to the anticipated explanation of Philip's motives by his partizans, an answer which consists in referring shortly to his conduct towards Messene and Argos.

The Third Philippic is certainly a very fine oration—by some preferred to all the minor ones. But as far as elaborate and close reasoning goes, it is of the same description with the First and the Second. Part of it consists in exposing the errors committed by the Athenians, to which the ill success of the public measures is ascribed; the rest is a description of Philip's conduct, for the purpose of showing that he had left them no longer the choice of war against him, or peace with him. In describing Philip's conduct, by far the most remarkable passage is one which, as a serious argument, never could have been urged to convince a mind undisturbed by the passions incident

to great meetings, though in such a place it was calculated to produce a powerful effect. When Athens or Sparta, he says, injured the other Greek states, at least the wrong-doers were of their own family, and might be forgiven, as we bear with indiscretions in our own children which we never could tolerate in a slave or in an alien to our blood. But Philip is not only not a Greek—he is not even of illustrious barbaric extraction—he is a vile Macedonian—of a country that never produced so much as a good slave; and then he proceeds to recount the instances of his offensive interference in the affairs of Greece. He then inveighs against the treachery and corruptions of the Macedonian party, and holds up the example of the Oreitans and Eretrians, the Olynthians and Phocians, and introduces that famous passage, so justly admired, painting the sufferings that the Macedonian party among those nations brought upon their country. But in this place the subject is not treated with the force of reasoning displayed on the same topic in the Chersonese Oration, where the argument is this—that even at Olynthus, in Thessaly, or at Thebes, no one durst have held the language of the Macedonian party at Athens, before Philip had done anything to gain over the state to his side—before he had delivered Potidæa to Olynthus, restored the Amphictyonic rights to Thessaly, and reconquered Bœotia for Thebes. The same argument is used in nearly the same words in the Fourth Philippic, which is made up of repetitions from the other minor orations, and especially from that upon the Chersonese, certainly the most argumentative of the whole, and, as it seems, the finest in all respects.

If, again, we examine the four lesser orations not usually termed Philipics, we shall find them still less argumentative in their texture than the Philipics which we have just gone through. Thus, the well-known and much admired speech for Megalopolis is a

calm and judicious statement of the sound principle of foreign policy, on which the modern doctrine of the balance of power rests—that the only point for a nation's consideration is, whether any given course of conduct will tend to help or to prevent a dangerous neighbour's aggrandizement; and that no former conduct of any state should operate as a reason for or against helping it in its struggle with a common and formidable enemy. This oration has no figures, nor any impassioned bursts, or other striking passages; and there is no reasoning in it, except perhaps where the orator tries to reconcile the conduct which he recommends, of helping the Arcadians against Sparta, with the aid formerly given to Sparta herself, by showing that the former, like the present policy, was governed by the principle of protecting the weak against oppression.

As for the Great Speech itself, the whole consists rather of explanations, narrations of important successes arising from his counsels, remarks upon the duty and the conduct of honest statesmen as contrasted with evil advisers (a very favourite topic in all the orations), and bitter invective against *Æschines*. The question mainly at issue is notwithstanding scarcely touched upon—namely, the right of one who had not passed his accounts to have the honours of the Crown. But this, the main point, is purposely avoided, because he was quite unable to deal with it, the fact and the law being equally clear against him. He therefore assumes that his whole public life is put in issue, and applies himself to that supposed issue alone. But the most celebrated passage of the whole has sometimes been given as an example of close reasoning, as showing that, even in his most impassioned and figurative passages, the orator never loses sight for a moment of the point he is labouring, that every appeal he makes, every illustration he employs, in short, every word he utters, furthers the attainment of the object in view.

This truly magnificent passage can never be too often referred to, or its merits too highly extolled. That it is a piece of close and sustained argumentation, can assuredly not be affirmed with equal accuracy. He is maintaining that his counsels were wise, though the policy which they prescribed led to defeat; and he begins with the well-known simile of the shipwreck, for which he says the captain of the vessel is not answerable, if he has taken all fit precautions. But it is singular that he should make the captain say, he did not govern (*ἐκυβέρινον*) the ship, and compare this with what he himself had certainly a far better right to say, that he did not command the army (*ἑστρατήγειον*); the analogy of the two positions consisting not in this, wherein it wholly fails, but in this, that both by sea and land, fortune is superior to all human efforts, and often sets all human precautions at defiance. It may also be observed, that were the comparison ever so apt, it assumes, like all such *cases in point*, the thing to be proved—namely, that all due precaution *had* been in fact taken, upon which the whole question turned. Another fine part of this passage is the invective against Æschines for never appearing but in times of distress, and the noted comparison of *τὰ ῥήγματα καὶ τὰ σπάσματα*. But this in no way advances Demosthenes' own defence, nor indeed at all bears upon this part of his conduct. Then follows a most magnificent description of the courage which consists in risking all extremities rather than embrace an easy and tranquil slavery, illustrated with moving and spirit-stirring appeals to the ancient deeds of the Athenians. But this, in point of argument, goes for nothing; the adversary being quite prepared to admit it all, and still to contend that Demosthenes had pursued a policy leading to the subjugation of the state, and to deny of course that *they* would ever have recommended submission or dishonour. This, therefore, is matter common to both parties, and could not

turn the scale in favour of either. Last of all, and to wind up the passage, comes the famous oath, and it is certain that in the midst of his vehement passion, he comes at once upon the honours awarded to the warriors slain in battle, and makes an application of the conduct held by the state in their case to the subject in question, by reminding his antagonist that those who failed were buried with funeral honours as well as those who conquered. Now, every way splendid and prodigious as this famous burst of eloquence is, in point of argument, and if viewed as a piece of reasoning, it is positively nothing. For it would then stand thus, and this would be the argument—"My counsels led to your defeat at Charonea; but because you won four or five great victories by following other counsels, or, which is the same thing, these counsels in other circumstances, therefore I was justified in the disastrous advice I gave you." Or thus,—“You gained great victories at Marathon, Salamis, Plataeæ, and Artemisium,* therefore you were justified in fighting at Charonea, where you were defeated.” Then as to the funeral honours, the argument would stand thus,—“The *victorious* soldiers who were slain in the *successful* battles of former times, were buried with public honours—therefore the state rewards those who fall in *defeat*; and consequently the counsels are not to be blamed which are bold, although they lead to disaster.” It is quite clear that close argument is not the peculiar merit of the passage, and that it cannot be regarded as a piece of reasoning at all. As a burst of most lofty and impassioned eloquence, it is beyond all praise, and the panegyrics of twenty-four centuries have left it inadequately marvelled at and admired.

It was necessary to set right by some detail the matter referred to in the erroneous view of those who,

* There were two battles fought at Artemisium, both successful, though one much more clearly so than the other.

mistaking vehemence, fulness of matter, and constant regard to the object in view, for sustained reasoning and close argument, have spoken of Demosthenes' Orations as they might of strict moral demonstrations, or chains of ratiocination—like the arguments maintained at the Bar upon legal points, or upon dry questions of fact—or like those inimitable specimens of pure logical deduction, the judgments, and yet more the speeches, of Sir William Grant. Had they been of this description, they would have been far less suited to the Athenian assembly before which they were delivered. Nevertheless, it is certain that far more argumentative speeches are well adapted to the British Parliament, and that the closest texture of reasoning is quite consistent with the loftiest legitimate flights of eloquence. Demosthenes could have addressed such an audience with all his fire and all his topics, and have reasoned as closely as his warmest eulogists have supposed him to have done at Athens. But such a display of his powers was not suited to that Athenian audience. What was wanted to move, to rouse, and also to please them, was a copious stream of plain intelligible observations upon their interests—appeals to their feelings—recollections of their past, and especially their recent history—expositions of the evils to be apprehended from inaction and impolicy of any sort—vindications of the orator's own conduct, upon grounds simple and uncontested—contrasts to show the inconsistency of those who differed from him, or refused to follow his advice—invectives, galling and unmeasured, against all his adversaries abroad and at home. By urging these topics in rapid succession, in the purest language, with a harmony never broken, save where the sense and the ear required a discord, he could move and could master the minds of the people, make their enemy quake upon his barbaric throne, and please the exquisite taste of the "fierce democratic" whom he was chiding and controlling.

Such was the first of Orators. At the head of all the mighty masters of speech, the adoration of ages has consecrated his place; and the loss of the noble instrument with which he forged and launched his thunders, is sure to maintain it unapproachable for ever. If in such varied and perfect excellences, it is required that the most prominent shall be selected, then doubtless is the palm due to that entire and uninterrupted devotion which throws his whole soul into his subject, and will not ever—no, not for an instant—suffer a rival idea to cross its resistless course, without being swiftly swept away, and driven out of sight, as the most rapid engine annihilates or shoots off whatever approaches it, with a velocity that defies the eye. So, too, there is no coming back on the same ground, any more than any lingering over it. Why should he come back over a territory that he has already laid waste—where the consuming fire has left not a blade of grass? All is done at once; but the blow is as effectual as it is single, and leaves not anything to do. There is nothing superfluous—nothing for mere speaking's sake—no topic that can be spared by the exigency of the business in hand; so, too, there seems none that can be added—for everything is there and in its place. So, in the diction, there is not a word that could be added without weakening, or taken away without marring, or altered without changing its nature, and impairing the character of the whole exquisite texture, the work of a consummate art that never for a moment appears, nor ever suffers the mind to wander from the subject and fix itself on the speaker. All is at each instant moving forward, regardless of every obstacle. The mighty flood of speech rolls on in a channel ever full, but which never overflows. Whether it rushes in a torrent of allusions,* or moves along in a majestic exposition of enlarged principles†

* Appendix, No. II.

† Ibid, No. III.

—descends hoarse and headlong in overwhelming invective*—or glides melodious in narrative and description,† or spreads itself out shining in illustration‡—its course is ever onward and ever entire;—never scattered—never stagnant—never sluggish. At each point manifest progress has been made, and with all that art can do to charm, to strike, and to please. No sacrifice, even the smallest, is ever made to effect—nor can the hearer ever stop for an instant to contemplate or to admire, or throw away a thought upon the great artist, till all is over, and the pause gives time to recover his breath. This is the effect, and the proper effect of Eloquence—it is not the effect of argument. The two may be well combined, but they differ specifically from each other.

* Appendix, No. IV.

† Ibid, No. V.

‡ Ibid, No. VI.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

EXTRACT FROM LORD ERSKINE'S SPEECH ON THE TRIAL OF
JOHN STOCKDALE.

"I HAVE not been considering it through the cold medium of books, but have been speaking of man and his nature, and of human dominion, from what I have seen of them myself amongst reluctant nations submitting to our authority. I know what they feel, and how such feelings can alone be repressed. I have heard them in my youth from a naked savage, in the indignant character of a prince surrounded by his subjects, addressing the Governor of a British colony, holding a bundle of sticks in his hand, as the notes of his unlettered eloquence: 'Who is it?' said the jealous ruler over the desert, encroached upon by the restless foot of English adventure—'Who is it that causes this river to rise in the high mountains, and to empty itself into the ocean? Who is it that causes to blow the loud winds of winter, and that calms them again in the summer? Who is it that rears up the shade of those lofty forests, and blasts them with the quick lightning at his pleasure? The same Being who gave to you a country on the other side of the waters, and gave ours to us; and by this title we will defend it!' said the warrior, throwing down his tomahawk upon the ground, and raising the war-sound of his nation. These are the feelings of subjugated man all round the globe; and depend upon it, nothing but fear will control where it is vain to look for affection."—*Erskine's Speeches*, vol. ii., p. 263.

PERORATION OF MR. GRATTAN'S SPEECH ON THE
DECLARATION OF IRISH RIGHTS.

“Do not suffer the arrogance of England to imagine a surviving hope in the fears of Ireland; do not send the people to their own resolves for liberty, passing by the tribunals of justice and the high court of Parliament; neither imagine that, by any formation of apology, you can palliate such a commission to your hearts, still less to your children, who will sting you with their curses in your grave, for having interposed between them and their Maker, robbing them of an immense occasion, and losing an opportunity which you did not create, and can never restore.

“Hereafter, when these things shall be history, your age of thralldom and poverty, your sudden resurrection, commercial redress, and miraculous armament, shall the historian stop at liberty, and observe—that here the principal men among us fell into mimic trances of gratitude—they were awed by a weak ministry, and bribed by an empty treasury—and when liberty was within their grasp, and the temple opened her folding doors, and the arms of the people clanged, and the zeal of the nation urged and encouraged them on, that they fell down, and were prostituted at the threshold.

“I might, as a constituent, come to your bar and demand my liberty. I do call upon you, by the laws of the land and their violation, by the instruction of eighteen counties, by the arms, inspiration, and providence of the present moment, tell us the rule by which we shall go—assert the law of Ireland—declare the liberty of the land.

“I will not be answered by a public lie in the shape of an amendment; neither, speaking for the subject's freedom, am I to hear of faction. I wish for nothing but to breathe in this our island, in common with my fellow-subjects, the air of liberty. I have no ambition, unless it be the ambition to break your chain and contemplate your glory. I never will be satisfied so long as the meanest cottager in Ireland has a link of the British chain clanking to his rags; he may be naked, he shall not be in iron; and I do see the

time is at hand, the spirit is gone forth, the declaration is planted; and though great men should apostatize, yet the cause will live; and though the public speaker should die, yet the immortal fire shall outlast the organ which conveyed it, and the breath of liberty, like the word of the holy man, will not die with the prophet, but survive him.”—*Grattan's Speeches*, vol. i., pp. 52, 53.

No. II.

Ἡμεῖς οὕτε χρήματα εἰσφέρειν βουλόμεθα, οὕτε αὐτοὶ στρατεύεσθαι φιλοῦμεν, οὕτε τῶν κοινῶν ἀπέχεσθαι δυνάμεθα, οὕτε τὰς συντάξεις Διοπεῖθαι δίδομεν, ὡς δ' ὅς ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πορίσῃται, ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ βασκαῖνομεν καὶ σκοποῦμεν, πόθεν καὶ τί μέλλει ποιεῖν, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὐτ' ἐπειδὴ περ οὕτως ἔχομεν, τὰ ἡμέτερά αὐτῶν πράττειν ἐθέλομεν, ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς λόγοις, τοὺς τῆς πόλεως λέγοντας ἄξια ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔργοις τοῖς ἐναντίουμένοις τούτοις συναγωνιζόμεθα. And then immediately afterwards, the repetition, τί οὖν χρὴ λέγειν; εἰ γὰρ μήτε εἰσπίσετε, μήτε αὐτοὶ στρατεύσεσθε, μήτε τῶν κοινῶν ἀφέξεσθε, μήτε τὰς συντάξεις Διοπεῖθαι δώσετε, μήτε, ὅς ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πορίσῃται, ἑάσετε, μήτε τὰ ὑμέτερά αὐτῶν πράττειν ἐβλήσετε, οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω.—*De Cherson. Orat. Græc.*, i. 95.

This is translated in the version of the Oration which follows.

Καλὴν γ' οἱ πολλοὶ νῦν ἀπειλήφασιν Ὀρειτῶν χάριν, ὅτι τοῖς Φιλίππου φίλοις ἐπέτρεψαν αὐτούς, τὸν δ' Εὐφρατίον ἐώθουν· καλὴν γ' ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἐρετριέων, ὅτι τοὺς ὑμετέρους μὲν πρέσβεις ἀπήλασε, Κλειτάρχῳ δ' ἐνέδωκεν αὐτόν· δουλεύουσί γε μαστιγούμενοι καὶ στρεβλούμενοι καλῶς Ὀλυνθίων ἐφείσατο τῶν τὸν μὲν Λασθένην ἱππαρχον χειροτονησάντων, τὸν δὲ Ἀπολλωνίδην ἐκβαλόντων.—*Phil. III. Orat. Græc.*, i. 128.

“A noble* return have the Oreitans met with, for betaking themselves to Philip's creatures, and abandoning Euphræus! A noble treatment have the Eretrians received for dismissing your ambassadors and surrendering themselves to Clitarchus—they are now enslaved, and tortured,

* The literal translation “fine” or “pretty” expresses the sense completely, but it is too colloquial.

and scourged!* Nobly have the Olynthians fared for giving the command of their horse to Lasthenes, while they banished Apollonides!”

No. III.

The Oration for the Megalopolitans is one instance of this. See for another example the following passage in the Chersonese Oration :—

“Ὅστις μὲν γὰρ, ὦ Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παριδὼν ἅ συνόψει τῇ πόλει, κρίνει, δημεύει, δίδωσι, κατηγορεῖ, οὐδεμιά ταυτ’ ἀνδρία ποιεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἔχων ἐνέχυρον τῆς αὐτοῦ σωτηρίας τὸ πρὸς χάριν ὑμῖν λέγειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι ἀσφαλῶς θρασύς ἐστιν· ὅστις δ’ ὑπὲρ τοῦ βελτίστου πολλὰ τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἐναντιοῦται βουλήμασι, καὶ μὴδὲν λέγει πρὸς χάριν, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ, καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν προαίρειται, ἐν ᾗ πλείονων ἡ τύχη κυρία γίνεται ἢ οἱ λογισμοί, τούτων δ’ ἀμφοτέρων ὑπεύθυνον ὑμῖν ἑαυτὸν παρέχει—οὗτός ἐστ’ ἀνδρεῖος, καὶ χρήσιμός γε πολίτης ὁ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν.—*Orat. Græc.*, i. 106.

This is translated in the version of the Speech subjoined.

“Ὁ γὰρ σύμβουλος καὶ ὁ συκοφάντης, ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἰκότες, ἐν τούτῳ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων γνώμην ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ δίδωσιν αὐτὸν ὑπεύθυνον τοῖς πεισθεῖσι, τῇ τύχῃ, τοῖς καιροῖς, τῷ βουλομένῳ· ὁ δὲ σιγήσας, ἥνίκ’ ἔδει λέγειν, ἂν τι δύσκιλον συμβῇ, τοῦτο βασκαίνει—*De Corona. Orat. Græc.*, i. 291.

“A statesman and a partizan, in no other respect resembling each other, differ most of all in this, that the one gives his counsels before the event, and makes himself accountable for his followers, for fortune, for emergencies, for those who sit in judgment on his conduct; while the other, holding his peace when he ought to speak out, the instant that anything goes wrong, cries out his disapproval.”

* There is no giving the force of the Greek here—δουλεύουσί γε μαστιγούμενοι καὶ στρεβλούμενοι.—*Orat. Græc.*, i. 128.

No. IV.

Οὗτοι πάντες εἰσὶν, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν αὐτῶν βουλευμάτων ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν πατρίσιν, ὥνπερ οὗτοι παρ' ὑμῖν, ἄνθρωποι μισροὶ καὶ κόλακες καὶ ἀλάστορες, ἡρωτηριασμένοι τὰς ἐαυτῶν ἑκαστοῦ πατριῶδας, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν προπεπωκότες, πρότερον μὲν Φιλίππῳ, νῦν δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, τῇ γαστρὶ μετροῦντες, καὶ τοῖς αἰσχίστοις τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ μηδένα ἔχειν δεσπότην αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖς προτέροις Ἕλλησιν ὅροι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες, ἀνατετροφότες.—*De Corona. Orat. Græc., i., 324.*

“Those men, Athenians, are all in their own provinces like our adversaries here among you, base and fawning creatures, wretches who have mutilated the glory each of his own country, and toasted away their liberties, first to Philip, then to Alexander; who place their supreme enjoyment in gluttony and debauchery, but hold cheap those rights of freemen, and that independence of any master, which the Greeks of former days regarded as the test and the summit of all felicity.”

Ἐδίδασκες γράμματα, ἐγὼ δ' ἐφοίτων· ἐτέλεις, ἐγὼ δ' ἐτελούμην· ἐχόρευες, ἐγὼ δ' ἐχορήγουν· ἐγραμμάτευες, ἐγὼ δ' ἐκχλησίαζον· ἐτριταγωνίστηκες, ἐγὼ δ' ἐθεώρουν· ἐξέπιπτες, ἐγὼ δ' ἐσύριττον· ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν πεπολίτευσαι πάντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς πατριδος· ἐγὼ τᾶλλα, ἀλλὰ νυνὶ τήμερον ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφανωθῆναι δοκιμάζομαι, τὸ δὲ μηδοτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν, ἀνωμολόγημαι· σοὶ δὲ συκοφάντῃ μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖν ὑπάρχει, κινδυνεύεις δὲ, εἴτ' ἐτι δεῖ σε τοῦτο ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἤδη πεπαῦσθαι, μὴ μεταλαβόντα τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.—*De Corona. Orat. Græc., i., 315.*

“You were an usher, I was a scholar; you were an initiator, I was initiated; you danced at the games, I presided over them; you were a clerk of court, I an advocate; you were a third-rate actor, I a spectator; you fell down on the stage, I hissed you; your counsels were always in the enemy's favour, mine always in the country's; and to pass over everything else, now, on this day, the question is of crowning me, while nothing whatever is alleged against my integrity, while it is your lot to be received as a calumniator, and you are even in jeopardy of being put to silence by failing to obtain a fifth of the votes.”

Εἴτά μ' ἐρωτᾷς, ἀντὶ ποίας ἀρετῆς ἀξιῶ τιμᾶσθαι; ἐγὼ δὴ σοὶ λέγω, ὅτι, τῶν πολιτευομένων παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι διαφθαρέντων ἀπάντων, ἀρξαμένων ἀπὸ σοῦ, πρότερον μὲν ὑπὸ Φιλίππου, νῦν δ' ὑπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου, ἐμὲ οὔτε καιρὸς, οὔτε Φιλανθρωπία λόγων, οὔτ' ἐπαγγελιῶν μέγεθος, οὔτ' ἐλπίς, οὔτε φόβος, οὔτε χάρις, οὔτ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐπῆρκεν οὐδὲ προσηγάγετο, ὃν ἔκρινα δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων τῇ πατρίδι, οὐδὲν προδοῦναι· οὐδ' ὅσα συμβεβούλευκα πώποτε τούτοιςιν, ὁμοίως ὑμῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐν τρυτάνῃ, βέπων ἐπὶ τὸ λῆμμα, συμβεβούλευκα· ἀλλ' ἀπ' ὀρθῆς, καὶ δικαίας, καὶ ἀδιαφθόρου τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ πάντα μοι πέπρακται· καὶ μεγίστων δὲ πραγμάτων τῶν κατ' ἐμαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων προστάς, πάντα ταῦτα ὑγιᾶς, καὶ δικαίως, καὶ ἀπλῶς πεπολίτευμαι.—*De Corona. Orat. Græc.*, i., 325.

"You ask, *Æschines*, what is my title to honour? I will tell you;—it is, that while the politicians of Greece, beginning with yourself, having all been corrupted, first by Philip and then by Alexander, neither opportunity, nor fine speeches, nor lavish promises, nor hopes, nor fears, nor favours, nor anything else, ever seduced or compelled me to betray what I deemed the rights and interests of my country. Never did I, like you and such as you, incline my counsels, as if weighed in a balance, towards the side which paid the best; but my whole actions were governed by the principles of right, and of justice, and an incorruptible soul; and having borne the most forward part in the conduct of the greatest affairs, my policy was ever sound, and just, and sincere."

No. V.

Ἐσπέρα μὲν γὰρ ἦν· ἥκε δ' ἀγγέλλων τις ὡς τοὺς πρυτάνεις ὡς Ἑλλάτι κατείληπται. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα οἱ μὲν εὐθύς ἐξαναστάντες μεταξὺ δειπνοῦντες τιὺς τ' ἐκ τῶν σκηνῶν τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐξῆλθον, καὶ τὰ γέβια ἐνεπιμύρασαν· οἱ δὲ τοὺς στρατηγούς μετέπεμποντο, καὶ τὸν σαλπικτὴν ἐκάλουν· καὶ βορύβοιο πλήρης ἦν ἡ πόλις· τῇ δ' ὑστεραία ἄμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, οἱ μὲν πρυτάνεις τὴν βουλὴν ἐκάλουν εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον, ὑμεῖς δ' εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐπορεύεσθε· καὶ πρὶν ἐκείνην χρηματίσαι καὶ προβουλεύσαι, πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἄνω καθήτο· καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα κ. τ. λ.—*De Corona. Orat. Græc.*, i., 284.

"It was evening. A messenger came to acquaint the Prytanes that Elatea was taken; whereupon, some of them, instantly starting from the table at which they were sitting, cleared the booths in the Forum, and set fire to their wicker coverings; others summoned the commanding officers, and ordered the alarum to be sounded. The city was filled with consternation. When the next day broke, the Prytanes convoked the Senate in the Senate-house; you repaired to your own assembly; and before they could adopt any measure, or even enter upon their deliberations, the whole people had seated themselves upon the steps. And now," &c.

Συνεπαίνεσάντων δὲ πάντων, καὶ οὐδενὸς εἰπόντος ἐναντίον οὐδέν, οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ· οὐδ' ἔγραψα μὲν, οὐκ ἐπρέσβευσα δέ· οὐδ' ἐπρέσβευσα μὲν, οὐκ ἔπεισα δὲ Θεοαίους· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς διὰ πάντων ἄχρι τῆς τελευτῆς διεξῆλθον, καὶ ἔδωκα ἑμαυτοῦ ὑμῖν ἀπλῶς εἰς τοὺς περιεστηκότας τῇ πόλει κινδύνους.—*De Corona. Orat. Græc.*, i., 288.

The diction, the exquisite composition of this, cannot be in any, even the least degree, preserved in our language, or indeed in any but the Greek.

Ἐώραν δ' αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον, πρὸς ὃν ἦν ὑμῖν ὁ ἀγὼν, ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκεκομμένον, τὴν κλεῖν κατεαγότα, τὴν χεῖρα, τὸ σκέλος πεπηρωμένον, πᾶν ὃ τι ἐν βουλευθείῃ μέρος ἢ τύχη τοῦ σώματος παρελίσθαι, τοῦτο ῥαδίως καὶ ἐτόίμως προΐεμενον, ὥστε τῷ λοιπῷ μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης ζῆν.—*De Corona. Orat. Græc.*, i., 247.

"I saw this same Philip, with whom your conflict lay, content to lose an eye, to have his shoulder broken, his hand and his leg mutilated, all for the sake of power and dominion, and abandoning to fortune whatever part of him she chose to take, readily and without a murmur, so as what remained should survive to honour and glory."*

Οὐ γὰρ λίθοις ἐτείχισα τὴν πόλιν, οὐδὲ πλίνθοις ἐγὼ, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτοις μέγιστον τῶν ἑμαυτοῦ φρονῶ· ἀλλ' ἐὰν τὸν ἐμὸν τειχισμὸν βούλει δικαίως σκοπεῖν, εὐρήσεις ὅπλα, καὶ πόλεις, καὶ τόταυς, καὶ λιμένας, καὶ ναῦς καὶ πολλοὺς ἵππους, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τούτων

* This was the inscription most appropriately placed under Nelson's bust by the Rev. G. A. Browne, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; and a happier quotation was perhaps never made.

ἀμυνουμένους. Ταῦτα προῦβαλόμην ἐγὼ πρὸ τῆς Ἀττικῆς, ὅσον ἦν ἀνθρώπινῳ λογισμῷ δυνατόν, καὶ τοῦτοις ἐτείχισα τὴν χώραν, οὐχὶ τὸν κύκλον μόνον τοῦ Πειραιῶς οὐδὲ τοῦ ἄστειος.—*De Corona. Orat. Græc.*, i., 325.

“But the fortifications at which you mock, and the repairs I counted as deserving the favour and the applause of the people—Why not? Yet I certainly place them far below my other claims to public gratitude. For I have not fortified Athens with stone walls or with tiled roofs; no, not I—neither do I plume myself much upon such works as these.—But would you justly estimate my out-works, you will see armaments, and cities, and settlements, and harbours, and ships, and cavalry, and armies raised to defend us.—These are the defences that I have drawn round Attica, as far as human prudence could defend her; and with such as these I fortified the country at large, not the arsenal only or the citadel. Nor was it I that yielded to Philip’s policy and his arms; very far from it.—It was your captains and your allies through whom his fortune triumphed. What are the proofs of it? They are manifest and plain.”

Εἰπέ μοι, τί δὴ, γιγνώσκων ἀκριβῶς, Ἀριστόδημε (οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτ’ ἀγνοεῖ), τὸν μὲν τῶν ἰδιωτῶν βίον ἀσφαλῆ, καὶ ἀπράγμονα, καὶ ἀκίνδυνον ὄντα, τὸν δὲ τῶν πολιτευομένων Φιλαίτιον, καὶ σφαλερόν, καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἀγῶναν, καὶ κακῶν μεστόν, οὐ τὸν ἡσύχιον καὶ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις αἰετῇ; *Phil. IV.—Orat. Græc.*, i., 150.

“Say then, Aristodemus, how comes it to pass that you, well knowing—what indeed no one can doubt—that private life is smooth, and peaceful, and secure, but the life of the statesman turbulent, and slippery, and chequered with daily contentions and miseries,—you should not prefer the tranquil and quiet lot, but that which is cast in the midst of perils?”

No. VI.

Οἰκοδομήματα μὲν γε καὶ κόσμον τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ λιμένων, κ. λ. τ.—*De Ordin. Rep. Orat. Græc.*, i., 174.

See, too, the different instances of figures of comparison cited in the Dissertation, as well as many others, *c. g.* the following:—

Νῦν ἡμῖν λέγεις ὑπὲρ τῶν παρεληλυθότων; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἰατρος, ἀσθενοῦσι μὲν τοῖς χάμνουσιν ἐσιῶν, μὴ λέγοι μηδὲ δεικνύοι δι' ὧν ἀποφεύζονται τὴν νόσον· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τελευτήσῃ τις αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα αὐτῷ φέροιτο, ἀκολουθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ μνημα διεξίει· Εἰ τὸ καὶ τὸ ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπος οὕτως, οὐκ ἂν ἀπέθανεν.—*De Corona. Orat. Græc.*, i., 307.

“Of what advantage is your eloquence to the country? You now descant upon what is past and done; as if a physician, when called to some patient in a sinking state, were to give no advice and prescribe no course whereby the malady might be cured; but when death had happened and the funeral was performing, should follow it to the grave, and expound how the poor man would never have died had such and such things only been done.”

No. VII.

Hæc, sicut exposui, ita gesta sunt Judices: insidiator superatus, vi victa vis, vel potius oppressa virtute audacia est. Nihil dico, quid respublica consecuta sit: nihil, quid vos: nihil, quid omnes boni. Nihil sane id prosit Miloni, qui hoc fato natus est, ut ne se quidem servare potuerit, quin una rempublicam vosque servaret. Si id jure non posset, nihil habeo quod defendam. Sin hoc et ratio doctis, et necessitas barbaris, et mos gentibus, et feris natura ipsa præscripsit, ut omnem semper vim, quacunque ope possent, a corpore, a capite, a vita sua propulsarent; non potestis hoc facinus improbum judicare, quin simul judicetis, omnibus, qui in latrones inciderint, aut illorum telis, aut vestris sentiis esse pereundum.—*Pro Milone*, c. 11.

This was the transaction as I have related it:—the assassin overcome,—force vanquished by force, or rather violence overpowered by valour. I say nothing of the country's gain,—nothing of yours,—nothing of all good men's. Let Milo take no benefit from that, holding as he

does his very existence upon the condition of being unable to save himself without saving by the same act the commonwealth too. If the act was illegal, I have nothing to urge in its defence. But if it be a lesson which reason has taught the sage, and necessity the savage, and general usage has sanctioned in nations, and nature has imparted to the beasts themselves, that all violence, whether offered to our limbs, our heads, or our lives, should by every means within our reach always be repelled, then can you not adjudge this deed criminal, without at the same time adjudging every one who falls among robbers, to perish either by their daggers, or by your sentence.

Video adhuc constare omnia, Judices : Miloni etiam utile fuisse Clodium vivere ; illi ad ea, quæ concupierat, optatissimum interitum Milonis : odium fuisse illius in hunc acerbissimum ; in illum hujus nullum : consuetudinem illius perpetuam in vi inferenda ; hujus tantum in repellenda : mortem ab illo denuntiata Miloni, et prædictam palam ; nihil unquam auditum ex Milone : profectionis hujus diem illi notum ; reditum illius huic ignotum fuisse : hujus iter necessarium ; illius etiam potius alienum : hunc præ se tulisse, se illo die Roma exiturum ; illum eo die se dissimulasse rediturum : hunc nullius rei mutasse consilium ; illum causam mutandi consilii finxisse : huic, si insidiaretur, noctem prope urbem expectandam ; illi, etiam si hunc non timeret, tamen accessum ad urbem nocturnum fuisse metuentum.—*Pro Milone*, c. 19.

The structure of our language, and the want of the *hic* and *ille*, preclude any attempt at translating this noble argument.

Si hæc non gesta audiretis, sed picta videretis, tamen appareret, uter esset insidiator, uter nihil cogitaret mali, quum alter veheretur in rheda pænulatus, una sederet uxor. Quid horum non impeditissimum ? vestitus, an vehiculum an comes ? quid minus promptum ad pugnam, quum pænula irretitus, rheda impeditus, uxore pæne constrictus esset ? Videte nunc illum, primum egredientem e villa, subito : cur ?—vesperi : quid necesse est ?—tarde : qui convenit, id præsertim temporis ? Devertit in villam

Pompeii. Pompeium ut videret? Sciebat in Alsiensi esse. Villam ut perspiceret? Millies in ea fuerat. Quid ergo erat moræ, et tergiversationis? Dum hic veniret, locum relinquere noluit.

Age nunc, iter expediti latronis cum Milonis impedimentis comparate. Semper ille antea cum uxore: tum sine ea: nunquam non in rheda; tum in equo: comites Græculi, quocunque ibat, etiam quum in castra Etrusca properabat; tum nugarum in comitatu nihil. Milo, qui nunquam, tum casu pueros symphoniacos uxoris ducebat, et ancillarum greges: ille, qui semper secum scorta, semper exoletos, semper lupas duceret, tum neminem, nisi ut virum a viro lectum esse diceres. Cur igitur victus est? Quia non semper viator a latrone, nonnunquam etiam latro a viatore occiditur: quia, quamquam paratus in imparatos Clodius, tamen mulier incidit in viros.—*Pro Milone*, c. 20, 21.

If instead of hearing these transactions related, you saw them painted, it still would appear manifest which of the two parties was the conspirator, and which of them had no evil design; when the one should be seen sitting in a carriage, with his wife, and in his cloak. What is there about him that leaves a limb free? dress, or conveyance, or company? Who so ill prepared for fight as yonder man who sits entangled in his mantle, cooped up in a carriage, tied down by his wife? Look now at that other figure,—first leaving the city in a hurry; and why? In the evening—why should he now start? It is late—why should this time of all others suit him? He turns aside to Pompey's Villa. In order to see Pompey? But he is known to be at Alsium. In order to see the Villa? But he has been there a thousand times before. Then why this delay, and this turning aside from the high road? Because he does not choose to leave the spot until Milo shall come up.

Now, then, compare the journey of the robber prepared for action, with that of Milo encumbered in his route. Till then he had always travelled with his wife; on that day he was alone. Before, he always was in his carriage; that day he was on horseback. Formerly, wherever he went his Greeks were with him, even when on his march to the

Etrurian camp. On this occasion there was no trifling accompaniments. Milo was now, for the first and only time in his life, attended with his wife's chorus singers, and her whole household of waiting-women. Clodius, who had always travelled with strumpets, always with boys, always with bawds, on that day had not a creature with him, but such as you would call picked men. How then came it to pass that he was overpowered? Why, because it is not always the traveller who is overcome by the robber, but sometimes the robber too is slain by the traveller—because, although Clodius had fallen upon the unprepared, himself ready for action, yet the effeminate had fallen among men!

TRANSLATION

FROM

DEMOSTHENES.

ORATION ON THE AFFAIRS OF THE CHERSONESE.

INTRODUCTION.

CHERSONNEPTES, king of the country, had ceded the Chersonese to Athens; but Cardia, a principal town, having put itself under the protection of Philip, Diopeithes was despatched to plant a colony in the peninsula, according to the policy of the Greeks when they wanted to retain any acquisition of distant territory. This general, without any orders to that effect, but relying on support at home from the party of Demosthenes, attacked Maritime Thrace from the Chersonese, regarding Philip's conduct towards Cardia as a sufficient act of hostility to justify this aggression. The result of this incursion was a large booty, which he placed in safety in the peninsula. The Macedonian party of course inveighed bitterly against the proceedings of Diopeithes, as an infraction of the peace which nominally subsisted between Athens and Macedon. The inimitable speech, of which a translation is here attempted, was Demosthenes' answer to their attacks. It unites all the great qualities of his prodigious eloquence in a remarkable degree; and, excepting in the article of invective, of which there is hardly any, it may fairly be placed on the same line with the Great Oration itself. Indeed, in point of argument and conciseness, and when judged by the severest rules of criticism, it has no superior.

The attempt here made is accompanied with a deep feeling of its necessary failure in many essential particulars. The thing aimed at has been to try how far the meaning of every word in the original could be given best in the English, and as nearly as possible, the Saxon idiom. Under the feeling how widely asunder the design and execution are placed, there is, perhaps, some consolation to be derived from reflecting, that the object in view is really unattainable, as the excellence of the original is altogether unapproachable. It is rather an experiment upon our own language than upon the Greek.

It would be well, Athenians,* if all who addressed you delivered themselves altogether without prejudice and without partiality, each propounding whatsoever he deemed most advisable, especially when you are assembled to deliberate upon public affairs of the greatest importance. But since some speakers are actuated partly by a spirit of contention,† partly by other similar motives, it remains for you, men of Athens, you, the people,‡ laying aside all other considerations, what things you deem best for the country, those things to resolve, and (those things) to do.

The question, then, relates to the affairs of the Chersonese, and the military operations which Philip has now for nearly eleven months been carrying on in Thrace. But this debate has for the most part turned upon what Diopithes is doing and designs to do. Now, as for those

* See Caesar's Speech (Sallust, *Bell. Cat.*, c. 47), the exordium of which is nearly taken from this.

† *Προάγονται λέγειν*. Happily rendered by Leland, "whose speeches are dictated;" but the end of the paragraph is not literal, nor does it contain all the matter of the original.

‡ *Ἦμας τοὺς πολλούς*. Neither Laharpe, nor Francis, nor Auger, take any account of this expression; but it is material, being in opposition here to the *ἐνιοί* and the *λέγοντες*, from whom Demosthenes appeals to the whole people. Wolf sees this in its true light, and renders the phrase by *τὸν δῆμον* (*Apud Rei-ke, Appar. Crit.*, i., 75.) In other instances the *οἱ πολλοί* are in opposition to the *οἱ ὀλίγοι*, as towards the end of this Oration.

offences of which parties may be accused at any time, and which by law it rests with you to punish when you think fit, either immediately or after a while, I am of opinion that such matters may be reserved for further consideration,* and that there is no necessity that either I, or any one else, should contend† much about them at present. But as for those places of which Philip, the unprovoked enemy‡ of the country, and at the head of a large force on the Hellespont,§ is endeavouring to surprise||—places which, if we let slip this opportunity, we never again can hope to rescue¶—as to them I am clear that we ought instantly to take our determination and make our preparations, nor suffer ourselves to be drawn aside from this course by other contentions** and other charges.

But astonished as I have been, Athenians, at many things that are oftentimes addressed to you, I own I have never been more astonished than to hear what was lately said in the Senate; that it is the duty of a statesman to counsel either absolutely making war,†† or maintaining

* Σκοπεῖν ἐγχαρεῖν, “it is admissible to deliberate;” “there is time enough to look after them.” Leland connects this with the antecedent πῶν ἤδη δοκῇ, κ. τ. λ., but this cannot be.

† Some MSS. have ἰσχυρίζεσθαι without the δι, “to pronounce confidently,” “dogmatically.”

‡ Ὑπάρχων. This cannot be left out as most translators do, Wolf among the rest; it is not here merely “actual” or “existing,” but “beginning,” “aggressor.”

§ Leland’s “hovering about the Hellespont” is not infelicitous, though perhaps not quite the true sense; for he was actually in the countries περιτῇ Ἑλλάσποντον, and therefore *was* about, and not *hovering* about. He had alighted.

|| Περιλαβεῖν, clearly is, “to anticipate” or “surprise,” given well in Wolf, “præcipere.” Leland, only “making attempts on;” which gets rid of the meaning, instead of giving it.

¶ Καὶν ἄπαξ ὑστερήσωμεν, κ. τ. λ. literally; “and if this once we be too late, we never shall be able to save *them*,” the relative to connect this with the antecedent ὅσα.

** Ἀποδρῆναι, “run away.” Leland, “in the midst of foreign clamours and accusations.” This is not the meaning. He refers to the accusations of which he had been speaking, and it is *to* those that the “running away” is supposed to be. The sense is given either by “running away *after*,” &c., or “being drawn aside *by*,” &c.

†† Ἡ πολυμῶν ἀπλῶς, ἢ ἄγιν τι, εἰρήνην. Their argument was—peace or war, one thing or another, either do nothing at all, or come to

peace. Now the case is this.* If, indeed, Philip will remain at peace, and neither keep possession of our settlements contrary to treaty, nor stir up all the world against us, there is nothing to be said, and peace must be strictly maintained; nor, to say the truth,† do I perceive any other disposition on your part. But if the conditions to which we swore, and upon which the peace was made, are plain to be seen, lying written indeed before our eyes, and yet from the first, and before Diopceithes set sail with his settlers, who are now accused of having occasioned the war, Philip manifestly appears to have wrongfully seized many of our possessions, of which your decrees, and those ratified,‡ impeach him; and also to have ever since been seizing the territories of the other Greeks, and of the Barbarians, and employing their force against us—how can these men thus speak of our only having the choice of at once going to war, or remaining at peace? We have no choice at all in the matter; nor any course but one left to pursue, and that of all others the most righteous and the most necessary, which, however, these men carefully overlook. And what is that course? To chastise§ the first that attacks us; unless, indeed, they shall contend that, so long as Philip keeps away from Attica and the Piræus, he neither wrongs this country nor makes war upon it; but then, if it be on

hostilities with Philip; meaning, as there was no chance of going to war, that no objection should be made to whatever Philip did.

* Ἔστι δέ. Most versions give this—"Be it so," or "Be it peace," which, especially the latter, does not tally with the preceding sentence. But it seems plainly to refer to what follows.

† Πῶς has here the force of "truly." There is a biting sarcasm in these words; but the tone is purposely subdued, and as inoffensive as possible. Demosthenes often attacked them fiercely; but he knew that the multitude can bear invective better than mockery. Leland fails exceedingly in this passage—"and I find it perfectly agreeable to you," viz., peace.

‡ Κέρτα—"authoritative," "ratified," "confirmed."

§ Ἀμύνεσθαι τὸν πρῶτον κ. τ. λ. Auger and Lacharpe render this 'reponsser'—Francis, "repel"—Leland, "repel force by force." But that is exactly what Demosthenes does not mean to recommend—he is for doing a great deal more, not merely for defensive operations—his whole argument being, that as Philip was substantially at war by his proceedings in one quarter, the Athenians should not merely repel him there, but carry the war into whatever parts of his dominions they could best attack; and this indeed was the very point in issue as to Diopceithes, who had ravaged Thrace, and not made any attack upon Cardia.

grounds like these that they lay down the rules of justice, and trace* the limits of peace and war, it must be manifest to every one that they are propounding principles neither just in themselves, nor consonant with your honour,† nor even consistent with your safety; nay, it so happens, that they are holding language utterly repugnant to what they charge upon Diopeithes; for how can we give Philip free leave to do whatever he pleases, so he only keeps away from Attica, while Diopeithes must not assist the Thracians, upon pain of being charged with involving us in war? But these things are narrowly scrutinized;‡ and then we are told that it is an outrage for foreign troops to ravage the Hellespont—that Diopeithes has been committing piracy—and that we should not give way to him. Be it so—let him be checked§—I have nothing to say against that. Nevertheless, I cannot help thinking, that if these men thus counsel you sincerely, and from mere love of justice; as they are seeking to disband the whole force of the State by calumniating the General|| who alone provides its pay, they are bound to show you that Philip's army too will be disbanded,¶ if you should follow their advice; else you plainly see that they are only reducing

* Leland has but one verb—"state the bounds of peace and justice;" but there is never any reason for making Demosthenes more concise than he is—*τὰ δίκαια τίθενται, καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ὀρίζονται*. In what follows, he does not give the sense.

† *Ἀνικτὰ*, "to be endured;" but if it be so taken, there would seem to be an anticlimax in what follows, *οὐδ' ὑμῖν ἀσφαλῆς*. We must render it, "to be endured by you;" and then the whole will stand, "dishonourable, and not even safe."

‡ *Ἐξελίχονται*. It may either mean that Diopeithes' proceedings are so watched, and represented as equally bad with Philip's; or that Philip's are admitted to be bad, and then that Diopeithes' are maintained to be no better.

§ *Γινώσθω ταῦτα*. This can hardly mean, "let these things be so," because *ἔστω*, which goes before, means that. It must rather be, "Let this," *i. e.*, checking Diopeithes—(the antecedent being *μὴ ἱππιτέπειν αὐτῷ*)—"be done." Most versions omit the words altogether.

|| Leland has it, "that man whose care and industry support them;" but it is *τὸν ἐπιστηκότα καὶ πορίζοντα χρήματα*, "the person commanding, and providing pay."

¶ This is one of the many instances of most chaste and refined sarcasm which we meet with in Demosthenes, *i. e.*, argument clothed in sarcasm of a subdued tone.

the country to the very position which has already been the ruin of our affairs. For you are well aware, that in no one respect has Philip had the advantage of us more than in being always beforehand* with us. Constantly at the head of a regular army, and planning prospectively the operations he is to undertake, he suddenly springs† upon whomsoever he pleases, while we, after we have ascertained‡ that some blow has been struck, then, and not till then, we put ourselves in a bustle, and begin to prepare. Thus, I conceive it comes to pass, that whatever he has seized upon he possesses in all security, and that we, coming too late, incur a great expenditure, and incur it all in vain, while displaying our enmity and our desire to check him; but making the attempt after his work is done, we, in addition§ to our loss, cover ourselves with disgrace.

Be then well aware, Athenians, that at this very time,

* *Πρότις πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασι γίνεσθαι*, is hardly rendered by "superior vigilance in improving all opportunities," (Leland)—for, beside being a paraphrase, it does not give the meaning so fully or so idiomatically as the more literal version; nor does it so well maintain the contrast with *ὑστερίζειν*, a favourite charge with Demosthenes, and urged soon after this passage. Francis is better—"being in action before us."

† *Ἐξαίφνης ἔφ' οὓς . . . πάρεστιν*. This expression is very strong. *Ἀφνης* or *ἄφνω*, is either, "so quick as not to be seen"—"in the twinkling of an eye"—*ex improviso*—and *ἐξ* is intensive of that sense; or it may be, "from a place where he could not be seen." *Πάρεστιν ἔφ' οὓς*—"is present with"—"appears like a ghost"—"arrives and is upon"—"springs upon." Leland has it, "in a moment strike the blow where he pleases," which is not so literal, nor nearly so expressive.

‡ *Πυθώμεθα*, "made inquiry, and learnt." The same idea runs through this that gave rise to the remarkable illustration in the Second Philippic, "*ὥσπερ οἱ βίβραροι πυκτεύουσιν*." The whole of the passage here is very fine. The contrast of the Athenians with Philip is full of bitter sarcasm, and of argument too. Leland omits the *πυθώμεθα*, and only gives it as "waiting till some event alarm us," which *τι γινόμενον* can hardly be; the version is also paraphrastical, and lowers the excellent effect of first inquiring—then learning—and then acting.

§ *Προσπολισκάνειν*. The *πρὸς* indicates that the disgrace (*αἰσχύνη*) is over and above something else. Now, the only antecedents were the *δαπάνη* which is mentioned, and the failure from being behind-hand; and loss implies both; *πρὸς* therefore means, "in addition to our loss." The beauty of the diction in this passage is remarkable—*δαπανησόμεν* and *ἀνηλωκίνας*, as well as *προσπολισκάνειν*. *Δαπάνη*, uncompounded, may be taken for "simple expenditure," though often used for "extravagance;" *ἀναλίσκω*, the compound, is properly, "to squander."

the speeches and pretexts of these men are one thing,* but there is another thing actually doing and preparing by them—how Philip may best dispose of everything at his pleasure in absolute security, while you remain at home, and have no force beyond the walls. For only mark, first of all, what is now going on. He is at present lingering† in Thrace with a large army, and according to the reports of those on the spot,‡ he is sending for strong reinforcements from Macedon and Thessaly. If, then, waiting till the Etesian winds set in, he falls upon Byzantium, and lays siege to it, do you think, in the first place, that the Byzantians will remain as they are, infatuated,§ and not call upon you, and require you to assist them? I believe nothing of the kind; nay, if even there were any other people whom they mistrusted more than they do you, they would rather admit that people into their city than surrender it to Philip,—always supposing him not to have already surprised and taken it. Should we, then, be wind-

* Τῶλλα μὲν ἔστι κ. τ. λ. "The rest is words and pretext—what they are doing is," &c. The antithesis in the idea, and not in the words, is a distinguishing feature of Demosthenes. He disdains everything *verbal*—all jingle. But here the contrast is as marked as if the structure had brought *πρόκειται* in opposition to *λέγεται*.

† Διατερεῖν. Some, as Leland, give this merely as if it were expressive of his being, or being stationed, in Thrace. The word may be used, like *commorari*, for merely "staying;" but here it seems to have its original sense.

‡ Οἱ παρόντες. This can hardly mean, "those present here"—at the assembly—without reference to their having been on the spot. Wolf considers it, however, as merely those present. Reiske inclines to think it means those coming from Macedon and Thessaly, and therefore aware of Philip having ordered troops from thence; he thus rather connects *οἱ παρόντες* with *ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας, κ. τ. λ.*, leaving *μετασπίπεται* absolute. Hervagius, like most critics, puts the comma at *παρόντες*. Auger gives it as meaning "persons on the spot"—not at Athens. As for Laharpe, he hardly troubles himself with the original in this passage at all, but speaks of Philip having "been long in Thrace and Thessaly!" Leland, "as we are here informed." Francis, "as persons here present assure us."

§ Ἄνοια means more than "folly"—it is "mental alienation;" and Demosthenes intends so to describe the conduct of the Byzantines, in having rebelliously left the Athenians, and joined Chios and Rhodes against them; *παρακαλῶσιν οὐτ' ἀζήσωσιν* means more than "to have recourse for assistance," as Leland has it; or "to implore assistance," as Francis; it seems to imply a *claim*, as entitled to aid.

bound here, and unable to make sail from hence,* if no succour is provided there, nothing can prevent the destruction of that people.

But these men, it will be said, are absolutely moonstricken,—they are in some paroxysm† of mental alienation. Be it so,—they must nevertheless be saved; for our own safety requires that. Besides,‡ it is by no means so certain after all, that Philip will not invade the Chersonese. Indeed, to judge by the letter which he has addressed to you, he means to attack our troops there. If then this army be now kept on foot, it will be able both to protect that province, and to harass him; but if once it is broken up, and he marches upon the Chersonese, where are we, and what shall we do? Bring Diopceithes to trial? Good God! and how will our affairs be the better for that? But we shall send succours from hence?§ And what if we are prevented by the winds? But then they say he won't come? And who, I ask, will be answerable for that? But, Athenians, do you observe and reflect upon the approaching season of the year, at which there are some who actually think you should leave the Hellespont defenceless, and abandon it to Philip? What then? If on his return from Thrace, and neither marching upon the Chersonese, nor upon Byzantium (for this possibility must also be taken into the account), he attacks Chalcis and

* 'Ενθ' ἐνδ' ἀναπλεῦσαι—"sail from hence;" not "thither," as Leland has inadvertently rendered it.

† Κακοδαίμονοῦσι—ὑπερβήλλουσιν ἀνοίᾳ. Leland fails signally here,—“The extravagance and folly of these men exceed all bounds,” is feeble and unlike the original,—to say nothing of extravagance exceeding bounds. Francis is better, because more literal; “they are absolutely (ὡς Δία) possessed by some evil daemon.” Wolf, “intemperis agitantur, nec ad eorum amentiam addi quicquam potest.” It is plain that coming after κακοδαίμονοῦσι, the ὑπερβήλλουσιν must imply an excess of mental alienation. The former is expressed by “moonstricken,” or “evil influence,”—the latter by “paroxysm.”

‡ The passage that follows is one of extraordinary force and rapidity; it is truly Demosthenic.

§ Βηθησάμην αὐτοῖς. This certainly looks as if the τοὺς ἐν Χερσονήσῳ meant the Chersonesitans, as some have rendered it, there being no αὐτοὶ to assist, if the army supposed to be broken up be the Athenian army in the Chersonese. In some MSS. and editions, as that of Hervagius, it is αὐτοί. Reiske prefers αὐτοῖς, and holds the meaning to be, “the Chersonesitans.”—*Orat. Græc., Appar. Crit.*, ii, 211.

Megara, as he lately did Oreus, whether will it be better to attack him there and let the war come close to Attica, or to find employment for him at a distance? * I certainly prefer the latter course.

All, therefore, who have seen and considered these things, will not only refrain from attempts to discredit and to destroy the army which Diopceithes is doing his utmost to raise for our defence; but will exert themselves to provide another† army for his assistance, to aid him with funds and credit,‡ and to co-operate with him in whatever other way they can serve him best. For, if Philip were asked,—Had you rather these troops now under Diopceithes, such as they are (on that head I say nothing), were well maintained, held in honour by the Athenians, and reinforced by the state,—or that they were dissipated and annihilated, in deference to the slanders and the charges of certain persons?—I can have no doubt that he would prefer the latter alternative. And is it possible that some among ourselves should be doing the very things for him which he himself would pray the gods to grant him? And can you still ask how it happens that the affairs of this country have gone to ruin? I would fain,§ therefore, lay before you without

* 'Εκεῖ—"there"—but as ἐκεῖ had previously been used, and with the sense of "there," because referring to the immediate antecedent, Chalcis and Megara, ἐκεῖ must be taken to mean the former antecedent—the Chersonese—where occupation was to be found for him.

† 'Επίσεν. Francis, Anger, Laharpe, Leland, &c., conceive that they are translating idiomatically when they render this by "reinforcements." The literal version is much to be preferred. "Instead of trying to destroy the army he has raised (or is raising), you ought to raise *another* in addition."—Προσπαρασκευάζειν—"to prepare beforehand"—"to have it ready when he shall want it."

‡ Συνεπαραρῶντας χρημάτων. This is always rendered as merely supplying money or funds,—but the σύν appears to imply a helping him to obtain, as well as furnishing—and that would mean credit as well as funds.

§ Βούλομαι πρόνυ πρὸς ὑμᾶς κ. τ. λ. is not to be rendered merely, as Francis and others do—"I shall"—or "I will now"—or "I am going to;" nor is Leland even so near the mark as that, when, by a paraphrase quite wide of the meaning, he translates, "let me entreat you to examine." Wolf, by the literal "*relim autem*," comes much nearer. Why both he and Leland should make the ἐξιτάσαι and σκέψασθαι (aorists of an active and a middle verb) have the neuter or rather passive sense of "being examined," as by you, is not easily perceived. The former word, though generally meaning to "inquire" or "examine," also signifies to "go over"—the latter here is plainly to "consider" or "examine."

reserve the present state of these affairs, and examine what we are now doing, and how we are dealing with them.* We neither choose to contribute our money, nor dare we serve in person, nor can we keep our hands off the public funds, nor do we furnish to Diopeithes the supplies voted, nor will we give him credit for supplying himself; but we must cavil at him, and pry into the reasons and the plans of his future operations, and whatever else can most harass him; nor yet, though we are in this temper of mind, does it please us to take our affairs into our own hands,† but while in words we extol those who hold a language worthy of the nation, by our actions we co-operate with those who are thwarting their counsels. As often as any one rises to speak, you are wont to ask him, What there is to be done? But I am disposed to ask you.‡ What there is to be said? For if you will neither contribute, nor serve in person, nor abstain from

* *Χρώμεθ' αὐτοῖς*, "comporting" or "bearing ourselves"—but in reference to the *παρόντα πράγματα*—therefore "dealing with them." Wolf, indeed, renders it *χρῶμεθα τοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν πράγμασι*.—*Orat. Græc., Appar. Crit.*, i., 78.

This is one of the finest passages in this or in any of the Orationes, and it is remarkable how little it loses by translation—provided that be literal. Every word, however, is to be weighed; none can be added nor any taken away; both qualities of the great orations here unite—the "*nihil detrakti*," and the "*nihil addi*."—Quintil. The variation of the governing verb in the first branch of the passage—*Βούλομαι*—*τολμᾶω*—*δύναμαι*, &c., and the repetition of the other set of verbs, omitting the governing ones, are to be noted. The celebrated address of Adam to Eve, in Milton, is framed on a like plan, and is an illustration of that great man's close study of the Greek orators—to which so many of the speeches in *Paradise Lost* bear testimony.

† Wolf suggests that *τὰ ἑμέτερά' αὐτῶν πράττειν* may possibly mean,— "do each man his own duty, without obstructing others,"—which is ingenious, and bears on the argument about obstructing Diopeithes. But *ἕκαστος*, or some such word, would have been added; as the text stands, it hardly can bear the meaning suggested.—*Apud Reiske, Appar. Crit.*, i., 79. Leland is quite distant from the meaning—"Thus we proceed, quite regardless of our interests."

‡ This part of the passage is full of refined wit—almost playful wit. "If you will be always asking us orators, whose business is with saying, to tell you what you are to do; why, really we must needs turn the tables upon you, whose business is with doing, and ask you to tell us what we are to say." When Cicero said, "*jocos non contigisse*," he must have meant jests and not wit.

the public funds, nor furnish the supplies assigned to Diopceithes, nor leave him to supply himself, nor resolve to take charge of your own affairs, I know not what to say;—for if you give such license to those who would carp at him, and tear his conduct in pieces on account of what, according to them, he is going to do, and if you listen to charges thus made by anticipation,* what can any one say? But what may be the result of all this,† it is fit that some of you should now learn; and I will speak my mind freely; for on any other terms I cannot submit to speak at all.

All your commanders who ever sailed from hence, I will answer for it with my life,‡ levied contributions on the Chians and the Erythræans, and whatever other people they could, I mean, of course, Asiatics. Such as have a vessel or two, take less,§—such as have a greater force, more; and those who pay, do not give for nothing either the smaller sums or the larger; they know better what they are about; they purchase for their merchants, freedom from injury and from pillage when their ships are passing

* *ὑποκατηγορούντων*—"accusing beforehand"—refers to their prying before mentioned, and grounding charges not on what he had done, but on what he was by their own surmises supposed to be going to do,—*ἔν φασί κ. τ. λ.* This is the winding up of the whole of their unreasonable conduct, and is very strikingly put.

† Francis thinks *ὅτι τοίνυν δύναται κ. τ. λ.* must mean that Diopceithes could do all these things,—i. e., by the usage of military men, and that Demosthenes means now to prove it. But he does not—he only shows the effects of the conduct of the accusers and the Athenians. Next, there is no *οὐτος* or *ἐκείνος*. Then, there seems no antecedent to *ταῦτα*, in the sense of things already done by Diopceithes; and nothing that he intended to do was specified, but only reference was made to his accusers surmising something, without saying what; and accordingly Francis and Lucchesini, whom in this he follows, to support this gloss, are obliged to alter the sense and to add, "what he has done." Leland is here right. The Greek is confessedly somewhat obscure. Wolf gives "*Quid his rebus proficiatur*," which is followed by Tourreil; and, with less than his accustomed diffuseness and paraphrase, by Auger; and Laharpe has the same sense, but, as usual, leaving out part, and inserting something else.

‡ *Πάσχειν ὀτιοῦν τιμῶμαι*—"I am condemned"—"adjudged." Seeing this, some readings have it, *ἵτοιμός εἰμι*.—Reiske, *Appar. Crit.*, ii., 231.

§ *Ἐλάττον*. Leland has it, "a talent,"—according, apparently, to some reading unknown to most commentators. Neither Wolf, Reiske, nor Hervagius, mention it.

to and fro.* But the contributions, it is said, are free gifts, and by this name these levies pass; and now it is perfectly certain that those nations will furnish such supplies to Diopceithes as soon as they see him at the head of an army. Indeed, from what other quarters do you imagine that he, who receives nothing at all from home, and has no funds of his own wherewithal to pay his soldiers, can derive the means of supporting them? From the clouds, think you? No such thing,—he must support them upon what he can collect, and beg, and borrow. His accusers, then, are in reality doing nothing but warning all not to give supplies to one who is about to be punished, not only for what he may have done, or assisted in doing, but for what he may intend to do.† Their language is this: “He is preparing sieges,—he is sacrificing the Greeks.” Much these men care for the Greeks that live in Asia! They are better at caring for them than for the Greeks of their own country.‡ And this, I presume, is the reason why another commander must needs be sent to the Hellespont. But if Diopceithes has committed these outrages—if he is guilty of piracy—a despatch, § Athenians, a little despatch, will suffice to stop it all. The law says that wrong-doers shall be impeached; not, good God! that we are to defend ourselves against them by costly expedi-

* Reiske and others have a stop thus at αὐτῶν. τὰ τοιαῦτα. φασὶ δ' εὐνοίας διδόναι. It seems raising a gratuitous difficulty and a plainly bad reading. Wolf stops it in the same way, and supplies other words, as either χρεῖματα διδοῦσιν (the antecedent being not the things given, but the purpose of the gift), or ἰσὶ τὰ πρᾶγματα.—“But they say that these contributions are given through benevolence (or good will), and by this name the levies pass.” They are literally called “benevolences,”—as in England of old; so universal is the vocabulary of fraudulent oppression!

† A play on the words μέλλει and μέλει (used immediately afterwards) has been suggested by some,—a thing so entirely unlike Demosthenes, that Reiske justly dismisses the notion as absurd.—*Appar. Crit.*, ii., 213.

‡ A remarkable instance of Demosthenes passing by an obvious sarcasm, or rather of his taking a gentle, subdued one, instead of a double and more cutting one. Ἀυσίνοος. The sense may either be: “they are very good to take care,” &c., or “they are better at taking care,” &c. Wolf is so much pleased with this latter sense that he cites Virgil—“Et cantare pares, et respondere parati.”—*Apud* Reiske, *Appar. Crit.*, i., 80.

§ Πινύκιον.—Some have it, “an impeachment of treason.” Reiske, as he generally does, takes the right view: “a letter of recall from the people.”—*Appar. Crit.*, ii., 214.

tions and fleets,—that would be the height of folly. Against the enemy whom we cannot bring under the lash of the law, it may be necessary to maintain armies, and fit out fleets, and contribute funds; but against our own citizens, decrees—impeachment—the vessel of recall—these are the appropriate proceedings—these are the measures of right-thinking men; but what those people are now about is the course of workers of mischief—of men who are bringing ruin upon the country.

That there should be such men among us, is indeed portentous; and yet it should seem not to be so.* On the contrary, in this meeting, you who are here assembled are so minded, that if any one were to stand forward and denounce Diopceithes, or Chares, or Aristophon, or any other of your fellow-citizens, as the cause of all our misfortunes, you would straightway applaud him, and cry out that he was in the right; but were any one to stand forward and say what is strictly true—"Athenians, you are trifling—Philip is the cause of all these miscarriages in our affairs;† for if he would only remain at peace, this country would be in no trouble;" you would have nothing to say in contradiction of a statement so true; nevertheless I am almost certain that you would be offended, and would feel as if you had lost something by it.‡ The cause

* *Δεινὸν ὄν, οὐ δεινὸν ἴσθιν.* The commentators, after their manner, pass over the real difficulty. Wolf translates it by a kind of play on the word—"quamquam ferendum graviter, non tamen graviter est ferendum"—quite unlike Demosthenes. Reiske is silent; Francis not unhappily suggests *ὅμιν* as to be inserted. It may be that the word is *ἔχεται*; or *ἔχεται*. At any rate we cannot suppose *δεινὸν* used in two different senses in the same breath—namely, as "what ought to be," or, "what is,"—(monstrous.) It is barely possible that Demosthenes may have said—"This is both monstrous, and after all, not monstrous, for," &c., meaning, "to look at your conduct it seems not so." There is a phrase of a like kind—*οὐκ ἔχων, ἔχων* (wold he, nold he). Tourreil takes the meaning to be—that the having such men at Athens was bad enough, but that what followed was worse—*i. e.*, that compared with the latter evil, the former, however bad in itself, was no evil at all. On this view at least his version is grounded (p. 117), and he is followed by both Laharpe and Auger.

† *Κακῶν καὶ πονημάτων*, justifies the departure from the version of the *κακῶν*, which immediately precedes.

‡ Leland renders this: "as if it were the account of some dreadful misfortune." It appears rather to be—"You would seem to think you had lost something," *i. e.*, by the advice or statement.

The passage immediately following is very fine; and the diction corres-

of all this (and Heaven grant that I may be suffered to speak frankly, as I am only speaking for your benefit) but the cause of it is, that one class of our statesmen have for a long time past taught you to be as awful and as stern in your public meetings, as in your warlike operations you are supine and contemptible. Thus, if some one within your power, and whose person you can at any time seize, is denounced, you assent and desire it may be done; but if the party denounced be one whom you must first overcome in the field before you can punish him, then I imagine you will find yourselves at a loss how to proceed, though you would be grievously offended at being convicted of such conduct. The contrary of this course, Athenians, was the duty of all statesmen; to give you habits of gentleness and humanity in your assemblies, where the rights of yourselves and your allies are debated; to make you wear an aspect formidable and stern in warlike operations, where the strife is with enemies—with antagonists.* But now, by managing and courting you beyond all bounds, they have brought you to this, that, spoilt with being pampered and fawned upon,† you can bear to hear in the assembly

ponds with the vehemence of the matter. It forms a contrast with the somewhat feeble one a little way back—about not employing armies and fleets against individuals under the power of the law; which if it be not a grave irony—not like Demosthenes—is an expanded truism.

* Ἀντιπάλους must mean more than the ἐχθροὺς which precedes. It is “antagonists”—but fighting on somewhat equal terms—those who are a match for you; as if he had said “with enemies; ay, and formidable ones too.”

† Τρυφᾶν καὶ κολακεύεσθαι—the former (τρυφᾶν) is from βρύπτω “to enfeeble,” and means—“to behave like one spoilt with pampering;” the latter—“to be wheedled”—from κόλαξ a parasite. Δημαγωγοῦντες may mean “flattering;” but it is a translative sense, the meaning being, “to lead or drive the people.” Leland has paraphrased this word and χαριζόμενοι καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν into “leading you gently on to their purposes by the most abject compliances with your humours; and in the same passage, he renders—διατεθείκασιν—“have formed and moulded;”—Nor is πάντα πρὸς ἡδονήν, “entertainment;” it is “what pleases”—“gives delight”—“tickles the ear.” Τρυφᾶν is not satisfied by, “being delicate;” this applies rather to the “listening only to soft things”—which follows: “spoilt” is plainly required by τρυφᾶν. There is wanting, too, a connecting word, as “while,” to make the concluding part of the sentence refer to the rest; and πράγμασι καὶ τοῖς γιγνομένοις is more than “affairs;” it is to make the contrast stronger with the λόγοι καὶ ἐκκλησίαι.

only what tickles your ear, while in the real state of your affairs and of events, you are destined speedily to struggle for your very existence.

Now then, by Heavens, suppose the states of Greece should call you to account for the opportunities which through supineness you have let slip, and should interrogate you thus,—“You, men of Athens, are always sending ambassadors, and telling us how Philip is plotting against us and all the Greeks, and how we should be on our guard against the man” (with many other things to this effect, as it must be confessed we do).* “And yet, O most pitiful of mortals!† for ten months was that same man detained abroad; intercepted by sickness, and winter, and wars, his return home was impossible; and you have neither delivered Eubœa, nor recovered a single one of your possessions; but while you remained at home idling away your time at your ease,‡ and in health (if they who thus act can be in a healthy state§), he planted two tyrants in Eubœa, erecting|| them as bulwarks, one against Attica, the other against Sciathos,—and you did nothing to

* This is plainly a parenthesis, as Reiske has observed. Some, as Auger, make only the part after *τοιαῦτα* parenthetical—which is quite impossible. The marks of parenthesis are omitted in Reiske's text. See *Orat. Græc.*, i., 98, *Appar. Crit.*, ii., 215.

† *ταυλότατοι*—“insignificant” or “of mean value,” enters into this word necessarily; and Leland's “wretched” will not do. (Qu. “dastardly.”)

‡ *Σχολὴν ἀγόντων*. “Keeping holiday” is the literal, perhaps the best version: *σχολή* came to signify the reverse of idleness, from the borrowed meaning of employing leisure in work—thus “*vacare negotiis*”—and “*ludi magister*.”

§ *ῥγαινότων* (*εἰ δὲ τ. τ. λ.*) It seems hardly possible to escape the conclusion that Demosthenes here plays upon the word, as in the parenthesis it must mean “mental health,” and in the other use “bodily,” as opposed to the *νόσος* from which Philip's operations suffered. It is barely possible that it may be an hyperbole, importing—that nothing but sickness can account for the inaction.

|| *ἑπιτιχίσας*—“*audacule dictum*” says Reiske, *Appar. Crit.*, ii., 216; but he thinks the “*durities dictionis*” softened by supposing “tyrant” to be put for “power of a tyrant!” Leland almost entirely loses this fine figure: “Eubœa is commanded by his two tyrants; the one, just opposite to Attica, to keep you perpetually in awe. Francis makes them both kings, but applies *ἑπιτιχίσας* to neither; he introduces Eretria, and makes it the thing fortified—as if *ἀπαντικρὺς* was *τὴν χώραν ἀπαντικρὺς*.”

The whole of this supposed expostulation is of the highest order of indignant eloquence, the latter part especially; it cuts the Athenians to

prevent him,—which you well might, even if you had done no more; but you connived at him, and notoriously abandoned your rights to him, and made it manifest* that were he to die ten times over, you never would bestir yourselves the more.† Wherefore, then, send ambassadors, and make charges, and busy yourselves with our concerns?” —If those states should hold this language, Athenians, what answer could we make, or what should we have to say?‡ I protest I cannot see. But some there are who think to embarrass a speaker by asking him—“What ought we to do?” To them I would give this answer—the most just and the most true that can be given. “Do anything but what you are now doing”—but further I will state the matter articulately; and as they are so ready to ask, let them be as willing to act.§

Of one thing then, Athenians, you must in the outset be intimately persuaded, that Philip is making war upon this country, and the peace is at an end.—Give over accusing each other upon this head; he is the bitter enemy of the whole city, and of the ground it stands on; and, I will add, of all who are within it; and those most|| of all who

the quick. There almost seems reason to suppose that they had on some occasion been mean enough to defend their *ἐλευθέρια* by saying, “only wait till Philip is well dead.” Their reference to their missions, &c., is equally severe. Reiske changed *πρεσβύταις* into the middle, to show that “sending ambassadors,” and not “going on embassies,” was meant; but it is by no means clear that “going” is not meant. The sarcasm may be this: “what signifies your coming to us as ambassadors, and your accusing others, and your stirring us up to act? Why don’t you stay at home and practise what you are so ready to preach?”

* *ἑαντὸν πεποιή αὖτε*, never can be, as Leland has it, “fully declared.” If he means, “your conduct shows,” it is too violent; if literally, “a declaration,” it is not the sense of the passage.

† Leland’s “it would not inspire you with the least degree of vigour,” is both a paraphrase and much inferior to the literal version of *οὐδὲν μάλλον κινήσει*.

‡ *Ἐφ’ ὅ μιν—φύσσειν*—the former—“what shall we advance”—“declare”—“answer?”—the latter—“what have we got to say at all?”

§ Leland gives this admirably, if not very literally: “as ready to follow, as to ask advice.”

|| *Τοῖς μάλιστα οἰομένοις*—is by some (Leland among them) given as if *μάλιστα* were connected with *χαρίζεσθαι*—but what follows as to Lasthenes shows that it is not so. Wolf connects it with *ἐχθρός*—but adds a superlative (*maxime*) to the *χαρίζεσθαι*.

This passage is repeated in the Fourth Philippic; which is indeed in

flatter themselves they are in favour with him. If they doubt it, let them look at Euthyrates and Lasthenes, the Olynthians, who, to all appearance, on the most familiar footing with him, after betraying their country to him, perished the most miserably of any.*—But with nothing is he more at war than with our Constitution; against nothing are his plans more steadily pointed; to nothing does he look more keenly than to how he may destroy it; and here indeed he acts consistently† enough; he knows full well that though he were to make himself the master of all the rest of Greece, he never could have any secure footing anywhere so long as your popular Government lasted, and that, should he encounter any of the shocks‡ which so often happen to all men, all whom he has now subjected to his power would be found§ flying for protection to you. For you are not by nature prone to grasping and usurpation, but rather famous for resisting the encroachments of others, and wresting their acquisitions from them; ready to make head against ambitious tyrants and restore|| liberty to mankind.—Can Philip, then, be

great part made up of passages from the other minor Oration, and most of all from the Chersonese. But the repetition of this passage has variations more remarkable than that of most others; and of these the most striking is, that instead of *σοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις*, it is *θεοῖς*—and he adds, as it were in passing, the exclamation *οἵ τε ἀὐτὸν ἐξολύσσειαν*—“may they utterly annihilate him!” Wolf notes the repetition, but as if it were without change (*Apud Reiske, Appar. Crit.*, i., 7.).—*προσέβω* certainly agrees better with *θεοῖς* than *ἀνθρώποις*—for with the latter it is an anticlimax; since no doubt he who was hostile to the very ground must be so to the inhabitants.

* It is well known they did not die—but were reduced to disgrace at Philip's Court; of whom it is related that when they complained of the people calling them traitors, Philip archly observed:—“These Macedonians are rough sort of folk—they call a spade a spade.”

† *Εἰς ταῦτα—πράττει*. In the Fourth Philippic it is *ἐξ ἀνάγκης—πεινῇ*. Leland renders it by “in some sort a necessity,” as if he had the Fourth Philippic under his eye—which he certainly had in a subsequent passage; but here it is only “consistency,” or some “likely reason.”

‡ *Πταίσμα*—“a fall from striking on anything”—“if he should encounter any of the many shocks which happen to man.”

§ *Ἦξεν πάντα κ. τ. λ.*—“it would happen,” or “turn out that all,” &c. But the force of “would be found” is the same.

|| *Ἐξαλείψαι*. “Assert the liberties,” as Leland has it, will not do. It is—“to remove,” “transfer,” “translate,”—i. e., out of slavery into liberty. Assert applies to resisting those who would enslave, as well as to freeing

pleased that your liberty should be lying in wait* for opportunities to molest him? Far from it; he is not so bad or superficial† a reasoner.

It behoves you, therefore, in the first place, to regard him as the enemy of our constitution, the implacable enemy of its democratic structure;‡ for if your minds are not imbued with this belief, you will never be strenuous in the prosecution of your measures. In the next place, you must be thoroughly aware that whatever he is working at and preparing, he is preparing against this country, and that whoever resists him anywhere, opposes him there in our defence. Nor is there any one of you simple enough to suppose that Philip is only bent§ upon possessing these miserable villages in Thrace, (for what else can we call Drongilos, and Cabyle, and Masteira, and the other places which he is now attacking and reducing?) or that to take such places as these he would expose himself to toil, and weather, and the greatest perils; while for the Athenian ports, and arsenals, and navy,|| and silver mines, and rich ¶

those already enslaved. Demosthenes plainly meant here the latter; he had already provided for the former by *ἰνοχλῆσαι*.

* Leland is exceedingly good here—"he sees, in your freedom, a spy upon the incidents of his fortune;" only that spy is not the word—it is some one lying in wait for the opportunity to spring upon him; it is one in ambush—and not a scout. Perhaps if such a thing as lending a figure to Demosthenes were ever lawful, Leland might have thus given it.—"Can he be pleased to think that your liberty is lying in ambush upon the march of his fortune!" Leland omits the answer, *οὐδὲ πολλοὺ δει*, and changes the sense of the commentary *οὐ κακῶς*; κ. τ. λ. by his translation.

† *Οὐδ' ἀργῶς*—from *ἀργός*, *q. ab ἔργον*.—Perhaps we might say, "in an unworkmanlike manner."

‡ Leland seems to consider the *ἐχθρός* simply as applied to *πολιτεία*, and the *ἀδιαλλάκτον* to *δημοκρατία*—and this is very possible; nor does it appear to be a refinement. It requires, however, in English, a repetition of the substantive. But he is plainly wrong in rendering *πολιτεία*, "state," and *δημοκρατία*, "free constitution:" the former is not used for *πόλις*, but always for "government," or "system,"—the latter for the "popular nature" of it.

§ *Ἐπιθυμῶν*, κ. τ. λ. Leland gives this admirably by "his desires are centred in these paltry villages."

|| Some MSS. omit the *πυρρῶν*—but there is no tautology in having both *νεωρίων* and that; for *νεώρια* may be "arsenals" as well as "navy."

¶ *Τοσούτων*—"so great,"—but not comparing them with anything else,—must be taken to mean "vast," "great," "rich." Leland renders

revenues,* he cared nothing, but suffered you to retain them all, himself willing to winter in a loathsome dungeon for the millet and rye of the Thracian store-pits!—No such thing—but it is to make himself master of your possessions that this and all his other enterprises are undertaken. *

What is the course, then, for wise men to take? Knowing and confessing all these things, to shake off that excessive and incurable† inactivity; to contribute money; to claim‡ the contributions of your allies; to make effectual provision§ for keeping on foot the regular army, in order that, as Philip has a force ever ready for outraging and enslaving all the Greeks, you may in like manner have|| one ready to save and to succour them all. • For with occasional levies¶ none of the military operations which are necessary can be undertaken; troops must be equipped, and magazines provided, and treasures, and a military police** appointed, and the strictest watch kept upon the military chest, care being however taken to make the treasurers accountable for the financial department, and

it “other revenues;” but nothing like revenues had been mentioned, unless, perhaps, the silver works—and *ποσούτος* is not “other.”

* Here, as in a former passage, he next year (in the Fourth Philippic) adds a fine sentence, greatly heightening the effect—*καὶ τόπων, κ. τ. λ.* (“and territory, and renown, which heaven forbid that either he, or any other conqueror of our country, should ever strip us of!”)

† *Ἀνήκιστον*. This certainly means “incurable,” though it may be only an intensive, like *ὑπερβάλλουσιν*;—for it seems like a contradiction to advise shaking off that which cannot be got rid of.

‡ *Ἀΐσιν* implies a demand as of right, *i. e.*, claim the quota they were bound to contribute.

§ *Ὁρᾶν καὶ πράττειν*—“see to, and act for, keeping up,” &c. Leland has it: “take all possible measures.” The more literal, “make effectual provision,” seems to include “see” and “do.”

|| *Ἐχρηται* and *ἅπαντι*, “have,” and “all,” omitted by Leland, as if too literal, give great force and beauty to this passage.

¶ *Βοηθείαις*. This word came to signify “a sudden levy,” or “raw troops;” hence to Attic ears there was no incongruity in this passage with the preceding requisition to have an army ready—*βιήλυσουσιν*.

** *Δημοσίους*. This may be an adjective, agreeing with *ταμίαις*, though separated by the *καὶ*,—the *καὶ* being, indeed, omitted in some MSS., and in Hervagius, and most editions. But Reiske seems well warranted in inserting it. The Treasurer, or Questor, *ταμίαις*, was necessarily a public officer, and *δημίσιος* means “gaoler,” “police,” *v. g.*, *Provost-marshal*.

the commander for the military operations. If you were to act thus, and be really* strongly animated with this spirit, you would either compel Philip strictly to maintain peace and stay at home (which is the best thing that could happen), or you would wage war with him upon equal terms.†

If indeed any one reckons that all this will require both a heavy expense and much toil and exertion,‡ he reckons rightly. Yet when he reflects on what will assuredly befall the country if we do nothing of the kind, he will find that we shall be gainers by doing cheerfully§ what ought to be done. But if the gods themselves were to engage for what no mortal could be trusted were he to promise, that you might remain inactive, leaving everything undone, and Philip should never attack you, it would still, by Heavens, be scandalous and wholly unworthy of yourselves, of the high destinies|| of the country, and the renown of your forefathers, to deliver over all the rest of Greece to bondage for the sake of your own ease; and for myself, I would much rather have laid down my life than be the adviser of such conduct. If, indeed, any one else will recommend it, and shall succeed in persuading you—be it so—cease to defend yourselves—give up the struggle. But if no one can be found to hold such language; if, on the contrary, we all plainly perceive that by how much the more wide we suffer him to stretch his sway, by so much the more vehement and more terrible an enemy we shall

* Some MSS. join *ὡς ἀληθῶς* with *ἀγρεῖν εἰρήνην*; but without it the *ἐπιλήσῃτε*, coming after the *ποιήσῃτε* is feeble—not to say, an anticlimax.

† A most beautiful addition is made to this passage, in the repetition of it in the Fourth Philippic. *Καὶ ἴσως, κ. τ. λ.* ("and then, perhaps, Athenians, as you now are anxiously asking, what is Philip doing? and whither is he marching? So the day may come, when he shall be solicitous to know whither the armies of Athens have gone; and on what point they will make their appearance.")

‡ *Πόγων καὶ τραυματείης*.—"toil and trouble," as well given by Leland—and quite literal. But the phrase has become with us applicable to other and lesser exertions than national ones.

§ *Ἐκόντας τοῖν τε, δύντα*, is ill rendered by Leland: "engaging heartily in this cause."

|| *ῥαρχιώντων*. Wolf and others render this, "dignity;" some, "glory." That is certainly not the true sense: it is literally, "the gifts of fortune," "the fortune or fate," and it may well mean here, "high destinies."

have to cope with, to what subterfuge* shall we betake ourselves? or why do we stand inactive? or when, O Athenians, shall we really set about acting as we ought? When, forsooth, some urgent necessity presses? Why, what every free man would call urgent necessity not only presses at this moment, but has long ago overtaken us;—and as for any necessity calculated to act upon slaves, let us pray that none such ever may arise. How do the two extremities differ? In this,—that to the free, the most urgent necessity is the shame of misconduct,—a greater I know none that can be named,—while the slave is only sensible to the blow and the stripe,†—and God forbid that should ever happen which it is degrading even to name!

Though I could willingly enter upon other subjects, and show in what manner certain persons misguide you by their policy,‡ yet I pass over these things. But as soon as Philip's affairs come into discussion, some one always rises, and dwells on the advantages of peace, the burthen of maintaining a large army, and the designs of certain persons on the public purse, with much more of such topics as tend to impede your operations and enable Philip to do in perfect security whatever he pleases; of all which the consequence is, you gain a holiday, a respite for the present from exertion,—which I much fear you may hereafter find has cost you dear,—while they obtain your good graces§

* Ἀναδύμεθα,—“get away from something we wish to avoid,”—“to escape,” “subterfuge.” Leland, “Why this reluctance?” and Francis has the same word “reluctant.” But this is not sufficient;—ἀναδύμεται denotes “rising out of the water”—the reversed operation of diving. Wolf's “quo subterfingimus?” is good.

† Δικαιοσύνη. It may be questioned if this is not from α and ἔκω—“unbecoming,” or “beneath dignity,” generally,—and here with τοῦ σώματος,—“bodily indignity,” and nothing more. This subdued expression may perhaps better suit the following phrase of “not mentioning,”—as the ἀποκρίσις may seem rather strong if “flogging” had been named in terms. Nevertheless, the ordinary meaning is the strong one, and Wolf abates none of it in “excarification.” Certain it is that Leland's “bodily pains” will not do,—nor Francis's “bodily tortures,”—nor Auger's “châtiment et coups,” (πληγαί, which precedes, is “blows” generally) —and least of all. Laharpe's “contrainte, violence, et crue des châtimens.”

‡ Καταπολιτεύονται may be dyslogistic—as advising a downward course—or a course against your interests; but probably it is only adversative—thwart you in their policy,—or by their schemes.

§ Δι' ἡμετέρας καὶ ὁ μισθὸς ὁ τοῦτων. Some render this as if it were,

and Philip's favour. For my part,* I can see no occasion there is to recommend peace to you, who, already quite enough disposed to it, are sitting with your hands across; it should rather be enjoined to him, who is engaged in warlike operations; for could he but be so persuaded, everything on your part is peaceable enough. What you should be taught to regard as grievous, is not the expense necessary for the salvation of the country, but the fate that awaits us if this expense shall be refused, if we do not prevent the squandering of our revenues by contriving proper checks, and if we abandon all charge of the public concerns:† although my indignation is moved when I see men so sorely distressed at the waste of our resources, which it is in your power to prevent and to punish; while Philip, plundering every part of Greece in succession,‡ and all manifestly to arm himself against you,§ gives them no uneasiness at all.

Whence is it, after all, O men of Athens, that he is thus openly carrying on military operations, doing acts of violence, taking towns, and yet no one|| of these creatures of his ever thinks of charging him with committing outrages, or even going to war at all, while the whole blame of beginning hostilities is cast upon those who are for resisting such violence, and against abandoning everything to his mercy? I can tell you the reason of all this.—That

"your favours and his wages,—or bounty;" but *τούτων* seems to connect *μισθός* with *χάριτες*. Wolf somewhat artfully avoids the pronouns, so as to leave it ambiguous,—"*gratiam consequantur et, quæ ex his rebus oritur, mercedem*;" but in his commentary he very plainly gives his opinion that it is *χάριτες παρ' ὑμῶν—ὁ μισθὸς παρὰ Φιλίππου*, and that *ὁ τούτων* means *διὰ τούτων τούτων λόγους*.—*Apud Reiske, Appar. Crit.*, i., 83.

* This is again the same sarcasm as at the beginning of the Speech.—*τὰ γὰρ ἂν ὑμῶν ἵτοιμα ὑπαρχόντα ὀρώ*—already noticed.

† This passage (particularly the close) has always appeared one of the most difficult in Demosthenes—not at all, as usual, from the words employed, but from the construction and sense,—namely, from "*καὶ τὸ διωρησισθήσεται*," to the end. As near as may be, this is literal—"and to prevent our property (treasure) being plundered by recommending a guard by which it may be saved, and not by departing from what is advantageous."

‡ *Εφεξῆς*.—"in its order."

§ Here the *καὶ ταῦτ' ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἀρπάζων* seems to defy translation.

|| "No one" *τούτων*, i. e., probably of those who got their *μισθός*, their "hire," before mentioned.

indignation which you are likely to feel* when you suffer by the war, our accusers would fain turn off upon us who gave you the sound advice, in order that you may condemn us instead of punishing Philip, and that themselves may play the part of prosecutors against us, instead of paying the penalty of their own misconduct.

This it is that makes them refer to some among us as wishing for war; this is the real source of all the altercation. But I know full well that before a single vote for war had been given at Athens, Philip had both seized upon many of our possessions, and sent to Cardia the auxiliary force which is now there.† If indeed it is our pleasure to affect to believe‡ that he is not making war upon us, he would be the most senseless of human beings to contradict us.—But after he shall have actually invaded us, what shall we say then? For he will still affirm that he is not making war upon us—no§ more than, by his account, he was making war upon the Oreitans when his troops were in their country—nor on the Pheræans the moment before he stormed their walls—nor on the Olynthians, at first, and until he was at the head of an army within their territory;—and shall we still go on charging those with being the aggressors, who would only prevent aggression? Then there is nothing left for us but at once to be his slaves.

* Leland here inserts a parenthesis, of which there is not a word in the Greek; but he takes it by some oversight from the Fourth Philippic, unless indeed some MS. or edition may have already transferred it from thence. The words are *ἀνάγκη γάρ—ἀνάγκη πολλὰ λυπηρὰ ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου γίνεσθαι*. It must be observed, too, that Leland's translation is as indifferent as possible:—"It is necessary, absolutely necessary, that war should be attended," &c., is really not the meaning—but that "war is necessarily, or of necessity attended with," &c. In Allen's edition, this paragraph is also here.

† *Νῦν* with the *πέπληται*, and after what precedes, must have the sense given in the text.

‡ *Μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι πολεμεῖν αὐτόν*, seems an order of words that connects the negative with the "pretending," and not with the "making war." But it must mean—*προσποιεῖσθαι μὴ πολεμεῖν αὐτόν*.

§ This rendering is necessary to preserve the force and beauty of the original; which is not constructed so as to connect the three cases put by the predicate of Philip's "telling the parties," but by that of his "not making war." It is negative—*οὐδὲ*—and it is to be remarked how much greater the effect of this is, than if it had been put merely that "he told the Oreitans, and told the Pheræans, and told the Olynthians."

Alternative* there is none between that and resistance, which we will not make, and repose, which we cannot have.

And indeed the perils to which you and other states are exposed are very different;† for it is not the conquest of this city that Philip aims at, but its utter destruction. He has long been well aware that you will not be his slaves, nor could if you would—for you have been habituated to command. And to give him embarrassment by seizing‡ on a critical juncture—that you can do better than all the world besides. Since then the struggle is for our existence, it behoves us to bear in mind, that they who have sold themselves to him, shall be holden in utter detestation, and suffer all extremities.§ —For it is impossible, it is quite impossible, that you should overcome your enemy without the walls, until you have chastised the enemies within the walls who are devoted to him; and against whom if you are driven as upon rocks|| standing in your course, you must inevitably be too late to cope with the others.

For how does it happen, think you, that he should be insulting you, (as I cannot for my part conceive but he is,)

* "Ἄλλο—μισαζὺν—"other middle course." But can this be called "middle course" between the two-things mentioned, and both of which are negatived? Or is it,—“There is no middle course” between being slaves, and one or other of the two things which are both out of the question? But the literal meaning is certainly that being slaves is a middle course, and the only one. Then, middle between what two others? “Alternative” seems therefore the fit word.

† "ἰπὲρ τῶν ἴσων is rendered by Wolf and others, *de iisdem rebus*. “Equality,” however, as if “equal terms of danger,” seems involved in the expression—though there is no material difference. Perhaps “unequal” renders it better.

‡ "Ἀν καὶρὸν λάβηται. Leland's “at an unfavourable juncture,” is not so good as the literal sense, “if you take, or seize on, a critical juncture;” besides, unfavourable means rather the relation of the juncture to the party seizing it, which is contrary to the sense here. Unless Leland means a juncture unfavourable for Philip, the version is nonsense; the meaning clearly is, “if you have a favourable juncture,” “if you have an opportunity.”

§ "Ἀποσυμψανίσαι—"utterly beat to death." The μισεῖν is so much less than “extreme abhorrence,” that it comes strange'y with this violent expression.

|| "Ὡς περ προβάλει; προσπταίνοντας. This is a figure which, however expressive, is for Demosthenes somewhat strong. Περὶ βόλος is “a rock in the way of a surge and on which it beats.” Leland's “s like on these, as so many obstacles,” has all the violence of the figure—i. e., the striking

and already menacing you, while he is overcoming others by his kindness, if by nothing else? Just as he allured the Thessalians into their present servitude by loading them with favours; and no one can tell by how many gifts, Potidæa among the rest, he gained over the wretched Olynthians.—The Thebans he is now seducing, after delivering over to them Bœotia, and relieving them from a long* and burdensome warfare. Now while these states have obtained each some accession of territory, yet they have all either already had to undergo extremities known to every one, or, happen what may, they will assuredly have to undergo them.† But *you*—I say nothing of the losses you have already sustained—but how have *you* been over-reached in the very act of making peace! and of how much have you been stript! Has not Phocis been wrested from you? and Thermopylæ? and your settlements in Thrace? and Doriscus, Serrium, Cersobleptes himself? Nay, does not Philip now hold the capital of Cardia, and does he not avow it? Why then does he conduct himself in so different a fashion towards others and towards you? It is because this is the only country where men have full licence to plead the cause of the enemy, and can in perfect safety receive his pay, while they are harassing you whom he has been despoiling of your possessions.—It was not safe in Olynthus to plead the cause of Philip, while yet the bulk of the Olynthian people had not been won over‡ by

upon enemies, without its picturesque effect. Francis is as bad as possible here,—“these quicksands upon which you strike, and upon which you are unavoidably shipwrecked,”—there being nothing like quicksands in the case, and nothing like striking on them if there were.

* *Παλλοῦ*. Wolf properly considers this epithet as applied to the *length* of the Phocian or Sacred war, and not to its *character*, as some understand it; *πολλοῦ*, says he, ἀντὶ τοῦ μακροῦ. Some MSS., however, omit the word altogether. It cannot mean “great” or “heavy;”—*χαλίστου* conveys that sufficiently.—Reiske, *Appar. Crit.*, i., 83.

† Leland gives this happily by a paraphrase; it is certainly not at all literal—but it brings out the meaning. They “are either involved in calamities known to the whole world, or wait with submission for the moment when such calamities are to fall upon them.” It should have been “await the moment;” “wait for” implies a desire for their coming.

‡ *Συνεπιπρονότων*—a word of much force, and indicating being received into the fellowship of one Power despoiling another—(like the Jackal with the Lion). The repetition of the same words in this fine passage, and the pursuing the same plan in the structure of the sentences throughout, are to

the possession of Potidæa. It was not safe in Thessaly to plead the cause of Philip, while yet the Thessalian multitude had not been won over by his casting out their tyrants and restoring their Amphictyonic right. It was not safe in Thebes, before he had restored Boeotia and extirpated the Phocians.—But at Athens, after he has not only stript us of Amphipolis and the country of Cardia, but has fortified* Eubœa like a citadel to overawe you, and is now invading Byzantium too,—at Athens it is quite safe to plead Philip's cause!† Hence it is that some of these advocates of his, from beggars have suddenly become rich, and from being nameless and obscure, are now eminent and distinguished, while you, on the contrary, from eminence have fallen into obscurity, and from affluence to destitution. For I certainly consider the real wealth of a state to consist in alliances—credit—public esteem; of all which you are destitute; and while you hold these in contempt and suffer them to be taken from you, Philip has become prosperous, and powerful, and terrible to all, Greek as well as Barbarian, and you desolate and low,—splendid, no doubt, in the unenvied‡ profusion of your merchandise,

be noted.—Also the πολλῶν and the πλείους,—though Leland drops these, and says merely “the Thessalians.” Auger is to be admired, however, chiefly in contriving to leave out all mention of either the συνυπερσπονδῶτων, the πολλῶν, or the πλείους. But the σύν may also imply “gaining over with,” or “as well as” the bribed (μισθωτοί) at Athens. Some MSS. have πολιστῶν for πολλῶν. Some too, and Hervagius follows these, have ἐνυπερσπονδῶτος, without the σύν, the second time it is used—and μηδὲν before it; but the bulk of the authority is the other way.—Reiske, *Appar. Crit.*, ii., 220-212. Some too have οὐκ ἂν ην—“it would not have been.” It is just possible that the πολλοὶ and πᾶσι may merely mean “people;” but the probability seems greatly in favour of a more intensive and specific meaning.

* Κατασκευαστός. Taylor gives this as the reading of his Aldine, instead of the present participle, which is in most editions; and the past certainly seems the right reading, both because it appears from the former passage that he had done the thing during the ten months of his absence from Macedon, and because of the καὶ νῦν παρίοντος which follows.

† Leland, who had appeared to see the fitness, because the effect, of retaining the same words throughout as in the Greek, *pecat ad extremum*—and drops them, changing the expression when he comes to the application to Athens—where retaining them was the most essential.

‡ Ἀφθονία, though generally used for “abundance,” yet here probably retains its original sense. In the Fourth Philippic, however, the expression is ἐνίστηρία, (κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν) “exuberance,” “plentifully supplied

but in all the things really valuable to a state, ridiculously destitute.

But I perceive that some of our politicians by no means lay down the same rule for themselves and for you. They would have you remain quiet whatever wrongs are done to you; while they can never remain quiet themselves, though no one is wronging them at all. Then, whoever rises, is sure to taunt me with—"So you will not bring forward a proposition for war; you will not venture upon that, timid and spiritless as you are?"* For my part, self-confident,† and forward, and shameless I am not, and may I never be! Yet do I account myself by a great deal more courageous than those whose counsels are marked with such temerity. He, in truth, Athenians, who regardless‡ of the interests of the country, condemns, confiscates, rewards,§ impeaches, by no means proves his courage in all this; for if he insures his own safety by such speeches and such counsels as are calculated to win your favour, he may be daring with very little|| hazard. But he who for your good oftentimes thwarts your inclinations; who never speaks to gain your good graces, but consults your interests always; who,¶

markets;" which repetition of the passage Leland seems to have had in his eye when he translated *ἀνίων*, "markets."

* *Ἀτολμος καὶ μαλακὺς*—"unenterprising and soft," literally; and perhaps that would be the best translation.

† *Θρασύς*. To be taken in a bad sense, but probably not in the worst. The Lexicographers make *θάρσος*, *fiducia* *audacia*,—"self-confidence" or "boldness," the root; but why it should be the root, and not derived from *θάρρειω*—the origin, in all likelihood, of our word "dare,"—does not appear.

‡ *Ἡξειδῶν*—"overlooking," "neglecting."

§ Reiske refers from *δίδωσι* here to *χαρίζεσθαι* afterwards; but the common reading being such, he changes it to *καταχαρίζεσθαι*, and says that it affords an explanation of *δίδωσι*. It rather seems as if *δίδωσι* explained *χαρίζεσθαι*. The simplicity and sincerity of this fine passage are quite moving.

|| *Ἀσφαλῶς*. This is clearly the meaning. Wolf drops the word, or makes it intensive to *θρασύς*—for his version is "*audax et confidens est*." Hervagius has a comma after *ἀσφαλῶς*, disconnecting it with *θρασύς*, which is plainly wrong. Leland merely says, "therefore he is daring."

¶ Commentators have often expressed surprise at this passage, as if it made the adoption of measures exposed to chance more than governed by design, a test of a statesman's capacity; whereas, choosing such as are under *λογισμὸς*, "reasoning," "calculation," is plainly the wiser course. But the meaning may merely be, that when, or in case he is compelled to

should he recommend some course of policy in which fortune may baffle the calculations of reason, yet makes himself accountable for the event*—he is indeed courageous—an invaluable citizen he truly is;† not like those who to an ephemeral popularity have sacrificed the highest interests of their country—men whom I am so far from wishing to rival,‡ or from regarding as true patriots, that were I called upon to declare what services I had rendered our common country, although I have to tell, Athenians, of naval commands, and public shows, of supplies raised and of captives ransomed, and other passages of a like description,§ to none of them all would I point but to this one thing, that my policy has never been like theirs. Able I may be, as well as others, to impeach, and distribute,|| and proscribe,¶ and whatever else it is they are wont to do; yet on none of these grounds did I ever choose to take my place,** or rest my pretensions, either through avarice or ambition. I have persevered in holding that language which lowers me in your estimation as compared

adopt a policy more under the control of fortune than prudence, he still takes the responsibility on himself. Perhaps καὶ should be read καὶ, "and if." In the great Oration, the same topic is dwelt upon, and in others.

* Literally, "makes himself accountable for both;" that is, both the goodness of the plan according to reasoning *a priori*, and the event with all the risks of fortune—both the design and the chances.

† The rhythm and inversion of the Greek are here beautiful. The force of the passage depends mainly on these—the diction, as regards the words themselves, being extremely simple—οὗτος ἐστὶ ἀνδρῆς; καὶ χρησιμὸς γὰρ πολίτης ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐστίν. The particle γὰρ gives also much beauty to the simple diction.

‡ Ζηλοῦν may be "envy" as well as "emulate."

§ Φιλανθρωπία. If the "such other" refers to the last antecedent, φιλανθρωπία is here "humanity;" but if to the whole enumeration, it must mean love of the community at large, *i. e.*, "public spirit."

|| Χαρίζεσθαι may certainly mean "ingratiate" generally; but coupled with the peculiar marks of ingratiating here given, *viz.* τὸ κρίνειν and τὸ δημεύειν, it is plain we must take τὸ χαρίζεσθαι in its other sense, of "distributing" the property of the persons impeached and proscribed.

¶ The sense may be this: "I might possibly impeach as well as other people, and gain popularity, and bring forward proscriptions."

** Ἐταῖα. In Leland—"a part I never assumed: my inclinations were averse." But the meaning of ἔταξα is, "placed myself upon," and πρεσβύχην "pretended" "put my pretensions on."—The text is literal, and it is English. Leland's is neither.

with others, yet which must greatly exalt you, so you will only listen to me. Thus much to have said, may perhaps not be deemed to be invidious. Nor do I conceive that I should be acting an honest part, were I to devise measures, which, while they raised me to the first rank in Athens, sank you to the lowest station among the Greeks. But the state ought to be exalted by the counsels of patriots, and it is the duty of us all to tender, not the most easy, but the most profitable advice. Towards the former, our nature is of itself but too prone; to enforce the latter, a patriot's lessons and eloquence are required.*

I not long† since heard some one talking as‡ if my advice was always sound enough,§ but words|| were all I gave the state; whereas it wanted deeds and actions. Now upon this point I will tell you what I think, and without any reserve. I do not hold it to be the province of those who advise you, to do any act whatever beyond giving you sound counsel; and that this is a correct view of the subject, I think I shall easily show. You remember how the celebrated Timotheus harangued you upon the necessity of succouring the Eubœans and saving them from the Theban yoke. "What?"¶ he said, "do you deliberate how to proceed and what to do, when the Thebans are actually in the Island? Men of Athens! will you not cover the sea with your ships? Will you not instantly arise and fly to the Piræus? Will you not draw down your vessels to the

* Leland gives nothing like the sense here—"not to be promoted but by the utmost efforts of a wise and faithful counsellor." In the speech there is neither "efforts" nor "utmost efforts" (unless *προάγεισθαι*—but that is limited to one thing), nor counsellor, nor wise, nor faithful—but there is "teaching" and "speaking," which are both omitted, *λόγῳ—διδάσκοντα*.

† *Ἦδη* requires this.

‡ *Τοιαῦτόν τι*—"something to this effect"—"to some such purpose as this."

§ Francis—"that I always speak extremely well." This is not the meaning at all. If *λίγω τὰ βέλτισσα* has anything to do with speaking, or words, it is "give fair words"—but the sense is "adverse"—or at least that the substance of the speech is good and sound. Francis refers it to the execution.

|| In the Greek it is *λίγω*, then *λόγοι*. The necessary change of the word in the translation is here, as often happens, prejudicial.

¶ *Εἰπέ μοι*—perhaps "what?" is as literal as "Tell me," or "say."

beach?"*—These were Timotheus' words; this was what you did; and from both concurring, the work was accomplished. But had he given, as indeed he did, the best of counsels; if you had remained immovable, giving ear to nothing that he said; would any of those things have been performed which were then done for the country? Impossible! And so it is with what I am now urging, and what others may urge. For deeds you must rely on yourselves; looking† to statesmen only for the capacity‡ to give you salutary counsels.

And now, after summing up in a word what I have to urge, I have done. I say you should levy the necessary supplies, should maintain the army on its necessary establishment—correcting whatever abuses may be found to exist, but not disbanding it altogether upon the first clamour that is raised—should send ambassadors wherever they can be useful in informing,§ admonishing, or anywhere furthering the interests of this country. But you should, beside all this, bring the men to punishment whose administration has been stained with corruption, and consign them to abhorrence in all times and all places, to the

* It is not so easy to see why the first question having been—"Will you not cover the sea with your ships?" the last should be, "Will you not launch your ships?" The difference of *πρὸς ἡμᾶς* and *ναῦς* will not explain this. Perhaps the difference alluded to is between ships already in service, and those not yet in use (or as we would say, in commission). Leland ingeniously has it—"Why are you not embarked?" but first the tense is wrong; for as Reiske has well observed, though *πρὸς ὑμᾶς* might be given in the present according to some MSS., *κατέλξετε* precludes this reading; and, secondly, the word is not at all "embark," but "launch," "draw down." In the First Philippic, where somewhat of the same idea occurs, and where "embark" is plainly meant, the word is *οὐκ ἐμβητόμεθα*.

† *ζητῶντες*, "look for," "seek for;" but in English this applies rather to what must come from others than from themselves; and this renders a change of the word necessary.

‡ *Ἐπιστήμη*—Wolf, following some MSS., is for leaving out this word, and inserting *τό*. The word must be admitted not to add much to the passage, and not to be in the manner of Demosthenes.

§ "Reform," in Leland, must surely be a misprint for "inform," the Greek being *διδάξοντες*. Francis has "notify;" it may mean so, or "warn," unless *νουθετήσοντες* means this, rather than "remonstrate," which both Leland and Francis give; certainly it seems like "suggest," "to put into one's mind," or "to remind;" but it is also used for "re-buke;" or it may even be "remonstrate."

end that those whose conduct has been temperate* and pure, may be shown to have consulted at once their own interests and yours.† If such shall be your course, and you no longer neglect your most important concerns, it may be that our affairs shall take a better turn. But if you sit down inactive, and confining your exertions‡ to acclamations and applause, shrink back§ the moment anything is required to be done, I can conceive no eloquence|| which, in the absence of every necessary effort on your part, will have the power to save the country.

* *Μέτριον*, "moderate," "measured;" but it also means "conformable to duty," and therefore "upright." *Δικαίους* which follows, however, is plainly "upright" or "pure," in opposition to "corrupt," and therefore *μέτριον* may be used to distinguish those who did not take the extravagant courses, *ἀμειπρία*, which at Athens were often mixed with corruption.

† Most translations join the *τοῖς ἄλλοις* with *εἰ βεβουλεύσθαι*,—which is not quite certain: it may be "in order to show them and all others." Wolf seems to join *τοῖς ἄλλοις* in this manner with *δοκῶσι*. But the doubt is, if *εἰ* and *βουλεύομαι*, there being no word *εὐβουλεύομαι*, be sufficient to denote "giving sound or honest advice," without a pronoun.

‡ *Ἀρχὴ τοῦ κ. τ. λ.* affords a happy instance of the full meaning being brought out by a choice of verbs and adverbs, without mentioning the *predicative*. Wolf, in his commentary, gives an admirable translation—"*usque ad applausum et laudationem rebus intenti.*" *Apud* Reiske, *Ap. Crit.*, I, 84. The force of *οἱ σπουδάζοντες* is here excellently preserved. In the translation he does not give so good a commentary—"hactenus duntaxat ut plaudatis et laudetis orationem studentes."

§ *Ἀναδύμενοι*. *Vide* former note, (p. 93.) Wolf renders it here by "tergiversemini;" which does not give the meaning. It is escape from a word.

|| Leland—"All the wisdom in the world;" but *λόγον* is here put in opposition to *τῶν*, and the applause referred to before, is plainly meant of speeches. Leland's turn of the negative, is, however, happy; and the passage may be rendered, "then all the eloquence in the world (or all the speeches) will fail to save the country,"—but the version in the text gives the precise meaning of the Greek.

NOTE.

THE Translation of the Chersonese Oration was given as an appendix to the Dissertation; but, two years after, Lord Brougham published in a separate form his Translation of the great Oration on the Crown. It was accompanied with the Greek text, and with an Introduction. This Introduction enters upon the subject of ancient oratory generally, and has been here inserted as a fit accompaniment to the Dissertation. The translation itself, as well as the Greek text, are omitted, as their length would be incompatible with the plan of the series.

ORATION ON THE CROWN.

INTRODUCTION.

THE attempt to translate the Greatest Oration of the Greatest of Orators into a language so different in its frame and idiom from that noble tongue in which it was pronounced, had long appeared so hopeless, that, after intentions repeatedly formed, the plan was for some years abandoned.

During the period of my retirement from Parliament after the general election in 1812, I had frequent communications upon this subject with one of the best scholars and most acute, though severe, critics of his time, my lamented friend Lord Dudley; and it was principally an argument of his that then turned me aside from the project. When pressed with the considerations which naturally suggested themselves in favour of it—among others the example of Cicero, who had made the same experiment on the Latin language,—his answer was calculated to make me pause, from its appearance of sense and force. “Either,” said he, “the translation is addressed to those who know the original, or to those who do not. The former cannot want it; the latter cannot materially profit by it; for no translation can give an adequate idea of the original.”

Subsequent reflection has served to remove the deep impression which Lord Dudley’s argument had made.

It must be considered, in the first place, that even to scholars the experiment is not without interest of trying how far the two languages can be used so as to render in the one the thoughts couched originally in the other; and even to scholars the comparative trial of the structures of the two, their resemblances, their differences, and their contrasts, is very interesting. Then, if indeed this be not

included in the preceding observation, there can no more accurate method be devised for well apprehending the force and genius of both tongues than such a comparative trial. Many things are sure to be thus observed which had previously escaped our attention: nor is it to be doubted that the sense, as well as the diction, of the original, is much more thoroughly perceived and felt after such an attempt. I can truly say in the present case, that although the exquisite original had been, for many long years, familiar to me in all its parts, the most remarkable of which I knew by heart, yet I never felt its incomparable beauties, both in the substance and in the diction, until I made the attempt at transferring them into our Saxon tongue; and although there is far less benefit in this respect to be derived from reading the work, yet whoever shall, in perusing, compare it carefully with the original, can hardly fail to profit considerably, and to discover merits and peculiarities which had before escaped him. There is something in this process resembling the advantage we gain in relishing the beauties of the ancient dramatists, from seeing their pieces performed instead of reading them. Many a scholar has felt how greatly his notions of Terence were improved by seeing a Westminster play—however well acquainted he may have been with the original by previous study. The examination of the Greek Orator's passages, with a view to their being delivered to an English audience, the consideration of the effects which they are calculated to produce upon such an assembly, and the feeling of their effects as given in our mother tongue, is calculated to produce somewhat of the same effect.

The example of Cicero must here again be adverted to. No one could more thoroughly know the Greek than he did, hardly even the Athenians themselves. He had practised declaiming in that language so much as to speak it with perfect ease. When he sent his *History*, written in Greek, to Posidonius at Rhodes, desiring he would write one in purer Attic, that Rhetorician said that the perusal of it filled him with despair of being able to improve the diction. Nay, when Molo, a teacher of rhetoric at the same famous school, heard him declaim in Greek, he is said to have lamented the complete subjugation of his country,

which must now yield the palm in Attic eloquence to the people whose arms had subdued her. Nothing, then, could have made the Great Roman undertake the task of translating the two Orations on the Crown, except the desire of trying an experiment such as we have been considering, probably with some such views as have just been stated. The loss of his Translation (of which the Introduction only has reached us) is deeply to be lamented. But we may venture to affirm that the English language is much better adapted to the task here exacted of it than the Latin. It is far richer in roots and in idiom; much titter than the dialect of a barbarous people to express abstract ideas and the other thoughts which the progress of civility and refinement gives birth to; indeed in all respects except the want of flexion, it is better able to convey with closeness the sense of the Greek original. The complacency with which certain French artists have expressed a conviction that their language comes nearest to the Attic of any, should make us suspicious of our national partialities and slow to claim for our mother tongue any decisive superiority—for it shows how far prejudices will warp acute minds. Yet still there seems good ground for affirming that the English and German, and generally the dialects of Saxon or Teutonic origin, when improved and corrected by judicious importations from the ancient tongues, are, of all others, if not the nearest in point of resemblance to the Greek, yet certainly the most capable of making its treasures accessible to those who are denied access to the original. Even against the superiority of the Latin in its conjugations and declensions (its greatest though not its only resemblance with the Greek) we may set off its want of articles; and how far its similar flexion has aided the work of translation may be seen by its failure where the exquisite diction of the Attic Orators was to be imitated. The famous passage in the *Παραπρεσβεία* of *Æschines* (*ταυτα ἕκαστω ποιῶν*, &c.) which *Cicero* had translated in the Oration against *L. Piso* ("*Hæ flammæ! Hæ faces!*" &c.), being one where the merit lay in the sense, is far better given by him than either he himself has succeeded when parodying the beautiful climax in the *περὶ Σεφάνου* (*οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταυτα, οὐκ*

ἐγγραψα δὲ, &c.) or Quintilian when professing to translate it, the exquisite diction being here the great beauty. In truth the similar flexion of the Latin carries us but a small way towards approaching the Greek. It has no articles, and so far, is inferior to the English; and as for particles, the Roman artists and ourselves are alike deficient in that great resource, as the equally signal failure of both in attempting the famous passage just mentioned may prove, the use of the particles being the source of the delicacy of the diction in that passage, and even of its perfectly luminous perspicuity, notwithstanding its extreme concision. The tenses which are peculiarly Greek, together with the particles, are certainly the great instruments by which such nice distinctions can be maintained, and such delicate shades of meaning expressed; and in both these particulars the Latin and English are alike at fault. As for the rhythm, there is assuredly no advantage in the Latin over our own tongue. The English is as sonorous; it is more musical; it is more majestic; it is more various. At an immeasurable distance in all these respects from the Greek, our music is on the whole superior to the Roman.

It is, however, necessary here to remark that, of the scheme of Cicero's work, we can only form an idea from the few sentences of the Introduction which describe it very generally; and that it appears from these to have been anything rather than a plan of literal or close translation. He seems to have set himself the task not of saying in Latin what Demosthenes had said in Greek, but of speaking in Latin as Demosthenes would have done had he been a Roman and not an Attic orator. This may certainly increase our regrets for the work, but it by no means shows that the experiment on the powers of the languages was made. If on the other hand the plan was (as is barely possible) to show how Cicero himself, with his taste, his habits of composition, his turn of thought, would have treated the same topics, all likeness to the original must have been lost, and we have little to regret in the work never having reached us; for in that case we have only lost one more Ciceronian oration.

Another object of translation, and which has by no means been lost sight of in the present work, is to assist

the student of the Greek language as well as the student of the rhetorical art. It is chiefly in this point of view that the learned Master of Rugby School (now flourishing beyond all former example under his auspices) has condescended to favour the undertaking; and the advice and assistance which I have received from him during the progress of my labours, demand my grateful acknowledgments. With the exception of a few pages, the whole translation and notes have been submitted to Dr. Arnold; and I have in almost every instance adopted his views of the text when they differed from my own. If, however, anything remains which may be supposed erroneous, I desire it to be assumed either that the fault is in my having retained my own opinion, or that the passage was part of the few pages which he happened not to see.

It remains to mention the third object of this work—the conveying to persons unacquainted with the original some notion of its innumerable and transcendent beauties. When one of the first scholars of the age, and the person of all I have ever known the most familiar with the Greek orators, urged me to undertake, or rather to complete the present work (if I were to add also, the first statesman of his age, I should be spared the necessity of naming Lord Wellesley), he was certainly misled by his friendly partiality of many years' standing, to think far more favourably of my fitness for the task, than could be justified by the specimens which he had seen in the translation of the Chersonese Oration, published a year or two ago.* But with his advice there coincided the strong desire of some much esteemed friends, admirable judges of composition and well versed in English oratory, to taste the streams which flow in such force from the perennial fountain of Attic eloquence, as near the well-head as their ignorance of the language would suffer them to approach. With them the experiment has proved eminently successful. They felt the wonderful power not only of the argument, but of the richly crowded statement, and of the noble declamation, in a manner which clearly proved that the translation had preserved a considerable portion of the

* Appendix to Dissertation on Ancient Eloquence. *Speeches*, vol. iv.

original. The music and the diction of course escaped; but upon the whole, this trial showed in a very satisfactory manner that, at the least, whoever was accustomed to oratory would gain by perusing the translation some idea of the Demosthenean manner. I have been encouraged by another friend well acquainted with both ancient and modern oratory, and himself a most distinguished speaker,* to believe that even on persons little versed in the arts of composition, the closeness, the vigour, the rapidity of the original are calculated, though only "seen as in a glass darkly," to produce a great effect. It was a remark of this excellent and experienced judge, on reading some of the notes where particular passages are pointed out as well adapted to succeed in our Senate, that the whole oration is eminently of that description; and therein it assuredly differs prodigiously from almost all the compositions of Cicero.†

Such were the impressions under which this work has been persevered in, and such the encouragements which have enabled me to bear up against the innumerable difficulties of the task. Among these difficulties, it certainly would only be a becoming tribute to my predecessors were I to enumerate either their success or their failure. But, with every disposition to follow so customary a practice, I really cannot honestly bring myself to do so, especially considering the Notes with which I have been obliged to accompany the text. The reason of this must now be shortly explained.

No one can deny a great knowledge of the Greek language to such men as Leland, and Francis, and Cesarotti‡ and Millot; nor indeed is Dawson in this respect

* Lord Lyndhurst.

† My learned friend also strongly urged me to undertake a task which I had long been contemplating, namely, an Imitation of the Great Oration, or some other ancient piece after the manner of Dryden's and Pope's Poetical Imitations. The delicacy of introducing parallel political topics, fertile as our times are of such, has hitherto restrained me.

‡ His translation will stand a comparison with any other; it is indeed, in many respects, deserving of much admiration; and as far as a foreigner may judge, it stands very much out from the common level of Italian prose. The Abate's taste, however, is often at fault. What can exceed the outrage of adding a whole figure to the Oath passage, and making the warriors "cover land and sea with their bodies?" as if Demosthenes wanted such a trope—as if the passage itself were not figurative enough!

at all deficient; while Wolff and Taylor must be admitted to have been among the most perfect masters of it. That both Leland and Francis, too, had very considerable power over the English language it would be absurd to deny; many passages have been rendered by both with success, some with great felicity. But one qualification for this task all those translators equally wanted; none of them had any practical experience of oratory; none of them had the habit of addressing popular assemblies, or even judicial bodies; none of them were orators either accidentally or by profession. If Pope had been ever so good a Greek scholar, and no poet, his Homer might have borne a nearer resemblance to the original, but it would have been the resemblance of prose to poetry. Had Dryden only written his admirable Prefaces and Introductions, works that might have placed him in the first rank of English classics even if all his immortal verse had perished, he never would have given us that masterpiece of poetical translation,—his fragment of Lucretius. It could only be a great poet, too, who might attempt to supply Pope's deficiencies, and add to English poetry the Homeric sense and style, as Cowper has done with a success unaccountably overlooked, and well calculated to alarm any translator who relies upon his knowledge of Greek and his power over English, for the accomplishment of a literal version. Now these who have rendered Demosthenes came to the task as Pope, Dryden, and Cowper would have done had they never written any of the poems on which their fame is built. They were Greek scholars, and not English orators; they knew the meaning of the one tongue, they did not know the resources of the other; they could understand in what manner Demosthenes affected an Attic audience, but only by reading Demosthenes himself; they had no knowledge of the manner in which an English audience was to be affected, nor indeed had they a practical knowledge how any audience was to be moved or controlled. Nay more, they not only were themselves no orators, but they had in all probability very little experience of oratory as auditors. Their lives had been passed in colleges or schools where, if rhetoric is taught at all, there is a very great chance of something exceedingly unlike real eloquence being learned

—possibly something the reverse of eloquence—for the true schools of oratory are the Senate, the Forum, the popular assembly. Their lives had not been passed in hearing the Erskines and Currans of the age, or in listening to Pitt and Fox, and Grattan, and Windham, and Plunket, and Canning. It was almost as if instead of Pope, and Monti, and Dryden, and Cowper attempting to transfuse Homer into English or Italian song, there had stood forward some one well acquainted with the Greek, a master of the Ionic and the Doric dialects, but who never had either written a couplet or read a line of poetry from the time of Chaucer and Dante to his own age. Such a one might be of excellent use in helping a poet as Pope and Monti were helped by men who knew Greek and had not the gift of song; but their verse would never have found a patient reader. It would be an exaggeration to say that the translators of Demosthenes have fared as ill as these would have fared—yet it is quite certain that what was altogether inevitable has happened to them—their versions betray at every step their imperfect acquaintance with the art of oratory; and whoever has been accustomed to address an audience, or even to pass his time in hearing great debates, would have at once rejected many of the turns of expression adopted by them, and have put the sense in another form quite as a matter of course.

It is a further consequence of the same deficiency, though not a necessary consequence, that those translators have been ignorant of the resources of the language in which they undertook to write. This has led, in all the modern tongues, in none more than our own, to the most mischievous practice into which a translator can fall—that of paraphrase and circumlocution—and still more that of preferring a foreign or roundabout turn of expression to the pure and racy and vigorous English idiom—the strong and natural Saxon dialect, never to be departed from without the most urgent necessity or the greatest temptation. Of this so many examples occur in the course of the present work, that it would only be a superfluous repetition of the remarks contained in the Notes, were any examples to be given here.

The present translation professes to be as close as it is

possible to make it without abandoning the peculiar idiom of the language in which it is written. How far any success has attended an attempt the extreme difficulty of which is most freely confessed as it has been most painfully felt, it is no business of mine even to form a conjecture.

It remains to acknowledge the great kindness of my old and valued friend, Thomas Campbell, who readily complied with the request that he would translate into English verse (of which he is so renowned a master) the Epitaph quoted by Demosthenes towards the close of the Oration. That a poet only could hope to succeed in this attempt has already, in discussing another matter, been incidentally observed—that such a poet was certain to succeed needs hardly be added. But one who has the highest hereditary titles both to Eloquence and to Poetry has ventured to suggest an alteration in one or two even of Campbell's verses, and with a success which he himself is the first to acknowledge.

Since the Notes were printed I have had occasion to peruse a French Translation which, had I before seen it, would really have prevented some remarks upon the paraphrase of Dawson and others. Thus, “*των ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν χάριν προσοφείλετε. Vous baisiez les mains avides qui vous lachent comme à regret quelque part de votre propre subsistence.*” Again, “*οἱ δ' ἐν πόλει καθειρξάντες ὑμᾶς ἐπαγούσι ἐπὶ ταῦτα, καὶ τιθασσένουσιν χειροθετοῖς αὐτοῖς ποιοῦντες. Comme des lions qu'on grille dans leur cage, ils vous enferment dans vos murs ; ils vous tendent à manger pour vous caresser, vous apprivoiser, vous faire dociles à leur main.*” Assuredly no English master of paraphrase ever went so far as to lend a cage of lions to Demosthenes for rhetorical uses. Writers of this class must be supposed to consider the old Greek a far worse orator than themselves.

There follows a discussion of the merits of different editors of the Greek, Reiske, Bekker, &c., which is here omitted, as the text is not given.

“RUGBY, *January 28, 1810.*

“MY LORD,—I found your Preface here on my arrival this evening.

“I am very much obliged to you for your kind mention of me, and I certainly am not insensible to the honour of being in any way connected with *your* translation of Demosthenes’ speech. But if the notice had been less flattering, I should have thought it better. I sympathize most heartily with what you say of the requisites of a translator, and there has all along seemed to be a beautiful fitness in an orator being translated by one to whom both oratory and political life were practically familiar. But I imagine that you over-estimate even the Greek of Leland and Francis. English Greek scholarship, I believe, even a few years back, was far short of that perfect knowledge of the language which is not uncommon now; such a knowledge, I mean, as enables a man to read Greek with exactly the same understanding and feeling as if it were English, so that he never goes through a process of mental translation, but the Greek speaks directly to the mind without any interpreter. I think that a want of this knowledge has hampered former translators, as well as that other great defect to which you allude so truly.—I remain, my Lord, your very faithful, obedient servant,

“T. ARNOLD.”

INAUGURAL DISCOURSE

ON BEING INSTALLED

LORD RECTOR

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

APRIL 6, 1825.

TO
THE VERY REVEREND THE PRINCIPAL,
THE PROFESSORS,
AND THE STUDENTS,
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

I BEG leave to inscribe this Discourse to you, in token of my great respect. Although the opinions which it sets forth are the result of mature deliberation, yet, as it was written during the business of the Northern Circuit, it will, I fear, as far as regards the composition, not be deemed very fit to appear before the world. Nevertheless, I have yielded a somewhat reluctant assent to the request of many of your number, who were of opinion that its publication would prove beneficial.

H. BROUGHAM, *R.*

INAUGURAL DISCOURSE.

IT now becomes me to return my very sincere and respectful thanks for the kindness which has placed me in a chair, filled at former times by so many great men, whose names might well make any comparison formidable to a far more worthy successor.

While I desire you to accept this unexaggerated expression of gratitude, I am anxious to address you rather in the form which I now adopt, than in the more usual one of an unpremeditated discourse. I shall thus at least prove that the remarks, which I deem it my duty to make, are the fruit of mature reflection, and that I am unwilling to discharge an important office in a perfunctory manner.

I feel very sensibly, that if I shall now urge you by general exhortations, to be instant in the pursuit of the learning, which, in all its branches, flourishes under the kindly shelter of these roofs, I may weary you with the unprofitable repetition of a thrice told tale; and if I presume to offer my advice touching the conduct of your studies, I may seem to trespass upon the province of those venerable persons, under whose care you have the singular happiness to be placed. But I would nevertheless expose myself to either charge, for the sake of joining my voice with theirs, in anxiously entreating you to believe how incomparably the present season is verily and indeed the most precious of your whole lives. It is not the less true, because it has been oftentimes said, that the period of youth is by far the best fitted for the improvement of

the mind, and the retirement of a college almost exclusively adapted to much study. At your enviable age, everything has the lively interest of novelty and freshness ; attention is perpetually sharpened by curiosity ; and the memory is tenacious of the deep impressions it thus receives, to a degree unknown in after life ; while the distracting cares of the world, or its beguiling pleasures, cross not the threshold of these calm retreats ; its distant noise and bustle are faintly heard, making the shelter you enjoy more grateful ; and the struggles of anxious mortals embarked upon that troublous sea, are viewed from an eminence, the security of which is rendered more sweet by the prospect of the scene below. Yet a little while, and you too will be plunged into those waters of bitterness ; and will cast an eye of regret, as now I do, upon the peaceful regions you have quitted for ever. Such is your lot as members of society ; but it will be your own fault if you look back on this place with repentance or with shame ; and be well assured that, whatever time—ay, every hour—you squander here on unprofitable idling, will then rise up against you, and be paid for by years of bitter but unavailing regrets. Study, then, I beseech you, so to store your minds with the exquisite learning of former ages, that you may always possess within yourselves sources of rational and refined enjoyment, which will enable you to set at nought the grosser pleasures of sense, whereof other men are slaves ; and so imbue yourselves with the sound philosophy of later days, forming yourselves to the virtuous habits which are its legitimate offspring, that you may walk unhurt through the trials which await you, and may look down upon the ignorance and error that surround you, not with lofty and supercilious contempt, as the sages of old times, but with the vehement desire of enlightening those who wander in darkness, and who are by so much the more endeared to us by how much they want our assistance.

Assuming the improvement of his own mind and of the lot of his fellow-creatures to be the great end of every man's existence, who is removed above the care of providing for his sustenance, and to be the indispensable duty of every man, as far as his own immediate wants leave him any portion of time unemployed, our attention is naturally directed to the means by which so great and urgent a work may best be performed; and as in the limited time allotted to this discourse, I cannot hope to occupy more than a small portion of so wide a field, I shall confine myself to two subjects, or rather to a few observations upon two subjects, both of them appropriate to this place, but either of them affording ample materials for an entire course of lectures—the study of the Rhetorical Art, by which useful truths are promulgated with effect, and the purposes to which a proficiency in this art should be made subservient.

It is an extremely common error among young persons, impatient of academical discipline, to turn from the painful study of ancient, and particularly of Attic composition, and solace themselves with works rendered easy by the familiarity of their own tongue. They plausibly contend, that as powerful or captivating diction in a pure English style is, after all, the attainment they are in search of, the study of the best English models affords the shortest road to this point; and even admitting the ancient examples to have been the great fountains from which all eloquence is drawn, they would rather profit, as it were, by the classical labours of their English predecessors, than toil over the same path themselves. In a word, they would treat the perishable results of those labours as the standard, and give themselves no care about the immortal originals. This argument, the thin covering which indolence weaves for herself, would speedily sink all the fine arts into barrenness and insignificance. Why, according to such reasoners, should a sculptor or

painter encounter the toil of a journey to Athens or to Rome? Far better work at home, and profit by the labour of those who have resorted to the Vatican and the Parthenon, and founded an English school, adapted to the taste of our own country. Be you assured that the works of the English chisel fall not more short of the wonders of the Acropolis, than the best productions of modern pens fall short of the chaste, finished, nervous, and overwhelming compositions of them that "resistless fulminated over Greece." Be equally sure that, with hardly any exception, the great things of poetry and of eloquence have been done by men who cultivated the mighty exemplars of Athenian genius with daily and with nightly devotion. Among poets there is hardly an exception to this rule, unless may be so deemed Shakspeare, an exception to all rules, and Dante, familiar as a contemporary with the works of Roman art, composed in his mother tongue, having taken, not so much for his guide as for his "master," Virgil, himself almost a translator from the Greeks. But among orators I know of none among the Romans, and scarce any in our own times. Cicero honoured the Greek masters with such singular observance, that he not only repaired to Athens for the sake of finishing his rhetorical education, but afterwards continued to practise the art of declaiming in Greek; and although he afterward fell into a less pure manner through the corrupt blandishments of the Asian taste, yet do we find him ever prone to extol the noble perfections of his first masters, as something placed beyond the reach of all imitation. Nay, at a mature period of his life, he occupied himself in translating the greater orations of the Greeks, which composed almost exclusively his treatise, "*De optimo genere oratoris*;" as if to write a discourse on oratorical perfection, were merely to present the reader with the two immortal speeches upon the Crown. Sometimes we find him imitating, even to a literal version, the beauties of those divine

originals,—as the beautiful passage of Æschines, in the Timarchus, upon the torments of the guilty, which the Roman orator has twice made use of, almost word for word; once in the oration for Sextus Roscius, the earliest he delivered, and again in a more mature effort of his genius, the oration against L. Piso.*

I have dwelt the rather upon the authority of M. Tullius, because it enables us at once to answer the question, Whether a study of the Roman orators be not sufficient for refining the taste? If the Greeks were the models of an excellence which the first of Roman orators never attained, although ever aspiring after it,—nay, if so far from being satisfied with his own success, he even in those his masters found something which his ears desiderated—(ita sunt avidæ et capaces; et semper aliquid immensum infinitumque desiderant†)—he either fell short while copying them, or he failed by diverting his worship to the false gods of the Asian school. In the one case, were we to rest satisfied with studying the Roman, we should only be

* Μὴ γὰρ οἴσθῃ, τὰς τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ Θιῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων ἀσιλγίας γίνεσθαι· μηδὲ τοὺς ἰσὶ βηκότας, καλὰ τινεῖς ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις, Ποινὰς ἐλαύνειν καὶ πολεῖν δασὶν ἡμῖν· ἀλλ' αἱ προσηγορίαι τοῦ σώματος· ἡδοναί, καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἰκανὸν ἡγεῖσθαι, ταῦτα πληροὶ τὰ ληστῆρια—ταῦτ' εἰς τὸν ἱπακτοκέλητα ἐμβιβάζει—ταῦτά ἐστιν ἐκείνῳ Παινέ—ταῦτα παρακλιύεται τοῖς νέοις, κ' τ' λ.—'ΑΙΣΧΙΝ. κατὰ Τιμόχου.

Nolite enim putare, quemadmodum in fabulis sæpenumero videtis, eos, qui aliquid impie scelerateque commiserint, agitari et perterrerī Furiarum tædis ardentibus. Sua quemque fraus, et suus terror maxime vexat; suum quemque scelus agitat, amentiaque afficit; suæ malæ cogitationes conscientiaque animi terrent. Hæ sunt impiis assiduæ domesticæque Furiae; quæ dies noctesque parentum pœnas a consceleratissimis filiis repetant.—*Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino*.

Nolite enim putare, ut in scena videtis, homines consceleratos impulsu decorum terrori Furiarum tædis ardentibus. Sua quemque fraus, suum facinus—suum scelus—sua audacia, de sanitate ac mente deturbat. Hæ sunt impiorum Furiae—hæ flammæ—hæ faces.—*In Luc. Calp. Pisonem*.

The great improvement in Cicero's taste between the first and the second of these compositions is manifest, and his closer adherence to the original. He introduces the same idea, and in very similar language, in the Treatise, *De Legg.*, lib. i.

† *Orator.*, c. 29.

imitating the imperfect copy, instead of the pure original—like him who should endeavour to catch a glimpse of some beauty by her reflection in a glass, that weakened her tints, if it did not distort her features. In the other case, we should not be imitating the same, but some less perfect original, and looking at the wrong beauty;—not her whose chaste and simple attractions commanded the adoration of all Greece, but some garish damsel from Rhodes or Chios, just brilliant and languishing enough to captivate the less pure taste of half civilized Rome.

But there are other reasons too weighty to be passed over, which justify the same decided preference. Not to mention the incomparable beauty and power of the Greek language, the study of which alone affords the means of enriching our own, the compositions of Cicero, exquisite as they are for beauty of diction, often remarkable for ingenious argument and brilliant wit, not seldom excelling in deep pathos, are nevertheless so extremely rhetorical, fashioned by an art so little concealed, and sacrificing the subject to a display of the speaker's powers, admirable as those are, that nothing can be less adapted to the genius of modern elocution, which requires a constant and almost exclusive attention to the business in hand. In all his orations which were spoken (for, singular as it may seem, the remark applies less to those which were only written, as all the Verrine, except the first, all the Philippics, except the first and ninth, and the Pro Milone), hardly two pages can be found which a modern assembly would bear. Some admirable arguments on evidence, and the credit of witnesses, might be urged to a jury;* several pas-

* There is a singular example of this in the remarks on the evidence and cross-examination in the oration for L. Flaccus, pointed out to me by my friend Mr. Scarlett (now Lord Abinger), the mention of whose name affords an illustration of my argument, for, as a more consummate master of the forensic art in all its branches never lived, so no man is more conversant with the works of his predecessors in ancient times. Lord Erskine, too, perhaps the first of judicial orators, ancient or modern, had well studied the noble remains of the classic age.

sages, given by him on the merits of the case, and in defence against the charge, might be spoken in mitigation of punishment after a conviction or confession of guilt, but, whether we regard the political or forensic orations, the style, both in respect of the reasoning and the ornaments, is wholly unfit for the more severe and less trifling nature of modern affairs in the senate or at the bar. Now, it is altogether otherwise with the Greek masters: Changing a few phrases, which the difference of religion and of manners might render objectionable,—moderating, in some degree, the virulence of invective, especially against private character, to suit the chivalrous courtesy of modern hostility,—there is hardly one of the political or forensic orations of the Greeks that might not be delivered in similar circumstances before our senate or tribunals; while their funeral and other panegyric discourses are much less inflated and unsubstantial than those of the most approved masters of the Epideictic style, the French preachers and Academicians. Whence this difference between the masterpieces of Greek and Roman eloquence? Whence but from the rigid steadiness with which the Greek orator keeps the object of all eloquence perpetually in view, never speaking for mere speaking's sake;—while the Latin Rhetorician, "*ingenii sui nimium amator*," and, as though he deemed his occupation a trial of skill, or display of accomplishments, seems ever and anon to lose sight of the subject matter in the attempt to illustrate and adorn it; and pours forth passages sweet indeed, but unprofitable—fitted to tickle the ear, without reaching the heart. Where in all the orations of Cicero, or of him who almost equals him, Livy, "*niræ facundiæ homo*,"* shall we find anything like those thick successions of short questions, in which Demosthenes oftentimes forges, as it were, with a few rapidly following strokes,

* Quintilian.

the whole massive chain of his argument ;—as, in the Chersonese, Εἰ δ' ἅπαξ διαφθαρήσεται καὶ διαλυθήσεται, τί ποιήσομεν, ἂν ἐπὶ Χερρόνησον ἴη ; κρινοῦμεν Διοπεΐθην ; νῆ Δία. Καὶ τί τὰ πράγματα ἔσται βελτίω ; ἀλλ' ἐνθὲνδε βοηθήσομεν αὐτοῖς. ἂν δ' ὑπὸ τῶν πνευμάτων μὴ δυνώμεθα ; ἀλλὰ' μὰ Δί' οὐχ ἥξει. καὶ τίς ἐγγυητής ἐστι τούτου ; or, comprising all of a long narrative that suits his argument in a single sentence, presenting a lengthened series of events at a single glance,—as in the Παραπρεσβεία :—Πέντε γὰρ γεγόνασιν ἡμέραι μόнай, ἐν αἷς—οὗτος ἀπήγγειλε τὰ ψευδῆ—ὕμεῖς ἐπιστεύσατε,—οἱ Φωκεῖς ἐπύθοντο—ἐνέδωκαν ἑαυτοὺς—ἀπώλοντο.

But though the more business-like manner of modern debate approaches much nearer the style of the Greek than the Latin compositions, it must be admitted that it falls short of the great originals in the closeness, and, as it were, density of the argument ; in the habitual sacrifice of all ornament to use, or rather in the constant union of the two ; so that, while a modern orator too frequently has his speech parcelled out into compartments, one devoted to argument, another to declamation, a third to mere ornament, as if he should say,—“ Now your reason shall be convinced ; now I am going to rouse your passions ; and now you shall see how I can amuse your fancy,”—the more vigorous ancient argued in declaiming, and made his very boldest figures subservient to, or rather an integral part of his reasoning. The most figurative and highly wrought passage in all antiquity is the famous oath in Demosthenes ; yet, in the most pathetic part of it, and when he seems to have left the farthest behind him the immediate subject of his speech, led away by the prodigious interest of the recollections he has excited ; when he is naming the very tombs where the heroes of Marathon lie buried, he instantly, not abruptly, but by a most felicitous and easy transition, returns into the midst of the main argument of his

whole defence—that the merits of public servants, not the success of their councils, should be the measure of the public gratitude towards them—a position that runs through the whole speech, and to which he makes the funeral honours bestowed alike on all the heroes, serve as a striking and appropriate support. With the same ease does Virgil manage his celebrated transition in the *Georgics*; where, in the midst of the Thracian war, and while at an immeasurable distance from agricultural topics, the magician strikes the ground on the field of battle, where helmets are buried, and suddenly raises before us the lonely husbandman, in a remote age, peacefully tilling its soil, and driving his plough among the rusty armour and mouldering remains of the warrior.*

But if a further reason is required for giving the preference to the Greek orators, we may find it in the greater diversity and importance of the subjects upon which their speeches were delivered. Besides the number of admirable orations and of written arguments upon causes merely forensic, we have every subject of public policy, all the great affairs of state, successively forming the topics of discussion. Compare them with Cicero in this particular, and the contrast is striking. His finest oration for matter and diction together is in defence of an individual charged with murder, and there is nothing in the case to give it a public interest, except that the parties were of opposite factions in the state, and the deceased a personal as well as political adversary of the speaker. His most exquisite performance in point of diction, perhaps the most perfect prose composition in the language, was addressed to one man, in palliation of another's having borne arms against him in a war with a personal rival. Even the *Catilinarians*, his most splendid declamations, are principally denunciations of a single conspirator; the

* *Georg. I.*, 493. *Scilicet et tempus veniet, cum finibus illis, &c.*

Philippics, his most brilliant invectives, abuse of a profligate leader; and the Verrine orations, charges against an individual governor. Many, indeed almost all the subjects of his speeches, rise to the rank of what the French term *Causes celebres*; but they seldom rise higher.* Of Demosthenes, on the other

* The cause of this difference between the Greek and Roman orators has been so strikingly described by a learned friend of mine, in the following note upon the above passage, that the celebrity of his name, were I at liberty to mention it, is not required to attract the reader's notice:—"In Athens," says he, "an incessant struggle for independence, for power, or for liberty, could not fail to rouse the genius of every citizen—to force the highest talent to the highest station—to animate her counsels with a holy zeal—and to afford to her orators all that, according to the profoundest writers of antiquity, is necessary to the sublimest strains of eloquence. 'Magna eloquentia sicut flamma materia alitur, a motibus excitatur, urendo clarescit.' Hers were not the holiday contests of men who sought to dazzle by the splendour of their diction, the grace of their delivery, the propriety and richness of their imagery. Her debates were on the most serious business which can agitate men—the preservation of national liberty, honour, independence, and glory. The gifts of genius and the perfection of art shed, indeed, a lustre upon the most vigorous exertions of her orators—but the object of their thunders was to stir the energies of the men of Athens, and to make tyrants tremble, or rivals despair. Rome, on the other hand, mistress of the world, at the time when she was most distinguished by genius and eloquence, owned no superior, hated no rival, dreaded no equal. Nations sought her protection, kings bowed before her majesty, the bosom of her sole dominion was disturbed by no struggle for national power, no alarm of foreign danger. While she maintained the authority of her laws over the civilized earth, and embraced under the flattering name of allies those who could no longer resist her arms, the revolt of a barbarian king, or the contests of bordering nations with each other, prolonged only till she had decided between them, served to amuse her citizens or her senate, without affecting their tranquillity. Her government, though essentially free, was not so popular as the Athenian. The severity of her discipline, and the gravity of her manners, disposed her citizens less to those sudden and powerful emotions which both excited and followed the efforts of the Greek orators. It seems, therefore, reasonable to conclude, that the character of Roman eloquence would be distinguished more by art than by passion, by science than by nature. The divisions and animosities of party, no doubt, would operate, and did operate with their accustomed force. But these are not like the generous flame which animates a whole nation to defend its liberty or its honour. The discussion of a law upon which the national safety could not depend, the question whether this or that general should take the command of an army, whether this or that province should be allotted to a particular minister, whether the petition of a city to be admitted to the privileges of

hand, we have not only many arguments upon cases strictly private, and relating to pecuniary matters (those generally called the *Ἰδιωτικοὶ*), and many upon interesting subjects, more nearly approaching public questions, as, the speech against Midias, which relates to an assault on the speaker, but excels in spirit and vehemence perhaps all his other efforts; and some which, though personal, involve high considerations of public policy, as that most beautiful and energetic speech against Aristocrates; but we have all his immortal orations upon the state affairs of Greece—the *Περὶ Στεφάνου*, embracing the history of a twenty years' administration during the most critical period of Grecian story; and the *Philippics*, discussing every question of foreign policy, and of the stand to be made by the civilized world against the encroachments of the barbarians. Those speeches were delivered upon subjects the most important and affecting that could be conceived to the whole community; the topics handled in them were of universal application and of perpetual interest. To introduce a general observation the Latin orator must quit the immediate course of his argument; he must for the moment lose sight of the object in view. But the Athenian can hardly hold too lofty a tone, or carry his view too extensively over the map of human affairs for the vast range of his subject—the fates of the whole commonwealth of Greece, and the stand to be made by free and polished nations against barbaric tyrants.

Roman citizens should be granted, or whether some concession should be made to a suppliant king;—these, with the exception of the debates on the Catiline conspiracy, and one or two of the *Philippics*, form the subjects of a public nature, on which the mighty genius and consummate art of Cicero were bestowed. We are not, therefore, surprised to find that those of his orations, in which he bears the best comparison with his rival Demosthenes, were delivered in the forum in private causes. In some of these may be found examples of perhaps the very highest perfection to which the art can be carried, of clear, acute, convincing argument, of strong natural feeling, and of sudden bursts of passion; always, however, restrained by the predominating influence of a highly cultivated art—an art little concealed."

After forming and chastening the taste by a diligent study of those perfect models, it is necessary to acquire correct habits of composition in our own language, first by studying the best writers, and next by translating copiously into it from the Greek. This is by far the best exercise that I am acquainted with for at once attaining a pure English diction, and avoiding the tameness and regularity of modern composition. But the English writers who really unlock the rich sources of the language, are those who flourished from the end of Elizabeth's to the end of Queen Anne's reign; who used a good Saxon dialect with ease, but correctness and perspicuity,—learned in the ancient classics, but only enriching their mother tongue where the Attic could supply its defects,—not overlaying it with a profuse pedantic coinage of foreign words,—well practised in the old rules of composition or rather collocation (*σύνθεσις*), which unite natural ease and variety with absolute harmony, and give the author's ideas to develop themselves with the more truth and simplicity when clothed in the ample folds of inversion, or run from the exuberant to the elliptical without ever being either redundant or obscure. Those great wits had no foreknowledge of such times as succeeded their brilliant age, when styles should arise, and for a season prevail over both purity, and nature, and antique recollections—now moretriciously ornamented, more than half French in the phrase, and to mere figures fantastically sacrificing the sense—now heavily and regularly fashioned as if by the plumb and rule, and by the eye rather than the ear, with a needless profusion of ancient words and flexions, to displace those of our own Saxon, instead of temperately supplying its defects. Least of all could those lights of English eloquence have imagined that men should appear amongst us professing to teach composition, and ignorant of the whole of its rules, and incapable of relishing the beauties, or indeed apprehending the very genius

of the language, should treat its peculiar terms of expression and flexion as so many inaccuracies, and practise their pupils in correcting the faulty English of Addison, and training down to the mechanical rhythm of Johnson the lively and inimitable measures of Bolingbroke.

But in exhorting you deeply to meditate on the beauties of our old English authors, the poets, the moralists, and perhaps more than all these the preachers of the Augustan age of English letters, do not imagine that I would pass over their great defects when compared with the renowned standards of severe taste in ancient times. Addison may have been pure and elegant; Dryden airy and nervous; Taylor witty and fanciful; Hooker weighty and various; but none of them united force with beauty—the perfection of matter with the most refined and chastened style; and to one charge all, even the most faultless, are exposed—the offence unknown in ancient times, but the besetting sin of later days—they always overdid—never knowing or feeling when they had done enough. In nothing, not even in beauty of collocation and harmony of rhythm, is the vast superiority of the chaste, vigorous, manly style of the Greek orators and writers more conspicuous than in the abstinent use of their prodigious faculties of expression. A single phrase—sometimes a word—and the work is done—the desired impression is made. as it were, with one stroke, there being nothing superfluous interposed to weaken the blow, or break its fall. The commanding idea is singled out; it is made to stand forward; all auxiliaries are rejected; as the Emperor Napoleon selected one point in the heart of his adversary's strength, and brought all his power to bear upon that, careless of the other points, which he was sure to carry if he won the centre, as sure to have carried in vain if he left the centre unsubdued. Far otherwise do modern writers make their onset; they resemble rather those cam-

paigners who fit out twenty little expeditions at a time, to be a laughing-stock if they fail, and useless if they succeed: or if they do attack in the right place, so divide their forces, from the dread of leaving any one point unassailed, that they can make no sensible impression where alone it avails them to be felt. It seems the principle of such authors never to leave anything unsaid that can be said on any one topic; to run down every idea they start; to let nothing pass; and leave nothing to the reader, but harass him with anticipating everything that could possibly strike his mind. Compare with this effeminate laxity of speech, the manly severity of ancient eloquence; or of him who approached it, by the happy union of natural genius with learned meditation; or of him who so marvellously approached still nearer with only the familiar knowledge of its least perfect ensamples. Mark, I do beseech you, the severe simplicity, the subdued tone of the diction, in the most touching parts of the "old man Eloquent's"* loftiest passages. In the oath, when he comes to the burial place where they repose by whom he is swearing, if ever a grand epithet were allowable, it is here—yet the only one he applies is ἀγαθούς—μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων—καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παραταξαμένους—καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχῆσαντας—καὶ τοὺς ἐπ' Ἀρτεμισίῳ, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐτέρους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις μνήμασι κειμένους Αἰῶθου'ς ἄνδρας. When he would compare the effects of the Theban treaty in dispelling the dangers that compassed the state round about, to the swift passing away of a stormy cloud, he satisfies himself with two words, ὥσπερ νέφος—the theme of just admiration to succeeding ages; and when he would paint the sudden approach of overwhelming peril to beset the state, he does it by a stroke the picturesque effect of which has not per-

* Milton applied this phrase to Plato, as well he might; but of the orator it is yet more descriptive.

haps been enough noted—likening it to a whirlwind or a winter torrent, ὥσπερ σκηπτὺς ἢ χειμάρρους. It is worthy of remark, that in by far the first of all Mr. Burke's orations, the passage which is, I believe, universally allowed to be the most striking, owes its effect to a figure twice introduced in close resemblance to these two great expressions, although certainly not in imitation of either; for the original is to be found in Livy's description of Fabius's appearance to Hannibal. Hyder's vengeance is likened to "a black cloud, that hung for a while on the declivities of the mountains," and the people who suffered under its devastations, are described as "enveloped in a whirlwind of cavalry." Whoever reads the whole passage, will, I think, admit that the effect is almost entirely produced by those two strokes; that the amplifications which accompany them, as the "blackening of the horizon"—the "menacing meteor"—the "storm of unusual fire," rather disarm than augment the terrors of the original *black cloud*; and that the "goaded spears of the drivers," and "the trampling of pursuing horses," somewhat abate the fury of the *whirlwind of cavalry*.—Δουλεύουσι γε μαστιγούμενοι καὶ στρεβλούμενοι, says the Grecian master, to describe the wretched lot of those who had yielded to the wiles of the conqueror, in the vain hope of securing their liberties in safety. Compare this with the choicest of Mr. Burke's invectives of derision and pity upon the same subject—the sufferings of those who made peace with Regicide France—and acknowledge the mighty effect of relying upon a single stroke to produce a great effect—if you have the master hand to give it. "The King of Prussia has hypothecated in trust to the Regicides his rich and fertile territories on the Rhine, as a pledge of his zeal and affection to the cause of liberty and equality. He has been robbed with unbounded liberty, and with the most levelling equality. The woods are wasted; the country is ravaged; property is confiscated; and the people are

put to bear a double yoke, in the exactions of a tyrannical government, and in the contributions of a hostile conscription." "The Grand Duke of Tuscany, for his early sincerity, for his love of peace, and for his entire confidence in the amity of the assassins of his family, has been complimented with the name of the '*wisest Sovereign in Europe*.' This pacific Solomon, or his philosophic cudgelled ministry, cudgelled by English and by French, whose wisdom and philosophy between them have placed Leghorn in the hands of the enemy of the Austrian family, and driven the only profitable commerce of Tuscany from its only port." Turn now for refreshment to the Athenian artist—*Καλὴν γ' οἱ πολλοὶ νῦν ἀπειλήφασιν Ὀρειτῶν χάριν, ὅτι τοῖς Φιλίππου φίλοις ἐπέτρεψαν αὐτοὺς, τὸν δ' Εὐφραῖον ἐώθουν· καλὴν γ' ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἑρετριέων, ὅτι τοὺς ὑμετέρους μὲν πρέσβεις ἀπήλασε, Κλειτάρχῳ δ' ἐνέδωκεν αὐτόν· δουλεύουσί γε μαστιγούμενοι καὶ στρεβλούμενοι.*—Phil. III. Upon some very rare occasions indeed, the orator, not content with a single blow, pours himself all forth in a full torrent of invective, and then we recognize the man who was said of old to eat shields and steel—*ἀσπίδας καὶ καταπελτας ἐσθίων.* But still the effect is produced without repetition or diffuseness. I am not aware of any such expanded passage as the invective in the *Περὶ Στεφάνου* against those who had betrayed the various States of Greece to Philip. It is indeed a noble passage; one of the most brilliant, perhaps the most highly coloured, of any in Demosthenes; but it is as condensed and rapid as it is rich and varied—*Ἀνθρώποι μιαινοὶ καὶ κύλακες καὶ ἀλάστορες, ἡκρωτηριασμένοι τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἑκάστοι πατρίδας, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν προπεπωκότες πρότερον μὲν Φιλίππῳ, νῦν δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ—τῇ γαστρὶ μετροῦντες καὶ τοῖς αἰσχίστοις τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν—τὴν δ' ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ μηδένα ἔχειν δεσπότην αὐτῶν (ἂ τοῖς προτέροις Ἑλλήσιν ὄροι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες), ἀνατετροφύτες (Περὶ*

Στεφ).*—This requires no contrast to make its merit shine forth; but compare it with any of Cicero's invectives—that, for instance, in the third Catilinarian, against the conspirators, where he attacks them regularly under six different heads, and in above twenty times as many words; and ends with the known and very moderate jest of their commander keeping “*Scortorum cohortem Prætoriam.*”

The great poet of modern Italy, Dante,† approached nearest to the ancients in the quality of which I have been speaking. In his finest passages you rarely find an epithet; hardly ever more than one; and never two efforts to embody one idea. “*A guisa di Leon quando si posa,*” is the single trait by which he compares the dignified air of a stern personage to the expression of the lion slowly laying him down. It is remarkable that Tasso copies the verse entire, but he destroys its whole effect by filling up the majestic idea, adding this

* The object of chief abhorrence to the old Greeks is remarkably expressed in this passage—*δισπόση*: is the correlative of *δούλος*—and the meaning of *δισπόσην ἑχουσιν αὐτῶν* is, “having an owner or proprietor of themselves,” that is, “being the property, the chattels of any one,”—and this they justly deemed the last of human miseries. The addition of the cart-whip, and a tropical climate, would not probably have been esteemed by them an alleviation of the lot of slavery.

† This great poet abounds in such master strokes. To give only a few examples. The flight of doves:—

“Con l' ali aperte e ferme al dolce nido
Volan per l' aër, dal voler portate.”—(*Inf.* v.)

The gnawing of a skull by a mortal enemy:—

“Co' denti
Che furo all' osso, come d' un cau, forti.”—(*Inf.* xxxiii.)

The venality and simoniacal practices of the Romish church:—

“Là dove Cristo tutto dì si merca.”—(*Parad.* xvii.)

The perfidy of a Bourbon:—

“Senz' arme n' esce, e solo con la lancia
Con la qual giostrò Giuda.”—(*Purg.* xx.)

The pains of dependence:—

“Tu proverai sì come sa di sale
Lo pane altrui, e com' è duro calle
Lo scendere e l' salir per l' altrui scale.”—(*Parad.* xvi.)

line, "*Girando gli occhi e non movendo il passo.*" A better illustration could not easily be found of the difference between the ancient and the modern style. Another is furnished by a later imitator of the same great master. I know no passage of the *Divina Commedia*, more excursive than the description of evening in the Purgatorio; yet the poet is content with somewhat enlarging on a single thought—the tender recollections which that hour of meditation gives the traveller, at the fall of the first night he is to pass away from home, when he hears the distant knell of the expiring day. Gray adopts the idea of the knell in nearly the words of the original, and adds eight other circumstances to it, presenting a kind of ground-plan, or at least a catalogue, an accurate enumeration (like a natural historian's), of every one particular belonging to nightfall, so as wholly to exhaust the subject, and leave nothing to the imagination of the reader. Dante's six verses, too, have but one epithet, *dolci*, applied to *amici*. Gray has thirteen or fourteen; some of them mere repetitions of the same idea which the verb or the substantive conveys—as *drowsy tinklings lull*,—the *moping owl complains*,—the ploughman *plods his weary way*. Surely when we contrast the simple and commanding majesty of the ancient writers with the superabundance and diffusion of the exhaustive method, we may be tempted to feel that there lurks some alloy of bitterness in the excess of sweets. This was so fully recognized by the wise ancients, that it became a proverb among them, as we learn from an epigram still preserved,

Εἰς τὴν μετριότητα.
 Πᾶν τὸ περιττὸν ἄκαιρον, ἐπεὶ λόγος ἐστὶ παλαιός,
 Ὡς καὶ τοῦ μέλιτος, τὸ πλέον ἐστὶ χολή.

In forming the taste by much contemplation of those antique models, and acquiring the habits of easy and chaste composition, it must not be imagined that all

the labour of the orator is ended, or that he may then dauntless and fluent enter upon his office in the public assembly. Much preparation is still required before each exertion, if rhetorical excellence is aimed at. I should lay it down as a rule, admitting of no exception, that a man will speak well in proportion as he has written much; and that with equal talents, he will be the finest extempore speaker, when no time for preparing is allowed, who has prepared himself the most sedulously when he had an opportunity of delivering a premeditated speech. All the exceptions which I have ever heard cited to this principle, are apparent ones only, proving nothing more than that some few men, of rare genius, have become great speakers without preparation; in nowise showing, that with preparation they would not have reached a much higher pitch of excellence. The admitted superiority of the ancients in all oratorical accomplishments, is the best proof of my position; for their careful preparation is undeniable; nay, in Demosthenes (of whom Quintilian says, that his style indicates more premeditation—*plus curæ*—than Cicero's) we can trace, by the recurrence of the same passage, with progressive improvements in different speeches, how nicely he polished the more exquisite parts of his compositions. I could point out favourite passages, occurring as often as three several times with variations, and manifest amendment.

I am now requiring, not merely great preparation while the speaker is learning his art, but after he has accomplished his education. The most splendid effort of the most mature orator will be always finer for being previously elaborated with much care. There is, no doubt, a charm in extemporaneous elocution, derived from the appearance of artless unpremeditated effusion, called forth by the occasion, and so adapting itself to its exigencies, which may compensate the manifold defects incident to this kind of composition: that which is inspired by the unforeseen circumstances

of the moment, will be of necessity suited to those circumstances in the choice of the topics, and pitched in the tone of the execution, to the feelings upon which it is to operate. These are great virtues: it is another to avoid the besetting vice of modern oratory—the overdoing everything—the exhaustive method—which an off-hand speaker has no time to fall into, and he accordingly will take only the grand and effective view: nevertheless, in oratorical merit, such effusions must needs be very inferior; much of the pleasure they produce depends upon the hearer's surprise, that in such circumstances anything can be delivered at all, rather than upon his deliberate judgment, that he has heard anything very excellent in itself. We may rest assured that the highest reaches of the art, and without any necessary sacrifice of natural effect, can only be attained by him who well considers, and maturely prepares, and oftentimes sedulously corrects and refines his oration. Such preparation is quite consistent with the introduction of passages prompted by the occasion; nor will the transition from the one to the other be perceptible in the execution of a practised master. I have known attentive and skilful hearers completely deceived in this matter, and taking for extemporaneous passages which previously existed in manuscript, and were pronounced without the variation of a particle or a pause. Thus, too, we are told by Cicero in one of his epistles, that having to make, in Pompey's presence, a speech after Crassus had very unexpectedly taken a particular line of argument, he exerted himself, and it appears successfully, in a marvellous manner, mightily assisted, in what he said extempore, by his habit of rhetorical preparation, and introducing skilfully, as the inspiration of the moment, all his favourite common-places, with some of which, as we gather from a good-humoured joke at his own expense, Crassus had interfered: “*Ego autem ipse, Di Boni! quomodo ἐνεπερπερευσάμην novo auditori*

Pompeio ! Si unquam mihi περίοδοι, si καμπαὶ, si ἐνθυμήματα, si κατασκευαὶ, suppeditaverunt, illo tempore. Quid multa ? clamores.—Etenim hæc erat ὑπόθεσις, de gravitate ordinis, de equestri concordia, de consensione Italiae, de immortalis reliquiis conjurationis, de vilitate, de otio—nôsti jam in hâc materiâ sonitus nostros ; tanti fuerunt, ut ego eo brevior sim, quod eos usque isthinc exauditos putem.”—*Ep. ad Att.*, I., 14.

If, from contemplating the means of acquiring eloquence, we turn to the noble purposes to which it may be made subservient, we at once perceive its prodigious importance to the best interests of mankind. The greatest masters of the art have concurred, and upon the greatest occasion of its display, in pronouncing that its estimation depends on the virtuous and rational use made of it. Let their sentiments be engraved on your memory in their own pure and appropriate diction. Καλὸν (says Æschines) τὴν μὲν διάνοιαν προαιρεῖσθαι τὰ βέλτιστα, τὴν δὲ παιδείαν τὴν τοῦ ρήτορος καὶ τὸν λόγον πείθειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας—εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὴν εὐγνωμοσύνην αἰεὶ προτακτέον τοῦ λόγου—(Κατὰ Κτησιφώντος). "Ἔστι (says his illustrious antagonist) δ' οὐχ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ρήτορος τίμιος, οὐδ' ὁ τόπος τῆς φωνῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ταῦτ' αὖ προαιρεῖσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς—(Ὑπὲρ Κτησ.)

It is but reciting the ordinary praises of the art of persuasion, to remind you how sacred truths may be most ardently promulgated at the altar—the cause of oppressed innocence be most powerfully defended—the march of wicked rulers be most triumphantly resisted—defiance the most terrible be hurled at the oppressor's head. In great convulsions of public affairs, or in bringing about salutary changes, every one confesses how important an ally eloquence must be. But in peaceful times, when the progress of events is slow and even as the silent and unheeded pace of time, and

the jars of a mighty tumult in foreign and domestic concerns can no longer be heard, then too she flourishes,—protectress of liberty,—patroness of improvement,—guardian of all the blessings that can be showered upon the mass of human kind; nor is her form ever seen but on ground consecrated to free institutions. “*Pacis comes, otiique socia, et jam bene constitutæ reipublicæ alumna eloquentia.*” To me, calmly revolving these things, such pursuits seem far more noble objects of ambition than any upon which the vulgar herd of busy men lavish prodigal their restless exertions. To diffuse useful information,—to further intellectual refinement, sure forerunner of moral improvement,—to hasten the coming of the bright day when the dawn of general knowledge shall chase away the lazy, lingering mists, even from the base of the social great pyramid;—this indeed is a high calling, in which the most splendid talents and consummate virtue may well press onward, eager to bear a part. I know that I speak in a place consecrated by the pious wisdom of ancient times to the instruction of but a select portion of the community. Yet from this classic ground have gone forth those whose genius, not their ancestry, ennobled them; whose incredible merits have opened to all ranks the temple of science; whose illustrious example has made the humblest emulous to climb steep no longer inaccessible, and enter the unfolded gates, burning in the sun. I speak in that city where Black having once taught, and Watt learned, the grand experiment was afterwards made in our day, and with entire success, to demonstrate that the highest intellectual cultivation is perfectly compatible with the daily cares and toils of working men; to show by thousands of living examples that a keen relish for the most sublime truths of science belongs alike to every class of mankind.

To promote this, of all objects the most important, men of talents and of influence I rejoice to behold

pressing forward in every part of the empire; but I wait with impatient anxiety to see the same course pursued by men of high station in society, and by men of rank in the world of letters. It should seem as if these felt some little lurking jealousy, and those were somewhat scared by feelings of alarm—the one and the other surely alike groundless. No man of science needs fear to see the day when scientific excellence shall be too vulgar a commodity to bear a high price. The more widely knowledge is spread, the more will they be prized whose happy lot it is to extend its bounds by discovering new truths, or multiply its uses by inventing new modes of applying it in practice. Their numbers will indeed be increased, and among them more Watts and more Franklins will be enrolled among the lights of the world, in proportion as more thousands of the working classes, to which Franklin and Watt belonged, have their thoughts turned towards philosophy; but the order of discoverers and inventors will still be a select few, and the only material variation in their proportion to the bulk of mankind will be, that the mass of the ignorant multitude being progressively diminished, the body of those will be incalculably increased who are worthy to admire genius, and able to bestow upon its possessors an immortal fame.

To those, too, who feel alarmed as statesmen, and friends of existing establishments, I would address a few words of comfort. Real knowledge never promoted either turbulence or unbelief; but its progress is the forerunner of liberality and enlightened toleration. Whoso dreads these, let him tremble; for he may be well assured that their day is at length come and must put to sudden flight the evil spirits of tyranny and persecution, which haunted the long night now gone down the sky. As men will no longer suffer themselves to be led blindfold in ignorance, so will they no more yield to the vile principle of judging

and treating their fellow-creatures, not according to the intrinsic merit of their actions, but according to the accidental and involuntary coincidence of their opinions. The Great Truth has finally gone forth to all the ends of the earth, THAT MAN SHALL NO MORE RENDER ACCOUNT TO MAN FOR HIS BELIEF, OVER WHICH HE HAS HIMSELF NO CONTROL. Henceforward, nothing shall prevail upon us to praise or to blame any one for that which he can no more change than he can the hue of his skin or the height of his stature. Henceforward, treating with entire respect those who conscientiously differ from ourselves, the only practical effect of the difference will be, to make us enlighten the ignorance on one side or the other from which it springs, by instructing them, if it be theirs; ourselves, if it be our own, to the end that the only kind of unanimity may be produced which is desirable among rational beings—the agreement proceeding from full conviction after the freest discussion. Far then, very far, from the universal spread of knowledge being the object of just apprehension to those who watch over the peace of the country, or have a deep interest in the permanence of her institutions, its sure effect will be the removal of the only dangers that threaten the public tranquillity, and the addition of all that is wanting to confirm her internal strength.

Let me, therefore, indulge in the hope, that, among the illustrious youths whom this ancient kingdom, famed alike for its nobility and its learning, has produced, to continue her fame through after ages, possibly among those I now address, there may be found some one—I ask no more—willing to give a bright example to other nations in a path yet untrodden, by taking the lead of his fellow-citizens,—not in frivolous amusements, nor in the degrading pursuits of the ambitious vulgar,—but in the truly noble task of enlightening the mass of his countrymen, and of leaving his own name no longer encircled, as heretofore, with

barbaric splendour, or attached to courtly gewgaws, but illustrated by the honours most worthy of our rational nature—coupled with the diffusion of knowledge—and gratefully pronounced through all ages by millions whom his wise beneficence has rescued from ignorance and vice. To him I will say, “*Hominibus dando: nihil habet nec fortuna tua majus quam ut possis, nec natura tua melius quam ut velis servare quamplurimos.*” This is the true mark for the aim of all who either prize the enjoyment of pure happiness, or set a right value upon a high and unsullied renown.—And if the benefactors of mankind, when they rest from their pious labours, shall be permitted to enjoy hereafter, as an appropriate reward of their virtue, the privilege of looking down upon the blessings with which their toils and sufferings have clothed the scene of their former existence; do not vainly imagine that in a state of exalted purity and wisdom, the founders of mighty dynasties, the conquerors of new empires, or the more vulgar crowd of evil-doers, who have sacrificed to their own aggrandizement the good of their fellow-creatures, will be gratified by contemplating the monuments of their inglorious fame:—theirs will be the delight—theirs the triumph—who can trace the remote effects of their enlightened benevolence in the improved condition of their species, and exult in the reflection, that the prodigious change they now survey, with eyes that age and sorrow can make dim no more—of knowledge become power—virtue sharing in the dominion—superstition trampled under foot—tyranny driven from the world—are the fruits, precious though costly, and though late reaped, yet long enduring, of all the hardships and all the hazards they encountered here below!

RIETORICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

TO THE

EDINBURGH REVIEW.

ROMAN ORATORS.

CICERO.*

A FREE translation of two chosen Orations, without any apparent object of illustration, and with no great felicity of execution, is evidently a proceeding which calls for the cognizance of the Courts Critical. Mr. Kelsall does not profess to give his book as a help to learners of the Latin language. He has added so few notes to the text, that explanation is clearly not his purpose; he propounds no new readings, nor discusses those of other commentators. Excepting a page of advertisement, he gives nothing by way of remark upon the original, or the matters connected with the history of the cause; and the postscript concerning Sicily is so avowedly unconnected with the body of the work, that he apologizes for introducing it. We are reduced, therefore, to the necessity of concluding that his view in this publication, is to clothe the two celebrated orations in an English dress, and exhibit a specimen either of Roman eloquence to those who are ignorant of Latin or of English diction applied to the topics and sentences—in a word to the composition—of the Roman orator. An adventure more alarming to such as have well studied the original, and are masters of

* *The two last Pleadings of Marcus Tullius Cicero against Caius Verres. Translated and illustrated with Notes.* By Charles Kelsall, Esq., author of a letter from Athens. To which is added, a Postscript, containing Remarks on the State of Modern Sicily. 8vo, pp. 370. White, London, 1812.

the comparative niceties of the two languages, cannot easily be conceived, unless perhaps the translation of Tacitus or the *Georgics*—which seems to be quite impossible. We suspect that Mr. Kelsall's literary courage would be somewhat diminished by a more intimate acquaintance with the tongues which it is the nature of a design like his to bring into contrast and competition. A few words may be premised upon both parts of the design.

The object of enabling mere English readers to taste the beauties of ancient oratory, seems scarcely worth the pains which it requires. For, in the first place, there are not many persons who care much for ancient oratory, to whom it is not accessible in the original languages,—a remark peculiarly applicable to the Latin: and then it is clear that the success of this attempt must be necessarily very limited, since the most exquisite translation, one which should be both perfectly close and perfectly English, would after all be only English oratory, in the part of rhetoric which consists of diction strictly so called. But it is plain that in order to enter into the spirit of the original thus far, in order to relish all its beauties, save those peculiar to the Latin, not merely a perfect translation would be required, but such a knowledge of customs, history, institutions—in short, of everything belonging to the Romans, except their language—as can scarcely be expected to exist in any one ignorant of that language. Without such a knowledge, however, the best possible translation must be a motley work in most cases; a production full of incongruity, and neither a Latin speech nor an English one.

The other object then seems to be the only one which deserves much attention; and, doubtless, there is a good deal to interest us in the experiment upon the genius of the two languages. The point is to show how the ancient orator would have expressed himself had everything been as it was in Rome, except the

language, and to see how near an English speech we can come, by skilful translation. As this must be a mere experiment on language, there can be no advantage in choosing subjects which tend to perplex it, by presenting forms of expression peculiar to ancient times. Nor, indeed, where the plan is to obtain a piece which will read as nearly as possible like an English speech, ought we to take one, the topics of which must perpetually remind us that it is a translation. The manners of the nations of antiquity were so different from ours—their religious systems, more especially, present such a contrast—and their mythology exercised so constant an influence upon their feelings and habits of thinking, that scarcely any of their oratorical compositions can be found which will not in some passages, translate it how we may, forcibly, and rather violently, recall to us its ancient origin, not merely by references to peculiar customs, but by the tone of sentiment that pervades them. Actions are observed to rouse the old orator's feelings, and events to interest him, which to us appear nearly indifferent, or such, at least, as would not bear to be dwelt upon before a modern audience. Many things with the Greeks and Romans most venerable, have not merely lost their sanctity in our eyes, but present contemptible, and even ludicrous ideas to us: hence, any allusion to them, or any expression of the feelings connected with them, or even a reference to the habits of thinking which those feelings have produced, must have an operation most unpropitious to the project which we are now contemplating. Yet something may be done by a sort of sympathy, where such passages are very splendid in execution, and do not occur at every step: we may work ourselves into a temporary state of feeling, similar to that of the orator and his audience; and, at all events, their infrequent recurrence may prevent any serious interruption of the design. But, surely, to select orations almost entirely composed of

them,—founded altogether on the peculiarities of the classical manners,—perpetually addressed to feelings which no modern can, without an effort of recollection, a commentary, a history, and a pause, enter into, and which he must be a scholar to understand at all,—is to adopt the precaution best adapted to secure the failure of the experiment. It is equally obvious, that to take for translation a speech more interesting for the substance than the composition,—valuable rather on account of the facts detailed in it, and the light which it throws upon ancient times, than for its rhetorical excellence,—is sacrificing the object which we are supposing to be in view, and recurring to the other, first mentioned, in its most questionable shape; there being little chance of finding persons ignorant of the original language, especially if it be Latin, yet so much interested in the concerns of those who spoke it, as to search after them among the remains of their oratory, instead of consulting histories and didactic treatises.

These remarks apply, we much fear, with no ordinary force, to the work before us; the production certainly of a sensible and accomplished man, and one whose opportunities appear to have been enviable of observing the remains of ancient art; a man, too, whose turn of mind, and cast of sentiment, we have every inclination to approve, from all the specimens of them that appear in his writings. Our first objection to his book is, that he has chosen the wrong orations.

It cannot be doubted, that, in the conduct of the great cause against Verres, Cicero displayed the whole resources of his genius. He was in the prime of life; he had the novelty to stimulate him of appearing for the first time as an accuser; he had, by a previous successful conflict, obtained the uncontrolled management of the impeachment; it was a child of his own care from the beginning. In collecting the materials, he had, as nearly as possible, been an eye-witness of the facts; he had arranged the cause with a view to

his own exertions; he had an audience of all that was noble, enlightened, virtuous, or refined, from every part of Italy; he addressed a tribunal at once popular and select; his clients were the oppressed people of a mighty province, in importance rivalling the imperial state; but, above all, he had such a subject, so copious, so various, so abounding, with the very topics which an orator would fancy to give his talents their full scope, that it was scarcely a merit to handle it with eloquence. Such a wonderful combination of circumstances never yet prepared the field for the triumphs of the art;—so grand an occasion for the display of forensic power, will, in all likelihood, never again exist. It is enough to say, that the orator surpassed by his execution the singular excellence of his materials; and, instead of being overwhelmed by their magnitude, only drew from thence the means of another perfection, in the skill and discretion of his selection. So at least all appears upon paper. But it abates somewhat of the interest which we feel in this renowned cause, to reflect that, with a trifling exception, it exists on paper merely; and that none of the orations against Verres were delivered but the first, which is only a short and general introduction to the subject.* Among the rest, the two which Mr. Kelsall has translated, were written only, and were published after Verres had brought the whole affair to a close, as far as judicial proceedings were concerned, by going into voluntary exile. Here, then, is our first objection to Mr. Kelsall's choice. It appears that the ancients so highly venerated the oratorical art, and were so much in the habit of regarding it as an art, and its productions as works extremely artificial, that they saw nothing absurd in what has among us become almost proverbially ridiculous, “a speech intended to have been spoken.” They had not, moreover, the

* The *Divinatio*, of course, we pass over, as not belonging properly to the case.

other facilities of publication which the press gives us; and, referring everything to their ordinary mode of communication, in popular meetings, they wrote and published speeches pretty much as our modern orators sometimes speak pamphlets; and would probably have held a speech made for the sake of being published, in as great ridicule as we do one that is published without having been delivered. Even the grand Philippic itself, the "*conspiciuæ divina Philippica famæ*,"* was in this predicament; and there seems some reason to doubt whether the finest of all his orations, the *pro Milone*, could have been delivered more than in form, under the circumstances of tumult and disorder which marked the day. Now, to pass over other considerations, with the knowledge of these particulars, nothing can be more grating to a modern reader, whose idea of eloquence is that of something natural, heartfelt, inartificial, and extemporaneous, than the manifest conviction of using artifice and preparation, which the orator incurs as often as we come to a passage only adapted to a speech, and still more in those instances where he had anticipated something which was to happen while he went on, and *provided* himself with an *extemporaneous* burst for the occasion. There are few passages of any merit or distinction, which do not fall within the first part of the observation; but we confine ourselves to the more glaring absurdity, as it strikes modern readers, of those passages that belong to the latter description. "*Superiori omni oratione*" (says Cicero, in the *Oratio Frumentaria*, alluding to one which was no more delivered than that speech itself) "*perattentos vestros animos habuimus: id fuit nobis gratum admodum.*"† The judges appear to have continued equally attentive to the end; for, in the *De*

* *Volveris a prima quæ proxima*—a form of expression which we do not criticise because accustomed to it as Juvenal's; yet no modern poet durst use so lame and prosaic a mode of reckoning to fill up his metre.

† *Act. II.*, lib. 3, c. 5.

Supplicis, we find him acknowledging again, “Quæso, ut fecistis adhuc, diligenter attendite.”*

So in the Second Philippic, which was written with the intention of not being published for some time, and certainly never meant to be spoken at all, sitting at his Formian Villa, he complains of Antony for filling the place in which he is speaking with armed men, and alludes to the senate being held in the temple of Concord,† which draws from him a passionate exclamation; and he afterwards gives a lively picture of the effects of his statement upon Antony, present and suffering under it. He is first terrified when a particular topic is mentioned: “Non dissimulat Patres Conscripti; apparet esse commotum—sudat—pallet, quidlibet, modo ne nauseet, faciat, quod in porticu Minutiâ fecit.”‡ Then after going through the topic, he mentions the effects which it had produced: “Num expectas dum te stimulis fodiam? Hæc te, si ullam partem habes sensûs lacerat, hæc cruentat oratio.” The Romans regarding an oration as we do a dramatic performance, in the light of a composition professedly prepared most elaborately, were probably no more offended with such marks of art, than we are in reading the dialogue and stage directions of a play. But anything that impresses upon *our* minds the idea of “*getting up*” anything *theatrical*, is so far from being tolerated in a speech, that we are thus wont to characterize it by names drawn from the stage, and never fail to feel disgusted with its introduction into the business of real life.

It appears somewhat doubtful to us whether Mr. Kelsall had obtained a very accurate knowledge of the history of the cause against Verres, when he began his Translations! Certainly some things occur in the first of the two, which look as if he thought they had been actually delivered. Towards the beginning of

* *Act.* II., lib. 5, c. 17.

† *Phil.* II., c. 8.

‡ *Ibid.*, c. 34.

the *De Signis*, speaking of two statues, Cicero says they were called Canephoræ; and proceeds as if he had forgotten the artist's name, and was reminded of it: "sed, earum artificem, quem? quemnam? recto admones, Polycleetum esse dicebant."* In the note to this passage (p. 116), our author observes, "Here, probably, some one reminded Cicero of the name of the sculptor;" whereas it is only one of the artifices to which we have been alluding, and of which the same oration affords a similar example, in the passage where he affects to be reminded, by a ring of Piso's, of something which he had almost forgotten.† The translator, however, has in another place committed a similar mistake in a more serious manner. It is where Cicero, arguing upon evidence, contends vehemently, and in abrupt sentences, that he has the most irrefragable proofs of Verres having carried the statue of Mercury away, and insists that it is in vain for him to deny it. "Publicæ litteræ sunt," he says, "deportatum esse Mercurium Messanam sumptû publico. Dicunt quanti; præfuisse huic negotio publice legatum Poleam. Quid? is ubi est? præsto est: testis est. Proagori Sopatri jussû. Quis est hic? qui ad statuam adstrictus est. Quid? is ubi est? testis est. Vidistis hominem et verba ejus audistis."‡ Our author supposes Poleas and Sopater to be actually called as witnesses, and examined during this part of the speech. He translates it thus: "There are written documents, and I do proclaim, that the Mercury was transported to Messina. They ask for how much? I say that Poleas was commissioned to do it. Where is Poleas? Here he is, listen to his testimony." (*Here Poleas is brought to the bar, and says, "It was removed by order of Sopater the Mayor."*) "Where is he who

* *Act. II.*, lib. 4, c. 3.

† *Ibid.*, lib. 4, c. 26. Quintilian mentions both these passages as examples of the same figure, IX., 2.

‡ *Ib.*, c. 42.

was strapped to the statue? Call him in. Listen to his deposition." (*Here Sopater probably gave his deposition; and having done so, left the Court.*) "You have seen the man, and heard his testimony."—(P. 68.) Now the whole of this is mere imagination, founded in mistakes of the sense, and humoured by twisting and adding to the text. The orator clearly asks all these questions, and answers them himself. He had been immediately before giving the history of Sopater's ill treatment; and coming to grapple with the argument upon the proof that Verres had carried away the statue, he shows it to be complete in all its parts. The passage should run as follows, for there are almost as many faults as words in Mr. Kelsall's version:—"The despatches state that the Mercury was conveyed to Messina at the public expense; they tell us the amount; they inform us that Poleas was publicly deputed to superintend this business. What Poleas? and where is he? He is here, he is a witness. But Sopater the magistrate gave the orders? Who is *he*? Why, the very man who was bound to the statue! Where is he? He too is a witness; and you have yourselves seen him, and heard his evidence!"—It argues no common inattention in our author to have fallen into this blunder; for in the part immediately preceding, Cicero refers several times to Sopater as having already given his evidence (see c. 39 and 40); and professes to give his account of the treatment of Sopater from the evidence. We will venture to say, that in the whole of the unspoken speeches against Verres there is no such fiction as Mr. Kelsall's translation here imputes to Cicero, that of suffering a witness to be called, and to give a particular deposition. In fact, the only evidence introduced in the course of these orations, consists of documentary evidence, read by the officer of the court: either despatches, or accounts, or depositions taken in Sicily, or those taken in the first action—a reference to

which last he evidently makes in the passage above. We are pretty sure, indeed, that no one can read these orations without being convinced that Cicero purposely relied on the evidence already adduced; for though he several times affirms that he has witnesses to carry his case farther, he holds this to be quite superfluous, after the body of proof already adduced. This is clearly the course which his excellent judgment would have pointed out, even if the orations had been delivered; but how much more expedient was it to rely on that evidence alone, when he was only writing against Verres speeches never to be spoken, and without the means of going beyond the testimony already adduced? In another passage (*note 36, p. 132*), our author appears still to treat these orations as having been delivered; but at the end of the notes to the *De Suppliciis*, that is, in the last two pages of the work, he states the fact as it really was. One is almost tempted to suspect that this important circumstance had till then escaped him.

Another objection to the choice of these orations, is their length. The experiment would have been much more conveniently tried upon a smaller scale. They are in fact the two longest of all Cicero's orations. In the space occupied by one of them, he might have included four or five of the most finished orations; those too which are less encumbered with details, and the beauties of which consist more especially in the composition.

But the radical objection to the choice of these specimens is derived from the nature of their subjects. That both of them are monuments of the transcendent genius of the master, and that their workmanship is exquisitely perfect, even in the parts least attractive to ordinary modern readers, we readily admit. But with a reference to the design of making that which shall as nearly as possible resemble an English speech, both subjects are faulty. The Romans regarded the statues

and pictures of their gods, the chief object of Verres's pillage, with religious veneration; and accordingly that pillage was viewed also as sacrilege. The vehemence of the orator, therefore, in exposing it, and the importance attached by him to every minute particular respecting the fate of each work, cannot fail to appear excessive in our eyes. Nothing can more clearly show the difference of the feelings with which the original and the translation must be read by those to whom they are respectively addressed than the peroration of the whole cause. It consists of apostrophes or prayers to all the deities, to direct the judges in their determination: but the topics by which he implores them are almost entirely drawn from the injuries offered to their statues and temples by Verres. His most enormous crimes—crimes that in all ages, and in every form into which society can be moulded, must excite equal horror—scarcely afford the matter of a single adjuration. If they are alluded to, it is in passing on to the matter more personally interesting to the gods and goddesses, and therefore more awful to the feelings of the audience. So it is in various other parts of these orations; where, after working our feelings up to the highest pitch, by the finest painting of vicious excesses and their miserable effects, the whole is wound up with what to us seems a pure anticlimax, a disrespect to some "Nymph of the Grot."

The *De Suppliciis*, which comprehends, in fact, the naval and military administration of Verres, as well as his cruelties, affords certainly a wider field, and presents us with new topics of permanent and universal interest. Yet there are few passages of it that do not in some particulars address themselves to feelings in which a modern reader can partake very little. The severity of Roman manners in some points, how lax soever in others, stamped a peculiar odium upon certain acts, to us merely indifferent. Other things, which we either consider as innocent, or at most

regard as excusable levities, were proscribed as contrary to that capricious, but stern decorum, the violation of which shocked their feelings more than the greatest enormities. Hence, such deviations are reprehended by the orator with a gravity which to us seems ludicrous; and even if we can get over that sensation, they are placed in such a manner upon the scale of delinquencies as to jar with our most rooted feelings. When he is making the father of Verres sum up his iniquities at the close of one noted division of the oration, the first acts enumerated are those of culpable negligence—the next of official corruption; then follows the connivance at and protection of piracy; then the judicial murder of citizens in furtherance of his collusion with the pirates; and after these enormities follow those of inviting matrons to a banquet, and appearing in public with a long purple robe. This last crime is frequently insisted upon, and the denunciation of it composes the chief part of that famous passage, so much praised by Quintilian for its picturesque effect in one place, and for its uncommon dignity in another: “Stetit soleatus prætor populi Romani, cum pallio purpureo, tunicâque talari, mulierculâ nixus in litore.”* No translation can be given of this, which shall have any pretensions to the climax, as well as dignity of the original; though certainly Mr. Kelsall does not lessen the difficulty by disjointing it, and throwing in his favourite “*My Lords*,” there being, by the way, no “*judices*” in the original. The harshness of the Roman feelings on many subjects presents still more grating passages. There is no more vehement declamation in the whole speech than that against his sparing a pirate’s life; and this not because the motive of the clemency was corrupt, but because it was intolerable that an enemy of the Roman name should be suffered to live longer than was

* *Act. II., lib. 5, c. 33.*

absolutely necessary. His chief topic is, that even the general who obtains a triumph only keeps the hostile captains, “ut, his per triumphum ductis, pulcherrimum spectaculum, fructumque victoriae populus Romanus percipere possit;”—and then, the instant the car sets out from the forum, they are flung into prison, and put to death,—the which seems to give the orator a wonderful satisfaction.* Yet we presume no one but an Indian orator would now venture on such a topic.

But this adoration of the majesty of the Roman people, is the diversity which most frequently and most violently offends the modern reader; indeed, it runs through almost every part of the oration. Thus, after describing the corrupt intrigue by which Cleomenes was entrusted with the fleet (for the same reason that Uriah was placed in the front of the battle), he breaks out into an ungovernable transport, and all because this Cleomenes was a *Syracusan*. He asks where he is to begin upon such a shocking subject; and after the most passionate strain of interrogation, and apostrophizing Verres, he exclaims, “O dii immortales? Quid? si harum ipsarum civitatum navibus,” &c.—“Syracusanus Cleomenes jussus est imperare? Non omnis honos, ab isto dignitatis, aequitatis, officiique sublatus est?”—and therewithal continues the topic in new details. The oration is, indeed, planned with a direct reference to this national feeling; which, far from exciting our sympathy, is to the modern reader almost as intolerable as it must have been to the unhappy sufferers under it. Having gone through Verres’s maladministration in all its branches—his peculation, extortion, and cruelties; having described scenes of cold-blooded murder, to which we verily believe Rome alone could ever furnish a parallel; after leading us through scenes, in which, among other

* *Act. II., lib. 5, c. 30.*

sights, we behold wretched parents dragged to the place where their children are tortured, that they may be compelled by their entreaties to purchase with their wealth the relief, that is, the death of the sufferers,—he comes to something far surpassing all this, and which, therefore, he reserves for the last place, and makes a distinct head of. What went before, he says, he had received in trust from the Sicilians; but he now comes to those topics “*quæ non recepta, sed innata, neque delata ad me, sed in animo sensûque meo penitus affixa atque insita.*” Such, it seems, was the Prætor’s “*furor, sceleris et audaciæ comes;*” such the “*amentia quæ istius effrenatum animum importunamque naturam oppressit,*” that he ordered Roman citizens to be flogged; nay, some were put to death in prison by his sentence of condemnation. Nor does the orator inquire with what justice; that seems to make no part of the aggravation; it is, that Verres would not listen to the famous plea of “*Civis Romanus sum;*” which proved an effectual security all over the world. But is there any worse act of frenzy to be conceived? It seems Verres has even surpassed this, by a deed reserved for the close of the speech immediately before the peroration, but of such a nature, that when first related to Cicero, he thought he should not dare to make use of it; and now that he has made up his mind to relate it, he knows not “*quâ vi vocis, quâ gravitate verborum, quo dolore animi*” he shall tell it. Therefore, as no words can exaggerate it, he thinks best to state it simply, and let it speak to their hearts. It seems Verres had first flogged, and then crucified a Roman citizen. The consummate orator, indeed, breaks his word, as to telling the story simply, for he involves it in such a burst of eloquence, as we shall in vain seek to parallel, except in his own works. In the whole, not merely of these orations, but of antiquity, is there no piece which exceeds this in dignity, and at the same time in the rapid and fervid

torrent of the composition. It is a storehouse from whence the finest examples of almost every kind of figure have been drawn: and yet more wonderful than the boldness and propriety of those figures is the beautiful and judicious disposition of them. Nor is there a doubt that the admirable discretion of the passage crowns the whole, and exemplifies the orator's own rule, the golden canon of the art, that whatever does not promote the main object of the oration is to be rejected as a deformity, how fair soever it be to the eye; for, having called to our recollection what were the feelings of the Romans on such subjects, we cannot question the prodigious effect which such a passage must have had upon them if delivered. Yet with all these temptations to the task, we have no hesitation in pronouncing the translation of this great specimen impossible, were it for no other reason but because an English reader has not the feelings and associations to which almost every word of it appeals. The leading idea of the cross and crucifixion, and consequently the words that convey it, are consecrated by religious associations: the inviolable nature of a Roman citizen, his inexpressible dignity in the eyes of barbarians, can only, in modern times, be felt by white colonists in the West Indies. Whatever feelings we may have of this topic are merely reflex, the result of thinking and effort and recollection.

We have been seduced into so long a disquisition on these points, that we must hurry over the other general remarks which present themselves, and only observe, that the vehemence which distinguishes the finer parts of these orations, is another reason against having selected them. Ancient eloquence, in general, deals much more in exclamation than our subdued and northern temperament can bear. We somewhat resemble those Romans who piqued themselves on a close imitation of the chaste Attic style, and carried it so far as to become cold rather than chaste, and thus

to lose all resemblance with their models.* The best kind of oration, then, to translate, would be one of less vehement and abrupt passion than those against Verres, which have the fervour of Roman declamation in peculiar excess.

We now come to the more important question, in what manner our author has attempted a task thus infinitely difficult—what approaches he has made towards a success clearly unattainable. In order to execute well a translation undertaken with the views in question, a person must not only know Latin thoroughly, but English; and, moreover, he must be himself an orator. This is quite essential; as much so as it is for a translator of Latin poetry to be a poet. We much fear it will be found that Mr. Kelsall has mistaken his forte, as well as his book, and appears in the light of one who, unable to write verses, should translate a part of Virgil, and choose for his part the second Georgic. We should conclude, from any one page of his book, that he never had turned his attention to the art of oratory. To say that he has utterly failed in rendering the *De Suppliciis*, then, is only like telling one who handles a violin for the first time, that he does not make it “discourse music.” We mean no further disrespect to Mr. Kelsall than this. His work is not a volume of English eloquence; and if he wrote it with any other design, our criticism does not touch him. To give instances of this cardinal defect would be endless. We shall select one or two of the most noted passages, and see how he has treated them, observing that he has the peculiar bad fortune to be guilty of mistranslations in some of the most critical parts, and sometimes to commit at the same moment another mistake, still more common in these pages, the introduction of a ludicrous or undignified English expression.

* Cicero, in his *Brutus*, rallies them pleasantly, by saying, “Let them be as Attic as they please, I expect the benches to empty as soon as they begin.”

The first shall be that celebrated climax and personification :—

“Facinus est vinciri civem Romanum: Scelus verberari; prope parricidium, necari: quid dicam in crucem tolli? Verbo satis digno tam nefaria res appellari nullo modo potest. Non fuit his omnibus iste contentus. Spectet, inquit, patriam; in conspectû legum libertatisque moriatur. Non tu hoc loco Gavius, non *unum* hominem, *nescio quem*, civem Romanum, sed communem libertatis et civitatis causam in illum *cruciatum* et crucem egisti.”

Our author thus renders it :—

“It is contrary to law that a Roman citizen be bound; it is a crime to submit him to stripes; it is almost parricide to put him to death: What can I say if he be crucified? So nefarious a deed cannot be expressed in adequate language. But he was not content with the infliction of all these *punishments*; ‘*Let him die,*’ he cries, ‘as he beholds his native shores; let him die in the presence of *his own* laws—of liberty.’ It was not here that you crucified Gavius, nor any Roman citizen; you nailed to the cross the common cause of Liberty and of the Republic.”

Now, here is both omission and redundancy. The words in italics in the Latin are left out in the translation, while for the words similarly printed in the latter, there is no authority in the former. The meaning is misconceived in other parts. *Civitatis* is evidently here the right of citizenship in the abstract; *legum, libertatisque*, are not *his own*: and “*It was not here,*” &c., is equally wrong; the original is, “*It was not Gavius,*” &c. But though this is by no means one of Mr. K.’s worst passages, our objection to it is general. Perhaps the following comes somewhat nearer a mark, necessarily removed to an unapproachable distance :—

“It is criminal to bind a Roman citizen—it is a wickedness to scourge him—to put him to death is all but parricide—What shall we say if he be crucified? Language has no name for so flagrant an enormity. Yet did not all this satisfy that man. ‘Let him be placed in view of his country,’ he cries; ‘let his dying looks be turned towards liberty and the laws!’ It was not

Gavius; it was not an obscure individual; it was not a single Roman citizen; but the common cause of freedom, and of all the citizens of Rome, that you there crucified and tortured."

The next shall be a passage of singularly beautiful diction in the original:—

"Homines tennes, obscuro loco nati, navigant: adeunt ad ea loca quæ nunquam antea viderunt; ubi neque noti esse iis quo venerunt, neque semper cum cognitoribus esse possunt. Hac unâ tamen fiducia civitatis non modo apud nostros magistratus qui et legum et existimationis periculo continentur, neque apud cives solum Romanos qui et sermonis, et juris, et multarum rerum societate juncti sunt, fore se tutos arbitrantur; sed quocunque venerint, hanc sibi rem præsidio sperant futuram."

Our author translates it thus:—

"Men of small property, born in an obscure place, traverse the seas, and touch at places which they never before saw, who are neither able to make it known whence they came, nor can they be always recognized: they are nevertheless thinking themselves secure by confiding in the protection of the name of Rome;—not merely from our magistrates, who are obligated by law and other risks of losing reputation—not merely from Roman citizens, who are connected with them by language, laws, commerce;—but wherever they go, they believe that this name alone will afford them protection."

First, as to the Latin: *Obscuro loco nati* is not "born in an obscure place," but men in an humble condition. *Quo* is *whither*, not *whence*. *Cognitores* means *vouchers*, or sureties, not persons who recognize.

The following is our author's translation of the fine passage where he closes the account of the murders committed in the hope of suppressing evidence:—

"Who was so callous, so inexorable, but you alone; as not to be affected at their misery, age, and condition? Was there any one who could refrain from tears? Who did not think that the calamity came home to them, and that the fortune of all was endangered? They are decapitated. You exult and triumph in their groans. you rejoice that the witnesses of your avarice are out of the way. You was mistaken, Verres, you was vehemently mistaken, if you imagined that the spots of your depredations and iniquities could be washed out by the

blood of our innocent friends. You was hurried headlong by frenzy, in thinking that the wounds occasioned by your avarice could be healed by your cruel proscriptions."

The spirit of the original is here flattened in every line; thus "*avaritiæ vulnera crudelitatis remediis sanare*" is an epigram wholly lost by the translator. "*Omnium gemitû*" certainly refers to the bystanders, not the victims. *Decapitate* is a very bad phrase. *Durus* and *ferreus* are ill rendered by *callous*; and *inhumanus* by *inexorable*. *Illo tempore* is omitted. The passage may be better given thus:—

"Who was there at that moment, of so hard, so iron a nature—what creature except yourself alone so inhuman, as not to be touched with the venerable age, the illustrious rank, the cruel sufferings, of those wretched men? Who could refrain from weeping, or fail to see in their fate a kindred destiny and a common danger? They are beheaded. You exult, you triumph in the midst of the groans which everywhere arise; you rejoice in having got rid of the witnesses to your extortions. You deceived yourself, Verres, you egregiously deceived yourself, if you hoped to wash out the stains of your rapine and profligacy with the blood of our unoffending allies! Headlong in frenzy must you have been borne, to fancy that cruelty could heal over the wounds which avarice had inflicted!"

The last instance shall be from that beautiful passage where he describes the steep and difficult path by which he is forced to rise in the state, and contrasts it with the hereditary eminence of his supposed audience; complaining, too, of the cold and unkind treatment which men of his rank were accustomed to experience from the aristocracy. It is difficult to read this passage without being reminded of Mr. Burke's celebrated letter, in which he says, "I was not swaddled and rocked and dandled into a legislator: *Nitor in adversum*, is the motto for a man like me."* The

* *Works*. 8vo edition. Vol. viii., 28. See, too, a striking remark in one of the volumes just published, respecting the constant suspicions of having *some interest* in view, to which his zeal exposed him.—IX., 155.

whole is worthy of being compared with the original Latin. Mr. K.'s translation is not like either.

"Some one, perchance, will ask, Will you then undergo this labour? Will you brave the enmities of so many individuals? Certainly I do not court their hatred. *But I am not to act as those noblemen who receive with indifference the benefits heaped upon them by the Roman people. I must run a very different course in this commonwealth.*

"We have lately witnessed L. Fimbria, C. Marius, and C. Coelius, contending, with no moderate share of exertion and enmity, to arrive at those honours which you have attained by trivial occupations and neglect. This is the path I intend to tread; these are the examples I purpose to follow. We see how much the virtue and industry of heads of families is obnoxious to the envy and hatred of certain nobles. If we cast our eyes ever so little askance, snares are immediately at hand: If we disclose any grounds for the suspicion of guilt, wounds must be received. We see we must be ever on our guard, ever on the alert. Are these then enmities? let them be braved. Are these then labours? let them be undergone. Indeed, occult and secret hatreds are more to be dreaded than declared and manifest. Scarcely do any nobles look upon our exertions with a favourable eye. It is impossible, with all our endeavours, to attract their good-will. As if disjoined by nature and species, so are they abhorrent of us in will and disposition."

The whole meaning of the original is here lost. The lines in Italics are a perversion of the sense. The Latin is, "*Non idem mihi licet quod iis qui nobili generi nati sunt, quibus omnia populi Romani beneficia dormientibus deferuntur: longe alia mihi lege in hac civitate et conditione vivendum est.*" To call *novi homines*, *heads of families*, is absurd; he must mean *founders* of families. "*Suspicioni aut crimini*" is suspicion or *charge*, not "*suspicion of guilt.*"

Although we certainly do not accuse the author of ignorance of Latin, yet his carelessness does most frequently subject him to suspicions of this sort. Thus, in p. 248, he renders "*commemoratio mei nominis*," "*the remembrance of my name*," in the supposed address of Verres's father; whereas it is plainly the "*mention*" of it by the unhappy wretches whom he

was torturing. In p. 214, "*vir accumberet nemo præter ipsum et prætextatum filium*" is rendered, apparently in order to introduce a *bull*, as well as a false translation, "no man but himself and his son, a mere youth, had access to him," instead of "no man sat down to table." In p. 210, "*pæne damnatus*" is turned into "even in *the jaws of damnation*," by a still more absurd blunder; and in p. 226, "*importuni tyranni*" is rendered by "an *importunate*" tyrant, instead of "*restless*." He is not by any means careful in the readings of the original which he adopts, and frequently throws away the most accredited emendations of the Ernesti edition, which he yet seems generally to use. In p. 215, he retains the enumeration of *mules, tents, and corn*, among the classes of PERSONS, as *quæstors, lieutenants, &c.*, whom the orator is proposing as fitter than Cleomenes to command a fleet.—*Vid.* Ed. Ern., *ad Act. II.*, lib. 5, c. 32. And in p. 234, he keeps the unmeaning words rejected by the same excellent commentator, "*et recte nihil videtur*," that he may translate them "in *troth* they cannot."—*Vid.* Ern., *ib.*, c. 34.

After all, however, it is with his English that we find most fault. Perhaps the very title-page, and certainly the dedication, give but a slender hope of seeing justice done to Cicero. Why should our English ideas be confounded with the name of *pleadings*, when *orations* was at hand—and, as if to make it worse, printed in black letter? The dedication of nine lines, to Sir S. Romilly, contains two, if not three errors in language. He addresses that eminent person as the enemy of "*Verrine proceedings*," and of all sinister practices, whether "*behind the shop-board or the Exchequer*"—probably meaning the *counter*; shop-board is the seat appropriated to tailors. But these are trifles. Of the language of the translation itself we have given specimens, and those among the best in the book. Every delicate passage is sure to

be interrupted with something that grates and jars. Are the names of liberty, &c., to be addressed?—it is “O *the* dear name of liberty! O *the* excellent laws of our republic! O *the* Porcian, &c. O *the* power of the Tribunes,” (p. 263); much as Hostess Quickly says, “O *the* father!” If any exclamation is made on the torments of the prisoners, it is, “O *their* unhappy destiny! O *their* insupportable agonies!”—p. 236. Then, in the 2d page, Verres is already “*that fellow*.”—“Sed meherecule, iudices” is “But, in troth, my lords,” p. 271;—and “*delecto consilio*” is “*this honourable court*.”—Ibid. Modern phrases are most injudiciously used. Thus, *verdict* passim, and four times in one page, p. 175; *lectica* is always a *lettiga*; and we have *speronaras* passim; *feluccas*, p. 208; *cash*, p. 201; *ridicule*, p. 180 (reticulum); *bondon*, p. 187. These things are not trifling in a work of mere composition. We repeat once more, that if Mr. Kelsall had any other plan in view, our remarks are at an end.

After contemplating the rich remains of ancient eloquence, through which this work has carried us, we are not unnaturally led from reflecting on the kind of feelings which it addressed, and the effects it produced, to consider its mere external qualities or accompaniments. We do not mean to enter upon the *vexata quæstio* of the tones and delivery, whether the orators were not, in the finer passages at least, in the habit of using somewhat of *recitativo* intonation. Certain it is, that some of the musical effects ascribed to the rhythm of those passages seem scarcely intelligible, if we imagine the same manner of speaking to have been used then as among us, and that a pitch-pipe was sometimes used as an accompaniment in their assemblies (which, however, A. Gellius treats as a vulgar error*); while, on the other hand, we know that

* *Noct. Att.* I., c. 11. Cicero's own account of the matter applies also rather to the notion of a pitch-pipe, *De Orat.* iii., c. 60. Indeed, the idea derided by A. Gellius was not strictly what we call an accompaniment, but rather a continued modulation.

their delivery could not have been much slower than ours, by the time said to have been consumed by several of the orations still preserved. But we will say a word or two upon the mode of pronunciation; and without meaning at all to infer from thence that any change would now be advisable, we cannot help thinking it quite clear, that the foreign, and to a certain degree the Scottish—perhaps most of all the modern Italian manner of pronouncing—approaches much nearer the Roman than that which is peculiar to England.

For this position, various general reasons may be given. The very circumstance of the English mode being peculiar, is a strong one. It is improbable that all other traditions should be wrong and this right. The place, moreover, where we might most reasonably expect a correct tradition is Italy. Again, in the chief peculiarity of the English method, the sound of the letter *I*, a third reason occurs: the English make it a diphthong. Now, that any one vowel should be either long or short is intelligible; but that a diphthong should be sometimes short, appears quite anomalous.—But there seems to be more precise and conclusive proof still, in the writings of the ancient critics.

If we examine the directions given by Quintilian respecting the *hiatus*, and the remarks on the force of the vowels, on which his rules are founded, we shall find that they accord more nearly with the Italian than any other mode of pronouncing them, and are most of all inconsistent with the English.* Thus, “*E plenior littera est, I angustior;*” but he adds what is decisive, that these two vowels coming together at the end and beginning of two consecutive words, make no great hiatus from the nature of their sounds; that they easily run into each other—a remark wholly inapplicable to the sound of *E, I*, in English, when

* Lib. ix., c. 4.

they thus follow, as *omne idem*. Thus, too, the use of the *ecthlipsis* by Cato, who used “to soften *m* into *e* in *diem hanc*.” If the *e* were sounded as in English, there would be the most complete hiatus here; it would scarcely be possible to sound the two words without the *m*; and still more, if both the *i* and *e* were so pronounced: but pronounce the *i* and *e* as in Italian, or the former as the English do *e* in *ego*, and the latter as they do *a* in *amo*,* and the *ecthlipsis* melts the vowels into each other completely. So Quintilian tells us, that the final *m* is scarcely sounded in “*multum ille*” and “*quantum erat*,” being used only as the mark of a pause between the two vowels “*ne coeant*.” Were those vowels, or were the *u* only, sounded as in England, there would be no fear of them running into each other, nor would there be a possibility of pronouncing the *u*, and dwelling upon it, without the *m*—so where the *m* is cut out after *u*, and before a consonant, as *serenum fuit*. The soft sound of *s*, as in *ars*, and its differing from the sound of the same letter at the beginning of a word, is equally inconsistent with what Quintilian says of the *rixatio* of similar consonants. *x* following *s* he says is bad—but “*tristior etiam (rixatio) si binæ collidantur stridor est, ut ars studiorum*.” Similar inferences may be drawn from other sources, particularly several parts of the *Orator*, as c. 48, with respect to the guttural in *ch*.† See, too, A. Gellius, VII., c. 20; XIX., c. 14.‡

With respect to the letter *I*, we ought to mention that some authors have held that it had one sound among the ancients similar to its English pronuncia-

* We mean the Eaton, not the Winchester mode.

† It is not quite clear whether it is the guttural or only the aspirate that is ridiculed in the well-known epigram of Catullus, “*Chommoda dicebat*,” &c., but probably the aspirate—a charge frequently made against the modern Tuscans.

‡ The latter passage, and others which might be cited, show that the pronunciation was different, in some letters, from all modern usage.

tion; and J. Lipsius says,* that he understands this sound only to be preserved in Britain. The ground of the opinion is, that a long *I* is sometimes found in ancient monuments written for *E I*; and that in old books *ei* is used where later ones have *i*. But the examples which he gives, and especially the first from Cicero, are equally applicable to the two modes of pronouncing both the letters. We must, however, repeat that we draw no inference, practically, against the English method, nor in favour of a narrow-minded adherence in this country to the old Scottish one; on the contrary, the assimilation of our mode of pronouncing is highly expedient, indeed necessary, as a matter of convenience; and we believe there are few persons of the present day so bigoted in admiration of antiquity as to feel with Milton, that "*to read Latin with an English mouth, is as ill a hearing as law French.*"

* *De Recta Pronunciatione Latinæ Linguae*, cap. 8.

GREEK ORATORS.

DEMOSTHENES.*

IN our former article upon the two first volumes of this work,† we promised to resume our remarks upon the merits of the French translation, and to lay before the reader some specimens of an English version. But before we proceed to this conclusion of the discussion into which the appearance of Mr. Planche's book has led us, we must be permitted to dwell yet a little upon a topic, in itself truly inexhaustible,—the prodigious merit of the immortal original. And we pursue this course the rather in these times, when a corrupt or a careless eloquence so greatly abounds, that there are but few public speakers who give any attention to their art, excepting those who debase it by the ornaments of a most vicious taste. Not, indeed, that the two defects are often kept apart; for some men appear to bestow but little pains upon the preparation of the vilest composition that ever offended a classical ear, although it displays an endless variety of far-fetched thoughts, forced metaphors, unnatural expressions, and violent perversions of ordinary language;—in a word, it is worthless, without the poor

* *Œuvres Complètes de Démosthène et d'Eschine, en Grec et en Français.* Traduction de L'Abbe Auger de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres de Paris. Nouvelle édition, revue et corrigée par J. Planche, Professeur de Rhétorique au Collège Royal de Bourbon. Tomes iii., iv., v., vi., et vii. Paris, Verlière. 1820.

† This was an able and learned article of Mr. Justice Williams on the same edition of Demosthenes.—*Edinburgh Review*, January, 1820.

merit of being elaborate; and affords a new instance how wide a departure may be made from nature with very little care, and how apt easy writing is to prove hard reading.

Among the sources of this corruption may clearly be distinguished as the most fruitful, the habit of extempore speaking, acquired rapidly by persons who frequent popular assemblies, and, beginning at the wrong end, attempt to speak before they have studied the art of oratory, or even duly stored their minds with the treasures of thought and of language, which can only be drawn from assiduous intercourse with the ancient and modern classics. The truth is, that a certain proficiency in public speaking may be attained with nearly infallible certainty by any person who chooses to give himself the trouble of frequently trying it, and can harden himself against the pain of frequent failures. Complete self-possession and perfect fluency are thus acquired, almost mechanically, and with little or no reference to the talents of him who becomes possessed of them. If he is a man of no capacity, his speeches will of course be very bad; but, though he be a man of genius, they will not be eloquent. A sensible remark, or a fine image, may frequently occur; but the loose and slovenly and poor diction, the want of art in combining and disposing his ideas, the inability to bring out many of his thoughts, and the utter incompetency to present any of them in the best and most efficient form, will deprive such a speaker of all claims to the character of an orator, and reduce him to the level of an ordinary talker. The same man, had he never spoken in public, would have possessed the same powers of convincing or expounding, provided he were only called upon to exert them in conversation with one or two persons. Perhaps the habit of speaking may have taught him something of arrangement, and a few of the simplest methods of producing an impression; but beyond

these first steps he cannot possibly proceed by this empirical process; and his diction is sure to be much worse than if he had never made the attempt,—clumsy, redundant, incorrect, unlimited in quantity, but of no value. Such a speaker is never in want of a word, and hardly ever has one that is worth having. “*Sine hæc quidem conscientia*” (says Quintilian, speaking of the habit of written composition) “*illa ipsa extempore dicendi facultas, inanem modo loquacitatem dabit, et verba in labris nascentia.*”—(X., iii.)

It is a very common error to call this natural eloquence; it is the reverse. It is neither natural nor eloquent. A person under the influence of strong passions or feelings, and pouring forth all that fills his mind, produces a powerful effect on his hearers, and frequently attains, without any art, the highest beauties of rhetoric. The language of the passions flows easily; but it is concise and simple, and the opposite of that wordiness which we have been describing. The untaught speaker, who is also unpractised, and utters according to the dictates of his feelings, now and then succeeds perfectly; but, in those instances, he would not be the less successful for having studied the art; while that study would enable him to succeed equally in all that he delivers, and give him the same control over the feelings of others, whatever might be the state of his own. Herein, indeed, consists the value of the study; it enables a man to do at all times what Nature only teaches upon rare occasions.

Now, we cannot imagine any better corrective to the faults of which we are complaining in the eloquence of modern times, than the habitual contemplation of those exquisite models which the ancients have left us; and especially the more chaste beauties of Greek composition. Its perfect success, both in moving the audience to whom it was addressed, and the readers in all ages who studied it, cannot be denied; its superiority to all that has ever been produced in

other countries is confessed. There may be some use, therefore, in observing how certainly it was the result of intense labour—labour previously bestowed to acquire the power, and the utmost care used in almost every exercise of that power. Without somewhat both of this discipline, and this sedulous attention, it would be as vain to think of emulating those divine originals, by dint of a habit of fluent speech attained through much careless practice, as to attempt painting like Raphael without having learned to draw, and by the help of some mechanical contrivance.

The extreme pains which the most illustrious of the Greeks bestowed upon their compositions, are evinced by all the accounts transmitted to us of the course of education deemed requisite to form an orator, and by the well-known anecdotes of the steps by which both Demosthenes, and, after his example, Cicero, and some of his contemporaries trained themselves to rhetorical habits. But the ancient writers have left us some still more striking illustrations of this matter. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, speaking of the exquisite finish given by Isocrates and Plato to their style, compares their works rather to pieces of fine chasing or sculpture than of writing—*οὐ γραπτοῖς ἀλλὰ γλυπτοῖς καὶ τορευτοῖς εἰκοτας λόγους*.—(*De Struct. Orat.*, sect. 25). Perhaps the minuter workmanship of chasing, the sort of gem-engraving which this seems to imply, may be thought more descriptive of the elaborate compositions of Isocrates, who was said to have employed more years in writing the panegyric on the Persian War alone, than Alexander took to conquer all Asia. Let it, however, be remembered, that this excessive labour, though allowed to have unfitted him for the forensic war—(“*palestræ quam pugnae magis accommodatus*”)—was never deemed incompatible with the highest excellence in oratory, at least with the cultivation of all its graces. “*Omnes dicendi vices sectatus est*,” says Quintilian (X., i., 3); and Cicero desires that those

who undervalued this great master of composition, would allow him to indulge in the bad taste of admiring him, which he had caught from Socrates and Plato—"Me autem, qui Isocratem non diligunt, unà cum Socrate et cum Platone errare patiantur."—(*Orat.* xiii.) But at least no one can doubt that Plato's qualities are of the noblest description; no one can charge with littleness—with miniature beauties—with sacrificing force and dignity to polish—him of whose diction it was said, that the Father of the Gods, had he spoken in Greek, would have used no other language than Plato's. Now this language, though compared by one great critic* to the inspirations of poetry, and by another† to those of the Delphic oracle, was by no means poured forth with the readiness which the admirers of modern fluency term Nature, and in which they think a true genius for eloquence consists, although it is only a habit acquired by a mechanical process. Plato "non hominis ingenio, sed quodam Delphico oraculo instructus"—excelling all men "eloquendi facultate divinâ quâdam et Homericâ"—did not at all pour out his mighty flood like our modern *Improvisatori*; for he continued (says the Grecian critic above cited) to his eightieth year, correcting and new-moulding the language of his Dialogues; and after his decease a note-book was found, in which he had written the first words of the celebrated treatise *De Repub.* several times over, in different arrangements. The words are, Κατέβην χθες ες Πειραια, μετὰ Γλαυκῶνος τοῦ Ἀριστωνος. "I went down yesterday to the Piræus, with Glaucon, the son of Ariston (*De Struc. Orat.*, sect. 25); and others relate the anecdote as if the changes were all made in the position of the four first words.

But let us come to Demosthenes himself. His extreme care in composing his orations is as well known

* Cicero, *Orat.*

† Quint. X., l. 4.

as the sedulous discipline which he underwent to learn the art; and, notwithstanding the facility which he must have acquired, both by this preparation and by long and constant practice, he was averse, in an extraordinary degree, to extempore speaking. Plutarch relates this of him; and, notwithstanding the great excellence which is ascribed to his unpremeditated harangues in the same passage, there may be some suspicion that his reluctance to "trust his success to Fortune," affected his execution upon certain occasions, —perhaps in the memorable debate with Philip, of which the orator's illustrious rival has left us so lively and so cutting a description. His anxiety in preparing may, however, be further estimated by the circumstance of his having left a collection of exordia, or introductions, almost resembling that "*volumen proemiorum*," which we know Cicero to have kept ready by him, from the pleasant mistake that he committed in sending one to Atticus as the beginning of his treatise *De Gloriâ*, when he had before used it for the Third Book of the Academic Questions.* It may justly be conceived that Demosthenes was not likely to have a book of Introductions, so unconnected with any particular subject as to be applicable to any speech. This rather befitted Sallust, or Cicero himself, than the close reasoning, business-like Athenian. Yet in whatever way we account for it, and though we suppose that most of the Exordia in question were written in the prospect of making some particular speech, when time was wanting to compose the whole, the fact of fifty-six of these pieces remaining, only two or three of which exist in their connexion with any of his known orations, seems to prove, incontestably, the laborious nature of the process by which he reached and kept his vast pre-eminence in eloquence.

* He tells him, as soon as he discovers the mistake, to cancel the exordium, and prefix another, which he sends, taken from the same collection.—*Ep. ad Att.*, xvi., 6.

But his immortal works themselves afford, by internal evidence, the most satisfactory proofs of this position; and we may obtain a singularly instructive view of the workmanship of those exquisite pieces, by examining its progress, where we are accidentally enabled to trace it through the different stages of the process. The means of doing this are afforded by those *repetitions* which occur in several of the most celebrated orations. The instance in which this is to be found to the largest extent, is in the Fourth Philippic. Commentators and critics, who have never very nicely traced this subject, aware generally of the existence of these repetitions, have denominated that philippic the peroration of the whole nine speeches against Philip; and thus conceived that they accounted for so many passages being found in it which had occurred in the others. But in truth the oration is almost entirely a repetition, and chiefly from one of the preceding, that most magnificent of all the minor works, the oration upon the affairs of the Chersonese, sometimes called the Eighth Philippic. Now, if there were only whole passages of great length found in two orations without the least variation, we might perhaps fairly conclude that the transcribers had by mistake copied them; and if nearly the whole of any one oration were an *exact* repetition of portions of some other we might suspect that oration to be spurious. But here there are so many variations and additions as plainly show that the orator sometimes improved upon the first thought, and sometimes adapted it to the new occasion: and we can frequently perceive the means by which the adaptation is effected. The repetition, however, of many whole sentences, and of many clauses of sentences, without a single alteration, clearly proves the pains which he had bestowed upon the composition of each part, and the value which he set upon the result. It demonstrates beyond a doubt that the choice and the disposition of the words, even in

passages apparently of inferior importance, had been a work of mature deliberation, and of some difficulty; for his retaining the selfsame words in the same order, when he wishes a second time to express the same ideas, shows that he regarded the first selection and arrangement as preferable to any other. Nothing can be more calculated to convince us that he deemed all the portions of his speech important; that all were elaborated with extreme art; and that no part of his composition was carelessly prepared and flung in as a kind of cement to fill up the interstices between splendid passages. We see those finer parts themselves repeated sometimes with variations, and sometimes in the same terms, exactly like the periods of a more ordinary description. On the other hand, nothing can be more instructive than an attentive consideration of the alterations, especially where they are made as additions or improvements, and not merely with the view of adapting an old sentence to some new purpose, but because the orator saw that he might increase its beauty, its aptness, or its force, by some happy turn or new thought, which had suggested itself since the first composition. We are thus let into the history of the composition almost as if his rough draft had been preserved; and can trace the progress of the work, not perhaps from the first execution to the most finished state, as in the manuscripts of Pope's verses which Dr. Johnson has cited, but from a state with which the great orator had, after much labour, rested satisfied, and which all ages would have deemed perfect had he gone no farther, to that still more exquisite pitch of beauty, in the existence of which only Demosthenes could have made us believe.

We shall begin with the highly-wrought description of Philip's implacable enmity to Athens, of his policy in overrunning Thrace, and of the reasons why he hates Athens. This passage is to be found both in the Oration upon the Chersonese, and the Fourth

Philippic; but adapted to the circumstances in which the latter was delivered, and somewhat more highly finished. He begins by saying, in the very same words, that they must first of all dismiss every doubt from their minds of Philip having broken the peace, and waged war against them. In the Chersonese,* when stating this, he calls upon them to give over their mutual wranglings and recriminations; which is omitted in the Fourth Philippic.† He then goes on in the same words in both: “Και κακονους μὲν ἐστι, και εχθρος ὅλη τῇ πολει, και τῷ της πολεως εδαφει.” —“He is the deadly enemy‡ of the whole city, of the very ground on which it stands.” And then he bursts forth, “προσθισω δε;” but in the two orations, the addition is perfectly different. In the Chersonese—“he is the enemy of every creature within the city, and of those, too, who most flatter themselves that they enjoy his smiles. Do they doubt it? Let them look at the fate of those Olynthians, Lasthenes and Euthyrates, who were to all appearance his most familiar favourites, and no sooner betrayed their country into his hands than they perished by the most miserable of deaths.” In the Fourth Philippic, after the words προσθισω δε, he adds, not that Philip is the implacable enemy of the men, but of the gods of the city, and invokes their vengeance upon his head—“τοις εν τη πολει θεοις, ὑπερ αυτον εξολεσειαν!” —“He is the enemy of the gods themselves who guard us;§ may they utterly destroy him!” The reason of the change is here sufficiently apparent. Possibly he might think the allusion to the Olynthians not so appropriate, when, another year having elapsed,

* Reiske, *Or. Græc.*, i., 99.

† Id., i., 134.

‡ Literally, “he is ill-disposed, and the enemy.”

§ The repetition of the word *πολει*, in the Greek, has a force which the literal translation would not give, for want of the associations connected with it. *The city* was everything; and it had all the importance of *country*, with greater individuality.

the fact could not be so fresh in the hearers' recollection; but this is by no means so probable a supposition as that he highly valued the appeal to the gods, or perhaps that it was a burst of passion at the moment of speaking. After this it was impossible, without sinking, to introduce the passage respecting the inhabitants of the city; and it would have been almost as difficult to introduce the whole passage, including the parenthesis respecting Olynthus, before the imprecation, for that would have destroyed the connexion between the substantive and the governing epithet. He then employs the same words in both orations to state, that the *government* at Athens is the chief object of his hatred; and justly. In the Philippic he gives two reasons for this; both that Philip feels the opposite interests and mutual injuries which make them necessarily enemies, and that he knows Athens must be always the refuge of the states which he wishes to subdue, and must always resist him herself while her democratic government endures. Both these reasons are repetitions, almost in the same words, from former orations; the one is taken from the Second Philippic, delivered many years before, and the other from the Chersonese.

The only material change in the composition of the former is the transposition, in the fourth, of the words *βεβαιως* and *ασφαλως*, apparently to correct the bad effect of the same vowels coming together, as they did in the Second Philippic, *παντα τα αλλα ασφαλως κекτηται*: the expression which seems finally to have satisfied his exquisite ear, is *απαντα ταλλα βεβαιως κекτηται*. Perhaps he also preferred for the rounding of the period, *εν Μακεδονια το οικοι*. The sense seems to be the same in each case, as it also is in the substitution of *ηγειται* for *νομιζει*, which he makes in the fourth, notwithstanding the same word ended the clause but one before. The sentence taken from the Second is tacked, as it were, to the one taken from the Cher-

sonese, by the insertion of a few words, *προς δε τούτοις τοσούτοις οὐσιν*. The few changes which the orator has made in the composition of the passage taken from the Chersonese, are remarkable—as the process of improving plainly appears in them, both with respect to the sense and sound—*εστε γαρ υμεις ουκ αυτοι πλεονεκτῆσαι και κατασχεῖν ἀρχην εν πεφυκοτες, ἀλλ' ἑτερον λαβειν κολυσαι, και εχοντ' ἀφελεσθαι δεινοι* (in the Fourth Philippic, *και τον εχοντ' ἀφελεσθαι*) *και ὁλως ενοχλησαι τοις ἀρχειν βουλομενοις, και παντας ἀνθρωπους εις ελευθεριαν εξαφελεσθαι ἐτοιμοι* (in the Fourth Philippic, *εξελεσθαι δεινοι*). He evidently considered *δεινοι* as the more powerful word fitter to close the period, and avoided repeating it; he also preferred *εξελεσθαι* to a compound of the *ἀφελεσθαι*, which he had used before; and beside the advantage of concluding with *δεινοι*, the hiatus occasioned by the *αι* and *ε* following was avoided.

Perhaps we may conclude from hence (and we shall have other instances hereafter) that sometimes when he repeats the same word, or words of the same root, within a very short space, it is rather because he had not given the last polish to those parts, than because he deliberately approves such repetitions; as in the same passage of the Chersonese, a little farther on, after using *κατασκευαζεται* twice in one period, where the repetition is a figure, and evidently intended for increasing the force of the expression, he repeats it with another word, where it seems superfluous; and in the beautiful description of private and public life, in the peroration of the Fourth Philippic, *ἀπραγμονα* is used twice. But in many instances the repetition is intensive, both where the whole word is repeated, and where the root only is taken; as in the Chersonese, *ταις κατηγοριας ἄς Διοπειθους κατηγοροῦσι*: in the oration against Aristocrates, where he speaks of persons *κινδυνους κινδυνευσαντας*; and in the oration for Ctesiphon and others, where he talks of persons *πολε-*

μοις πολέμουντας. In other instances (and these form the great majority of the cases where he may be supposed to have repeated intentionally, though without any argument or figure, the fittest word having been selected at first, and the idea recurring), he seems to think any sacrifice, however slight, of the sense to the sound, beneath his dignity, and does not condescend to go out of his way in order to vary the phrase.

In the next part of the passages which we are comparing, two curious instances occur of the orator using the sentences originally made for one purpose, in such a manner as to adapt them to a different state of things. The argument in the Chersonese is, that Diopceithes must be supported in his predatory attack upon Thrace, both because it was justified by Philip's intrigues in the Chersonese, and his open assistance to the Cardians; and because whatever thwarted his policy furthered that of Athens. "All his operations" (says the orator), "and all his enterprises, are enterprises against this country; and wheresoever any one attacks him, he attacks him in our defence." In the Fourth Philippic this last member of the sentence is omitted, because it evidently, though stating a general proposition, referred peculiarly to the movements of Diopceithes, which were no longer in discussion. Again, when the Chersonese oration was delivered, Philip had not as yet taken many of the towns in Upper Thrace; and Demosthenes, in speaking of his campaign there, asks if any one is so weak as to imagine that he would encounter the toil and the dangers of that winter campaign for the sake of such miserable places as Drongylum, Cabyle, Mastira—*καὶ ἃ νῦν ἐξαιρεῖ καὶ κατασκευάζεται*. When the Fourth Philippic was delivered, he was supposed to be in possession of nearly all Thrace; therefore the above expression is altered to *καὶ ἃ νῦν φασιν αὐτὸν εἶναι*. He also expands the fine period immediately following, in which he contrasts the importance of Athens with those wretched con-

quests, in order to demonstrate that this alone can be the object of Philip's attack, introducing an invocation somewhat like that which he had added to the first part of the passage. With the exception of this addition, every other word is the same in the two orations; it is printed in italics in the following translation: "Who can suppose that about Athens—her ports, and arsenals, and navy, and precious mines, and ample revenues, *her territory and her renown,—which may neither he nor any other conqueror ever tear from our country!*—he is wholly indifferent; and will suffer you to keep quiet possession of them, while, for the millet and rye of the Thracian barns, he is content to bury himself in the winter of that dreary region?"*

To trace, in the same manner, the whole of the passages repeated, either word for word, or with such improvements as these, and forming nearly one-half of the Fourth Philippic, is unnecessary; but we may remark, that the two bursts of eloquence which seem the most calculated of any in those two orations to strike the Athenian audience, and which, for effect, are perhaps surpassed by none in the whole Philippics, are, with only the change of a single particle, the same in both. In one of them he appeals with the greatest skill to their sense of shame, and most artfully rouses their feelings without offending their pride; insinuating, that if they wait until any more pressing emergency obliges them to act, they will be yielding to the fear of corporal violence, by which slaves only can be actuated. In the other, he appeals with the utmost dignity to their ancient renown, and sets before them their incapacity to endure subjection, as the ground of Philip's implacable enmity. In the former passage, he supposes that some god should offer to be answerable

* Literally, "to winter in that dungeon." The contempt shown for Thrace on all occasions by the Greeks, was increased by their practice of tracing Philip's origin to that country, though it perhaps gave rise to the genealogy.

for their safety, provided they let Philip alone; and he swears by all the powers of heaven that this would still be a degenerate policy, unworthy of their own and their forefathers' glory. He protests that he would rather die than give such disgraceful counsel, and that no one else dares give it; and demands why they delay acting, and for what greater emergency they are waiting. All that should ever urge free men to action, he says, they have long ago been pressed by.—“And far be from us the compulsion which slaves only know! Where lies the difference? To a free man the dread of dishonour is, of all considerations that can be fancied, the most powerful; to the slave, indeed, blows and bodily stripes supply its place; but that is impossible here; and decency forbids the mention of it.”* In the other passage we have alluded to, the language in which he tells them that the very existence of the state, and not merely its independence, is at stake, as Philip knows they would never endure slavery, and that they would not be able to endure it, even if they wished it, after their inveterate habits of dominion, must have produced an effect beyond description upon the Athenian audience.—οἶδε γὰρ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι δουλεύειν μὲν ὑμεῖς οὐτ' ἐβέλησάτε, οὐτ' ἀν' ἐβέλητε ἐπιστάσθε. ἀρχεῖν γὰρ εἰώθατε. Yet these very words, the three last of which, for conciseness and dignity, may be compared to the celebrated ὥσπερ νεφός, in the oration for Ctesiphon, he uses for the same purpose, after having produced the like sensation by means of them a few months before.† Even the well-known invective against the Athenians, in the First Philippic, for busying themselves about the news, when they had news enough in a man from Macedon having become powerful in Greece, is repeated in the oration upon the arrival of the Letter (sometimes called the Eleventh Philippic), and applied to that incident.

* Reiske, *Orat. Græc.*, i., 102 and 138.

† Ibid, i., 104 and 148.

He there describes his countrymen as occupied in issuing decrees, and *πυνθανομενοι κατα την αγωγαν ει τι λεγεται νεωτερον*: and he asks indignantly, in the same tone and with the very same meaning as he had done twelve years before, but only with the substitution of "braving" for "subduing," and the addition of the letter—*Και τοι τι γενοιτ αν νεωτερον, η Μακεδων ανηρ καταφρονων Αθηναιων και τολμων επιστολας πεμπειν τοιαντας οιας ηκουσατε μικρω προτερον*.*

The Perorations of the Greek orators are not remarkable for strength, if we regard only the very last sentences of all; because it seems to have been a rule enjoined by the severe taste of those times, that, after being wrought up to a great pitch of emotion, the speaker should, in quitting his audience, leave an impression of dignity, which cannot be maintained without composure. The same chastened sense of beauty which forbade a statue to speak the language of the passions, required that both the whole oration, and each highly impassioned portion of it, should close with a calmness approaching to indifference, and tameness. *Æschines*, in the speech against *Ctesiphon*, would have furnished a remarkable exception to this rule, had he finished with that truly magnificent passage in which he calls up the illustrious dead of Athens, and plants them round himself, and bids his hearers listen to the groans that the crowning of the man who had conspired with barbarians, draws from the tombs of those who fell at *Marathon* and *Platææ*. So fine a peroration is perhaps not in any language to be found; it probably suggested to his great rival the celebrated oath which has long stood, by universal consent, first among the remarkable passages of perfect eloquence. But *Æschines* was obliged to compose himself after this burst; and he added the two sentences, one of

* *Reiske, Orat. Græc., i., 157.*

which has ever been deemed both extravagant and absurd, and was indeed attacked as such by Demosthenes—the invocation to a series of natural objects and abstract qualities; and the other becomes still more feeble than it naturally would have been, by immediately following that lofty but clumsy flight. The result is a total failure—one of the most remarkable in the history of rhetoric—an attempt which is violent and overstrained, rather than vehement, yet heavy withal and cold, bearing the character of the worst declamation, and succeeded by a mean commonplace, without any felicity whatever, either of conception or execution. This failure—this sudden reverse of fortune—this total defeat in the very moment of the most prodigious success—a transition from one of the grandest triumphs of the art of oratory to nearly the most signal discomfiture upon record—must be ascribed entirely to a compliance with that harsh rule which we have cited as regulating the Greek peroration, and which the judgment of all succeeding ages, both of ancient* and modern times, has repealed. But we find remarkable exceptions to this rule in the orations of Demosthenes himself,—not, indeed, that he ever breaks off abruptly in the midst of an impassioned period, but that one or two of his finest orations are closed with passages of great force, and most careful

* Some few of Cicero's perorations appear to be formed upon the Grecian model. We allude not to such orations as those *Pro Ligario* and *Pro Archia*, where the conclusion only preserves the subdued tone of the whole composition, and is as highly wrought as most parts of the speech, and with ornaments of the same kind. But the deep pathos of the antepenultimate period in the *Pro Milone* is somewhat in contrast with the two last sentences; although, no doubt, there was a great object in view, the application perhaps of all that had gone before, by a solemn call upon the judges to do a certain thing. The sentence with which the Second Philippic closes, furnishes a more near approach to the tameness of the Attic peroration, or rather ultimate conclusion. But many of his finest orations break off in bursts of the highest eloquence—as the first *Catalinarian*; the exquisite orations for Flaccus and Cluentius; and that *Pro Domo Sua*, which he himself prized so highly, and which he tells us he laboured so carefully.—*Ep. ad Att.*, iv., 2.

composition, instead of ending in the very plain, seemingly negligent, perhaps purposely, or even affectedly, negligent manner, observable in most of the others. We allude to no less than the grand oration of all, that for Ctesiphon, the concluding prayer of which is, if not vehement, yet singularly animated, and in the ideas as well as the rhythm most beautiful; and to the powerful declamation in which the oration upon the Embassy closes. Among the lesser works, the oration for the Rhodians affords an instance of a highly-finished conclusion; at least, if it is not so grand as those two just referred to, we have evidence of its being well considered; for the most striking part of it is a repetition of a sentence in the oration *De Republicâ Ordinandâ*; that sentence being almost the only part of the passage which is not repeated from the Third Olynthiac. "And" (says the orator) "when you delight in listening to the praises of your forefathers, and the recital of their deeds, and the story of their trophies, I call upon you to act in a way worthy of your country; bearing in mind that your ancestors erected those trophies, not for you to gaze upon with fruitless wonder, but that the sight might urge you to emulate the virtues of those who raised them."* The last clause (*νομιζετε τοιυυυ, &c.*) is repeated almost word for word from the oration *De Rep. Ord.*,† where it is attached to another sentence, taken, with many others, as closely from the Third Olynthiac.‡

The repetitions of which we are treating can rarely be traced in the great oration for Ctesiphon. In the speech itself there is a remarkable repetition of the invocation with which it opens. Yet even there we may perceive ideas, formerly thrown out, again presented in an improved and expanded form. Thus, the expressive simile taken from bodily infirmities, bitterly applied to the silence or quiescence of Æschines, ex-

Orat. Græc., i., 201.

† *Id.*, i., 174.

‡ *Id.*, i., 35.

cepting when the state was in danger, occurs not then for the first time in the orator's history; ὥσπερ τα ρηγματα και τα σπασματα όταν τι κακον το σωμα λαβη, τότε κινείται.* This idea, it must be admitted, is of the boldest; the comparison depending for the justness of its application upon the assumption, that Æschines is in the nature of an old disease which has crept into the system, and, being quiet in the healthy state of the body, breaks out the moment any accident happens, and seizes on the weak point. The same comparison, in words very similar, had been used by Demosthenes many years before, in the Second Olynthiac (sometimes called the First). It is there applied, in a less adventurous manner, to the tendency which success has to cover Philip's defects—επαν δε αρρωστημα τι συμβη παντα κινειται, και ρηγμα, και στρεμμα, και αλλο τι των υπαρχοντων σαθρον η.†

Although the bitter description of Philip's vices, and the profligacy of his court, which immediately precedes this simile, is introduced partly to prove the weakness of his dynasty, and encourage the Athenians with the hope that its days are numbered, yet the digression (for such the orator, by his apology, seems conscious that it has become) runs away with him, and the simile is applied, not to the weakness of Philip, the principal point in discussion, but to the vices, which form the subject of the episode. This is clear from the ονειδη, which he says are now veiled by success, but will anon be disclosed ει τι πταισεις. It may therefore be observed, that there is a little incorrectness in the reasoning, which is somewhat in a circle; for, first, the vices of Philip are introduced to prove his weakness; then those vices, concealed by his success, are to be exposed by his failure. But in another oration, that upon the Letter, sometimes called the Eleventh Philippic, and which consists, even more than the

* *Orat. Græc.*, i., 294.

† *Id.*, i., 24.

Fourth, of repetitions from the former speeches, Demosthenes again introduces the same figure, and almost in the same words, with, however, a more correct application; for the general description of Philip's vices is there omitted; and the simile is only employed to illustrate the probability of any reverse being fatal to his power, by calling into action its hidden imperfections. The alterations made in the composition here are remarkable. The comparison having been introduced with *συμβαίνει γὰρ*, the verb *αφροσύνη* is used instead of the noun *αφροσύνημα* with *συμβῆ*; and *σαθρῶν* and *σαθρὸν* having been both used in the same sentence in the Olynthiac, *μη τελευτῆς ὑγιαίνον* is delicately substituted for the latter word in the Philippic.* When he makes use of this favourite figure a third time in the great oration, the passage may be supposed to have attained a still more exquisite degree of refinement. The composition is evidently more perfect; and, though the application may be somewhat more violent, the diction is far simpler, and the rhythm more harmonious.

In the former part of the passage in the Second Olynthiac, on which we have been commenting, we have that fine piece of eloquence so justly admired by all lovers of this great orator, in which he displays the slippery foundation of ill-gotten power. Any translation so close as to deserve the name, and yet retain the beauties, is always hopeless from the Greek; but the following may be something like a remote approximation, where, to come near the diction, preserving the sense, appears impracticable:—

“When a confederacy rests upon union of sentiments, and all have one common interest in the war, men take a delight in sharing the same toils, in bearing the same burthens, and in persevering to the end. But when, by aggression and intrigue, one party, like this prince, has waxed powerful over the rest, the first pretext, the slightest reverse, shakes off the yoke, and

* *Orat. Græc.*, i., 156.

it is gone! For it is not, O men of Athens, it is not in nature that stability should be given to power by oppression, and falsehood, and perjury. Dominion may for once be thus obtained: it may even endure for a season; and, by the favour of fortune, may present to men's hopes a flourishing aspect; but time will search it, and of itself it must crumble in pieces. For as the lower part of buildings and vessels, and all such structures, should be the most solid, so ought the motives and principles of our actions to be founded in justice and in truth."

The changes which this passage has undergone, when repeated in the oration upon the Letter, are remarkable; it is contracted, and is less rich and splendid; but the diction appears to be more exquisitely elaborated. Instead of *πλεονεξίας και πονηρίας*, it is *επιβουλης και πλεονεξίας*, both to avoid the alliteration, and because *πονηρία* expresses the busy, rather than the crafty qualities of the intriguer; *απάτη και βία* are also introduced as the instruments by which ambition and intrigue work; instead of *πρωτη προφασις και μικρον πταισμα*, it is *μικρα προφασις και το τυχον πταισμα*, to avoid the alliteration; and because "a slight pretext, an ordinary reverse," is perhaps more descriptive, besides that both epithets are in the same degree of comparison; *ταχεως* is inserted between *πταισμα* and *απαντα*, to prevent the two *a*'s coming together; and, lastly, the remarkable word *ανεχαιτισε*, shook off as does a horse impatient of its burthen, is changed into *διεσεισε*, a more ordinary expression, though one also of great force, and which may perhaps be safely rendered in this place, shivered to pieces. The praises bestowed by some commentators upon *ανεχαιτισε*, may therefore be corrected by the ultimate decision of the most chaste and severe taste ever known in the world, that of Demosthenes, in his revision of his own compositions. The preference may have been given to *διεσεισε*, partly to avoid the two *a*'s coming together, but most likely because the former word had been thought to convey a figure too violent for the rigorous abstinence of the

Attic taste.* The translation of the altered part of the passage will therefore stand thus:—

“But when intrigue and ambition have created the dynasty (as he has done) by treachery and by violence, the slightest pretext, the most common mischance, shivers it in a moment, and it is gone!”

In all orators, we fear, certain inconsistencies may be traced; certain variations in the views taken of the same subject, according to the topic in hand; and Demosthenes himself is no exception to the remark. This seems naturally incident to the rhetorical art, to the vehemence and exaggeration in which it delights, independently of the risk to which a professional advocate is exposed of being employed successively on opposite sides of a question, involving the same general observations, and turning upon the same principles. Besides the change of councils, which has been often remarked in Demosthenes upon one or two great public questions, we frequently find him appealing to the same maxim in contrary ways. Thus, when it suits his purpose, he will say that every one knows how much easier it is to gain than to keep; when, at another time, for an opposite view, he had treated, as an admitted truth, that preserving was less difficult than acquiring. But it seems extremely strange to find him so hurried away by his zeal—so wrapt up in the matter immediately before him—as to state, in a manner diametrically reversed, matters of fact in the

* Reiske (*Orat. Græc.*, xii., 62) explains *αναχατίζω* by the effect of stroking the hair or mane of any animal from the tail towards the head; and also by the effect of fear or anger in raising the hair or the mane. Constantine renders it, when neuter, *mordere frenum ut equus erectis jubeis*; and, when active, *cohibere pilis retractis*;—and H. Steph. gives nearly the same sense, citing the passage of the Second Olynth. “retroagere—reprimere comâ retrorsum tractâ.” If such were the meaning, it is not wonderful that Demosthenes should have changed the word; for the sense he intended to express was the reverse, viz., liberation from previous temporary restraint, and regaining the natural position. But see Hesych. and Ulpian. cit. in Not., where a meaning is given to the word exactly corresponding to our translation.

history and usages of the commonwealth. We allude to a remarkable passage in that splendid oration against Aristocrates, which will bear a comparison with any of the others, though Plutarch says that it was composed in his twenty-seventh or twenty-eighth year; and it certainly was delivered when he was only thirty, by Euthyrates, for whom it was written. The object of it was to attack a decree denouncing outlawry against any person who should slay Charidemus, as a remuneration for the services of that foreign general. In the beautiful passage to which we are referring, the orator contrasts with this lavish distribution of public honours, nay, this invention of a new privilege, the slowness of their ancestors even to admit that individuals, and individuals of their own country, had the merit of saving the state, and the scanty reward which they deemed equivalent to any services a stranger could render. His argument is, that when foreigners had conferred the highest benefits on the state, they never were in return protected by such decrees as the one in favour of Charidemus, but obtained the rights of citizenship, which were not then prostituted, and therefore were deemed of high value; and he names two instances of this judicious system of rewards, Menon and Perdiccas. Now, in the oration upon the government of the commonwealth, he is inveighing against the prostitution of public honours, and particularly that lavish distribution of the rights of citizenship; and he repeats, almost word for word, the passage which he had composed for Euthyrates; except that he says their ancestors never thought of giving those rights of citizenship to Menon and Perdiccas, but only an exemption from tribute, deeming the title of citizen to be a reward far greater than any service could justify them in bestowing. In the oration against Aristocrates, after describing the services rendered by Menon, he says, in return for these benefits, "our ancestors did not pass a decree of outlawry

against any one who should attempt Menon's life *ἀλλὰ πολιτείαν ἔδοσαν*—and this honour they deemed an ample compensation.”* But in the oration upon the commonwealth, after describing Menon's services in the same words, he says, “*οὐκ ἐψηφίσαντο πολιτείαν, ἀλλ’ ἀτελείαν ἔδωκαν μόνον.*”† Again, in the two orations, he describes Perdicas's services in the same words; but in the one, he says, our ancestors did not decree that whoever attempted his life should be outlawed, *ἀλλὰ πολιτείαν ἔδωκαν μόνον*; and in the other he says, *οὐκ ἐψηφίσαντο πολιτείαν ἀλλ’ ἀτελείαν ἔδωκαν μόνον*, and adds, that they withheld the *πολιτεία*, “because they deemed their country great, and venerable, and glorious, and the privilege of bearing its name far above any stranger's deserts.”‡ Both orations then proceed to complain, but in different language, of the manner in which that title had been prostituted.

From the detailed examination into which we have entered of these repetitions, two conclusions may be drawn, both highly illustrative of the degree in which oratory among the Greeks was considered as an art demanding the utmost care, and calculated to exhibit the mere display of skill, as well as to attain more important objects. In the first place, we find that the greatest of all orators never regarded the composition of any sentence worthy of him to deliver, as a thing of easy execution. Practised as he was, and able surely, if any man ever was, by his mastery over language, to pour out his ideas with facility, he elaborated every

* *Orat. Græc.*, tom. i., pt. 2., p. 687.

† *Id.* i., 173.

‡ It might have been supposed that, in the oration against Aristocrates, *ποσιτία* had, by an error crept into the MSS. instead of *ατελία*; but, besides that, the expression *ἰκανή τιμή* applied to the reward the first time it is mentioned, would not be justly descriptive of the merely pecuniary exemption in which the *ατελία* consists; the second instance, that of Perdicas, is immediately followed by the reason, namely, that the *το γένεσθαι πολίτας παρ’ ὑμῖν* was always held a sufficient honour to call forth any services.

passage with almost equal care. Having the same ideas to express, he did not, like our easy and fluent moderns, clothe them in different language for the sake of variety; but reflecting that he had, upon the fullest deliberation, adopted one form of expression as the best, and because every other must needs be worse, he used it again without any change, unless further labour and more trials had enabled him in any particular to improve the workmanship. They who speak or write with little or no labour to themselves, and proportionably small satisfaction to others, would, in similar circumstances, find it far easier to compose anew, than to recollect or go back to what they had finished on a former occasion. Not so the mighty Athenian, whom we find never disdaining even to make use of half a sentence which he had once happily wrought, and treasured up as complete; nay, to draw part of a sentence from one quarter and part from another, applying them by some slight change to the new occasion, and perhaps adding some new member,—thus presenting the whole, in its last form, made of portions fabricated at three different periods, several years asunder. Nothing can more strikingly demonstrate how difficult, in the eyes of the first of all orators and writers, that composition was, which so many speakers and authors, in all after ages, have thought the easiest part of their task.

But another inference may be drawn from the comparisons into which we have entered. If they prove the extreme pains taken by the orator, they illustrate as strikingly the delicate sense of rhetorical excellence in the Athenian audience; and seem even to show that they enjoyed a speech as modern assemblies do a theatrical exhibition, a fine drama or piece of music, which, far from losing by repetition, can only produce its full effect after a first or even a second representation has made it thoroughly understood. It seems hardly possible, on any other supposition, to account

for many of the repetitions in Demosthenes. A single sentence, or even a passage of some length, if it contained nothing very striking, might be given twice to a court or a popular assembly in modern times, after no great interval of time; but who could now venture upon making a speech, about two-thirds of which had been spoken at different times, and nearly half of it upon one occasion the very year before? This would be impossible, how little soever there might be of bold figures, and other passages of striking effect. But we find Demosthenes repeating, almost word for word, some of his most striking passages—those which must have been universally known, and the recurrence of which might have been foreseen by the context. It seems to modern readers hardly possible to conceive that the functions of the critic thus performed by the Athenians should not have interfered with the capacity of actors or judges, in which it was certainly the orator's business chiefly to address them; and that the warmth of feeling, arising from a sense of the reality of all they were hearing, should not sometimes have been cooled by the recollection of the very artificial display they were witnessing. Yet no fact in history is more unquestionable than the union of the two capacities in the Athenian audience,—their exquisite discrimination and high relish of rhetorical beauties, with their susceptibility of the strongest emotions which the orator could desire to excite. The powers of the artist become, no doubt, all the more wonderful on this account; and no one can deny that he was an artist, and trusted as little to inspiration as Clairon and the other actors, of whose unconcern during the delivery of passages which were convulsing the audience, so many striking anecdotes are preserved. In the whole range of criticism, there is not perhaps a more sound remark than that of Quintilian, which has sometimes been deemed paradoxical, only because it is profound, in his celebrated comparison of the

Greek and Roman masters—*Curæ plus in illo; in hoc naturæ.*

Although the difference between the ancient and modern audience, and, above all other diversities, perhaps, the abundant supply of composition through the press, and the universally diffused habits of reading, must render it impracticable to restore anything like the niceties of execution and of criticism which we have been contemplating; yet we may safely affirm, that even the most ordinary assembly of hearers have a far better taste than they generally get credit for. Cicero remarked this long ago; and there is certainly no reason why the observation should be more applicable to a Roman multitude than to any other. “Mirabile est” (says he) “cum plurimum in faciendo intersit inter doctum et rudem, quam non multum differat in iudicando.”—(*De Orat.*, iii.) But that the chief excellence of the Greek orator, rapid argument, and, still more, striking points strongly and shortly made, and in choice language—always harmonious except where the subject requires a discord, or where sweetness is incompatible with force,—that this would be infallibly successful with a modern audience, when so few of Cicero’s beauties could be borne, we conceive to be a proposition which requires no proof beyond the attentive study of almost any of the Athenian’s works. Let any reader who has been accustomed to hear debates in Parliament, note what passages have struck him most in those works, and he will find that they are the sort of things which have the most instantaneous success in modern speeches; which produce the most sudden and thrilling sensations; and, finding in every bosom an echo, occasion the loudest expressions of assent. Now, some speakers may create admiration by careful composition alone, or without sallies; but they do not find their way as the old Greek did to our hearts. Others may find their way thither without the just care of composition;

but he united both powers, and concealed, for the time at least, the labour by which the combination was effected. Can we marvel that his success was prodigious—and that it was equally complete with hearers whom he was to move, and with critics whom he was to please? But the experiment which we are suggesting must be made by a very attentive reader; and it may not succeed at the first. He must imbue himself so thoroughly with a knowledge of all the circumstances in which the oration was delivered, that he can enter at once into the situation of the speaker and the hearer; and he must ponder accurately the words used in each fine passage, often read them, and often repeat them, until their power is familiar to his mind, and their force and their harmony to his ear. In no other way can he enter into the feelings with which they were heard by those to whom the language was natural, and the extremely small number of the topics as well known as the features of their own or the orator's countenance.

It will thus be found, that there is not any long and close train of reasoning in the Orations, still less any profound observations, or remote and ingenious allusions; but a constant succession of remarks, bearing immediately upon the matter in hand, perfectly plain, and as readily admitted as easily understood. These are intermingled with the most striking appeals, sometimes to feelings which all were conscious of, and deeply agitated by, though ashamed to own; sometimes to sentiments which every man was panting to utter, and delighted to hear thundered forth—bursts of oratory, therefore, which either overwhelmed or relieved the audience. Such *hits*, if we may use a homely phrase (for more dignified language has no word to express the thing), are the principal glory of the great combatant; it is by these that he carries all before him, and to them that he sacrifices all the paltry graces which are the delight of the Asian and

Italian schools. Suppose the audience in the state we are figuring, it is evident that one sentence, or parenthesis, or turn of expression—a single phrase—the using a word, or pronouncing a name, at the right place and in the just sense, may be all that is wanting to rouse the people's feelings, or to give them vent. Now in this way, and not by chains of reasoning, like mathematical demonstration or legal argument, it is that Demosthenes carries us away; and it is in no otherwise that an assembly at the present day is to be inspired and controlled. Whosoever among the moderns has had great success in eloquence, may be found not perhaps to have followed the Grecian master, but certainly in some sort to have fallen into his track. Had he studied correctness equally, the effect would have been heightened, and a far more excellent thing would have been offered to our deliberate admiration, after its appeal to the feelings, had been successfully made.

In illustration of these remarks, we might refer to the fine passages upon which we have already commented, only with the view of examining their composition. Who, for instance, can doubt that the λεγετο τι καινον is a burst of the very kind most adapted to electrify an English House of Commons? Indeed, we may go farther; for, change Macedon into Corsica, and substitute Europe for Greece, the passage itself might have been pronounced at any time during the late war with infallible success—or perhaps, in the present day, we might apply it to the Calmuck members of the Holy Alliance. But let us attend to one or two of his turns, where the argument is more enlarged. In the oration upon the Chersonese, his principal object is to defend Diopithes against the charge of having caused the war by his inroad into Thrace, and to obtain for him the support of the country in those operations necessary to support his army; and he begins by grappling with the arguments

of those who are so ready to call everything done by Diopeithes an attack upon Philip, and yet never can see any harm in Philip, who had done all but attack their arsenals; and observe how suddenly he turns this trite topic into a conclusive answer to everything urged by those same partizans of Philip against Diopeithes, and, as it were, finishes the discussion at the first blow.

“But, for Heaven’s sake, let them not still pretend that Philip, so long as he lets Attica and the Piræus alone, neither wrongs the country nor wages war against it. If this be their notion of right—this their definition of peace—unjust, indeed, and intolerable it manifestly is, and fatal to your security;—but, at all events, it is utterly repugnant to the charges with which those very men are bearing down Diopeithes; for with what consistency can they suffer Philip to do every one act short of invading Attica, and call it peace; and yet, the moment Diopeithes succours the Thracians, accuse him of making war upon Philip?”* After showing the dangerous tendency of Philip’s projects, and the evils of letting him bring the war near their country, he breaks out into a vehement inculcation of the Athenians, for their numberless negligences and follies in the conduct of their affairs. This passage has all the characteristic fire and rapidity and point of the orator; it affords, too, an example of a very fine repetition, in which the same words are used a second time with the most powerful effect, and the whole is brought to bear full upon the question of Diopeithes, which is first introduced by a skilful parenthesis. The orator’s favourite figure of antithesis is not spared;† and the original is as sonorous to the

* *Orat. Græc.*, i., 91.

† The love of this figure, as is well known, was one of the very few parts of his oratory upon which the vile scurrility of the Greek satirists (or rather buffoons) could fix. Even those abandoned writers, shameless as they were in their attacks upon the orator’s life, which by fabrications they could misrepresent, durst not sneer at his works, because they were

ear as it is striking by the sense with which it is so over-informed.

“Ἡμεῖς οὐτε χρηματα εισφέρειν βουλομεθα, οὐτε αὐτοὶ στρατευσθαι τολμῶμεν, οὐτε τῶν κοινῶν ἀπεχέσθαι δυνάμεθα, οὐτε τὰς συνταξεῖς Διοπείθει δίδομεν, οὐθ’ ὅς’ ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πορίσῃται, ἐπαινούμεν, ἀλλὰ βασκαίνουμεν καὶ σκοποῦμεν, ποθεν καὶ τί μελλεῖ πσιεῖν, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὐτ’ ἐπειδὴ περ οὕτως ἐχομεν, τὰ ἡμετέρ’ αὐτῶν πράττειν ἐθέλομεν. ἀλλ’ ἐν μὲν τοῖς λόγοις, τοὺς τῆς πόλεως λεγόντας ἀξία ἐπαινούμεν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐργοῖς τοῖς ἐναντιούμενοις τοῦτοις συναγωνίζομεθα. Ὑμεῖς μὲν τοίνον εἰωθατε ἑαστοτε τὸν παρόντα ἐρωτᾶν, τί οὖν χρὴ ποιεῖν; ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμᾶς ἐρωτῆσαι βουλομαι; τί οὖν χρὴ λέγειν; εἰ γὰρ μὴτε εἰσοίσετε, μὴτε αὐτοὶ στρατεύσεσθε, μὴτε τῶν κοινῶν ἀφεξέσθε, μὴτε τὰς συνταξεῖς Διοπείθει δώσετε, μὴτε ὅς’ ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πορίσῃται, εἰσατε, μὴτε τὰ ὑμετέρ’ αὐτῶν πράττειν ἐθέλησετε, οὐκ ἔχω τί λεγῶ· εἰ γὰρ ἤδη τοσαύτην ἐξουσίαν τοῖς αἰτιασθαι καὶ διαβαλλεῖν βουλομένοις δίδετε, ὥστε καὶ περὶ ὧν ἂν φασὶ μελλεῖν αὐτὸν ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτων προκατηγοροῦντων ἀκροασθαι, τί ἂν τις λέγοι;—(Reiske, *Orat. Græc.*, i., 95).

“You neither choose to contribute your money—nor dare to serve in person—nor bear to sacrifice your shares in the distributions—nor do you furnish to Diopceithes the appointed supplies—nor give him credit for supplying himself, but vilify him for what he has done, and pry into what he is going to do:* nor can you apply yourselves to the management of your own affairs; but you go on lauding, by your words, those whose councils are worthy of their country, while, by your actions, you are straining every nerve for their

before the public. An extreme care of composition, and fondness for antithesis, was all they could lay to his charge. Thus, ironically, he is termed—*μισῶν λόγους, ἀνέρωπος, οὐδὲ πῶποτε ἀντίθετον εἰπὼν οὐδέν*.—*Athen.* vi., 224.

* His accustomed *πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα* is also here, in which a feebleness of sense, perhaps, was covered by the effect of the sound in closing a period or member.

antagonists. Then, you are perpetually asking of each speaker who appears—what is to be done? But I would fain ask *you*—what is to be said? For if you* will neither contribute, nor serve, nor sacrifice your shares, nor furnish Diopceithes his supplies, nor suffer him to supply himself, nor attend to your own affairs, I know not what is to be said; for, if you will give such licence to those who are sifting and calumniating his conduct, that you must lend an ear both to their predictions of what he may hereafter do, and to the positive charges which they ground on those predictions, what *can* any one say?" This wonderfully condensed and most spirited exposure (in the last clause) of the unbearable injustice practised towards the general, must remind every reader of many passages of Mr. Fox's speeches; one in particular we recollect, upon the conduct and consequences of the War, in the debate on Parliamentary Reform in 1797.

In passages of the same effect the Third Philippic especially abounds; in fire and variety, indeed, it is surpassed by none of the lesser orations; and by some it is preferred to all the rest. The argument against trusting Philip's friends, and giving up those orators who had steadily opposed him, drawn from the example of other states who had fallen into this snare, as Oritum, Eretria, and Olynthus, merits especial attention. Nothing can be finer than the burst of irony at the close of that part beginning *καλην γ' οι πολλοι*—"A noble† return have the Oritans met with, for betaking themselves to Philip's creatures,

* We have rendered both portions of the passage in the second person; the original changes from the first to the second, for a reason only applicable to the Greek, namely, the beautiful variety afforded by the flexion. Thus, the first part runs—*βουτομισθα, πολμωμιν, δυναμισθα, διδομιν, εβίλομιν*, &c.; the second, *δωσειτι, ειλησειτι*, &c. The force of *πρακτετηγροντων*, following *μ:λλειν*, as it does, can only be rendered by the repetition in the text, which gives the sense accurately.

† The literal translation "fine" or "pretty," expresses the sense completely, but is too colloquial.

and abandoning Euptræus! A noble treatment have the Eretrians received, for dismissing your ambassadors and surrendering themselves to Clitarchus—they are now enslaved, and tortured, and scourged! * Nobly have the Olynthians fared for giving the command of their horse to Lasthenes, while they banished Apollonides!” Now, every name here pronounced awakened in the audience the recollection of events deeply interesting to them; and the few words applied to each were sufficient to bring up the most lively idea of those circumstances on which the orator desired to dwell.

Both the orations upon the embassy afford many fine examples of the same kind. In that of Demosthenes, we may note the observations upon his motives in preferring the charge, especially the part beginning *σκοπεῖτε εἰ ἐφ’ οἷς*,†—the description of Philip’s peculiar fortune, that when he stood in need of mischievous men to do his work, *πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων*, he always found men even more mischievous than he wanted, *πονηροτέρους εὐρεῖν ἢ ἐβουλετο*,—perhaps, too, the bitter description of the Athenian populace, which he puts into the mouths of his adversaries, but seems to have wrought as highly as if he meant to adopt it.‡ But the oration for Ctesiphon abounds in these passages more than all the rest, and in a far greater variety. It may suffice to remind the classical reader of the powerful description of Philip, where he contrasts his conduct with that of the Athenians, and presents him wounded and maimed, but cheerfully abandoning to fate any of his limbs, provided what was left might live in honour and renown; the exposure of the variance between the charge and the decree on which it purports to proceed, particularly the passage that follows the decree; the exposure of Æschines’s incon-

* There is no giving the force of the Greek here—*δουλιουσι γὰρ μαστιγουμένοι καὶ στρεβλουμένοι*.—*Orat. Græc.*, i., 128.

† *Orat. Græc.*, i., 410.

‡ *Ibid.*, 383.

sistency in ascribing to fortune the favourable result of a mere statesman's councils, while he imputes to those councils the disasters that arise in the operations of the war; the appeal to his own services, which had, for the first time, obtained for Athens the extraordinary honour of a crown from the other States of Greece, the question now being, whether the very ordinary honours of the civic crown had been rightly decreed to him; with almost every other sentence of that long and wonderful passage which immediately follows his Theban Decree; and more especially the part beginning *εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα προεῖτο ἀκονίτι*. Upon these, however, we have the less occasion to enlarge here, as they will fall afterwards under consideration with reference to the subject of these remarks, when we discuss the merits of the translation, and offer the specimens we have promised.

The grand excellence which we have been contemplating, is, if not peculiar to Demosthenes, at least possessed by him in a degree prodigiously superior to any other orator of ancient times, Æschines excepted, who abounds in fine passages of a similar description, though more diffuse, and more verbose also, and less cogent in their effect, as well as rapid in succession. His richness is, however, truly magnificent, and appears almost to have been a compensation for the diminution of strength in the judgment of Cicero, who indeed resembles him more than his great rival, though it is impossible to think that he formed his style upon either model. The reader who, without studying his masterpiece, the defence of his conduct in the embassy, would form at once an idea of Æschines's beauties, and his more luxuriant manner, may turn to the truly Demosthenean attack upon Demosthenes, in the oration against Ctesiphon, where he draws his invective from an Athenian law, analogous to our law of deodands; and to the concluding part of the oration against Timarchus; from one fine burst in which Lucretius

has evidently borrowed, in his description of the real hell created by unruly desires—"μη γαρ οϊεσθε"—"τους ησεβηκοτας ποινας ελαυειν, και πολαζειν δῦσιν ημμεναις."—"Think not that it is furies, like those we see on the stage, who chase the wicked, and torment them with flaming torches; but lawless appetites," &c., &c.—"these are the real furies," &c.* But Cicero himself twice copied this great passage; in his earliest speech, the "Pro Sexto Roscio," and still more closely in his later oration, that of "In L. Pisonem," which is almost a translation from Æschines.†

Demosthenes studied under Isæus; but no speeches of that orator are preserved, excepting upon mere private causes; and we confess that the total want of interest in the subject, and the minuteness of the topics, has always made a perusal of them so tedious, as to prevent us from being duly sensible of the force and keenness in which he was said to abound. Demosthenes is also understood to have resembled Pericles in his style. But this is a subject upon which no modern can speak, nor indeed any one except those who lived in the days of Demosthenes, and might therefore have received accounts of Pericles from his contemporaries; for it seems certain that he left nothing in writing behind him, and that the orations in Thucydides, which bear his name, were written by others—probably by that historian himself.‡ (*Quint.*, III., 1, and XII., 2.) But Demosthenes is known to have deeply studied that historian; and though the three orations

* Reiske, *Orat. Græc.*, iii., 187.

† "Nolite enim putare ut in scenâ videtis, homines consceleratus impulsu decorum teneri furiarum tactisde dentibus. Sua quemque frenso suum facinus, suum scelus—sua audacia, de sanitate ac mente deturbat. Hæ sunt impiorum Furix—hæ flammæ—hæ faces."—(In L. cap. Pis.) He has a similar passage in his treatise *De Legg.*, lib. i. It is remarkable how much he had improved in his last treatises, the *Pro Sexto* and the *In Pisonem*; but it is also remarkable how much closer he came to the original in the latter work.

‡ The passage in Cicero (*De Orat.*, lib. ii.,) seems by no means sufficient evidence of Pericles having left works behind him.

there given as those of Pericles, resemble anything rather than that "thunder and lightning" which tradition has ascribed to him, yet there is something in the diction, particularly the chaste and beautiful antitheses,* which may have been copied by the great orator of the succeeding age. In abundance of general remark, and want of cogent reasoning, they rather resemble the speeches in Sallust. One of them, indeed, is a funeral oration, and the other was spoken to soothe the angry passions of the multitude.

Upon the prevailing character of extreme conciseness which has been so often remarked in the style of Demosthenes, and which extends to his figures, to the ornamental as well as the argumentative and narrative parts (if indeed we can make any such distinction in him who had nothing of mere ornament), one observation must be added. If the orations were spoken in all respects as they now appear, it is extremely difficult to conceive how they should, in all their parts, have produced their full effect. Possibly, when afterwards written over, some things may have been omitted—some of that expansion curtailed which seems almost indispensable in speaking, as we know for certain that some passages have been left out in both *Æschines* and *Demosthenes*, from the allusions to them which are to be found in the replies. It will not be imagined that we, for an instant, think of commending the contrary extreme of diffuseness, of overloading, of redundant point and figure and circumstance into which modern composers of all kinds, both writers and speakers, have run, never satisfied without exhausting each idea, and running down, as it were, every topic that presents itself. Yet one can hardly suppose any audience so quick, as, in the time required for uttering two or three words, to seize the whole meaning which they allude to, rather than convey. "*Vitanda illa*

* See particularly the first of these speeches, *Thucyd.*, lib. i., *sub. fin.*

brevitas et abruptum sermonis genus, quod otiosum forte lectorem minus fallit, audientem transvolat, nec dum repetatur expectat." Even the celebrated simile in the great speech, which has been so much admired by those who judged of its effect as readers, the *ὥσπερ νεφός*, seems liable to this remark; the words that go before scarcely prepare the hearer sufficiently for what is coming, and the speaker is in the middle of something else before the due impression can have been made. It deserves our attention, that in another passage, where a similar figure is introduced, some MSS. add another word. In most editions, no doubt, it is *ὥσπερ χειμαρῶνς ἀν' ἅπαν τούτο το πρᾶγμα εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰσεπέσσει*: but in one MS. which Taylor has followed,* it is *ὥσπερ σκηπτὸς ἢ χειμαρρὸς*. In applying to modern languages the rules of rigorous conciseness; in teaching those who must use instruments comparatively so feeble, that most difficult lesson "to blot,"—a lesson as hard to an author as "to forget" is to a lover, and for the same reason, his fondness—it must be distinctly admitted, not only that more words are required to express the same ideas, but that it may often be necessary to crowd more ideas into the same passage, in order to make only an equal impression to what the ancient would have accomplished by the powers of his finer language. Thus, *χειμαρρὸς* both signifies, in one word, a winter torrent, and, by its fine sound, produces on the hearer an effect equal to our translation of both *σκηπτὸς* and *χειμαρρὸς* together. Consider for a moment the fine words collected in any of Demosthenes's grander passages, as the famous oath, where we have such verbs as *προκινδυνεύσαντας* and *παρὰταξάμενους*. Even

* See Reiske, i., 278. So Wolf, &c. In another passage of the same oration (292), *σκηπτὸς ἢ χειμῶν* is used in all the MSS. which omit the former word in the first passage. But we cannot help regarding the *χειμῶν* as an interpolation,—which seems to be Reiske's opinion also.—*Vide* note in tom. xi.

admitting that we have something like the aorist in English, at any rate we have no participles which in one word convey the ideas of action and time together; then we have no particles which enable one word to express a whole sentence as here—"exposing themselves to dangers in warding off a meditated attack;" or "for the common safety of Greece"—and, lastly, we have few or none of those words which so fill the ear as to render a variation of the idea, by adding other words, superfluous. With them a word often produced the whole effect desired; while we must supply the defect of strength by addition. It must, on the other hand, be allowed, that our language gains considerably in delicacy what it loses in force. While many of the words in most ordinary use among the ancients, recalled, by their structure, their very base origin, and were indeed powerful in proportion to the plainness with which that origin was perceived, we question if there be one word in use among us, in serious composition, which savours of an indelicate etymology; and even the expressions allowed in lighter works, are only indelicate to those who know the foreign language they come* from. At the same time, we are aware that a certain violence of expression, in which Demosthenes and Æschines both indulge, may, independent both of the structure of the language, and of the difference of manners, be deemed to partake of coarseness. To this charge, perhaps, the saying of Dr. Johnson may afford a concise and not unjust answer—"Big thinkers require big words."†

* Independent of the phrases of unequivocal grossness which ancient manners allowed to be bandied about in debate, words of an impure original were transferred to an ordinary acceptation, the etymon being however plain to every Greek who heard them—as *καταπυστος*, *βδελυγος*, &c. Such words as *rascal*, *gadso*, &c., with us, are of foreign origin, which veils their grossness.

† When Demosthenes describes (in the oration upon the Embassy) the attempts of Philip to corrupt the Orator, he uses the word *δι:κωδωνιτε*, tried or sounded by making the money tinkle or chink in their ears; a figure taken from the manner of trying horses by ringing a bell near

It may not be unfit to close this article, as we did a former one upon Roman eloquence, with a few words upon the pronunciation of the language among the ancients themselves. A passage in Quintilian then furnished us with the clue; and the Greek Quintilian may render the same service on the present occasion. Dionysius of Halicarnassus plainly indicates, in a chapter of his treatise on composition, which treats of the Letters, that the Greeks pronounced in a manner wholly different from our Southern neighbours, and much more nearly resembling our own method, and that used upon the Continent. Thus, he says, *a* is, when long, the most sonorous of the vowels, and is pronounced by opening the mouth as wide as possible (*ανοιγμενου επι πλειστον*), and raising the breath upwards, *προς τον ουρανον*, which commentators consider as a metaphor for the *palate*; *υ* is pronounced, he says, by contracting the lips greatly, and stifling (*πνιγεται*) the breath, and issuing a small sound; the sound of *ι*, in like manner, is described exactly as the Scotch and foreigners pronounce it; *η* is described differently from both the English and Scotch pronunciation, and resembling the Continental, if we mistake not, being the sound of the Latin *e* both in this and foreign countries. Of *ε*, no distinct account is given, nor any account at all of the diphthongs.* Of the consonants, *χ* was evidently pronounced as the Scotch and foreign nations sound it; for, of the three, *κ*, *χ* and *γ*, it is placed at the opposite extreme to *κ*, *γ* being put as the middle between them, whereas the English confound it almost entirely with *κ*. About *ζ*, there may be some doubt; for, in one place, we are

them. Another "big thinker," in the Impeachment of 1806, said of the defendant—"Does he see money when it shines? Does he hear it when it chinks?"

* The use of the diphthong *αυ*, *αυ*, in Aristophanes, to express the barking of a dog, as we say *bow*, *wow*, clearly shows the diphthong to have been sounded in the Scotch and Continental manner.

told that it consists of σ and δ^* mingling, but so as to have the sound of both; and, in another, it is described as much more pleasing to the ear than the other double consonants. It appears, therefore, to have had a sound more soft than our Scotch pronunciation, which preserves the δ and σ distinctly, but not quite so near the soft ς as the English pronunciation makes it. Of certain sounds peculiar to the English pronunciation, no trace is to be found in this author's remarks;† as the ι short, and also the long sound of the same vowel, if indeed that be not rather a diphthongal sound. But persons more learned in these matters than we can pretend to be, may be aware of other authorities. The well-known saying of Milton, against pronouncing Latin in the English way, was, by him, confined to that language; but there can be no doubt that his practice extended to Greek also.

* The σ is put before δ ; though, in describing the other two double consonants, it is put after δ . Is this an error in the transcriber—or is it a Loricism?—For we know that the Doric transposed the σ in ψ .

† *Dion. Hal. de Struct., Orat.*, sect. xvi.

ENGLISH ORATORS.

ERSKINE.*

WE regard the publication of this collection as an event of great importance, both in a literary and political view. The orations which have been given to the world in modern times, under the sanction of the person who delivered them, or in such a manner as to secure a tolerable share of correctness, are lamentably few. Perhaps Mr. Burke's are the only speeches of note which have been printed in an authentic shape, in an age teeming with orators, and, though prolific of much bad eloquence, adorned by some of the greatest geniuses that ever practised this divine art. When we consider how great the difference is between ancient and modern eloquence,—how much of that which peculiarly marks the latter was utterly unknown to the ancients—we mean, the extemporaneous reasoning and declamation known by the name of *debating*,—and when we reflect how much more adapted this talent is to the business of real life than the elaborate and ornate compositions of antiquity,—we cannot fail to lament, that almost all our great masters of the art have died, without leaving a trace of their genius behind them; and

* *The Speeches of the Honourable Thomas Erskine (now Lord Erskine), when at the Bar, on Subjects connected with the Liberty of the Press, and against Constructive Treasons.* Collected by James Ridgway. 2 vols. 8vo, pp. 854. Ridgway, London, 1810.

This publication is understood to have been superintended by Mr. Cutler Ferguson, who wrote the Preface or Introduction.

that if, unhappily, the free constitution of England were destroyed, the speeches of Mr. Burke alone would leave to posterity any means of conjecturing what powers had been exerted to avert its fate. To those immortal specimens of modern popular eloquence, must now be added the most perfect examples of the eloquence of the Bar which are to be found in any age; for the volumes before us both collect and preserve the fugitive publications of Mr. Erskine's speeches formerly in circulation, and add, in a correct and authentic form, several which had been most scantily and inaccurately reported.

These volumes, which we rejoice to learn will be followed by another, embrace the most celebrated speeches, from the case of Captain Baillie in 1779, when Mr. Erskine, in the very outset of his brilliant career, astonished the legal world with a display of talents, which was outshone, indeed, but not obscured by his own riper efforts, down to his celebrated defence of Mr. Perry in 1793, when, having long stood unrivalled among English lawyers for eloquence, for skill and conduct, for knowledge of the constitutional law of the realm, and for dauntless love of liberty, he put forth his matured genius with a power that carried everything before it, and bore down the utmost efforts of the court against the independence of the British press. The speeches are twelve in number; and they are prefaced with such explanations of the subjects, extracts from the pleadings, and reports of the speeches of the Crown lawyers to whom Mr. Erskine replied, as serve to render the matter of them perfectly intelligible to every reader. Where it is of importance, the address of the judge to the jury is likewise inserted; and many anecdotes which occurred at the trials are added,—with the verdict,—motions in arrest of judgment, and conversations at delivering the verdict,—where anything of this kind took place. The prefatory statements

are very well, and, as far as we happen to know, very faithfully executed. We have understood, that the public is indebted for them, and indeed for this publication, to a gentleman of the profession. Mr. Erskine himself, we believe, revised many of his speeches at the time of their original publication—at least we have heard so; and, from the character of accuracy which they here bear, we are inclined to believe the report. By rather a singular omission in so careful a compilation, no table of contents is given to these volumes. We shall therefore give a list of the speeches contained in them. The first is that in Captain Baillie's case, in the Court of King's Bench. Then follows the speech for Carnan, at the Bar of the House of Commons, against the monopoly of the two Universities in printing almanacs. Next come—the famous speech for Lord George Gordon at the Old Bailey—the speeches for the Dean of St. Asaph, at Shrewsbury assizes, at the motion in the King's Bench for a new trial, and afterwards in support of the rule,—with a note of his speech in arrest of judgment, in the same noted case. These close the first volume. The second begins the speech for Paine; after which comes the speech, rather more popular at the time, against the publisher of the *Age of Reason*—and which finds a place here somewhat strangely, as it was not delivered for years after the period where these volumes end, and should have come into a subsequent part of the publication. The speech in Stockdale's case follows; and then those for Messrs. Frost and Perry; with which the second volume concludes.

In these volumes, we have a complete body of the law of libel, and a most perfect history of its progress, down to the libel bill of Mr. Fox, which owed its origin, indeed, to the doubts and difficulties that arose during the prosecution (is there not an error in the first syllable?) of the Dean of St. Asaph. The

argument on the rights of juries, as connected with that case, affords the clearest exposition of the subject, and is, in itself, by far the most learned commentary on the nature of that inestimable mode of trial, which is anywhere to be found. Mr. Fox's bill is merely declaratory of the principles, which were laid down in this argument with unrivalled clearness, and enforced with a power of reasoning which none ever denied to this great advocate, except in the moment when, dazzled by the astonishing powers of his language, they were tempted to fancy, that so rare a union of different qualities was not in nature; and to doubt whether such eloquence and fire—so lively an imagination, and so great warmth of passions, were compatible with the faculties of close reasoning and nice discrimination. As connected, then, with the history of jury trial—as laying down its principles—as furnishing the groundwork of Mr. Fox's famous bill—and as having, in point of fact, given occasion to that bill, we view the speeches for Dean Shipley, which contain a most complete history of that case, as the most important part of this collection. We need scarcely add, that the trial by jury is here only viewed in its relation to the law of libel; but, to administer this law, is, beyond all comparison, the most important office of juries,—the one in which the excellence of that institution is most conspicuous and indisputable, and independent of which, the objections to it would be neither few nor light. Of the speeches now described, we purpose to say nothing more at present: they are so well known, and so often referred to, that we need not dwell upon them in this place.

In the importance of the occasion, and of its consequences to the liberties of Englishmen, we cannot hesitate in placing the defence of Lord George Gordon in the next rank. This great speech, and the acquittal which it secured to the object of it,

were the deathblow of the tremendous doctrine of *constructive treason*. Lord George Gordon's, indeed, may be called the Case of Constructive Treasons; and, after its decision, that engine of oppression lay at rest for a series of years; till the season of alarm, which, with all other monstrous and unutterable things, arose out of the French revolution, seemed to furnish a fit opportunity for reviving the times of legal oppression, and injustice under colour of law. In that inauspicious era, this most perilous doctrine once more found, in the same consummate advocate, an enemy so irresistible, that again it utterly failed, though brought forward with every chance in its favour, from the temper of the times—the power of the Crown—the madness of the country—the folly of the mob, and the talents of Mr. Erskine's political enemies and professional rivals. We shall have an opportunity of contemplating this, the greatest of all his victories, with more advantage, when the speeches in 1794 are added to the collection. At present, our attention is confined to the defence of Lord George Gordon.

From this we are unable to extract any passages which can give a just notion of its character and high merits; for these consist, not in dazzling sentences, nor in particular bursts of eloquence, but in the close texture of the whole argument, both where Mr. Erskine lays down the principles of treason-law,—skilfully adapting them to his purpose, by bringing forward such parts chiefly as suit his case,—and illustrating them by a reference to circumstances like those he had himself to deal with, and where he more particularly and more directly makes the application of those doctrines to the charges against Lord George Gordon. The whole speech must be read, and even carefully studied, before a just sense of the talents displayed in it can be entertained, or a conjecture formed of its great effects upon the audience who

heard it, and the tribunal to which it was addressed. We shall here only give a passage from the conclusion,—because its diction is peculiarly beautiful and chaste, and the topics highly persuasive:—

“What, then, has produced this trial for high treason, or given it, when produced, the seriousness and solemnity it wears?—What, but the inversion of all justice, by judging from *consequences*, instead of from *causes* and *designs*?—what but the artful manner in which the Crown has endeavoured to blend the petitioning in a body, and the zeal with which an animated disposition conducted it, with the melancholy crimes that followed?—crimes, which the shameful indolence of our magistrates—which the total extinction of all police and government suffered to be committed in broad day, and in the delirium of drunkenness, by an unarmed banditti—without a head—without plan or object—and without a refuge from the instant gripe of justice;—a banditti, with whom the associated Protestants and their president had no manner of connexion, and whose cause they overturned, dishonoured, and ruined.

“How unchristian, then, is it to attempt, without evidence, to infect the imaginations of men who are sworn dispassionately and disinterestedly to try the trivial offence of assembling a multitude with a petition to repeal a law (which has happened so often in all our memories), by blending it with the fatal catastrophe on which every man's mind may be supposed to retain some degree of irritation!—*O fie! O fie!* Is the intellectual seat of justice to be thus impiously shaken? Are your benevolent propensities to be thus disappointed and abused?—Do they wish you, while you are listening to the evidence, to connect it with unforeseen consequences, in spite of reason and truth? Is it their object to hang the millstone of prejudice around his innocent neck to sink him?—If there be such men, may Heaven forgive them for the attempt, and inspire you with fortitude and wisdom to discharge your duty with calm, steady, and reflecting minds.

“Gentlemen, I have no manner of doubt that you will.—I am sure you cannot but see, notwithstanding my great inability, increased by a perturbation of mind (arising, thank God! from no dishonest cause), that there has been not only no evidence on the part of the Crown to fix the guilt of the late commotions upon the prisoner, but that, on the contrary, we have been able to resist the *probability*—I might almost say the *possibility*—of the charge, not only by living witnesses, whom we only ceased to call because the trial would never have ended, but by the evidence of all the blood that has paid the forfeit of that guilt

already—an evidence that, I will take upon me to say, is the strongest and most unanswerable which the combination of natural events ever brought together since the beginning of the world for the deliverance of the oppressed:—since, in the late numerous trials for acts of violence and depredation, though conducted by the ablest servants of the Crown, with a laudable eye to the investigation of the subject which now engages us, no one fact appeared which showed any plan, any object, any leader—since, out of forty-four thousand persons who signed the petition of the Protestants, *not one* was to be found among those who were convicted, tried, or even apprehended on suspicion—and since, out of all the felons who were let loose from prisons, and who assisted in the destruction of our property, not a single wretch was to be found who could even attempt to save his own life by the plausible promise of giving evidence to-day.

“What can overturn such a proof as this! Surely a good man might, without superstition, believe that such an union of events was something more than natural, and that the divine Providence was watchful for the protection of innocence and truth.

“I may now, therefore, relieve you from the pain of hearing me any longer, and be myself relieved from speaking on a subject which agitates and distresses me. Since Lord George Gordon stands clear of every hostile act or purpose against the Legislature of his country, or the properties of his fellow-subjects—since the whole tenor of his conduct repels the belief of the *traitorous intention* charged by the indictment—my task is finished. I shall make no address to your passions—I will not remind you of the long and rigorous imprisonment he has suffered—I will not speak to you of his great youth, of his illustrious birth, and of his uniformly animated and generous zeal in Parliament for the constitution of his country. Such topics might be useful in the balance of a doubtful case; yet, even then, I should have trusted to the honest hearts of Englishmen to have felt them without excitation. At present the plain and rigid rules of justice and truth are sufficient to entitle me to your verdict.”—i., 132–135.

A singular passage, to be found in this speech, affords a great contrast to the calm and even mild tone of its peroration. It is indeed, as far as we know, the only instance of the kind in the history of modern eloquence; and we might justly have doubted, if even Mr. Erskine's skill, and well-known discretion as a

public speaker, had not forsaken him, and allowed his heat and fancy to hurry him somewhat too far,—had we not, in the traditional account of the perfect success which attended this passage, the most unequivocal evidence in his favour. After reciting a variety of circumstances in Lord George's conduct, and quoting the language which he used, the orator suddenly, abruptly, and violently breaks out with this exclamation—" *I say*, BY GOD, that man is a ruffian, who shall, after this, presume to build upon such honest, artless conduct, as an evidence of guilt!"—(Vol. i., p. 125). The sensation produced by these words, and by the magic of the voice, the eye, the face, the figure, and all we call the manner with which they were uttered, is related, by those present on this great occasion, to have been quite electrical, and to baffle all power of description. The feeling of the moment alone,—that sort of sympathy which subsists between an observant speaker and his audience,—which communicates to him, as he goes on, their feelings under what he is saying,—deciphers the language of their looks,—and even teaches him, without regarding what he sees, to adapt his words to the state of their minds, by merely attending to his own. This intuitive and momentary impulse could alone have prompted a flight, which it alone could sustain; and, as its failure would indeed have been fatal, so its eminent success must be allowed to rank it among the most famous feats of oratory.

The speech which we are inclined to rank the next in importance, but the first in oratorical talent, and happily the most accurately reported and revised, is the celebrated defence of Stockdale, whose trial may be termed the case of Libels; for in it we have clearly laid down, and most powerfully enforced, the doctrine which now enters into every such question,—viz., that if, taking all the parts of a composition together, it shall not be found to exceed the bounds of a free and

fair discussion,—so fair as a regard to good order, the peace of society, and the security of the government requires, but so free as the nature of our happy constitution, and the unalienable right of Englishmen to canvass public affairs, allows;—if, in short, the discussion be, upon the whole, sufficiently decent in its language, and peaceable in its import, although marked with great freedom of opinion, and couched in terms as animated as a free man can use on a subject that interests him deeply;—although even a great share of heat should be found in the expression, and such invective as, surpassing the bounds of candour and of charity, can only be excused by the violence of honest feelings;—nay, although detached passages may be pitched upon, in their nature and separate capacity amounting to libels:—yet these also shall be overlooked, and the defendant acquitted, on the ground, that he has only used the grand right of political discussion with uncommon vehemence. This great doctrine, now on the whole generally received, was first fully expounded in the defence of Stockdale; and it forms obviously the foundation of whatever is more than a mere name in the liberty of the press—the first and proudest pre-eminence of this country over all the rest of Europe.

While the trial of Mr. Hastings was going on, Mr. Stockdale, a bookseller in London, published a pamphlet, written by the late Mr. Logan, one of the ministers of Leith, and a gentleman of very distinguished genius. It was a defence of Mr. Hastings;—and, in the course of it, the author was led into several reflections upon the conduct of the managers, which the House of Commons deemed highly contemptuous and libellous. The language of certain passages was indeed rather free and offensive. The charges against Mr. Hastings were said to “originate from *misrepresentation and falsehood*.” The House of Commons, in making one of those charges, was compared to “a

tribunal of inquisition, rather than a Court of Parliament." Others of them were stigmatized as "so *insignificant* in themselves, or founded on such *gross misrepresentations*, that they would not affect an obscure individual, much less a public character." And, after a great deal of other invective, somewhat more diffuse, and less offensive in single terms, but fully more bitter and sarcastic in substance, the impeachment of Mr. Hastings was said to be "*carried on from motives of personal animosity, not from regard to public justice.*" This pamphlet made a considerable impression on the public mind; and it was complained of by Mr. Fox on the part of the managers. It deserves, however, to be remarked, that although it was published during the proceedings against Mr. Hastings, and had a direct and undeniable tendency to influence the judgment of the peers as well as the country, no attempt was made to commit the printer or the author, by the mere authority of the House of Commons; and Mr. Fox himself was content to move an address for a prosecution in a court of common law.

Mr. Stockdale, the publisher, was accordingly tried on an information filed by the Attorney-General, *ex officio*. The passages, of which we have just given a summary, were set forth, and stated as libellous. The fact of publication was admitted; and Mr. Erskine then delivered the finest of all his orations,—whether we regard the wonderful skill with which the argument is conducted,—the soundness of the principles laid down, and their happy application to the case,—or the exquisite fancy with which they are embellished and illustrated,—and the powerful and touching language in which they are conveyed. It is justly regarded, by all English lawyers, as a consummate specimen of the art of addressing a jury;—as a standard, a sort of precedent for treating cases of libel, by keeping which in his eye, a man may hope to succeed in special pleading his client's case within

its principle, who is destitute of the talent required even to comprehend the other and higher merits of his original. By those merits, it is recommended to lovers of pure diction,—of copious and animated description,—of lively, picturesque, and fanciful illustration,—of all that constitutes, if we may so speak, the Poetry of eloquence,—all for which we admire it, when prevented from enjoying its Music and its Statuary. We shall venture to recommend this exquisite specimen of Mr. Erskine's powers, by extracting a few passages almost at random.

He thus introduces his audience to a striking view of the grand trial in Westminster Hall,—not for the sake of making fine sentences, or of adorning his speech with a beautiful description,—for the speeches of this great advocate may be searched through by the most crafty special pleader, from beginning to end, and no one instance of such useless ornament will be found,—but for the solid and important purpose of interesting his hearers in the situation of Mr. Hastings, and of his defender the author of the pamphlet,—of leading the mind to view the prisoner as an oppressed man, overwhelmed by the weight of parliamentary resentment, and ready to be crushed, in the face of the country, by the very forms and solemnities of his trial,—of insinuating that the pamphlet only ventures to say something in defence of this unhappy person,—and that, in such an unequal contest, an English jury may well excuse a little intemperance in the language of such a generous and almost hopeless defence:—

“Gentlemen, before I venture to lay the book before you, it must be yet further remembered (for the fact is equally notorious) that, under these inauspicious circumstances, the trial of Mr. Hastings at the bar of the Lords had actually commenced long before its publication.

“There, the most august and striking spectacle was daily exhibited which the world ever witnessed. A vast stage of justice was erected, awful from its high authority, splendid from its illustrious dignity, venerable from the learning and wisdom

of its Judges, captivating and affecting from the mighty concourse of all ranks and conditions which daily flocked into it as into a theatre of pleasure ;—there, when the whole public mind was at once awed and softened to the impression of every human affection, there appeared, day after day, one after another, men of the most powerful and exalted talents, eclipsing by their accusing eloquence the most boasted harangues of antiquity,—rousing the pride of national resentment by the boldest invectives against broken faith and violated treaties,—and shaking the bosom with alternate pity and horror by the most glowing pictures of insulted nature and humanity ;—ever animated and energetic, from the love of fame, which is the inherent passion of genius ;—firm and indefatigable, from a strong prepossession of the justice of their cause.

“Gentlemen, when the author sat down to write the book now before you, all this terrible, unceasing, exhaustless artillery of warm zeal, matchless vigour of understanding, consuming and devouring eloquence, united with the highest dignity, was daily, and without prospect of conclusion, pouring forth upon one private unprotected man, who was bound to hear it, in the face of the whole people of England, with reverential submission and silence. I do not complain of this as I did of the publication of the Charges, because it is what the law allowed and sanctioned in the course of a public trial : but when it is remembered that we are not angels, but weak fallible men, and that even the noble Judges of that high tribunal are clothed beneath their ermines with the common infirmities of man's nature, it will bring us all to a proper temper for considering the book itself, which will in a few moments be laid before you. But, first, let me once more remind you, that it was under all these circumstances, and amidst the blaze of passion and prejudice, which the scene I have been endeavouring faintly to describe to you might be supposed likely to produce, that the author, whose name I will now give to you, sat down to compose the book which is prosecuted to-day as a libel.”—ii., 229–231.

He now brings the author more immediately before the audience, thus skilfully prepared to give him a favourable reception ; and he proceeds to put to them at once the chief question they have to decide,—but in a striking shape :—

“He felt for the situation of a fellow-citizen, exposed to a trial which, whether right or wrong, is undoubtedly a severe one ;—a trial, certainly not confined to a few criminal acts like those we are accustomed to, but comprehending the transactions

of a whole life, and the complicated policies of numerous and distant nations ;—a trial, which had neither visible limits to its duration, bounds to its expense, nor circumscribed compass for the grasp of memory or understanding ; a trial, which had therefore broke loose from the common form of decision, and had become the universal topic of discussion in the world, superseding not only every other grave pursuit, but every fashionable dissipation.

“Gentlemen, the question you have, therefore, to try upon all this matter is extremely simple. It is neither more nor less than this.—At a time when the charges against Mr. Hastings were, by the implied consent of the Commons, in every hand, and on every table ;—when, by their managers, the lightning of eloquence was incessantly consuming him, and flashing in the eyes of the public ;—when every man was with perfect impunity saying, and writing, and publishing just what he pleased of the supposed plunderer and devastator of nations—would it have been criminal in *Mr. Hastings himself* to have reminded the public that he was a native of this free land, entitled to the common protection of her justice, and that he had a defence in his turn to offer them, the outlines of which he implored them in the meantime to receive as an antidote to the unlimited and unpunished poison in circulation against him? This is, without colour or exaggeration, the true question you are to decide ; because I assert, without the hazard of contradiction, that if Mr. Hastings himself could have stood justified or excused in your eyes for publishing this volume in his own defence, the author, if he wrote it *bonâ fide* to defend him, must stand equally excused and justified ; and if the author be justified, the publisher cannot be criminal, unless you had evidence that it was published by him with a different spirit and intention from those in which it was written. The question, therefore, is correctly what I just now stated it to be : Could *Mr. Hastings* have been condemned to infamy for writing this book ?

• “Gentlemen, I tremble with indignation to be driven to put such a question in England. Shall it be endured that a subject of this country (instead of being arraigned and tried for some single act in her ordinary courts, where the accusation, as soon, at least, as it is made public, is followed within a few hours by the decision) may be impeached by the Commons for the transactions of twenty years,—that the accusation shall spread as wide as the region of letters,—that the accused shall stand, day after day, and year after year, as a spectacle before the public, which shall be kept in a perpetual state of inflammation against him ; yet that he shall not, without the severest penalties, be permitted to submit anything to the judgment of mankind in his defence? If this be law (which it is for you to-day to decide),

such a man has NO TRIAL. 'That great hall, built by our fathers for English justice, is no longer a court, but an altar; and an Englishman, instead of being judged in it by GOD AND HIS COUNTRY, is A VICTIM AND A SACRIFICE.'—ii., 232-234.

We pass over the whole critical argument which follows on the true meaning of the work in question; and come to perhaps the most interesting passage of the speech. Although Mr. Erskine very judiciously disavows all intention of defending the opinions contained in the pamphlet, or of censuring the managers, and vindicating Mr. Hastings, he is nevertheless led to show, that Mr. Hastings's defender only made a sincere and *bonâ fide* appeal to the public in his behalf; and that he only used, in doing so, the topics which would naturally strike every one who impartially considered the subject. Without defending Mr. Hastings, therefore, he shows how he may be defended, in order to vindicate his client from the charge of making his book a cloak for abusing the House of Commons;—and it is evident, that the higher he can state the grounds of Mr. Hastings's defence, though without actually entering upon it, the better it must be for Mr. Stockdale. Yet this is not to be rashly done neither. On no account could the orator palliate the enormities of the Indian administration;—the public mind was too full of them;—the ears of his audience still rang with the prodigious eloquence which had been called in to blazon them. Anything absolutely favourable such conduct—any appearance of callousness or carelessness to such scenes—and consequently any admission which mixed up the pamphleteer too intimately with the author of the wrongs complained of—was studiously to be shunned. How does this most dexterous advocate proceed? He studiously separates his defence of Stockdale as much as possible from a defence of Hastings; yet he begins to feel his way, by remarking, that the supporter of the Governor-General might fairly wonder at the want of Indian accusers:—

“Will the Attorney-General proceed then to detect the hypocrisy of our author, by giving us some detail of the proofs by which these personal enormities have been established, and which the writer must be supposed to have been acquainted with? I ask this as the defender of *Mr. Stockdale*, not of *Mr. Hastings*, with whom I have no concern. I am sorry indeed to be so often obliged to repeat this protest; but I really feel myself embarrassed with those repeated coincidences of defence which thicken on me as I advance, and which were, no doubt, overlooked by the Commons when they directed this interlocutory inquiry into his conduct. I ask, then, *as counsel for Mr. Stockdale*, whether, when a great state criminal is brought for justice at an immense expense to the public, accused of the most oppressive cruelties, and charged with the robbery of princes and the destruction of nations, it is not open to any one to ask, Who are the accusers? What are the sources and the authorities of these shocking complaints? Where are the ambassadors or memorials of those princes whose revenues he has plundered? Where are the witnesses for those unhappy men in whose persons the rights of humanity have been violated? How deeply buried is the blood of the innocent, that it does not rise up in retributive judgment to confound the guilty! These surely are questions which, when a fellow-citizen is upon a long, painful, and expensive trial, humanity has a right to propose; which the plain sense of the most unlettered man may be expected to dictate, and which all history must provoke from the more enlightened. When CICERO impeached VERRES, before the great tribunal of Rome, of similar cruelties and depredations in *her* provinces, the Roman people were not left to such inquiries. ALL SICILY surrounded the forum, demanding justice upon her plunderer and spoiler, with tears and imprecations. It was not by the eloquence of the *orator*, but by the cries and tears of the miserable, that Cicero prevailed in that illustrious cause. VERRES fled from the oaths of his accusers, and their witnesses, and not from the voice of TRULLY. To preserve the fame of his eloquence, he composed his five celebrated speeches; but they were never delivered against the criminal, because he had fled from the city, appalled with the sight of the persecuted and the oppressed. It may be said that the cases of Sicily and India are widely different; perhaps they may be;—whether they are or not is foreign to my purpose. I am not bound to deny the possibility of answers to such questions; I am only vindicating *the right to ask them*.”—ii., 242-244.

He here leaves this attempt in favour of the defenders of Hastings, and goes again into some details

as to the work and its subject. But seeing, in all probability, how far he might go, he again reverts to the same topic with more perseverance and boldness,—and fairly shows how much of the atrocities of Mr. Hastings are to be imputed to his instructions—to his situation—to the wicked policy of England and of Europe in distant countries—to the general infamy of civilized man when he disturbs the repose of his less-enlightened fellow-creatures; till by description and anecdote,—and even by a personal adventure of his own in North America, and a speech which, with a fair licence, he puts into the mouth of an Indian (a flight to which he *evidently* did not soar until he perceived that it was safe, from the previous preparation of his hearers);—he at last envelops this delicate part of his subject,—Hastings,—India,—the book and all, in a blaze of imagery and declamation, which overpowers the understandings of his audience. We give this wonderful passage entire,—premising that the traditional accounts of its effects are to be credited, not even by those who now read it,—if they have not also experienced the witchery of this extraordinary man's voice, eye, and action :—

“Gentlemen of the Jury,—If this be a wilfully false account of the instructions given to Mr. Hastings for his government, and of his conduct under them, the author and publisher of this defence deserves the severest punishment for a mercenary imposition on the public. But if it be true that he was directed to make the *safety and prosperity of Bengal the first object of his attention*, and that, under his administration, it has been safe and prosperous;—if it be true that the security and preservation of our possessions and revenues of Asia were marked out to him as the *great leading principle of his government*, and that those possessions and revenues, amidst unexampled dangers, have been secured and preserved;—then a question may be unaccountably mixed with your consideration, much beyond the consequence of the present prosecution, involving, perhaps, the merit of the impeachment itself which gave it birth :—a question which the Commons, as prosecutors of Mr. Hastings, should in common prudence have avoided; unless, regretting the unwieldy length of their proceedings against him, they wished to

afford him the opportunity of this strange anomalous defence. For, although I am neither his counsel, nor desire to have anything to do with his guilt or innocence, yet, in the collateral defence of my client, I am driven to state matter which may be considered by many as hostile to the impeachment. For if our dependencies have been secured, and their interests promoted, I am driven in the defence of my client to remark, that it is mad and preposterous to bring to the standard of justice and humanity the exercise of a dominion founded upon violence and terror. It may, and must be true, that Mr. Hastings has repeatedly offended against the rights and privileges of Asiatic government, if he was the faithful deputy of a power which could not maintain itself for an hour without trampling upon both:—he may and must have offended against the laws of God and nature, if he was the faithful viceroy of an empire wrested in blood from the people to whom God and nature had given it:—he may and must have preserved that unjust dominion over timorous and abject nations by a terrifying, overbearing, insulting superiority, if he was the faithful administrator of your government, which, having no root in consent or affection,—no foundation in similarity of interests,—nor support from any one principle which cements men together in society, could only be upheld by alternate stratagem and force. The unhappy people of India, feeble and effeminate as they are from the softness of their climate, and subdued and broken as they have been by the knavery and strength of civilization, still occasionally start up in all the vigour and intelligence of insulted nature:—to be governed at all, they must be governed with a rod of iron; and our empire in the East would long since have been lost to Great Britain, if civil skill and military prowess had not united their efforts to support an authority—which Heaven never gave,—by means which it never can sanction.

“Gentlemen, I think I can observe that you are touched with the way of considering the subject; and I can account for it. I have not been considering it through the cold medium of books, but have been speaking of man and his nature, and of human dominion, from what I have seen of them myself amongst reluctant nations submitting to our authority. I know what they feel, and how such feelings can alone be repressed. I have heard them in my youth from a naked savage, in the indignant character of a prince surrounded by his subjects, addressing the governor of a British colony, holding a bundle of sticks in his hand, as the notes of his unlettered eloquence: ‘Who is it,’ said the jealous ruler over the desert, encroached upon by the restless foot of English adventure—‘who is it that causes this river to rise in the high mountains, and to empty itself into the ocean? Who is it that causes to blow the loud winds of winter,

and that calms them again in the summer? Who is it that rears up the shade of those lofty forests, and blasts them with the quick lightning at his pleasure? The same Being who gave to you a country on the other side of the waters, and gave ours to us; and by this title we will defend it!" said the warrior, throwing down his tomahawk upon the ground, and raising the war-sound of his nation.* These are the feelings of subjugated man all round the globe; and, depend upon it, nothing but fear will control where it is vain to look for affection.

"These reflections are the only antidotes to those anathemas of superhuman eloquence which have lately shaken these walls that surround us;—but which it unaccountably falls to my province, whether I will or no, a little to stem the torrent of, by reminding you that you have a mighty sway in Asia, which cannot be maintained by the finer sympathies of life, or the practice of its charities and affections. What will they do for you when surrounded by two hundred thousand men with artillery, cavalry, and elephants, calling upon you for their dominions which you have robbed them of? Justice may, no doubt, in such a case forbid the levying of a fine to pay a revolting soldiery;—a treaty may stand in the way of increasing a tribute to keep up the very existence of the government; and delicacy for women may forbid all entrance into a Zenana for money, whatever may be the necessity for taking it. All these things must ever be occurring. But, under the pressure of such constant difficulties, so dangerous to national honour, it might be better, perhaps, to think of effectually securing it altogether, by recalling our troops and our merchants, and abandoning our oriental empire. Until this be done, neither religion nor philosophy can be pressed very far into the aid of reformation and punishment. If England, from a lust of ambition and dominion, will insist on maintaining despotic rule over distant and hostile nations, beyond all comparison more numerous and extended than herself, and give commission to her viceroys to govern them with no other instructions than to preserve them, and to secure permanently their revenues; with what colour of consistency or reason can she place herself in the moral chair, and affect to be shocked at the execution of her own orders; advert to the exact measure of wickedness and injustice necessary to their execution, and complaining only of the *excess* as the immorality, considering her authority as a dispensation for breaking the commands of God, and the breach of them as only punishable when contrary to the ordinances of man?

"Such a proceeding, gentlemen, begets serious reflections.

* The rhythm of this celebrated passage has been unusually admired: it is in iambics.

It would be better, perhaps, for the masters and the servants of all such governments to join in supplication that the great Author of violated humanity may not confound them together in one common judgment."—ii., 260–265.

In considering this passage, we earnestly entreat the reader, whoever he may be, to reflect on the moral of it, as it bears on the great questions of East Indian policy; but, as far as relates to the character of Mr. Erskine's eloquence, we would point out, as the most remarkable feature in it, that in no one sentence is the subject—the business in hand—the case—the client—the verdict, lost sight of; and that the fire of that oratory, or rather that *rhetoric* (for it was quite under discipline), which was melting the hearts, and dazzling the understandings of his hearers, had not the power to touch for an instant the hard head of the *Nisi Prius* lawyer, from which it radiated; or to make him swerve, by one hairbreadth even, from the minuter details most befitting his purpose, and the alternate admissions and disavowals best adapted to put his case in the *safest position*. This, indeed, was the grand secret of Mr. Erskine's unparalleled success at the English Bar. Without it, he might have filled Westminster Hall with his sentences, and obtained a reputation for eloquence, somewhat like the fame of a popular preacher or a distinguished actor;—but his fortunes—ay, and the liberties of his country—are built on the matchless skill with which he could subdue the genius of a first-rate orator to the uses of the most consummate advocate of the age.

After the passage just quoted, he contends (always taking care to protest against the innuendoes in every particular), that though a man in the situation of the author should happen, in a long work, to use one or two intemperate expressions, he must not, on this account, be "subjected to infamy," "If," says he, "this severe duty were binding on your consciences, the liberty of the press would be but an empty sound;

and no man could venture to write on any subject, however pure his purpose, without an attorney at one elbow, and a counsel at the other." This leads to another of those highly-wrought, and yet argumentative passages, which so eminently distinguish this oration:—

"From minds thus subdued by the terrors of punishment, there could issue no works of genius to expand the empire of human reason, nor any masterly compositions on the general nature of government, by the help of which the great commonwealths of mankind have founded their establishments; much less any of those useful applications of them to critical conjunctures, by which, from time to time, our own constitution, by the exertions of patriot citizens, has been brought back to its standard. Under such terrors, all the great lights of science and civilization must be extinguished: for men cannot communicate their free thoughts to one another with a lash held over their heads. It is the nature of everything that is great and useful, both in the animate and inanimate world, to be wild and irregular,—and we must be contented to take them with the alloys which belong to them, or live without them. Genius breaks from the fetters of criticism, but its wanderings are sanctioned by its majesty and wisdom when it advances in its path:—subject it to the critic, and you tame it into dulness. Mighty rivers break down their banks in the winter, sweeping away to death the flocks which are fattened on the soil that they fertilize in the summer: the few may be saved by embankments from drowning, but the flock must perish for hunger. Tempests occasionally shake our dwellings, and dissipate our commerce; but they scourge before them the lazy elements, which without them would stagnate into pestilence. In like manner Liberty herself, the last and best gift of God to his creatures, must be taken just as she is: you might pare her down into basish regularity, and shape her into a perfect model of severe scrupulous law, but she would then be Liberty no longer; and you must be content to die under the lash of this inexorable justice which you had exchanged for the banners of Freedom."—ii., 266–268.

The only other extract which we shall make, is from the Peroration, where he illustrates his argument—of the necessity of taking the whole work in question together, in judging of its intentions and merits—by the awful example of the judgment to be expected on

the book of human life at the last day ; a topic which he manages with his usual delicacy of taste, and felicity of diction :—

“One word more, gentlemen, and I have done. Every human tribunal ought to take care to administer justice, as we look hereafter to have justice administered to ourselves. Upon the principle on which the Attorney-General prays sentence upon my client,—God have mercy upon us !—instead of standing before him in judgment with the hopes and consolations of Christians, we must call upon the mountains to cover us ; for which of us can present, for Omniscient examination, a pure, unspotted, and faultless course ? But I humbly expect that the benevolent Author of our being will judge us as I have been pointing out for your example. Holding up the great volume of our lives in his hands, and regarding the general scope of them ;—if he discovers benevolence, charity, and good-will to man beating in the heart, where he alone can look ;—if he finds that our conduct, though often forced out of the path by our infirmities, has been in general well directed : his all-searching eye will assuredly never pursue us into those little corners of our lives, much less will his justice select them for punishment without the general context of our existence, by which faults may be sometimes found to have grown out of virtues, and very many of our heaviest offences to have been grafted by human imperfection upon the best and kindest of our affections. No, gentlemen, believe me, this is not the course of Divine justice, or there is no truth in the Gospels of Heaven. If the general tenor of a man’s conduct be such as I have represented it, he may walk through the shadow of death, with all his faults about him, with as much cheerfulness as in the common paths of life ; because he knows that, instead of a stern accuser to expose before the Author of his nature those frail passages which, like the scored matter in the book before you, chequers the volume of the brightest and best-spent life, His mercy will obscure them from the eye of His purity, and our repentance blot them out for ever.”—*ib.*, 269–271.

The speech of Mr. Perry (the editor of the *Morning Chronicle*, who has distinguished himself too, on a late occasion, as the successful advocate of a free press), is, though much less brilliant, almost equal in skill and argument ; and it produced, like the defence of Stockdale, a clear acquittal. We shall, however, rather direct the attention of our readers to the speech in.

Frost's case, who was accused, by the very *comfortable* loyalty of some good men in those days, of uttering seditious words. They turned out to be a few random expressions used in passing through a coffee-house, where he had been dining, and drinking pretty freely, at an *agricultural* meeting.

At the present day, or at any time since the mild and conciliatory administration of Mr. Addington (to whom, on this, as well as on other accounts, we gladly pay the tribute of our humble gratitude), no man would be found base enough to denounce such offences, —because the government would be ashamed to employ even professional spies on such eavesdropping errands. But in that day of alarm, it was far otherwise. We were then reaping the bitter first-fruits of the penitence of Mr. Pitt—a new convert from the damnable heresy of Reform, and performing his rigorous noviciate among the associated enemies of popular rights. In the fervour of that new-sprung zeal, an experiment was made on the temper and character of the nation, which nothing but the alarms transplanted from France could have made any mortal bold enough to have attempted; which the conversions of Oliver Cromwell did not surpass, except in success;—which Buonaparte himself, in the antijacobin part of his life—in his third manner (to use the language of painters) has scarcely excelled, unless in the greater boldness of the design, and brilliancy of the execution;—and which the integrity of British courts of justice, and the genius of Mr. Erskine, alone prevented from dyeing the canvas with as deep a shade among ourselves. The trade of a spy was then not morelly lucrative; it had almost ceased to be degrading. Friends of the constitution, as they were called, conveyed the dark hint, and carried the careless words of the supposed “*democrat*” from house to house, till, at last, his person was watched, his temper tried, the accents of discontent registered, as they were wrung from his lips by every indignity

which the *persecution of society* (if we may so speak) can inflict ;—and then his company shunned by the base and the cowardly,—or only resorted to by the *loyal* who had not yet fattened upon him, and had their fortune still to make out of his life and conversation.

We speak not from hearsay—or from fancy—but from distinct and personal recollection ; for fifteen years have not passed over our heads, since every part of the island, from the metropolis to the meanest village that supports an attorney or a curate, teemed with the wretched vermin whom we are in vain attempting to describe. We speak, indeed, from notes that are still fresh and legible ; for, turn which way we will, we now see almost all the places of profit and trust in this island filled with persons, for whose elevation we should find it hard to account, if we did not look back to their apprenticeships in 1794 and 1795. We speak from a feeling recollection ;—for, where did this unutterable baseness—this infinite misery—this most humiliating curse, fall so heavily as in the very city where we now write ?—and for no other reason, but because Scotland has no popular spirit, from having no popular elections—and because her courts of justice were, at that time, considerably behind the courts of Westminster. In London, the evil was less severely felt ; but it was no fault of Mr. Pitt's that it stopt where it did. He had committed in his youth the sin of reform ;—he had his atonement to make for an offence only pardonable on the score of that heedless and tender age—only to be expiated by the most glaring proofs of amendment.

The speech for Mr. Frost is the first of those almost miraculous exertions which, in that momentous crisis, Mr. Erskine made for the liberties of his country. We shall give our readers only a short specimen of it, as descriptive of the proceedings which we have been alluding to ; and more especially of the conduct of the

government and their agents in Scotland. Could evidence be brought from Ireland, we apprehend the Scottish persecutions would sink out of sight :—

“ Gentlemen, it is impossible for me to form any other judgment of the impression which such a proceeding altogether is likely to make upon your minds, but from that which it makes upon *my own*. In the first place, is society to be protected by the breach of those confidences, and in the destruction of that security and tranquillity, which constitute its very essence everywhere, but which, till of late, most emphatically characterized the life of an Englishman? Is government to derive dignity and safety by means which render it impossible for any man who has the least spark of honour to step forward to serve it? Is the time come when obedience to the law and correctness of conduct are not a sufficient protection to the subject, but that he must measure his steps, select his expressions, and adjust his very looks in the most common and private intercourses of life? Must an English gentleman in future fill his wine by a measure, lest, in the openness of his soul, and whilst believing his neighbours are joining with him in that happy relaxation and freedom of thought, which is the prime blessing of life, he should find his character blasted, and his person in a prison? Does any man put such constraint upon himself in the most private moment of his life, that he would be contented to have his loosest and lightest words recorded, and set in array against him in a court of justice? Thank God, the world lives very differently, or it would not be worth living in. There are moments when jarring opinions may be given without inconsistency,—when Truth herself may be sported with without the breach of veracity—and where well-imagined nonsense is not only superior to, but is the very index to wit and wisdom. I might safely assert, taking, too, for the standard of my assertion the most honourably correct and enlightened societies in the kingdom, that if malignant spies were properly posted, scarcely a dinner would end without a duel and an indictment.

“ When I came down this morning, and found, contrary to my expectation, that we were to be stuffed into this miserable hole in the wall,* to consume our constitutions :—suppose I had muttered along through the gloomy passages—What, is this cursed trial of Hastings going on again? Are we to have no respite? Are we to die of the asthma in this damned corner? I wish to God that the roof would come down and abate the Impeachment, Lords, Commons, and all together. *Such a wish*

* The King's Bench sat in the Small Court of Common Pleas, the Impeachment having shut up its own court.—*Edit.*

proceeding from the mind, would be desperate wickedness, and the serious expression of it a high and critical contempt of Parliament. Perhaps the bare utterance of such words, even without meaning, would be irreverend and foolish; but still, if such expressions had been gravely imputed to me as the result of a malignant mind, seeking the destruction of the Lords and Commons of England, how would they have been treated in the House of Commons on a motion for my expulsion? How! The witness would have been laughed out of the house before he had half-finished his evidence, and would have been voted to be too great a blockhead to deserve a worse character. Many things are, indeed, wrong and reprehensible, that neither do nor can become the objects of criminal justice; because the happiness and security of social life, which are the very end and object of all law and justice, forbid the communication of them; because the spirit of a gentleman, which is the most refined morality, either shuts men's ears against what should not be heard, or closes their lips with the sacred seal of honour.

"This tacit but well understood and delightful compact of social life is perfectly consistent with its safety. The security of free governments, and the unsuspecting confidence of every man who lives under them, are not only compatible but inseparable. It is easy to distinguish where the public duty calls for the violation of the private one: criminal intention, but not indecent levities,—not even grave opinions unconnected with conduct, are to be exposed to the magistrate; and when men, which happens but seldom, without the honour or the sense to make the due distinctions, force complaints upon governments, which they can neither approve of nor refuse to act upon,—it becomes the office of juries—as it is yours to-day—to draw the true line in their judgments, measuring men's conduct by the safe standards of human life and experience."—ii., 341–344.

After quoting Mr. Burke's spirited remarks on the system of *espionage* and persecution practised in France he proceeds:—

"If these sentiments apply so justly to the reprobation of persecution for opinions—even for opinions which the laws, however absurdly, inhibit,—for opinions, though certainly and maturely entertained,—though publicly professed, and though followed up by corresponding conduct;—how irresistibly do they devote to contempt and execration all eavesdropping attacks upon loose conversations, casual or convivial, more especially when proceeding from persons conforming to all the religious and civil institutions of the state, unsupported by general and avowed profession, and not merely unconnected

with conduct, but scarcely attended with recollection or consciousness! Such a vexatious system of inquisition, the disturber of household peace, began and ended with the Star Chamber;—the venerable law of England never knew it;—her noble, dignified, and humane policy soars above the little irregularities of our lives, and disdains to enter our closets without a warrant founded upon complaint. Constructed by man to regulate human infirmities, and not by God to guard the purity of angels, it leaves to us our thoughts, our opinions, and our conversations, and punishes only overt acts of contempt and disobedience to her authority.

“Gentlemen, this is not the specious phrase of an advocate for his client;—it is not even my exposition of the spirit of our constitution;—but it is the phrase and letter of the law itself. In the most critical conjunctures of our history, when government was legislating for its own existence and continuance, it never overstepped this wise moderation. To give stability to establishments, it occasionally bridled opinions concerning them; but its punishments, though sanguinary, *laid no snares for thoughtless life*, and took no man by surprise.”—ii., 345, 346.

We subjoin one other passage from the conclusion of the speech, because its application to the present times is but too striking:—

“Indeed, I am very sorry to say that we *hear* of late too much of the excellence of the British Government, and *feel* but too little of its benefits. They, too, who pronounce its panegyrics, are those who alone prevent the entire public from acceding to them;—the eulogium comes from a suspected quarter, when it is pronounced by persons enjoying every honour from the Crown, and treating the people upon all occasions with suspicion and contempt. The three estates of the kingdom are co-ordinate, all alike representing the dignity, and jointly executing the authority of the nation; yet all our loyalty seems to be wasted upon one of them. How happens it else that we are so exquisitely sensible, so tremblingly alive to every attack upon the CROWN, OR THE NOBLES that surround it, yet so completely careless of what regards THE ONCE RESPECTED AND AWFUL COMMONS OF GREAT BRITAIN!

“If Mr. Frost had gone into every coffee-house, from Charing Cross to the Exchange,—lamenting the dangers of popular government,—reprobating the peevishness of opposition in Parliament, and wishing, in the most advised terms, that we could look up to the Throne and its excellent Ministers alone for quiet and comfortable government, do you think that we should

have had an indictment? I ask pardon for the supposition; I can discover that you are laughing at me for its absurdity. Indeed, I might ask you whether it is not the notorious language of the highest men, in and out of Parliament, to justify the alienation of the popular part of the Government from the spirit and principle of its trust and office, and to prognosticate the very ruin and downfall of England, from a free and uncorrupted representation of the great body of the people? I solemnly declare to you, that I think the whole of this system leads inevitably to the dangers we seek to avert;—it divides the higher and the lower classes of the nation into adverse parties, instead of uniting and compounding them into one harmonious whole;—it embitters the people against authority, which, when they are made to feel and know is but their own security, they must, from the very nature of man, unite to support and cherish. I do not believe that there is any set of men to be named in England,—I might say that I do not know an individual who seriously wishes to touch the Crown, or any branch of our excellent constitution; and when we hear peevish and disrespectful expressions concerning any of its functions, depend upon it, it proceeds from some practical variance between its theory and its practice. These variances are the fatal springs of disorder and disgust;—they lost America, and in that unfortunate separation laid the foundation of all that we have to fear; yet, instead of treading back our steps, we seek recovery in the system which brought us into peril. Let Government in England always take care to make its administration correspond with the true spirit of our genuine constitution, and nothing will ever endanger it. Let it seek to maintain its corruptions by severity and coercion,—and neither laws nor arms will support it. These are my sentiments: and I advise you, however unpopular they may be at this moment, to consider them before you repel them.”—ii., 353-356.

In the violence of that day, the exertions of Mr. Erskine failed of their accustomed effect; and Mr. Frost was found guilty. But the impression of his defence was not lost; and it deterred the government from risking its credit on such precarious speculations, until, in 1794, the charges of high treason were brought forward, the whole force of the Bar marshalled against the prisoners, and every effort used to beat down their undaunted defender. Then it was that his consummate talents shone in their full lustre.

His indefatigable patience—his eternal watchfulness—his unceasing labour of body and of mind—the strength of an herculean constitution—his untameable spirit—a subtlety which the merest pleader might envy—a quickness of intellect which made up for the host he was opposed to:—these were the great powers of the man; and the wonderful eloquence of his speeches is only to be spoken of as second to these. Amidst all the struggles of the constitution, in parliament, in the council, and in the field,—there is no one man, certainly, to whose individual exertions it owes so much, as to this celebrated advocate; and if ever a single patriot saved his country from the horrors of a proscription, this man did this deed for us, in stemming the tide of state prosecutions.

We have spoken most at large of his later productions; but the reader will naturally be anxious to look at the beginnings of his career. We subjoin, therefore, an extract from his celebrated speech for Captain Baillie, being the first he ever made, and pronounced by him immediately after he was called to the Bar. The specimen we are about to give, is selected principally with a view to show, that the courage which marked Mr. Erskine's professional life was not acquired after the success which rendered it a safe and cheap virtue; but being naturally inherent in the man, was displayed at a moment when attended with the most formidable risks:—

“In this enumeration of delinquents, the Rev. Mr. — looks round, as if he thought I had forgotten him. He is mistaken;—I well remembered him; but *his* infamy is worn threadbare. Mr. Murphy has already treated him with that ridicule which his folly, and Mr. Peckham with that invective which his wickedness, deserve. I shall, therefore, forbear to taint the ear of the Court further with his name;—a name which would bring dishonour upon his country and its religion, if human nature were not happily compelled to bear the greater part of the disgrace, and to share it amongst mankind.”—

“*Such, my Lords, is the case.* The defendant,—not a disap-

pointed, malicious informer, prying into official abuses, because without office himself, but himself a man in office ;—not troublesomely inquisitive into other men's departments, but conscientiously correcting his own ;—doing it pursuant to the rules of law, and, what heightens the character, doing it at the risk of his office, from which the effrontery of power has already suspended him without proof of his guilt ;—a conduct not only unjust and illiberal, but highly disrespectful to this Court, whose Judges sit in the double capacity of ministers of the law, and governors of this sacred and abused institution. Indeed, Lord —— has, in my mind, acted such a part”

* * *

[*Here, Lord Mansfield observing the Counsel heated with his subject, and growing personal on the first Lord of the Admiralty, told him that Lord —— was not before the Court.*]

“ I know that he is not formally before the Court ; but, for that very reason, *I will bring him before the Court.* He has placed these men in the front of the battle, in hopes to escape under their shelter ; but I will not join in battle with them : *their vices, though screwed up to the highest pitch of human depravity, are not of dignity enough to vindicate the combat with me.* I will drag *him* to light, who is the dark mover behind this scene of iniquity. I assert that the Earl of —— has but one road to escape out of this business without pollution and disgrace : and *that is*, by publicly disavowing the acts of the prosecutors, and restoring Captain Baillie to his command. If he does this, then his offence will be no more than the too common one, of having suffered his own *personal* interest to prevail over his *public* duty, in placing his voters in the Hospital. But if, on the contrary, he continues to protect the prosecutors, in spite of the evidence of their guilt, which has excited the abhorrence of the numerous audience that crowd this Court,— IF HE KEEPS THIS INJURED MAN SUSPENDED, OR DARES TO TURN THAT SUSPENSION INTO A REMOVAL, I SHALL THEN NOT SCRUPLE TO DECLARE HIM AN ACCOMPLICE IN THEIR GUILT— A SHAMELESS OPPRESSOR—A DISGRACE TO HIS RANK, AND A TRAITOR TO HIS TRUST. But as I should be very sorry that the fortune of my brave and honourable friend should depend, either upon the exercise of Lord —— 's virtues, or the influence of his fears, I do most earnestly entreat the Court to mark the malignant object of this prosecution, and to defeat it :—I beseech you, my Lords, to consider, that even by discharging the rule, and with costs, the defendant is neither protected nor restored. I trust, therefore, your Lordships will not rest satisfied with fulfilling your JUDICIAL duty, but, as the strongest evidence of

foul abuses has, by accident, come collaterally before you, that you will protect a brave and public-spirited officer from the persecution this writing has brought upon him, and not suffer so dreadful an example to go abroad into the world as the ruin of an upright man for having faithfully discharged his duty.

"My Lords, this matter is of the last importance. I speak not as an ADVOCATE alone—I speak to you AS A MAN—as a member of a state, whose very existence depends upon her NAVAL STRENGTH. If a misgovernment were to fall upon Chelsea Hospital, to the ruin and discouragement of our army, it would be no doubt to be lamented; yet I should not think it fatal: But if our fleets are to be crippled by the baneful influence of elections, WE ARE LOST INDEED! If the seaman, who, while he exposes his body to fatigues and dangers—looking forward to Greenwich as an asylum for infirmity and old age—sees the gates of it blocked up by corruption, and hears the riot and mirth of luxurious landmen drowning the groans and complaints of the wounded, helpless companions of his glory—he will tempt the seas no more. The Admiralty may press HIS BODY, indeed, at the expense of humanity and the constitution; but they cannot press *his mind*—they cannot press the heroic ardour of a British sailor; and, instead of a fleet to carry terror all round the globe, the Admiralty may not much longer be able to amuse us with even the peaceable unsubstantial pageant of a review.

"FINE AND IMPRISONMENT! The man deserves a PALACE instead of a PRISON, who prevents the palace, built by the public bounty of his country, from being converted into a dungeon, and who sacrifices his own security to the interests of humanity and virtue."—i., 20, 29–32.

The professional life of this eminent person, who has, of late years, reached the highest honours of the law, is in every respect useful as an example to future lawyers. It shows, that a base, time-serving demeanour towards the Judges, and a corrupt or servile conduct towards the Government, are not the only, though, from the frailty of human nature, and the wickedness of the age, they may often prove the surest roads to preferment. It exalts the character of the English Barrister beyond what, in former times, it had attained, and holds out an illustrious instance of patriotism and independence, united with the highest legal excellence, and crowned, in the worst of times, with

the most ample success. But it is doubly important, by proving how much a single man can do against the corruptions of his age, and how far he can vindicate the liberties of his country, so long as courts of justice are pure, by raising his single voice against the outcry of the people, and the influence of the Crown, at a time when the union of these opposite forces was bearing down all opposition in Parliament, and daily setting at nought the most splendid talents, armed with the most just cause. While the administration of the law flows in such pure channels,—while the Judges are incorruptible, and are watched by the scrutinizing eyes of an enlightened Bar, as well as by the jealous attention of the country,—while juries continue to know, and to exercise their high functions, and a single advocate of honesty and talents remains—thank God, happen what will in other places, our personal safety is beyond the reach of a corrupt ministry and their venal adherents. Justice will hold her even balance, in the midst of hosts armed with gold or with steel. The law will be administered steadily, while the principles of right and wrong—the evidence of the senses themselves—the very axioms of arithmetic—may seem, elsewhere, to be mixed in one giddy and inextricable confusion; and, after every other plank of the British constitution shall have sunk below the weight of the Crown, or been stove in by the violence of popular commotion, that one will remain, to which we are ever fondest of clinging, and by which we can always most surely be saved.

ERSKINE.

It is now a considerable time since we called the attention of our readers to the very interesting and important publication of which this volume forms the sequel. The opinions then expressed, although known to be those entertained by the enlightened profession of which Lord Erskine was the chief ornament, have, as might be expected from party violence and ignorance, encountered some opposition;—chiefly, however, among persons at a distance from the theatre where his talents were displayed, and not the most capable, in other respects, of forming a sound judgment on such subjects. The remarks which we made on the political persecutions of 1794, have been also attacked; and, as might be expected, with some bitterness, by the few remaining adherents of the system,—and the supporters of those weak and contemptible politicians who are seeking to remove the worst enemy they have to contend with—popular discussion—by reviving the measures formerly pursued against the liberty of the press. Having now had some leisure for maturely weighing both branches of the subject,—the merits of the orations in question, and the character of the measures of 1794,—and having had ample opportunities of observing the way in which those topics are canvassed by such as are competent to handle them, we have no hesitation in avowing that our sentiments remain wholly unchanged. Not a word have we heard derogatory to the warm and unbought

* *Speeches of Lord Erskine, when at the Bar, on Miscellaneous Subjects.* 8vo, pp. 248. Ridgway, London, 1812.

applause extorted from us by the great services which Lord Erskine has rendered to the cause of Liberty; and we fancy that all who have had time to study the speeches, now go along with us in the tribute of admiration paid to their transcendent merits. Indeed there seems but one voice upon the matter. We heard some time ago of an exception or two, the particulars of which have escaped us; but we believe there was a newspaper written in the Scottish tongue, in some remote part of the country, which professed an inability to understand the beauties of the composition, possibly from ignorance of the language in which the speeches were delivered: and it was said, that an attorney, somewhere in Scotland (and most likely from the same cause), was greatly offended at our praise of the speech for Stockdale, which he professed an inability to enter into;—but was confident the best “*Session papers*” were very different things. With these slight exceptions we take the opinion of the country, and of every part of the world where the language is understood, to be that of the most unbounded admiration of these exquisite specimens of judicial oratory,—and of great obligations to the editor of the collection.

Those obligations are now considerably increased by the publication of the present volume, which contains some speeches less known to the world, because upon subjects of a private nature, but not at all inferior in oratorical merit to the finest of Lord Erskine’s performances in State Trials. It is with great delight that we revert to so interesting a task as that of tracing the skill and genius of a first-rate orator, and of holding up his exertions for the instruction of those who may feel within themselves one of the noblest passions of our nature—love of the fame to be acquired, and the gratification to be felt, in wielding the feelings of a popular assembly;—a passion only second to that of which Lord Erskine too holds forth so bright an example—the love of earning that fame by the services

which, in a free country, eloquence may render to the rights of the people, and the best interests of mankind.

This volume contains seven speeches of Mr. Erskine; three of which are on trials of a public nature—the speech of Hadfield, that for the Madras Council, and that for Cuthell. The other four are speeches in private actions; two in cases of adultery, one in an action for breach of promise of marriage, and one in the Bishop of Bangor's case. There is a circumstance, unavoidable perhaps, but greatly to be lamented, in the publication of the two speeches in cases of seduction: we mean the pain which a revival of such discussions must give to the feelings of the parties and their families. The publicity of their story inflicts some of the most acute of the sufferings arising from such transactions at the time; and it is painful to think how severely the same feelings must be wounded by the revival of the subject at a distance of time, when those may have become capable of being wounded, over whose happily tender years the first blast of evil fame had passed innoxious. For this serious evil we fear there is no remedy; yet we do not the less regret it; and, in alluding to the cases in question, and quoting passages, we shall carefully abstain from mentioning names, that we may not have to reproach ourselves with spreading the mischief.

The speech for Hadfield contains one of the most sound and able disquisitions on the subject of insanity, as matter of defence against a criminal charge, that is anywhere to be found. Indeed we view it as a particularly important addition to legal learning, and as going far to settle the question within what limits this defence shall be available. Most of our readers must recollect the singular transaction which gave rise to it. We prefer recalling it to the minds of such as do not, in the words of Mr. Erskine's exordium; for they convey a lesson as well as a narrative of the fact:—

“ The scene which we are engaged in, and the duty which I am not merely *privileged*, but *appointed* by the authority of the Court to perform, exhibits to the whole civilized world a perpetual monument of our national justice.

“ The transaction, indeed, in every part of it, as it stands recorded in the evidence already before us, places our country, and its government, and its inhabitants, upon the highest pinnacle of human elevation. It appears that, upon the 15th day of May last, his Majesty, after a reign of forty years, not merely in sovereign *power*, but spontaneously in the very hearts of his people, was openly shot at (or to all appearance shot at) in a public theatre in the centre of his capital, and amidst the loyal plaudits of his subjects, YET NOT A HAIR OF THE HEAD OF THE SUPPOSED ASSASSIN WAS TOUCHED. In this unparalleled scene of calm forbearance the King himself, though he stood first in personal interest and feeling, as well as in command, was a singular and fortunate example. The least appearance of emotion on the part of that august personage must unavoidably have produced a scene quite different, and far less honourable, than the Court is now witnessing; but his Majesty remained unmoved, and the person *apparently* offending was only secured, without injury or reproach, for the business of this day.”—P. 5.

He then describes the peculiar indulgences which our treason-laws extend to the accused; in so much that he who, for an attack upon the meanest individual, would be hurried away to trial, without delay or counsel, or knowledge of witnesses, or of jurors, or of charges, is, when charged with a murderous design against the sovereign of the country, “ covered all over with the armour of the law;”—a distinction which, when soberly considered, we may in passing remark, affords praise to the English law of treasons, at the expense of the other branches of criminal jurisprudence. Mr. Erskine, pursuing the topic, enters upon a train of reflections, which, we think, all will acknowledge to be profound, who are not resolved to call everything shallow and empty which they are forced to admit is beautiful and brilliant:—

“ Gentlemen, when this melancholy catastrophe happened, and the prisoner was arraigned for trial, I remember to have said to some now present, that it was, at first view, difficult to bring those indulgent exceptions to the general rules of trial

within the principle which dictated them to our humane ancestors in cases of treason against the political government, or of *rebellious* conspiracy against the person of the king. In *these* cases, the passions and interests of great bodies of powerful men being engaged and agitated, a counterpoise became necessary to give composure and impartiality to criminal tribunals; but a *mere murderous* attack upon the King's person, not at all connected with his political character, seemed a case to be ranged and dealt with like a similar attack upon any private man.

"But the wisdom of the law is greater than any man's wisdom; how much more, therefore, than mine! An attack upon the King is considered to be parricide against the State; and the jury and the witnesses, and even the judges, are the children. It is fit, on that account, that there should be a solemn pause before we rush to judgment: and what can be a more sublime spectacle of justice than to see a statutable disqualification of a whole nation for a limited period,—a fifteen days' *quarantine* before trial, lest the mind should be subject to the contagion of partial affections!"*—Pp. 6, 7.

The speech for the Madras Council was delivered soon after Mr. Erskine came to the bar, on an occasion which excited unexampled interest in those days of quiet, when the world was unaccustomed to great and strange events,—the arrest of Lord Pigot, in consequence of a misunderstanding between him and his Council. They were prosecuted at the desire of the House of Commons, and convicted; but when brought up for judgment, after Mr. Dunning, Mr. Erskine, and others, had been heard in mitigation, they were only sentenced to pay a fine of one thousand pounds, which was considered, and most justly, as a very lenient punishment. We abstain from entering further into the subject of this speech, because it is so similar to the late proceedings in the East, and in some of our other foreign settlements, that we prefer reserving the subject for a more regular and ample consideration. This speech is now published for the first time; and though from almost any other quarter it would excite no little admiration, we look upon it as the one of the

* There must be fifteen days between arraignment and trial.

least brilliant of Mr. Erskine's exhibitions, and by no means the shortest.

The last speech on a public trial contained in this volume, is the defence of Mr. Cuthell; against whom an indictment for libel had been preferred, in circumstances of so peculiar a nature, that we are extremely glad to find the case recorded. The interest it excites is closely connected with the topics of the present day, and the attacks which ill-advised men are making upon the liberty of the press.

The argument in *Morton v. Ferm*, is extremely short, and only valuable on account of the principle which it illustrates. A verdict had been obtained of £2,000 by the plaintiff, who was formerly housekeeper to the defendant, and had cohabited with him on promise of marriage. After living with her, he had contrived to get rid of her, and married another person. In consequence of this treatment and disappointment, the plaintiff's health, as well as peace of mind, had been destroyed. The plaintiff was a widow, past the usual age of marriage; the defendant an old man; and both parties remarkably deficient in personal charms. The principle contended for by Mr. Erskine, in showing cause against a rule obtained by Mr. Wallace for a new trial on the ground of excessive damages, was, that though in cases where the claim is regulated by pecuniary or other contracts of a certain definite nature, or founded on damages done to property in a certain calculable shape, the Court may interfere if the jury have gone very wide of the mark; yet, where the compensation is for an injury not definite, nor capable of being accurately computed, the jury are the fit judges of the amount, provided the case has been fairly and fully before them. This ground he maintained with success; and the rule was discharged.

We hasten to the two remaining speeches in this volume (passing over that in the Bishop of Bangor's

case as well known),—those in cases of adultery. They contain some of the finest specimens of Mr. Erskine's eloquence; and we trust we shall be able to lay a few of the passages before our readers without being under the necessity of particularizing names. In the one, he was counsel for the plaintiff; and the defendant having suffered judgment to go by default, this address was delivered before the under-sheriff and his jury, impannelled to assess the damages, in execution of the writ of inquiry. In the other, he was counsel for the defendant at the trial in the Court of King's Bench.

Perhaps the circumstances in which the first of these speeches was delivered are little known to many of our readers. The majesty of English justice,—which is ample and full while the parties are at issue, and the Court in which the record is, or the Judge to whom it is sent for trial, have the whole treatment of the cause,—sinks into rather an obscure form, when the general statement of the facts is no longer disputed, and the only remaining question between the parties relates to the amount of the compensation due. This point, frequently the most important of all, is left to the ministerial officer, or his deputy, who is generally a practising attorney, assisted by a junior barrister and a common jury. The Court, thus constituted, meets in any room which may be provided for the purpose:—In the present case it assembled in the King's Arms Tavern, in Palace Yard. The first object of Mr. Erskine was, therefore, to counteract the natural effect of these circumstances, and to raise the dignity of the place, and form of procedure, by all his arts; and he judiciously recurs to the same topic in his peroration. After describing the early intimacy and long-continued friendship of the parties, he proceeds—

“Yet, dreadful to relate, and it is, indeed, the bitterest evil of which the plaintiff has to complain, a criminal intercourse for

nearly five years before the discovery of the connexion, had most probably taken place. I will leave you to consider what must have been the feelings of such a husband, upon the fatal discovery that his wife, and such a wife, had conducted herself in a manner that not merely deprived him of her comfort and society, but placed him in a situation too horrible to be described. If a man without children is suddenly cut off by an adulterer from all the comforts and happiness of marriage, the discovery of *his* condition is happiness itself when compared with that to which the plaintiff is reduced. When children, by a woman lost for ever to the husband by the arts of the adulterer, are begotten in the unsuspected days of virtue and happiness, there remains a consolation: mixed, indeed, with the most painful reflections, yet a consolation still. But what is the plaintiff's situation? He does not know at *what time* this heavy calamity fell upon him; he is tortured with the most afflicting of all human sensations. When he looks at the children, whom he is by law bound to protect and to provide for, and from whose existence he ought to receive the delightful return which the union of instinct and reason has provided for the continuation of the world, he knows not whether he is lavishing his fondness and affection upon his own children, or upon the seed of a villain sown in the bed of his honour and his delight. He starts back with horror, when, instead of seeing his own image reflected from their infant features, he thinks he sees the destroyer of his happiness—a midnight robber introduced into his house, under professions of friendship and brotherhood—a plunderer, not in the repositories of his treasure, which may be supplied, or lived without,—‘*but there where he had garnered up his hopes,—Where either he must live or bear no life.*’”—Pp. 176-178.

We know not how this may please some readers, such as those few who thought our praise of the other speeches too unbounded; but to us it does appear the perfection of simple and beautiful composition. We extract the following reflections on the law as it regards this subject,—but without pursuing the subject which they start; as we may have another opportunity of treating it at large:—

“But there are other wrongs which cannot be estimated in money:

‘You cannot minister to a *mind* diseas’d.’

You cannot redress a man who is wronged beyond the possibility of redress. The law has no means of restoring to him

what he has lost. God himself, as he has constituted human nature, has no means of alleviating such an injury as the one I have brought before you. While the sensibilities, affections, and feelings he has given to man remain, it is impossible to heal a wound which strikes so deep into the soul. When you have given to a plaintiff, in damages, all that figures can number, it is as nothing;—he goes away hanging down his head in sorrow, accompanied by his wretched family, dispirited and dejected. Nevertheless, the law has given a civil action for adultery, and, strange to say, it has given *nothing else*. The law commands that the injury shall be compensated (as far as it is practicable) **IN MONEY**, because courts of *civil* justice have no other means of compensation **THAN money**; and the only question, therefore, and which *you* upon your oaths are to decide, is this—Has the plaintiff sustained an injury up to the extent which he has complained of? Will twenty thousand pounds place him in the same condition of comfort and happiness which he enjoyed before the adultery, and which the adulterer has deprived him of? You know that it will not. Ask your own hearts the question, and you will receive the same answer. I should be glad to know, then, upon what principle, as it regards the *private* justice which the plaintiff has a right to, or upon what principle, as the example of that justice affects the public and the remotest generations of mankind, you can reduce this demand even in a single farthing.”—Pp. 180, 181.

Having applied these reflections and brought them all to bear on his case, so as to increase the amount of damages by their assistance, he touches another string for the same purpose; and we pray our readers to mark, that, wide as he may seem to begin from the point he aims at, and largely as his fancy may appear to roam, luxuriating in the outskirts of his subject, not an idea is ever started by this great advocate, which the matter in issue could have spared, or which he does not bring round to the very object he has immediately in view; and then we find that it has been not merely the most pleasing train of description which he has been pursuing, but the course most directly conducive to the accomplishment of his purpose:—

“I had occasion, not a great while ago, to remark to a jury, that the wholesome institutions of the civilized world came seasonably in aid of the dispensations of Providence for our

well-being in the world. If I were to ask what it is that prevents the prevalence of the crime of incest, by taking away those otherwise natural impulses, from the promiscuous gratification of which we should become like the beasts of the field, and lose all the intellectual endearments which are at once the pride and the happiness of man? What is it that renders our houses pure, and our families innocent? It is that, by the wise institutions of all civilized nations, there is placed a kind of guard against the human passions, in that sense of impropriety and dishonour, which the law has raised up, and impressed with almost the force of a second nature. This wise and politic restraint beats down, by the habits of the mind, even a propensity to incestuous commerce, and opposes those inclinations which nature, for wise purposes, has implanted in our breasts at the approach of the other sex. It holds the mind in chains against the seductions of beauty. It is a moral feeling in perpetual opposition to human infirmity. It is like an angel from heaven placed to guard us against propensities which are evil. It is *that* warning voice, gentlemen, which enables you to embrace your daughter, however lovely, without feeling that you are of a different sex. It is *that* which enables you, in the same manner, to live familiarly with your nearest female relations, without those desires which are natural to man.

“Next to the tie of blood (if not, indeed, before it), is the sacred and spontaneous relation of friendship. The man who comes under the roof of a married friend ought to be under the dominion of the same moral restraint; and, thank God, generally is so, from the operation of the causes which I have described. Though not insensible to the charms of female beauty, he receives its impressions under a habitual reserve, which honour imposes. Hope is the parent of desire, and honour tells him he must not hope. Loose thoughts may arise, but they are rebuked and dissipated—

‘Evil into the mind of God or man
May come and go, so unprov’d, and leave
No spot or blame behind.’

“Gentlemen, I trouble you with these reflections, that you may be able properly to appreciate the guilt of the defendant; and to show you that you are not in a case where large allowances are to be made for the ordinary infirmities of our imperfect natures. When a man does wrong in the heat of *sudden* passion—as, for instance, when, upon receiving an affront, he rushes into immediate violence, even to the deprivation of life, the humanity of the law classes his offence amongst the lower degrees of homicide; it supposes the crime to have been committed

before the mind had time to parley with itself. But is the criminal act of such a person, however disastrous may be the consequence, to be compared with that of the defendant? Invited into the house of a friend,—received with the open arms of affection, as if the same parents had given them birth and bred them;—in THIS situation, this most monstrous and wicked defendant deliberately perpetrated his crime; and, shocking to relate, not only continued the appearances of friendship, after he had violated its most sacred obligations, but continued them as a cloak to the barbarous repetitions of his offence—writing letters of regard, whilst, perhaps, he was the father of the last child, whom his injured friend and companion was embracing and cherishing as his own. What protection can such conduct possibly receive from the humane consideration of the law for sudden and violent passions? A passion for a woman is progressive—it does not, like anger, gain an uncontrolled ascendancy in a moment; nor is a modest matron to be seduced in a day. Such a crime cannot, therefore, be committed under the resistless dominion of *sudden* infirmity: it must be *deliberately*, *wilfully*, and *wickedly* committed. The defendant could not possibly have incurred the guilt of this adultery without often passing through his mind (for he had the education and principles of a gentleman)—the very topics I have been insisting upon before you for his condemnation. Instead of being suddenly impelled towards mischief, without leisure for such reflections, he had innumerable difficulties and obstacles to contend with. He could not but hear, in the first refusals of this unhappy lady, everything to awaken conscience, and even to excite horror. In the arguments he must have employed to seduce *her* from *her* duty, he could not but recollect, and wilfully trample upon *his own*. He was a year engaged in the pursuit—he resorted repeatedly to his shameful purpose, and advanced to it at such intervals of time and distance, as entitle me to say, that he determined in cold blood to enjoy a future and momentary gratification, at the expense of every principle of honour which is held sacred amongst gentlemen, even where no laws interpose their obligations or restraint.”—Pp. 183-186.

The jury gave £7,000 damages, supposed to be equal to the defendant's whole property.

The other speech which we proceed to notice is of the same exalted character. It was delivered in behalf of a gentleman of high family, who having been attached to a young lady of equal rank, was prevented

from marrying her by the interested views of her relations, who preferred an alliance with one of the greatest houses in the kingdom. The marriage was an unhappy one: the original attachment seems never to have been replaced by any other—it revived after an interval of misery and separation—and produced the elopement which occasioned the present action. It is quite impossible, we think, for human ingenuity and eloquence to have turned those circumstances to better account than Mr. Erskine's did in this exquisite speech.

The counsel for the plaintiff having dwelt on the loss of domestic happiness occasioned by the seduction, Mr. Erskine meets him here at once:—

“In order, therefore, to examine this matter (and I shall support every syllable that I utter with the most precise and uncontrovertible proofs), I will begin with drawing up the curtains of this blessed marriage-bed, whose joys are supposed to have been nipped in the bud by the defendant's adulterous seduction. Nothing, certainly, is more delightful to the human fancy than the possession of a beautiful woman in the prime of health and youthful passion: It is, beyond all doubt, the highest enjoyment which God, in his benevolence, and for the wisest purposes, has bestowed upon his own image: I reverence, as I ought, that mysterious union of mind and body, which, while it continues our species, is the source of all our affections; which builds up and dignifies the condition of human life; which binds the husband to the wife by ties more indissoluble than laws can possibly create; and which, by the reciprocal endearments arising from a mutual passion, a mutual interest, and a mutual honour, lays the foundation of that parental affection which dies in the brutes with the necessities of nature, but which reflects back again upon the human parents the unspeakable sympathies of their offspring, and all the sweet, delightful relations of social existence. While the curtains, therefore, are yet closed upon this bridal scene, your imaginations will naturally represent to you this charming woman, endeavouring to conceal sensations which modesty forbids the sex, however enamoured, too openly to reveal; wishing, beyond adequate expression, what she must not even attempt to express; and seemingly resisting what she burns to enjoy. Alas! gentlemen, you must now prepare to see in the room of this a scene of horror and of sorrow; you must prepare to see a noble lady, whose birth surely required no further illustration; who had been courted to marriage

before she ever heard even her husband's name; and whose affections were irretrievably bestowed upon and pledged to my honourable and unfortunate client; you must behold her given up to the plaintiff by the infatuation of parents, and stretched upon this bridal bed as upon a rack;—torn from the arms of a beloved and impassioned youth, himself of noble birth, only to secure the honours of a higher title; a legal victim on the altar of heraldry!"—Pp. 201-203.

He then goes into the particular facts which are to support this description, and works them up to a purpose bold indeed—but not rash;—he contrives to make the parties change places, and represents the seducer as the injured person:—

"To all this it will be said by the plaintiff's counsel (as it has, indeed, been hinted already), that disgust and alienation from her husband could not but be expected; but that it arose from her affection for Mr. B. Be it so, gentlemen. I readily admit that, if Mr. B.'s acquaintance with the lady had commenced *subsequent to the marriage*, the argument would be irresistible, and the criminal conclusion against him unanswerable. But has Mr. H. a right to instruct his counsel to charge my honourable client with seduction when *he himself* was the SEDUCER? My learned friend deprecates the power of what he terms my pathetic eloquence: Alas! gentlemen, if I possessed it, the occasion forbids its exertion, because Mr. B. has only to defend *himself*; and cannot demand damages from Mr. H. for depriving him of what was *his* by a title superior to any law which man has a moral right to make. Mr. H. was NEVER MARRIED. God and nature forbid the banns of such a marriage. If, therefore, Mr. B. this day could have, by me, addressed to you his wrongs in the character of a plaintiff demanding reparation, what damages might I not have asked for him—and, without the aid of this imputed eloquence, what damages might I not have expected?

"I would have brought before you a noble youth, who had fixed his affections upon one of the most beautiful of her sex, and who enjoyed hers in return. I would have shown you their suitable condition;—I would have painted the expectation of an honourable union, and would have concluded by showing her to you in the arms of another, by the legal prostitution of parental choice in the teeth of affection: with child by a rival, and only reclaimed at last, after so cruel and so afflicting a divorce, with her freshest charms despoiled, and her very morals in a manner impeached, by asserting the purity and virtue of her

original and spotless choice. Good God! imagine my client to be PLAINTIFF, and what damages are you not prepared to give him? and yet he is here as DEFENDANT, and damages are demanded against HIM. Oh, monstrous conclusion!"—Pp. 204, 205.

After this, he says he considers his client as perfectly safe in the hands of the jury; and may spare a moment to render his cause beneficial to the public. It might be supposed that he is in reality going to lecture upon some general topics arising out of the cause; not for the sake of really edifying his audience, but for relieving their attention, and displaying rhetoric. No such thing—these are arts of lesser rhetoricians. He enlarges on such points indeed, and persuades his hearers that he is instructing them, and stepping aside for their improvement; but after thus getting the more complete and unsuspecting possession of them, he speedily, but not abruptly, turns all he has been saying to the account of his cause, by a transition perfectly natural, and indicating the purpose for which the supposed digression was indulged in:—

"It involves in it an awful lesson; and more instructive lessons are taught in courts of justice than the church is able to inculcate. Morals come in the cold abstract from pulpits; but men smart under them practically when we lawyers are the preachers. Let the aristocracy of England, which trembles so much for itself, take heed to its own security; let the nobles of England, if they mean to preserve that pre-eminence which, in some shape or other, must exist in every social community, take care to support it by aiming at that which is creative, and alone creative, of real superiority. Instead of matching themselves to supply wealth, to be again idly squandered in debauching excesses, or to round the quarters of a family shield; instead of continuing their names and honours in cold and alienated embraces, amidst the enervating rounds of shallow dissipation, let them live as their fathers of old lived before them;—let them marry as affection and prudence lead the way; and, in the ardours of mutual love, and in the simplicities of rural life, let them lay the foundation of a vigorous race of men, firm in their bodies, and moral from early habits; and, instead of wasting their fortunes and their strength in the tasteless circles of de-

bauchery, let them light up their magnificent and hospitable halls to the gentry and peasantry of the country, extending the consolations of wealth and influence to the poor. Let them but do this,—and, instead of those dangerous and distracted divisions between the different ranks of life, and those jealousies of the multitude so often blindly painted as big with destruction; we should see our country as one large and harmonious family,—which can never be accomplished amidst vice and corruption, by wars or treaties, by informations *ex officio* for libels, or by any of the tricks and artifices of the state:—Would to God this system had been followed in the instance before us! Surely the noble house of F. needed no further illustration; nor the still nobler house of H.,—with blood enough to have inoculated half the kingdom.”—Pp. 205–207.

The speech concludes with such a representation of the defender's circumstances as might conduce to the same end—the diminution of damages. Whether he was successful or not, the reader may judge, when he learns that only £500 were given; barely enough to cover an application for a divorce bill.

We shall now close this article, which we trust will not be thought tedious, however extended in length, by such as have read the extracts, which give it the whole value it possesses. It is too late to indulge in general reflections upon a professional career, about which the world has long since made up its mind. Nothing now remains but to admire its lustre, and to lament that it has been terminated,—not indeed by events which took Mr. Erskine from a new sphere, to which the habits of his previous life were little adapted, and in which he could have experienced no great comfort, however necessary for his fame and for the honour of the profession his elevation to it might have been. Nor yet do we mourn because the prospect of his return to the same sphere has been overcast. But we may be allowed to express a sincere, though unavailing regret, that the strange and humiliating events which have recently inflicted such injuries on the country, should have deprived it of the services which Lord Erskine might still render in returning to the courts of

common law, and filling a high magisterial station in those scenes where his life was spent.

In concluding these reflections, we cannot avoid recurring to the topic with which our former article on the same subject was wound up. To hold up Lord Erskine's skill and eloquence to the younger members of the profession for their models might be in most instances unavailing. But every one, however slenderly gifted, may follow him close in the path of pure honour and unsullied integrity;—above all—of high and unbending independence,—incapable of being seduced or awed, either by the political or judicial influence of the times. Had he not been the first in this path—had his powers been exerted in obsequiousness to the government, or in time-serving or timid submission to the courts of justice, *we*, at least, should not have stepped aside to attempt the task of praising his eloquence. He might have spoken with the tongue of an angel, if his cause had not been that of the people—and conducted with dauntless resistance to power—unceasing enmity to every kind of oppression, by whomsoever attempted. Covered over with honours (as they are called), satiated with wealth, bepraised in every court and assembly within the realm—one thing he would still have found beyond the reach either of his talents or his power:—the humble, but honest, and therefore not worthless, tribute of praise which we have given, not to the orator, but to the friend of the people.

PULPIT ELOQUENCE.*

It is one of the most trite remarks of rhetorical criticism, that the eloquence of the pulpit, generally speaking, turns very peculiar advantages to a very moderate account. If any one were, for the first time, informed what Preaching was—if, for example, one of the ancient critics had been told that the time would come when vast multitudes of persons should assemble regularly to be addressed, in the midst of their devotions, upon the most sacred truths of a religion sublime beyond all the speculations of philosophers, yet in all its most important points simple, and of the easiest apprehension; that with those truths were to be mingled discussions of the whole circle of human duties, according to a system of morality singularly pure and attractive; and that the more dignified and the more interesting parts of national affairs were not to be excluded from the discourse; that, in short, the most elevating, the most touching, and the most interesting of all topics, were to be the subject-matter of the address, directed to persons sufficiently versed in them, and assembled only from the desire they felt to hear them handled—surely the conclusion would at once have been drawn, that such occasions must train up a race of the most consummate orators, and that the effusions to which they gave birth must needs cast all other rhetorical compositions into the shade. The

* *Modern Infidelity considered with respect to its influence on Society, in a Sermon preached at the Baptist Meeting, Cambridge.* By Robert Hall, M.A. Tenth edition, 8vo, pp. 88. London: Hamilton. 1822.

preacher has, independent of his subject, advantages of a kind enjoyed by no other orator. He speaks with the most complete preparation; in the midst of a profound silence, without the slightest contention to ruffle him or distract his audience; he speaks too as from a lofty eminence, clothed with high authority, not soliciting, but commanding attention—not entreating or exhorting, but requiring compliance with his mandate, by virtue of the commission he bears—not discoursing as man to men, but delivering a divine message as if he were upon an embassy from above, and claimed to represent the Supreme Power, whose minister he is admitted to be. His superiority over his auditors is far more marked than that of other orators, who only excel their hearers in talents and acquirements: for he is also more pure in life and conversation; his habits are more virtuous, generally speaking, than that of the common run of men; and he is, therefore, more entitled to be respected. In very many cases he has a yet stronger claim to their regard; he is most probably their ordinary pastor, and endeared to them by having counselled them in difficulties, visited them in sickness, and comforted them in affliction. What, compared with this, is the advantage which secular declaimers prize the most, that of having a willing audience, when, as candidates for popular favour, they address their own partizans, or, as chiefs of a party, they appeal to their banded followers?

How then comes it to pass that instances are so rare of eminent eloquence in the pulpit? That there should be a great number of dull sermons preached, we can easily bring ourselves to expect—because there are a much greater number of such discourses delivered, than of all others taken together. Reckoning only 15,000 every Sunday (which is allowing above 10,000 of the clergy in England and Wales to preach but once a-week), and supposing only 5,000 by dissenters of all kinds, in both parts of the island, we have above a

million of sermons preached regularly every year, beside many thousand occasional discourses. How small a per-centage of this large number ever sees the light through the press! How trifling a per-centage of the number published ever reaches a second edition! Yet sermons, from the great multitude which are composed, form the most numerous class of publications; and, excepting works of very abstruse science, have the fewest readers; and without any exception, of all books sink, proverbially, the most speedily into oblivion. Their prodigious number will easily account for so many bad ones being found; and this may also explain the evil name which this species of composition generally has acquired. But it will hardly account for so few fine ones appearing. The vast body of preachers always at work is, on the contrary, a reason why many great orators should start up, independent of all the peculiar advantages which pulpit eloquence enjoys. We must seek elsewhere, then, for the cause of the undeniable fact, which is so often admitted and lamented.

It is commonly said, that the advantages such as we have adverted to are more apparent than real,—that ample as they seem to be when enumerated, they shrink into a narrow space in practice,—that some of them, as for instance the absence of conflict, and the uniform preparation, are rather drawbacks than benefits;—and that all the solid points of superiority over secular oratory would be most profitably abandoned, if they could only be exchanged for the lively excitement, the heartfelt glow, created by a present interest, however trifling in amount, compared with the reversionary prospects toward which sacred contemplations are directed. That such is the grovelling nature of men, may be easily admitted; that they will be disposed to feel far more strongly the appeals made to them, upon matters before their eyes, and at the present time, than any topics drawn from “the evidence of things

unseen," and which refer to the period "when time shall be more;" that the question, what shall be suddenly enacted, is much more practical, and affects the bulk of mankind more vehemently, than the question how they shall regulate their lives, and what they shall hope or dread to experience hereafter, will readily be granted; and, therefore, that the natural tendency of a preacher's auditory, is to regard his topics with indifference, as not calling for any lively attention or immediate resolution, when the same hearer would be roused to enthusiasm by the more practical discourses at the bar, the hustings, or the vestry. But after we have made every allowance of this kind, it remains unquestionable, that the preacher *has* advantages of subject, and of character and opportunity, which should enable him to overcome the grovelling tendency of men; to lift their ideas above the impulses of sense; and to counteract their inveterate habit of mistaking near things for great ones.

It has long been conceded by the most rigorous and orthodox divines, that their sacred office does not set them above the necessity of borrowing help from the resources of worldly rhetoric. Indeed, when the preachers who had supernatural endowments—who had the gift of tongues to fortify them, and could confirm the faith of their hearers by performing miracles before their eyes—when even they disdained not the aids of mere earthly eloquence, St. Paul himself holding a very high place among orators in his purely secular capacity,—we may well admit, that their successors are not only justified, but called upon to exert themselves with all earnestness and diligence in the arts of persuasion, and to rely upon them for making their ministry effectual. They are bound, as St. Jerome expresses it, to fight the flesh with the arms of the flesh,—after the manner of David, who slew Goliath with his own sword. They are bound, moreover, to keep pace with the improvements of the

age they live in, that they may retain the influence which the success of their ministry requires, over those among whom they labour. That men of commanding genius have been able to move their auditors from the pulpit, as effectually as any secular orators ever did, is beyond all question. Not to mention the extraordinary feats performed by some of the Roman preachers,* there are numerous testimonies to the triumphs of the French pulpit. De Lingendes, Castillon, Bourdaloue, are less familiarly known to us than Flechier, Bossuet, and Massillon; but they seem to have been men cast in a grand mould. Rapin says of the first, in his *Reflexions* (II., 104), "Il enflammoit le cœur par tout ce qu'il y avoit de feu et d'ardeur dans les passions, dont il sçavoit l'art, par une rhétorique particuliere qu'il s'étoit faite. On commençait alors à l'écouter avec plaisir, parcequ'il s'insinuoit dans les esprits par l'artifice de son éloquence, et l'on ne craignoit jamais tant de le voir finir, que quand il étoit prest de la faire. Car c'étoit alors qu'il entroit dans les cœurs, pour s'y rendre le Maître, et pour y faire ce qu'il luy plaisoit. Mais rien ne parloit plus à son avantage que le profond silence de son auditoire quand il avoit achevé son sermon. On voyoit ses auditeurs se lever de leurs chaises, le visage pâle, les yeux baissés, et sortir tout émus et pensifs de l'Eglise, sans dire un seu mot, sur tout dans les matieres touchantes, et quand il avoit trouvé lieu de faire le terrible, ce qu'il faisoit fort souvent." There can be no more decisive character painted of great and successful eloquence, unless it be that fact—of itself the most eloquent, and which every one has heard of—the sudden starting up of the whole congregation, when Massillon preached, for the first time, that wonderful sermon upon the "Few who will

* It is related of Philip of Narni, that he once preached a sermon upon Non-residence before the Pope (Gregory XV), which had the effect of driving thirty bishops to their respective dioceses the day after.

be saved." (*Le petit nombre des Elûs*). A general shuddering seized them at the famous passage, and they hastily rose, with a kind of cry, as if trying to escape from the frightful state he was describing! Dean Kirwan's sermons are known to have produced the most extraordinary effects in later times. Persons have gone to church without being much afraid of being induced, as others had been, to give more to the charity for which the Dean was to preach, than they could afford; but, after resisting for some time, they have ended by throwing down their watches and rings, and whatever else of value they had about them. We have heard also of very remarkable effects being produced by the great preacher, one of whose most finished works, though certainly not the best, now lies before us.

Nor will it suffice to contend, that, in sermons, the principal object of great oratory is wanting—a topic of close and contested reasoning, some practical argument to be maintained and enforced. Some of the great specimens of ancient eloquence, belong to the class which admits of little or no argumentation. Not to speak of Isocrates and the professed Panegyrist, some of Cicero's finest orations are properly of the *Demonstrative* or *Epidictic* kind, in point of execution, though certainly not in their object; for they were not, like those strictly so called, made for the mere purpose of display. However, Demosthenes himself did not disdain to deliver at least one oration of this class, in every sense; and although there are conclusive reasons for believing that the one preserved as his, is by another hand,* yet he has, in the *περι*

* The observations in the *Επιταφιος λογος*, upon the impossibility of citizens in a democracy misbehaving in battle, and not choosing *θυνατον* *ναλον*, *μαλλον η βιν αιτχρον*, never could have been risked by one who had misbehaved in the very battle of which he was speaking. They form a striking contrast, too, to the extreme discretion shown in the oration *πρις σιρφανον*, where he cautiously avoids the topic of his mis-conduct at Chersonæa, although Æschines had not only made it a distinct article of charge,

στεφανου, recorded the satisfaction which he experienced in performing that task.* It must indeed be admitted, that nothing but the highest degree of excellence can render this species of oratory attractive; and that it becomes unbearable long before it reaches the point of mediocrity. The great fame of Bossuet affords no exception to this remark. His funeral sermons, which alone he laboured with such care as to leave in a perfect state, although replete with exalted passages, where much dignity is united to very exquisite composition, have nevertheless such a sickening sweetness diffused over them, contain so little solid matter upon which the ornament is fine drawn, and show in the ornament such a defect of manly and original genius, that they oftener tire out our patience and pall upon the appetite, than afford gratification; while their perpetual exclamations and apostrophes, their gross exaggerations, and the never-ending *onction* of both thought and expression, is calculated not a little to excite disgust, in a reader of correct taste and masculine understanding.

but had, at least a dozen times, alluded to it in the most offensive terms. He declines the argument here: as indeed in the whole conduct of his defence, he makes a point of choosing his own ground, notwithstanding all his adversary's attempts to make him follow the line of attack. He only refers to the selection made of him to pronounce the funeral oration, as an answer to all that had been said against the measures which led to the disaster, and ascribes the choice to the confidence in his *εὐνοια καὶ προθυμία*. Æschines, in attacking him, had, among other invectives upon his want of courage, and beside contrasting it with the reward of the brave bestowed by Ctesiphon, used this remarkable topic: "He dared to pronounce a panegyric upon the valour of the dead, while he trod upon their graves with the feet of a coward (literally, a runaway slave), who had fled from his post." *Ετολμησε, τοις δραπνιταῖς ποσὶ καὶ λιλοῖ ποσιν ταξὶν ἀναβαῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τάφον τῶν τιτιλιυτηκότων, ἐγκωμιάζειν τὴν κεινῶν ἀρετὴν*. Is it conceivable that such an artist as Æschines, who here resorts to a far-fetched, though very fine allusion, should have let slip the obvious advantage which the expressions above cited from the supposed funeral oration gave him, had they really been used?

* The funeral oration, ascribed to Fericles in Thucydides, is still more undeniably made for him; but it proves beyond a doubt, that one of this illustrious orator's greatest efforts was of that kind.

The sermon upon Queen Henrietta Maria's death is esteemed among his finest, and probably would be pitched upon as his masterpiece. Now, passing over the subject-matter—which in displays of this class is always secondary—dismissing from our view such theories as those which ascribe to the Reformation all the crimes of our civil wars—such gross flatteries as that which can find in Charles I.'s whole life no error but the amiable failing of too much clemency, which he shares with Julius Cæsar, and can single out no qualities so undeniably belonging to his character as wisdom and justice—there is, nevertheless, a way of expressing such nonsense which makes it more intolerable, and compels us at once to reject it, as there is also a manner of enfolding it in imagery, and conveying it in chaste and subdued diction, which beguiles our better judgment, and makes us receive it unawares. The exquisite adulation of Cicero to Cæsar, has this remarkable quality, that it is so delicately managed, as to be no more offensive to the bystander, or even to the reader (a severer test), than to the object of it. But the clumsy preacher at the first sickens us with the subject and the artist. “*Que lui peut-on reprocher, sinon la clemence? Je veux bien avouer de lui, ce qu'un auteur celebre a dit de Cesar.*”—“*Qu'il a été clement jusqu'à être obligé de s'en repentir.*”—“*Que ce soit donc la, si l'on veut, l'illustre défaut de Charles aussi bien que de Cesar.*”—“*Comme il n'a jamais refusé ce qui étoit raisonnable, étant vainqueur; il a toujours rejeté ce qui étoit foible et injuste, étant captif.*” *—“*Grande Reine!*” (says he, apostrophizing Henrietta Maria), “*je satisfais à vos plus tendres desirs, quand je celebre ce Monarque; et ce cœur que n'a jamais vécu que pour lui, se reveille, tout poudre qu'il est, et devient sensible, même sous ce drap mor-*

* So thought not the unfortunate king himself, when he admitted that he justly merited his fate for *not rejecting* Strafford's bill of attainder, and while he was at liberty.

taire, au nom d'un epoux si cher, à qui ses ennemis mêmes accorderont le titre de sage et celui de juste," &c. But it is not only the Queen's deceased husband that draws the preacher off his subject; her living son-in-law, being present in the church, is addressed at some length—exhorted to work upon the power and the *virtue* of Louis XIV. and Charles II., for the peace of the two countries; and told, "que l'on peut tout éspérer d'un Prince que la sagesse conseille, que la valeur anime, et que la justice accompagne dans toutes ses actions."—"Mais (he suddenly exclaims), ou m'emporte mon zele, si loin de mon triste sujet? Je m'arrête à considerer les vertus de Philippe, et ne songe pas que je vous dois l'histoire des malheurs d'Henriette!" He afterwards addresses himself to the wife of Philippe, and daughter of Henrietta Maria, apparently present also, but with a far-fetched contrivance, perhaps as absurd as any on record in the worst schools of rhetoric. The Duchess, as is well known, was born at Exeter, whence her mother was obliged to fly immediately after her confinement, and leave her in the power of the Parliamentary army. This happened in 1664. The preacher, in 1669, long after all the perils of her infancy are over, and when she is grown up and safely married and settled in France, most fervently prays for her preservation from the enemies who surrounded her cradle. "Princesse! dont la destinée est si grande et si glorieuse, faut-il que vous naissiez en la puissance des ennemis de votre maison? O Éternel! veillez sur elle; anges saints! ranger à l'entour vos escadrons invisibles, et faites la garde autour du berceau d'une Princesse si grande et si délaissée. Elle est destinée" (he goes on to inform the angels as a reason for watching her) "au sage et vaoureux Philippe! et doit des Princes à la France, dignes de lui, dignes d'elle, et de leurs aïeux!" Of Charles II. he says, in plain terms, that "his reign is peaceful and *glorious*, and that he causes justice,

wisdom, and mercy to reign with him." Certes, these effusions are not from the great master, who exclaimed, "Cave ignoscas! Hæc nec hominis, nec ad hominem, vox est: Quâ, qui apud te C. Cæsar utetur, suam citius abjiciet humanitatem, quam extorquebit tuam;" and who afterwards flattered the conqueror in such terms as these—the model no doubt of the French artist,—but which he has most successfully copied—"Vidi enim et cognovi quid maxime spectares, cum pro alicujus salute multi laborarent, causas, apud te rogantium graviores esse quam vultus: neque spectare te quam tuus esse, necessarius is qui te oraret, sed quam illius pro quo laboraret. Itaque tribuis tu quidem tuis ita multa, ut mihi beatiore illi esse videantur interdum, qui tuâ liberalitate fruuntur, quam tu ipse, qui illis tam multa concedis. Sed video tamen apud te causas, ut dixi, rogantium valere plus quam preces; ab iisque te moveri maxime, quarum justissimum dolorem videas in petendo."—(*Pro. Lig.*)

The *Panegyrics* of Bossuet, or Discourses in Praise of the Virgin, the Apostles, and Saints, are still more offensive to correct taste; containing, with much excellent composition, and many displays of a subtle, though perverse ingenuity, an abundance of the most childish conceits, and whining exclamations, calculated to sicken and divert, rather than awaken or sustain devotional feelings; while the topics of praise are often such as, to Protestant ears at least, are not only tainted with the grossest absurdity, but the most revolting indelicacy. Take a specimen from two of his most famous sermons; the one preached on the Fast of the Nativity of the Virgin, "*Sur les Grandeurs de Marie*;" and the other on the Conception. They both turn much on the same point—one of his most favourite topics—the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, and of Christ, on which he has many theories, by which he appears to set no little store. "Car permettez moi,

je vous prie, d'approfondir un si grand mystere, et de vous expliquer une verité qui ne sera pas moins utile pour votre instruction qu'elle sera glorieuse à la Sainte Vierge. Cette verité, Chrétiens, c'est que notre Sauveur Jesus-Christ ne s'unit jamais à nous par son corps, que dans le dessein de s'unir plus étroitement en esprit. Tables mystiques! banquet adorable! et vous saints et sacrés autels, je vous appelle à temoins de la verité que j'avance, mais soyez en les temoins vous-mêmes, vous qui participez à ces saints mysteres. Quand vous avez approché de cette table divine; quand vous avez vu venir Jesus-Christ à vous, en son propre corps, en son propre sang; quand on vous l'a mis dans la bouche, dites-moi, avez-vous pensé qu'il vouloit s'arreter simplement au corps? A Dieu ne plaise que vous l'ayez cru, et que vous ayez reçu seulement au corps celui qui court à vous pour chercher votre âme! 'Ames saints! âmes pieuses! vous qui savez goûter Jesus-Christ dans cette adorable mystere!'" &c.

This constant practice of apostrophizing, borrowed, no doubt, from the Roman school, but adopted with the wonted intemperance of imitators (who, far from being servile followers, as of old, are almost always extravagant caricaturists), is one of the most offensive parts of French oratory, and would destroy the force of a far more powerful species than the Epideictic in which our neighbours have so long revelled, can ever be made, even in the strongest hands. Will it be credited, that the same sort of address which we have seen Bossuet make on behalf of the Duchess of Orleans, five-and-twenty years after she had escaped the perils in question, is made in behalf of the Virgin Mary, seventeen centuries and more after the occasion—a prayer to Christ that, in creating his mother, he would prevent her from being conceived in sin! "Cheres Freres, que vous en semble? que pensez vous de cette doctrine? Ne vous paroît-elle pas bien plausible?"

Pour moi, quand je considere le Sauveur Jesus, notre amour et notre esperance, entre les bras de la Sainte Vierge, en suçant son lait virginal, en se reposant doucement sur son sein, ou enclos dans ses chastes entrailles !—mais je m'arrete à cette derniere pensée !” —it might be supposed, out of regard to the feelings of propriety, and because he had gone quite far enough ;—no such thing !—only because the other topics belonged to another day—“ dans peu de jours nous celebrerons la Nativité du Sauveur ; et nous le considerons à present dans ces entrailles ne sa Sainte Mere ; quand donc je regarde l'Incomprehensible ainsi renfermé, et cette université comme raccourcie ; quand je vois mon Libérateur dans cette étroite et volontaire prison, je dis quelquefois à part moi se pourroit-il bien faire que Dieu eût voulu abandonner au diable, quand ce n'auroit été qu'un moment, ce temple sacré qu'il destinoit à son fils ? ce saint tabernacle ou il prendra un si long et si admirable repos ; ce lit virginal où il celebrera des nœces toutes spirituelles avec notre nature ? C'est ainsi que je me parle à moi-même. Puis, m'adressant au Sauveur : Enfant Beni, lui dis-je, ne le souffrez pas, ne permettez pas que votre mere soit souillée ! Ah ! que si Satan l'osoit aborder pendant que demeurant en elle vous y faites un paradis, que de foudres vous feriez tomber sur sa tête ! Avec quelle jalousie vous defendriez l'honneur et l'innocence de votre Mere ! Mais, ô Saint Enfant ! par qui les siecles ont été faits, que vous étés avant tout les temps —quand votre Mere fût conçue, vous la regardiez du plus haut des cieux ; mais vous-même vous formiez ses membres. C'est vous qui inspirâtes ce souffle de vie qui anima cette chair dont la votre devoit être tirée. Ah prenez garde, ô sagesse eternelle ! que dans ce meme moment elle va être infectée d'un horrible peché, elle va être en la possession de Satan ! Detournez ce malheur par votre bonté ! commencez à honorer votre Mere ; faites qu'il lui profité d'avoir un fils qui est

avant elle. Car enfin, à bien prendre les choses, elle est déjà votre Mere, et déjà vous etes son fils !”*

After pursuing the subject at great length, he observes, that next to the Articles of Faith, he knows no doctrine more attractive or more certain than that of the Immaculate Conception, and therefore is the less surprised that “cette celebre Eccle des Theologiens de Paris oblige tous ses enfans à defendre cette doctrine.” This of course brings on an apostrophe, as indeed does the mention of any person or body corporate whatever. “Savante compagnie ! cette pieté pour la Vierge est peut être l’un des plus beaux heritages que vous ayiez reçu de vos peres ! Puissiez-vous être à jamais florissante ! Puisse cette tendre dévotion,” &c., &c. “Pour moi, je suis ravi, Chretiens, de suivre aujourd’hui ses intentions. Apres avoir été nourri de son lait, je me soumetts volontiers à ses ordonnances ; d’autant plus que c’est aussi, ce me semble, la volonté de l’Eglise. Elle a un sentiment fort honorable de la conception de Marie ; elle ne vous oblige pas de la croire immaculée ; mais elle nous fait entendre que cette croyance lui est agreable.”—“Il est de notre pieté, si nous sommes vrais enfans de l’Eglise, non seulement d’obeir aux commandemens, mais de flechir aux moindres signes de la volonté, d’une mere si bonne et si sainte.”†

It is to be remarked that Bossuet, in the character which he gives of Cromwell—the finest passage perhaps, in the funeral sermon upon Henrietta Maria—says nothing of his canting and mysterious language ; nor does he, in stigmatizing the sects which then sprung up, join in the abuse lavished upon them for the same excesses. (VI., 69, 74.) How indeed could he, who thus equals at the least in absurdity, the very

* How striking is the effect, almost ludicrous, produced in this last sentence, by the French having no poetical language—no diction higher than the tone of common life !

† The first of these Sermons to be found in vol. v., p. 371 ; the second in vol. i., p. 204, of the *Choix de Sermons de Bossuet*. Paris, 1808.

wildest of their ravings? But it would be well for those in this country, who are fond of laughing at the language of the old Covenanters, to point out anything in the choicest remains of their field oratory, which goes beyond the effusions of this court-preacher, the classical prelate whose sermons are deemed among the choicest models of sacred eloquence.

The style of Massillon is undoubtedly much more masculine, and formed more in the Greek than the Latin school. As he flourished somewhat later than Bossuet, and as "the fashion of this world passeth away," not merely in secular matters, he is not wont, like the "Eagle of Meaux," to lose himself in the cloudy regions of mystery, but more apt, when he must deal with such subjects, to draw down from them some practical inferences applicable to the concerns of his flock. His panegyrical discourses, though abounding in the faults of the French manner, offend far less in that luscious sweetness and sickly "*onction*," which remind us of the descriptions the ancients have left of the Asiatic oratory. If in praising Louis XIV., but after his death, he could paint him as a husband, "*malgré les foiblesses qui partagerent son cœur, toujours respectueux pour la vertu de Therese ; condamnant, pour ainsi dire, par ses egards pour elle, l'injustice de ses engagements et renouant par l'estime un lieu affoibli par les passions,*" he certainly does not spare the reverses of fortune which followed his conquests ; but paints the miseries of war, and the losses sustained by France, with an honesty as rare in court-preachers, as it must have been unpalatable to the people he was addressing. "*Mais hélas ! triste souvenir de nos victoires, que nous rappelez vous ? Monumens superbes élevés au milieu de nos places publiques, pour en immortaliser la mémoire, que rappelleres-vous à nos neveux, lorsqu'ils vous demanderont, comme autrefois les Israelites, ce que signifient vos masses pompeuses et énormes ? Quando interrogaverint vos filii vestri,*

dicentes : Quid sibi volunt isti lapides ? •Vous leur rappellerez un siecle entier d'horreurs et de carnage : l'elite de la Noblesse Françoise precipitée dans le tombeau ; tant de maisons anciennes eteintes ; tant de meres point consolées, qui pleurent encore sur leurs enfans ; nos compagnes desertes, et au lieu des tresors qu'elles renferment dans leur sein, n'offrant plus que des ronces au petit nombre des laboureurs forcés de les negliger ; nos villes desolées ; nos peuples epuises ; les arts à la fin sans emulation : le commerce languissant ; vous leur rappellerez nos pertes plutôt que nos conquêtes ; *Quando interrogaverint ?* &c. Vous leur rappellerez tant de lieux saints profanés ; tant de dissolutions capables d'attirer la colere du ciel sur les plus justes entreprises ; le feu, le sang, le blaspheme, l'abomination ! et toutes les horreurs qu'enfante la guerre : vous leur rappellerez nos crimes plutôt que nos victoires ! *Quando interrogaverint ?*" &c.—(*Sermons de Massillon*, VII., 238.) This, it must be admitted, is a language far better adapted to the pulpit, and much better to be held, both to princes and their subjects, than the glorious descriptions of war, and the sons of triumph upon the success of their arms, and the shouts of exultation at national superiority, and the thunders and invectives against other countries, with which so many high priests of the religion of peace and charity make the vaults of their temples ring in modern times.

It is observable, that this funeral sermon upon Louis XIV. must have been preached at the beginning of the Regency, and probably was delivered in the presence of that holy man, the Duke of Orleans ; but no allusion whatever is made to him ; and in the sermon upon his mother's death (when indeed he had ceased to be regent), the most extravagant praise bestowed upon him, is only that he was " le premier exemple d'une minorité pacifique ; le modele des Princes bien-faisans," (ib., 295), which might be said with the most

perfect truth. After all we are accustomed to hear of the flatteries of French courtiers, and especially French preachers, in the age of Louis XIV., it is somewhat mortifying to find them so far exceeded by our own countrymen of the same day; and not by men only of little mark, unknown in after times, and in their own distinguished merely for their servile propensities, but by the ablest and most gifted of their profession; as South, who proved before Charles II. that Providence saves and delivers princes, "by endowing them with a more than ordinary sagacity and quickness of understanding above other men—so that they have not only a long reach with their arm, but a farther with their mind—by giving them a singular courage and presence of mind—and by disposing their hearts to such virtuous and pious courses as he has promised a blessing to, and restraining them from those ways to which he has denounced a curse;" beside disposing of events, and of the minds of men in their favour.—(*Sermons*, III., 410)..

Voltaire, an unsuspected eulogist of pulpit eloquence, describes the famous passage in the sermon, "*Sur les Elus*," as one of the finest strokes of eloquence in ancient or modern times, and the figure which forms its basis, as at once the boldest and most happily appropriate ever employed. He gives the passage, but in a manner differing materially from the version of it in the common edition of the *Sermons*. He says, that there have been several varieties of it in the several editions, but that the substance is the same in all. It is probable, that the bishop may have made the additions which certainly enfeeble it, from a desire to improve still further what was so successful; and that Voltaire may quote from the earliest edition; but one very remarkable figure is omitted by him, and one piece of reasoning of a kind so truly Demosthenean, that no further proof is wanted of the models upon which Massillon formed his style. We shall give

Voltaire's, and then add those two passages, and afterwards attempt a translation; but we shall also note the changes by which the effect has been so much altered, and generally for the worse, in the subsequent versions:—

“ Je suppose que ce soit ici notre dernière heure à tous; que les cieux vont s'ouvrir sur nos têtes; que le temps est passé, et que l'éternité commence; que Jesus-Christ va paraître pour nous juger, selon nos œuvres, et que nous sommes tous ici pour attendre de lui l'arrêt de la vie ou de la mort éternelle! Je vous le demande, frappé de terreur comme vous, ne séparant point mon sort du votre, et me mettant dans la même situation où nous devons tous paraître un jour devant Dieu notre Juge; si Jesus-Christ, dis-je, paraissait dès à présent, pour faire la terrible séparation des justes et des pécheurs, croyez-vous que le plus grand nombre fut sauvé? Croyez-vous que le nombre des justes fût au moins égal à celui des pécheurs? Croyez-vous que, s'il faisait maintenant la discussion des œuvres du grand nombre qui est dans cette église, il trouvât seulement dix justes parmi nous? En trouverait-il un seul?”

Nothing can be finer than the conception, nor more perfect than the execution. The language is at once the most simple, and the most expressive;—the effect is strikingly grand;—the temperance with which so much is rejected, can only be equalled by the felicity of the selection. The sensation produced is supposed, according to this edition, and by what we can collect from the narrative of Voltaire, to have been at the awful words, “En trouverait-il un seul?” which seemed as it were to exclude each individual present from all hope of mercy. But, in the later editions, those words are postponed; and the “discussion des œuvres du grand nombre qui est dans cette église,” is expanded into an enumeration of four classes of sinners, who are to be deducted from the congregation;

and the preacher proceeds thus: "Retranchez ces quatre sorts de pecheurs de cette assemblée sainte; car ils en seront retranchés au grand jour. Paraissez maintenant, justes; ou êtes-vous? Pestes d'Israel, passez à la droite: froment de Jesus-Christ, demelez-vous de cette paille destinée au feu! O Dieu! ou sont vos Elus? et que reste-il pour votre partage?" And we presume, that the effect is supposed to have been produced here, according to this edition. The preacher then enlarges upon the idea, and weakens it lamentably; but he closes in a very high strain of reasoning, introducing at last something like the words which conclude the passage in the edition of Voltaire, though so far weakening what went before, that it is a reference to the topic, and a repetition of part.

"Sommes nous sages, mes chers auditeurs. Peut-être que parmi tous ceux que m'entendent il ne se trouvera pas dix justes; peut-être s'en trouvera-t-il encore moins; que sais-je? O mon Dieu! Je n'ose regarder d'un œil fixe les abîmes de vos jugemens et de votre justice; peut-être ne s'en trouvera-t-il qu'un seul; et ce danger ne vous touche point, mon cher auditeur? et vous croyez être ce seul heureux, dans le grand nombre qui périra—vous qui avez moins sujet de le croire que tout autre; vous sur qui seul la sentence de mort devoit tomber, quand elle ne tomberoit que sur un seul des pecheurs qui m'ecoutent."

Now, although this last part is of the highest merit, and equals the closeness of the Greek originals, there can be no doubt that the topic is derived from a very great blemish, namely, a recurrence to the former topic for the purpose of changing and weakening it. Whether we take the edition referred to by Voltaire, or suppose an alteration to have been practised by him in citing it, and that "en trouverait-il un seul?" was not in the original; at any rate, the same meaning is conveyed by the figure which he suppresses, the invocation to the Just, and the exclamation, "O Dieu,

ou sont vos Elus? et que reste-t-il pour votre partage?"—for this supposes that there are none at all; and then the preacher, going back to the enumeration, assumes as the worst that can happen, that possibly there may be but one! It may also be observed, that the exclamations, "Sommes nous sages," &c.—"O mon Dieu!" &c., and "Mes chers auditeurs!" lower the severe dignity of the style, by lessening that nervous simplicity which gives such grandeur to the former part of the passage. That simplicity, however, is far less remarkable in the later editions, than in that from which we have cited. They introduce, in the middle of the description, an argument of some length—that as the audience now is, so will it be, as to salvation, in death and in judgment—which, in Voltaire's edition, is merely glanced at in a word. Instead of simply making Jesus Christ appear, they make him appear "dans ce temple," and not only there, but "au milieu de cette assemblée;" and worse still, the assembly is "la plus auguste de l'univers." Instead of that sublime expression, "Que le temps est passé, et que l'éternité commence," they have, "Que c'est la fin de l'univers:" Instead of "l'arrêt de la vie, ou de la mort éternelle," they vary the first substantive, drop the antithesis, and diffuse the expression into "une sentence de grace, ou un arrêt de mort éternelle;" and instead of the simple and appropriate language, in which Voltaire's edition makes the preacher identify himself with his flock, without a word to awaken them from the trance, as it were, into which he has flung them, the later versions add to the words, "ne séparant pas mon sort du votre," these, "en ce point;" and these, which still more effectually end the delusion, as much as if he had reminded them in so many words that he was preaching—"me mettant dans la même disposition, ou je souhaite que vous étiez"—and drop the fine phrase, "paraître devant Dieu notre juge." These and other

changes are all very much for the worse. One or two alterations are, perhaps, improvements; as, “le terrible discernement des boucs et des brebis;” for, “la terrible separation des justes et des pecheurs;” and certainly the description is made more lively, and the allusion better pursued, by substituting for the general expression, “Croyez vous que le plus grand nombre fut sauvé?” the picturesque one, “Croyez vous que le plus grand nombre, de tout-ce que nous sommes ici, fut placé à la droite?” The passage, as we cannot avoid thinking it must have originally stood, may be thus given in English, though with the inferiority which is almost necessarily the lot of a translation, even from a less to a more expressive language:—

“I figure to myself that our last hour is come;—the heavens are opening over our heads—Time is no more, and Eternity has begun. Jesus Christ is about to appear to judge us, according to our deserts—and we are here awaiting at his hands the sentence of everlasting life or death. I ask you now—stricken with terror like yourselves—in nowise separating my lot from yours, but placing myself in the situation in which we all must one day stand before God, our Judge—If Christ, I ask you, were at this moment to come to make the awful partition of the just and the unjust—think you that the greater number would be saved?—Do you believe that the numbers would be even equal? If the lives of the multitude here present were sifted, would he find among us ten righteous? Would he find a single one?”

If any one examines the rest of this famous sermon, which abounds with the most nervous and brilliant passages, he will find the strongest reason to conclude, that the great one we have been speaking of was retouched and overdone, after its first extraordinary effect had stamped it with celebrity; for the other

* “Think you that the greater number would pass to his right hand?”
—(*Later Editions.*)

parts are by no means liable to the same objections. Many of them are distinguished by Attic simplicity, and recall to the mind of the classical reader the close and rapid declamation of the greatest orators.

“ Ou sont ceux qui renoncent de bonne foi aux plaisirs, aux usages, aux maxims, aux esperances du monde? Tous l'ont promis—qui le tient? On voit bien des gens qui se plaignent du monde; qui l'accusent d'injustice, d'ingratitude, de caprice; qui se dechainent contre lui; qui parlent vivement de ses abus, de ses erreurs; mais en le decriant ils l'aiment, ils lo suivent, ils ne peuvent se passer de lui; en se plaignant de ses injustices, ils sont piqués, ils ne sont pas desabusés; ils sentent ses mauvais traitemens, ils ne connaissent pas ses dangers; ils se censurent, mais ou sont ceux qui le haissent? Et delà, jugez si bien des gens peuvent pretendre au salut. Enfin vous avez dit anatheme à Satan et à ses œuvres; et quelles sont ses œuvres? Celles qui composent presque le fil, et comme toute la suite de votre vie; les pompes, les jeux, les plaisirs, les spectacles, le mensonge dont il est le pere, l'orgueil dont il est le modele, les jalousies et les contentions dont il est l'artisan. Mais, je demande, où sont ceux qui n'ont pas levé l'anatheme,” &c., &c.

We have extended this quotation for the purpose of remarking, that it is employed to introduce a long and most vehement invective against all dramatic exhibitions, and all actors,—which makes Voltaire's unqualified admiration of the whole discourse a still stronger testimony in its favour. A comparison with Bossuet's frequent sermons on kindred subjects is quite unnecessary to establish Massillon's vast superiority. But whoever would satisfy himself of this, may compare Bossuet's “ *Sur l'impenitence finale*,” with Massillon's on the same subject. It is certainly one of Bossuet's best. There is one magnificent passage worthy of Massillon in conception, and, but for the superfluous exclamations, in execution also, in which the Angel of

Death is described as retiring, time after time, to give an opportunity for repentance—till at length the order goes forth from on high, Make an end!—"L'Audience est ouverte; le juge est assis: Criminel! venez plaider votre cause. Mais que vous avez peu de temps pour vous préparer! O Dieu, que le temps est court pour demeler une affaire si enveloppé que celles de vos comptes et de votre vie. Ah! que vous jetterez de cris superflus: Ah! que vous soupirezerez amercement après tant d'années perdues! Vainement, inutilement: il n'y a plus de temps pour vous; vous entrez au séjour de l'éternité. Voyez qu'il n'y a plus de soleil visible, qui commence et qui finisse les jours, les saisons, les années. C'est le Seigneur lui-même qui va commencer de mesurer toute chose par sa propre infinité. Je vous vois étonné et éperdu en présence de votre juge: mais regardez encore vos accusateurs; ce sont les pauvres qui vont s'élever contre votre dureté inexorable."—(Tom. iv., p. 255.) It is very probable that the opening of this splendid passage first suggested to Massillon the idea of that of which so much has been said; and, in the remainder, we certainly perceive a striking coincidence with the leading feature of Mr. Hall's peroration to his beautiful Sermon upon War.

Of Massillon's discourse, "Sur l'impenitence finale," the merits are indeed of the highest order. The exordium, in particular, is eminently oratorical; supposing the audience to have shuddered at the awful words of the text,* and to stand in need of being comforted and supported, rather than awakened and intimidated. But the description of a death-bed, which is much admired, in its most striking circumstances, the picture of the state of the soul, immediately on quitting the body (Tom. ii., p. 169), falls short of the effect produced by a few simple and most picturesque

* "I go my way, and ye shall seek me, and shall die in your sins: whither I go, ye cannot come."—John viii. 21.

expressions on the same subject, in the Sermon upon Death. "Vous ignorez ce que vous serez dans cette autre terre, ou les conditions ne changent plus; entre les mains de qui tombera votre ame, seule, etrangere, tremblante, au sortir du corps." What follows is much more ambitious, but less striking, though by no means unsuccessful. "Si elle sera environée de lumiere et portée aux pieds du Trône sur les ailes des Esprits bien-heureux, ou enveloppée d'un nuage affreux, et précipitée dans les abîmes."—(Tom. iii., 410).

The funeral sermon of this great orator on the death of Louis XIV. is well known. Certainly there never was in the history of rhetoric, a more striking passage than its commencement; and we can easily credit all the traditional accounts of its prodigious effects. The congregation, composed of the court and of the people, were assembled in the Sainte-Chapelle of Paris; prince after prince of the royal family had died in the course of a short time; the almost only survivor, now the infant king, stricken with a grave malady, was all but given over; the general sorrow, anxiety, and alarm, seemed at its height; when the late monarch's, Louis-le-Grand's, remains, slowly borne through the aisle, were placed in the centre of the chapel,—and Massillon pronounced the memorable words which thrilled every bosom,—"Dieu seul est grand, mes frères." When we consider the absolute simplicity and perfect conciseness of the language; the entire appropriateness of the idea—quite natural, not quite obvious—so that though it might not have occurred to any, yet it must, when presented, have made every one marvel that it had not—above all, its awful effect in bringing the whole scene into the Divine presence—we must confess, without hesitation, that there is not to be found in any merely human composition, a more genuine example of the sublime. It differs from all, or almost all other instances, in this, that there is a reality in the passage—the thing

is acted, not described. The famous oath of Demosthenes, *Μα τους εν Μαραθωνι κινδυνευσκυντας των προγονων!* approaches this reality, but falls short of it. Cicero's appeal to Tubero, "*nimis urgeo—com-moveri videtur adolescens*" (*Pro Ligurio*), was touching; it was exquisitely skilful, but had nothing awful. The "*haud ducum in crucem tolli*" (*In Var.*) had no reality. Nor must it be forgotten, that the perfect appropriateness to the occasion, the completely natural character of the allusion, precluded the possibility of the objection that it was acting. Acting, that is dramatic, it was in the highest degree; and Baron, the great tragedian, who went to hear the preacher, as so many preachers had gone in disguise to take a lesson from him,* when he said, "Here is a true orator; we are but actors," might, had he been present at the funeral sermon, have added to his praise, that the great orator was also a great dramatist.†

To sustain the opening of the discourse was manifestly impossible; indeed it ought, for full effect, to have ended with the four words. But as that was equally impossible,—nay, would have been reckoned a stage trick—Massillon proceeds, and as far as it was possible avoids sinking—at least, he most artistly so contrives both the sense and the diction as to break his fall. He probably made a long pause after "*Dieu seul est grand, mes frères,*" and then he adds: "*Et dans ces derniers momens surtout, où il préside à la mort des rois de la terre; plus leur gloire et leur*

* The great preachers used to attend the theatre when Baron acted, in a grilled box. He had quitted the stage for some years before 1715, but afterwards returned to it in his old age, and was as successful as ever.

† Cardinal Maury, in his *Essai sur l'Eloquence de la Chaire*, has given a description, apparently with some fanciful exaggeration, of the manner in which the great passage was pronounced. One part is probably given accurately enough; that the preacher first read with great solemnity the impressive text from Solomon, "I was king over Israel, and behold all is vanity and vexation of spirit," and then remained for a few seconds in profound silence before he began, "*Dieu seul est grand!*"

puissance ont éclaté, plus, en s'évanouissant alors, elles rendent hommage à sa grandeur suprême : Dieu parent tout ce qu'il est ; et l'homme n'est plus rien de tout ce qu'il croyoit être :” a passage which must have commanded admiration, had it stood alone, and apart from the extraordinary beginning, unavoidably impaired by it, as it must needs have been by anything that any one could add, speaking with the tongues of men and of angels.*

In sermons professedly of the Panegyrical kind, the orator must needs fall into the two vices more or less inseparable from this species of eloquence — flattering, and speaking for the mere sake of display. The latter, indeed, seems to have been regarded as an excellence by the great master of Epideictic Rhetoric ; for he says, that in his judgment those “ are the finest orations which handle the greatest topics, benefit the audience most, and best show off the speakers.” [*τοὺς τε λεγοντας μαλιστα επιδεικουσι.*] (Isocrates.) Massillon's panegyrics partake accordingly of these defects, though in a far less degree than Bossuet's ; who does not confine to his funeral orations, the introduction of allusions, and direct addresses to the great ones of the earth, but hardly ever suffers an occasion to pass, when he is preaching before princes, of turning to them and making them parts of speech. “ Grand Roi ! qui surpasses de si loin tant d'augustes predecesseurs,” &c. After recounting his earthly glories, indeed, he makes a very fine application. “ Ne voyez vous pas ce feu de-

* The great force of the opening has made the rest of the sermon be overlooked ; but it abounds with the greatest beauties. One remarkable passage is fit to be remembered, in which the wars of Louis XIV. are blamed. In fact, the patron of Massillon, who made him bishop, the Regent Orleans, was, happily for France and for Europe, also the patron of peace. But Louis' parting advice to his infant successor is in all probability given with accuracy, and it well deserves our attention : — “ Mon fils, vous allez être un grand roi ; mais souvenez-vous que tout votre bonheur dépendra d'être soumis à Dieu et du soin que vous aurez de soulager vos peuples. Evitez la guerre ; ne souvez pas là-dessus mes exemples ; soyez un prince pacifique et soulagez vos sujets.”

vorant qui precede la face du Juge terrible, qui abolira, en un même jour, et les villes, et les forteresses et les citadelles, et les palais, et les maisons de plaisance, et les arsenaux, et les marbres, et les inscriptions, et les titres, et les histoires, et ne fera qu'un grand feu, et peu après qu'un amas de cendre, de tous les monumens des Rois? Peut-on s'imaginer de la grandeur en ce qui ne sera un jour que de la poussiere? Il faut remplir d'autres faites et d'autres annales."—(Tom. i., p. 158.) In preaching upon the day of judgment before the court, he dwells on the havoc which will then be made among titles and ranks; and very properly exclaims, "God grant that so many grandees who are now listening to me, may not lose their precedence on that day!" But he straightway turns to the King (Tom. iii., p. 497), "Que cet Auguste Monarque ne voie jamais tomber sa couronne! qu'il soit auprès de Saint Louis, qui lui tend ses bras, et qui lui montre sa place! O Dieu, que cette place ne soit point vacante!" Then comes a prayer for his temporal glory, and a curse on all who desire it not. But, the Prelate goes on, "Sire! je trahis votre Majesté si je borne mes souhaits pour vous dans cette vie perissable. Vivez donc heureux, fortuné, victorieux de vos ennemis. Pere de vos peuples!—mais vivez toujours bon et juste;" and so he wishes him a heavenly crown, "Au nom du Pere, et du Fils, et du Saint Esprit!"

Between Massillon and Bossuet, and at a great distance certainly above the latter, stands Bourdaloue, whom some have deemed Massillon's superior, but of whom an illustrious critic has more justly said that it was his greatest glory to have left the supremacy of Massillon still in dispute.* In the vigour and urgency of his reasonings, he was undeniably, after the ancients, Massillon's model: and if he is more

* D'Alembert—*Eloge de Massillon*.

harsh, and addresses himself less to the feelings and the passions, it is certain that he displays a fertility of resources, an exuberance of topics, whether for observation or argument, not equalled by almost any other orator, sacred or profane. It is this fertility, the true mark of genius, that makes us certain of finding in every subject handled by him, something new, something which neither his predecessors had anticipated, nor even his followers have imitated, so far as to deprive, if not his substance, at least his manner of the charm of originality. It is another mark of genius, and one akin to this exuberance, and generally seen in its company, that though his language be, for a French orator, somewhat rough, and his composition not always diligently elaborated, his style abounds in point, and in felicitous turns of expression.

“ Quand je parle de l'hypocrisie, ne pensez pas que je la borne à cette espece particuliere qui consiste dans l'abus de la pieté, et qui fait les faux devots. Je la prends dans un sens plus étendu, et d'autant plus utile à votre instruction, que, peut-être, malgré vous-mêmes, serez-vous obligés d'avouer que c'est un vice qui ne vous est que trop commun. Car j'appelle hypocrite, quiconque, sous de specieuses apparences, a le secret de cacher les désordres d'une vie criminelle. Or, en ce sens, on ne peut douter que l'hypocrisie ne soit repandue dans toutes les conditions; et que parmi les mondains, il ne se trouve encore bien plus d'imposteurs et d'hypocrites, que parmi ceux que nous nommons devôts. En effet, combien dans le monde de scelerats travestis en gens d'honneur? Combien d'hommes corrompus, et pleins d'iniquité, qui se produisent avec tout le faste et toute l'ostentation de la prohibité? Combien de fourbes, insolens à vanter leur sincerité? Combien de traitres, habiles à sauver les dehors de la fidelité et de l'amitié? Combien de sensuels, esclaves des passions les plus infames, en

possession d'affecter la pureté des mœurs, et de la pousser jusqu'à la severité? Combien de femmes libertines, fieres sur le chapitre de leur reputation, et quoique engagées dans un commerce honteux, ayant le talent de s'attirer toute l'estime d'une exatte et d'une parfaite regularité? Au contraire, combien de justes, faussement accusés et condamnés? Combien de serviteurs de Dieu, par la malignité du siecle, decriés et calomniés? Combien de devots de bonne foi, traités d'hypocrites, d'intriguans, et d'interessés? Combien de vraies vertus contestées? Combien de bonnes œuvres censurées? Combien d'intentions droites mal expliquées, et combien de saintes actions empoisonnées?" —(Tom. i., p. 531. *Ed.* 8vo, 1818.)

Although the other passions are seldom addressed by this great orator, yet does he not unfrequently appeal to the terrors of his audience, and with the greatest effect set before them some unexpected ground of alarm. Thus, in his Sermons upon the Universal Judgment, he pronounces that the Saviour is to be the Judge, for the purpose of rendering it more rigorous and dreadful. "Il paroît etrange, et il semble d'abord que ce soit un paradoxe, de dire que nous devons être jugés avec moins d'indulgence, parce que c'est un Dieu Sauveur qui nous jugera. Nous comprenons sans peine la parole de Saint Paul, '*Qu'il est terrible de tomber dans les mains du Dieu vivant!*' Mais qu'il soit en quelque sorte, plus terrible de tomber dans les mains d'un Dieu Mediateur, d'un Dieu qui nous a aimés, jusqu'à se faire la victime de notre salut; voilà ce qui nous etonne, et ce qui renverse toutes nos idées. Cette verité, néanmoins, est une des plus constantes et des plus solidement établies. Comment? C'est après avoir abusé des merites d'un Dieu Sauveur, et profané son sang precieux, le pecheur en sera plus criminel; et qu'une bonté negligée, offensée, outragée, devient le sujet de l'indignation la plus vive, et de la plus ardente colere. Job disoit à Dieu, '*Ah! Seigneur, vous êtes*

changé pour moi dans un Dieu cruel. Funeste changement, qu'éprouveront tant de libertins et de pecheurs, de la part de ce Dieu-Homme, qu'ils auront les uns meconnu en renonçant à la foi, les autres meprisé et deshonoré par la transgression de la loi! Ce qui devait leur donner un accès plus facile aupres de lui, et leur faire trouver grace, je veux dire les abaissemens, et les travaux de son humanité, sa passion, sa mort, c'est par un effet tout contraire, ce qui l'aigrira, ce qui l'irritera, ce qui lui fera lancer sur eux les plus severes arrêts, et les anathemes les plus foudroyans.—Juge d'autant plus inexorable, qu'il aura été Sauveur plus misericordieux. Aussi est-il remarquable dans l'écriture, qu'à ce dernier jour, qui sera son jour, il nous est représenté comme un agneau, mais *un agneau en fureur*, qui repand de tous cotés la desolation et l'effroi. Telle est l'affreuse peinture que nous en fait le disciple bien aimé, Saint Jean, lorsqu'annonçant par avance le dernier jugement de Dieu, dont il avait eu une vue anticipée, et le decrivant, il dit que les rois, les princes, les potentats de la terre, les conquerans, les riches, que tous les hommes, soit libres, soit esclaves, saisis d'épouvante, et consternés, allerent se cacher dans les cavernes et dans les rochers des montagnes, et qu'ils s'écrierent—'Montagnes et rochers, tombez sur nous et derobez-nous à la colere de l'Agneau; car le grand jour de sa colere est arrivé, et qui peut soutenir ses regards?'—(Tom. xvii., p. 36.)

We have seen above the extravagances into which Bossuet was betrayed in treating of the Mysteries; and the sins which he committed, against common sense and delicacy, as well as correct taste, in dwelling upon their details. Much of this fault was that of the age; but Bourdaloue, his contemporary, is nearly free from it—his moderation, his logical head, and his chastened taste, keep him above it. When, upon the appointed feast of the church, he must preach upon the Immaculate Conception, he sets forth the doctrine

in a few words; supports it by a reference to St. Augustin, who very peremptorily says, that upon this point he will not have any question raised (*nullam prorsus haberi volo quaestionem*), and to the Council of Trent, which, though less dogmatically, excepts the Blessed Virgin from its decree touching Original Sin; and then he hastens to draw from the position its practical inferences in favour of grace, and purity of life, as illustrated by the grace and life of Mary. (Tom xii., p. 1, et seq.) His three sermons upon the Purification are almost equally free from extravagance and indelicacy; and nearly altogether devoted to the practical lesson of obedience, derived, by no strained process of reason, from the consideration of the Mystery. The third closes with a peculiar application to the monarch in whose presence it was delivered, and whom the preacher will by no means exempt from the same duty, though he lavishly praises his Majesty for his piety, which he seems to represent as something gratuitous in so puissant a sovereign. However, as Louis was fortunately so very obedient to the Divine will, the preacher draws a somewhat novel inference from hence, and makes, it should seem, a practical application to a quarter, very unexpectedly addressed even in a sermon before the King. “Il est, si j’ose le dire, de l’intérêt et de l’honneur de Dieu, de maintenir votre Majesté dans ce même lustre qui lui attire les regards du monde entier, puisque plus vous serez grand, plus Dieu tirera de gloire des hommages que vous lui rendez! Il aura, Sire, dans votre personne royal, aussi bien que dans la personne de David, un roi selon son cœur, fidele à sa loi, zélé pour sa loi, protecteur et vengeur de sa loi.” (Tom. xii., p. 244.) It is only fair to mention, that however Bourdaloue may have been occasionally seduced into such absurd time-serving conduct, by the influence of the courtly atmosphere he moved in, his independence, generally speaking, was exemplary. Not only did he, in the

most plain and unwelcome language, denounce the vices of the age to those who chiefly practised them—"frappant" (as Mad. de Sevigné said) "comme un sourd, disant des vérités à bride abattue—parlant à tort et à travers, contre l'adultère—sauve qui peut—allant toujours son chemin." Not only did he openly, and in the King's presence, rebuke men for the very conduct notoriously pursued by the King himself; but, in private, he risked the monarch's displeasure, by being instant with him, in season and out of season, upon the most delicate points of his life and conversation. Bossuet, it is true, when transported with the heat of controversy, which in him raged uncontrolled, had attacked too loudly the mild and amiable Fenelon in the king's presence, and was asked by Louis, what he would have said, if *he* had taken Fenelon's part?—was carried on by the same hot fit to give his Majesty an admirable answer—"I should have roared ten times as loud." But this was inferior to Bourdaloue's calm and witty rebuke, when the King, bragging that he had sent Mad. de Montespan to Clagny, said, "Mon Pere, vous devez être content de moi—Elle est à Clagny."—"Oui, Sire; mais Dieu serait plus satisfait, si Clagny était à soixante-dix lieues de Versailles."

It must not be forgotten, in comparing together these two great preachers, that Bourdaloue was the first in point of time, and therefore had effected the reformation of the eloquence of the French pulpit before Massillon began his career. Bossuet, indeed, had begun a few years before him; but his discourses are confessedly inferior, and are besides extremely imperfect, and, except his panegyrics, rather the heads from which he spoke, than complete sermons. Hence, Voltaire calls Bourdaloue the first model of good preachers in Europe, by which he plainly means the first in point of time, and not of excellence; for it is certain, that he greatly preferred Massillon to all others.

We should now proceed to the great English models; but the subject is too extensive and too interesting to be handled in the close of this paper, and demands a separate discussion. It may be proper, however, to note the great excellence of some, especially in later times, as showing that our preachers have certainly not degenerated; if, indeed, they have not surpassed those of a former age in all that constitutes eloquence. No one can call in question the power of Barrow, the cogency and originality of whose argumentation, spun out though it be, yet never enfeebled by its copiousness, is such as might be expected from the profound and inventive mathematician, surpassed only by Newton; nor are the boldness and the fancy, the endless variety and unexpected sallies of Taylor, to be matched by other divines, any more than they are to be ventured upon by such as duly regard the severe taste which the solemnity of the occasion prescribes; nor can the ingenuity, the subtlety, the brilliancy of South, though too exuberant in point, and drawing away the attention from the subject to the epigrammatic diction, be regarded otherwise than as proofs of the highest order of intellect. But eloquence, to produce its effect upon the feelings of others, must plainly appear to proceed from the feelings of the orator; his feelings must occupy them while his words arrest their attention; and he fails signally if he does not conceal the art by which his workmanship has been produced. If this is true of all oratory, emphatically must it be true of his whose vocation is to deliver a message from the Deity, and to rouse or persuade a conscience with the topics of his revealed Word. Fine-spun reasoning, far-fetched illustration, any the least deviation from seriousness, anything at all casting a doubt upon the earnestness of the speaker, were it only the too apparent artifice of his diction, is most anxiously to be shunned.

We shall not give an example of eminently successful

oratory, in strict accordance with this rule, from the sermons of Dean Kirwan or Augustus Hare, finished models as they are, and the former at least unparalleled in their effects; but from Robert Hall's, one of whose discourses is named at the head of this article. The two first passages we select because they are upon the most trite of all subjects, the horrors of war, and yet must at once be allowed to treat it in a manner unusual, but perfectly natural:—

“The contemplation of such scenes as these forces upon us this awful reflection, that neither the fury of wild beasts, the concussions of the earth, nor the violence of tempests, are to be compared to the ravages of arms; and that nature in her utmost extent, or more properly, Divine justice in its utmost severity, has supplied no enemy to man so terrible as man.” After showing how its effects extend to every pursuit and interest concerning nations:—“The plague of a widely-extended war possesses, in fact, a sort of omnipresence by which it makes itself everywhere felt; for while it gives up myriads to slaughter in one part of the globe, it is busily employed in scattering over countries exempt from its immediate desolations, the seeds of famine, pestilence, and death.”—(*Sermon—Thanksgiving at the end of the War. June, 1802.*)

After painting in the strongest colours the enormities of the French Revolution, when it had degenerated into the reign of terror, he proceeds:—

“When He to whom vengeance belongs, when He whose ways are unsearchable, and whose wisdom is inexhaustible, proceeded to the execution of this strange work, he drew from his treasures a weapon he had never employed before. Resolving to make their punishment as signal as their crimes, he neither let loose an inundation of barbarous nations, nor the desolating powers of the universe: he neither overwhelmed them with earthquakes, nor visited them with pestilence. He summoned from among themselves a ferocity more terrible than either; a ferocity which, mingling in the struggle for liberty, and borrowing aid from that very refinement to which it seemed to be

opposed, turned every man's hand against his neighbour, sparing no age, nor sex, nor rank, till, satiated with the ruin of greatness, the distresses of innocence, and the tears of beauty, it terminated its career in the most unrelenting despotism."

The conclusion of this sermon is also very striking :—

"Happy are they whose lives correspond to these benevolent intentions; who, looking beyond the transitory distinctions which prevail here, and will vanish at the first approach of eternity, honour God in his children, and Christ in his image. How much, on the contrary, are those to be pitied, in whatever sphere they move, who live to themselves, unmindful of the coming of their Lord! *When he shall come and shall not keep silence, when a fire shall devour before him, and it shall be very tempestuous round about him*, everything, it is true, will combine to fill them with consternation; yet methinks neither the voice of the archangel, nor the trump of God, nor the dissolution of the elements, nor the face of the Judge itself, from which the heavens will flee away, will be so dismaying and terrible to these men as the sight of the poor members of Christ: whom having spurned and neglected in the days of their humiliation, they will then behold with amazement united to their Lord, covered with his glory, and seated on his throne. How will they be astonished to see them surrounded with so much majesty! How will they cast down their eyes in their presence! How will they curse that gold which will then eat their flesh as with fire, and that avarice, that indolence, that voluptuousness, which will entitle them to so much misery! You will then learn that the imitation of Christ is the only wisdom; you will then be convinced it is better to be endeared to the cottage than admired in the palace; when to have wiped away the tears of the afflicted, and inherited the prayers of the widow and the fatherless, shall be found a richer patrimony than the favour of princes."

The last passage which we shall give is the celebrated peroration of the sermon on the breaking out of the war, preached at the general fast, 19th October, 1803. Of this Mr. Pitt expressed the greatest admiration :—

"While you have everything to fear from the success of the enemy, you have every means of preventing that success, so that it is next to impossible for victory not to crown your exertions. The extent of your resources, under God, is equal to the justice of your cause. But should Providence determine otherwise,

should you fall in this struggle, should the nation fall, you will have the satisfaction (the purest allotted to man) of having performed your part; your names will be enrolled with the most illustrious dead, while posterity, to the end of time, as often as they revolve the events of this period (and they will incessantly revolve them), will turn to you a reverential eye, while they mourn over the freedom which is entombed in your sepulchre. I cannot but imagine the virtuous heroes, legislators, and patriots, of every age and country, are bending from their elevated seats to witness this contest, as if they were incapable, till it be brought to a favourable issue, of enjoying their eternal repose. Enjoy that repose, illustrious immortals! Your mantle fell when you ascended; and thousands, inflamed with your spirit, and impatient to tread in your steps, are ready to swear *by Him that sitteth upon the throne, and liveth for ever and ever*, they will protect freedom in her last asylum, and never desert that cause which you sustained by your labours, and cemented with your blood. And thou, sole Ruler among the children of men, to whom the shields of the earth belong, *gird on thy sword, thou Most Mighty*: go forth with our hosts in the day of battle! Impart, in addition to their hereditary valour, that confidence of success which springs from thy presence! Pour into their hearts the spirit of departed heroes! Inspire them with thine own; and, while led by thine hand, and fighting under thy banners, open thou their eyes to behold in every valley and in every plain, what the prophet beheld by the same illumination—chariots of fire, and horses of fire! *Then shall the strong man be as tow, and the maker of it as a spark: and they shall both burn together, and none shall quench them.*"

DISCOURSE
OF THE
OBJECTS, ADVANTAGES, AND PLEASURES
OF
SCIENCE.

DISCOURSE ON SCIENCE.

INTRODUCTION.

IN order fully to understand the advantages and the pleasures which are derived from an acquaintance with any Science, it is necessary to become acquainted with that Science; and it would therefore be impossible to convey a complete knowledge of the benefits conferred by a study of the various Sciences which have hitherto been cultivated by philosophers, without teaching all the branches of them. But a very distinct idea may be given of those benefits, by explaining the nature and objects of the different Sciences: it may be shown, by examples, how much use and gratification there is in learning a part of any one branch of knowledge; and it may thence be inferred, how great reason there is to learn the whole.

It may easily be demonstrated, that there is an advantage in learning, both for the usefulness and the pleasure of it. There is something positively agreeable to all men, to all at least whose nature is not most grovelling and base, in gaining knowledge for its own sake. When you see anything for the first time, you at once derive some gratification from the sight being new; your attention is awakened, and you desire to know more about it. If it is a piece of workmanship, as an instrument, a machine of any kind, you wish to know how it is made; how it works; and what use it is of. If it is an animal, you desire to know where it comes from; how it lives; what are its dispositions,

and, generally, its nature and habits. You feel this desire, too, without at all considering that the machine or the animal may ever be of the least use to yourself practically; for, in all probability, you may never see them again. But you have a curiosity to learn all about them, because they are new and unknown. You accordingly make inquiries; you feel a gratification in getting answers to your questions, that is, in receiving information, and in knowing more,—in being better informed than you were before. If you happen again to see the same instrument or animal, you find it agreeable to recollect having seen it formerly, and to think that you know something about it. If you see another instrument or animal, in some respects like, but differing in other particulars, you find it pleasing to compare them together, and to note in what they agree, and in what they differ. Now, all this kind of gratification is of a pure and disinterested nature, and has no reference to any of the common purposes of life; yet it is a pleasure—an enjoyment. You are nothing the richer for it; you do not gratify your palate or any other bodily appetite; and yet it is so pleasing, that you would give something out of your pocket to obtain it, and would forego some bodily enjoyment for its sake. The pleasure derived from Science is exactly of the like nature, or, rather, it is the very same. For what has just been spoken of is, in fact, Science, which in its most comprehensive sense only means *Knowledge*, and in its ordinary sense means *Knowledge reduced to a System*; that is, arranged in a regular order, so as to be conveniently taught, easily remembered, and readily applied.

The practical uses of any science or branch of knowledge are undoubtedly of the highest importance; and there is hardly any man who may not gain some positive advantage in his worldly wealth and comforts, by increasing his stock of information. But there is also a pleasure in seeing the uses to which knowledge may be

applied, wholly independent of the share we ourselves may have in those practical benefits. It is pleasing to examine the nature of a new instrument, or the habits of an unknown animal, without considering whether or not they may ever be of use to ourselves or to anybody. It is another gratification to extend our inquiries, and find that the instrument or animal is useful to man, even although we have no chance of ever benefiting by the information: as, to find that the natives of some distant country employ the animal in travelling;—nay, though we have no desire of benefiting by the knowledge; as, for example, to find that the instrument is useful in performing some dangerous surgical operation. The mere gratification of curiosity; the knowing more to-day than we knew yesterday; the understanding clearly what before seemed obscure and puzzling; the contemplation of general truths, and the comparing together of different things,—is an agreeable occupation of the mind; and, beside the present enjoyment, elevates the faculties above low pursuits, purifies and refines the passions, and helps our reason to assuage their violence.

It is very true, that the fundamental lessons of philosophy may to many, at first sight, wear a forbidding aspect, because to comprehend them requires an effort of the mind somewhat, though certainly not much, greater than is wanted for understanding more ordinary matters; and the most important branches of philosophy, those which are of the most general application, are for that very reason the less easily followed, and the less entertaining when apprehended, presenting as they do few particulars or individual objects to the mind. In discoursing of them, moreover, no figures will be at present used to assist the imagination; the appeal is made to reason, without help from the senses. But be not, therefore, prejudiced against the doctrine, that the pleasure of learning the truths which philosophy unfolds is truly above all price. Lend but a

patient attention to the principles explained, and giving us credit for stating nothing which has not some practical use belonging to it, or some important doctrine connected with it, you will soon perceive the value of the lessons you are learning, and begin to interest yourselves in comprehending and recollecting them; you will find that you have actually learnt something of science, while merely engaged in seeing what its end and purpose is; you will be enabled to calculate for yourselves, how far it is worth the trouble of acquiring, by examining samples of it; you will, as it were, taste a little, to try whether or not you relish it, and ought to seek after more; you will enable yourselves to go on, and enlarge your stock of it; and after having first mastered a very little, you will proceed so far as to look back with wonder at the distance you have reached beyond your earliest acquirements.

The Sciences may be divided into three great classes: those which relate to *Number and Quantity*—those which relate to *Matter*—and those which relate to *Mind*. The first are called the *Mathematics*, and teach the property of numbers and of figures; the second are called *Natural Philosophy*, and teach the properties of the various bodies which we are acquainted with by means of our senses; the third are called *Intellectual or Moral Philosophy*, and teach the nature of the mind, of the existence of which we have the most perfect evidence in our own reflections; or, in other words, they teach the moral nature of man, both as an individual and as a member of society. Connected with all the sciences, and subservient to them, though not one of their number, is *History*, or the record of facts relating to all kinds of knowledge.

I. MATHEMATICAL SCIENCE.

THE two great branches of the *Mathematics*, or the two mathematical sciences, are *Arithmetic*, the science

of number, from the Greek word signifying *number*, and *Geometry*, the science of figure, from the Greek words signifying *measure of the earth*—land-measuring having first turned men's attention to it.

When we say that 2 and 2 make 4, we state an arithmetical proposition, very simple indeed, but connected with many others of a more difficult and complicated kind. Thus, it is another proposition, somewhat less simple, but still very obvious, that 5 multiplied by 10, and divided by 2, is equal to, or makes the same number with, 100 divided by 4—both results being equal to 25. So, to find how many farthings there are in £1000, and how many minutes in a year, are questions of arithmetic which we learn to work by being taught the principles of the science one after another, or, as they are commonly called, the *rules* of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. Arithmetic may be said to be the most simple, though among the most useful of the sciences; but it teaches only the properties of particular and known numbers, and it only enables us to add, subtract, multiply, and divide those numbers. But suppose we wish to add, subtract, multiply, or divide numbers which we have not yet ascertained, and in all respects to deal with them as if they were known, for the purpose of arriving at certain conclusions respecting them, and, among other things, of discovering what they are; or, suppose we would examine properties belonging to all numbers; this must be performed by a peculiar kind of arithmetic, called *Universal arithmetic*, or *Algebra*.* The common arithmetic, you will presently perceive, carries the seeds of this most important science in its bosom. Thus, suppose we inquire what is the number which multiplied by 5 makes 10? This is found if we divide 10 by 5,—it is 2; but suppose that, before finding this number 2, and before knowing

* Algebra, from the Arabic words signifying the *reduction of fractions*; the Arabs having brought the knowledge of it into Europe.

what it is, we would add it, whatever it may turn out, to some other number; this can only be done by putting some mark, such as a letter of the alphabet, to stand for the unknown number, and adding that letter as if it were a known number. Thus, suppose we want to find two numbers which, added together, make 9, and, multiplied by one another, make 20. There are many which, added together, make 9; as 1 and 8; 2 and 7; 3 and 6; and so on. We have, therefore, occasion to use the second condition, that multiplied by one another they should make 20, and to work upon this condition before we have discovered the particular numbers. We must, therefore, suppose the numbers to be found, and put letters for them, and by reasoning upon those letters, according to both the two conditions of adding and multiplying, we find what they must each of them be in figures, in order to fulfil or answer the conditions. Algebra teaches the rules for conducting this reasoning, and obtaining this result successfully; and by means of it we are enabled to find out numbers which are unknown, and of which we only know that they stand in certain relations to known numbers, or to one another. The instance now taken is an easy one; and you could, by considering the question a little, answer it readily enough; that is, by trying different numbers, and seeing which suited the conditions; for you plainly see that 5 and 4 are the two numbers sought; but you see this by no certain or general rule applicable to all cases, and therefore you could never work more difficult questions in the same way; and even questions of a moderate degree of difficulty would take an endless number of trials or guesses to answer. Thus a shepherd sold his flock for £80; and if he had sold four sheep more for the same money, he would have received one pound less for each sheep. To find out from this, how many the flock consisted of, is a very easy question in algebra, but would require a vast many guesses, and a long time to hit upon by common

arithmetic:* and questions infinitely more difficult can easily be solved by the rules of algebra. In like manner, by arithmetic you can tell the properties of particular numbers; as, for instance, that the number 348 is divided by 3 exactly, so as to leave nothing over: but algebra teaches us that it is only one of an infinite variety of numbers, all divisible by 3, and any one of which you can tell the moment you see it; for they all have the remarkable property, that if you add together the figures they consist of, the sum total is divisible by 3. You can easily perceive this in any one case, as in the number mentioned, for 3 added to 4 and that to 8 make 15, which is plainly divisible by 3; and if you divide 348 by 3, you find the quotient to be 116, with nothing over. But this does not at all prove that any other number, the sum of whose figures is divisible by 3, will itself also be found divisible by 3, as 741; for you must actually perform the division here, and in every other case, before you can know that it leaves nothing over. Algebra, on the contrary, both enables you to discover such general properties, and to prove them in all their generality.†

By means of this science, and its various applications, the most extraordinary calculations may be performed. We shall give, as an example, the method of *Logarithms*, which proceeds upon this principle. Take a set of numbers going on by equal differences; that is to say, the third being as much greater than the second, as the second is greater than the first, and the

* It is 16.

† Another class of numbers divisible by 3 is discovered in like manner by algebra. Every number of 3 places, the figures (or digits) composing which are in arithmetical progression (or rise above each other by equal differences), is divisible by 3: as 123, 789, 357, 159, and so on. The same is true of numbers of any amount of places, provided they are composed of 3, 6, 9, &c., numbers rising above each other by equal differences, as 289, 299, 309, or 148, 214, 280, or 307142085345648276198756, which number of 24 places is divisible by 3, being composed of 6 numbers in a series, whose common difference is 1137. This property, too, is only a particular case of a much more general one.

common difference being the number you begin with; thus, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and so on, in which the common difference is 1; then take another set of numbers, such that each is equal to twice or three times the one before it, or any number of times the one before it, but the common multiplier being the number you begin with: thus, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128; write this second set of numbers under the first, or side by side, so that the numbers shall stand opposite to one another, thus,

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2	4	8	16	32	64	128

you will find, that if you add together any two of the upper or first set, and go to the number opposite their sum, in the lower or second set, you will have in this last set the number arising from multiplying together the numbers of the lower set corresponding or opposite to the numbers added together. Thus, add 2 to 4, you have 6 in the upper set, opposite to which in the lower set is 64, and multiplying the numbers 4 and 16 opposite to 2 and 4, the product is 64. In like manner, if you subtract one of the upper numbers from another, and opposite to their difference in the upper line, you look to the lower number, it is the quotient found from dividing one of the lower numbers by the other opposite the subtracted ones. Thus, take 4 from 6 and 2 remains, opposite to which you have in the lower line 4; and if you divide 64, the number opposite to 6, by 16, the number opposite to 4, the quotient is 4. The upper set are called the *logarithms*, of the lower set, which are called *natural numbers*; and tables may, with a little trouble, be constructed, giving the logarithms of all numbers from 1 to 10,000 and more: so that, instead of multiplying or dividing one number by another, you have only to add or subtract their logarithms, and then you at once find the product or the quotient in the tables. These are made

applicable to numbers far higher than any actually in them, by a very simple process: so that you may at once perceive the prodigious saving of time and labour which is thus made. If you had, for instance, to multiply 7,543,283 by itself, and that product again by the original number, you would have to multiply a number of 7 places of figures by an equally large number, and then a number of 14 places of figures by one of 7 places, till at last you had a product of 21 places of figures—a very tedious operation; but, working by logarithms, you would only have to take three times the logarithm of the original number, and that gives the logarithm of the last product of 21 places of figures, without any further multiplication. So much for the time and trouble saved, which is still greater in questions of division; but by means of logarithms many questions can be worked, and of the most important kind, which no time or labour would otherwise enable us to resolve.

Geometry teaches the properties of figure, or particular portions of space, and distances of points from each other. Thus when you see a triangle, or three-sided figure, one of whose sides is perpendicular to another side, you find, by means of geometrical reasoning respecting this kind of triangle, that if squares be drawn on its three sides, the large square upon the slanting side opposite the two perpendiculars, is exactly equal to the smaller squares upon the perpendiculars, taken together; and this is absolutely true, whatever be the size of the triangle, or the proportions of its sides to each other. Therefore, you can always find the length of any one of the three sides by knowing the lengths of the other two. Suppose one perpendicular side to be 3 feet long, the other 4, and you want to know the length of the third side opposite to the perpendicular; you have only to find a number such, that if, multiplied by itself, it shall be equal to

3 times 3, together with 4 times 4, that is 25.* (This number is 5).

Now only observe the great advantage of knowing this property of the triangle, or of perpendicular lines. If you want to measure a line passing over ground which you cannot reach—to know, for instance, the length of one side, covered with water, of a field, or the distance of one point on a lake or bay from another point on the opposite side—you can easily find it by measuring two lines perpendicular to one another on the dry land, and running through the two points; for the line wished to be measured, and which runs through the water, is the third side of a perpendicular-sided triangle, the other two sides of which are ascertained. But there are other properties of triangles, which enable us to know the length of two sides of any triangle, whether it has perpendicular sides or not, by measuring one side, and also measuring the inclinations of the other two sides to this side, or what is called the two *angles* made by those sides with the measured side. Therefore you can easily find the perpendicular line drawn, or supposed to be drawn, from the top of a mountain through it to the bottom, that is, the height of the mountain; for you can measure a line on level ground, and also the inclination of two lines, supposing them drawn in the air, and reaching from the two ends of the measured line to the mountain's top; and having thus found the length of the one of those lines next the mountain, and its inclination to the ground, you can at once find the perpendicular, though you cannot possibly get near it. In the same way, by measuring lines and angles on

* It is a property of numbers, that every number whatever, whose last place is either 5 or 0, is, when multiplied into itself, equal to two others which are square numbers, and divisible by 3 and 4 respectively:—thus, $45 \times 45 = 2025 = 729 + 1296$, the squares of 27 and 36; and $60 \times 60 = 3600 = 1296 + 2304$, the squares of 36 and 48.

the ground, and near, you can find the length of lines at a great distance, and which you cannot approach : for instance, the length and breadth of a field on the opposite side of a lake or sea ; the distance of two islands ; or the space between the tops of two mountains.

Again, there are *curve-lined* figures as well as straight, and geometry teaches the properties of these also. The best known of all the curves is the *circle*, or a figure made by drawing a string round one end which is fixed, and marking where its other end traces, so that every part of the circle is equally distant from the fixed point or centre. From this fundamental property, an infinite variety of others follow by steps of reasoning more or less numerous, but all necessarily arising one out of another. To give an instance ; it is proved by geometrical reasoning, that if from the two ends of any diameter of the circle you draw two lines to meet in any one point of the circle whatever, those lines are perpendicular to each other.

Another property, and a most useful one, is, that the sizes, or areas, of all circles whatever, from the greatest to the smallest, from the sun to a watch-dialplate, are in exact proportion to the squares of their distances from the centre ; that is, the squares of the strings they are drawn with : so that if you draw a circle with a string 5 feet long, and another with a string 10 feet long, the large circle is four times the size of the small one, as far as the space or area enclosed is concerned ; the square of 10 or 100 being four times the square of 5 or 25. But it is also true, that the lengths of the circumferences themselves, the number of feet over which the ends of the strings move, are in proportion to the lengths of the strings ; so that the curve of the large circle is only twice the length of the curve of the lesser.

But the circle is only one of an infinite variety of

curves, all having a regular formation and fixed properties. The *oval* or *ellipse* is, perhaps, next to the circle, the most familiar to us, although we more frequently see another curve, the line formed by the motion of bodies thrown forward. When you drop a stone, or throw it straight up, it goes in a straight line; when you throw it forward, it goes in a curve line till it reaches the ground; as you see by the figure in which water runs when forced out of a pump, or from a fire-pipe; or from the spout of a kettle or teapot. The line it moves in is called a *parabola*; every point of which bears a certain fixed relation to a certain point within it, as the circle does to its centre. Geometry teaches various properties of this curve: for example, if the direction in which the stone is thrown, or the bullet fired, or the water spouted, be half the perpendicular to the ground, that is, half-way between being level with the ground and being upright, the curve will come to the ground at a greater distance than if any other direction whatever were given, with the same force. So that, to make the gun carry farthest, or the fire-pipe play to the greatest distance, they must be pointed, not, as you might suppose, level or point blank, but about half way between that direction and the perpendicular. If the air did not resist, and so somewhat disturb the calculation, the direction to give the longest range ought to be exactly half perpendicular.

The *oval*, or *ellipse*, is drawn by taking a string of any certain length, and fixing, not one end as in drawing the circle, but both ends to different points, and then carrying a point round inside the string, always keeping it stretched as far as possible. It is plain, that this figure is as regularly drawn as the circle, though it is very different from it; and you perceive that every point of its curve must be so placed, that the straight lines drawn from it to the two points where the string was fixed, are, when added

together, always the same; for they make together the length of the string.

Among various properties belonging to this curve, in relation to the straight lines drawn within it, is one which gives rise to the construction of the *trammels*, or elliptic compasses, used for making figures and ornaments of this form; and also to the construction of lathes for turning oval frames, and the like.

If you wish at once to see these three curves, take a pointed sugar-loaf, and cut it anywhere clean through in a direction parallel to its base or bottom; the outline or edge of the loaf where it is cut will be a *circle*. If the cut is made so as to slant, and not be parallel to the base of the loaf, the outline is an *ellipse*, provided the cut goes quite through the sides of the loaf all round, or is in such a direction that it would pass through the sides of the loaf were they extended; but if it goes slanting and parallel to the line of the loaf's side, the outline is a *parabola*; and if you cut in any direction, not through the sides all round, but through the sides and base, and not parallel to the line of the side, being nearer the perpendicular, the outline will be another curve of which we have not yet spoken, but which is called an *hyperbola*. You will see another instance of it, if you take two plates of glass, and lay them on one another; then put their edge in water, holding them upright and pressing them together; the water, which, to make it more plain, you may colour with a few drops of ink or strong tea, rises to a certain height, and its outline is this curve; which, however much it may seem to differ in form from a circle or ellipse, is found by mathematicians to resemble them very closely in many of its most remarkable properties.

These are the curve lines best known and most frequently discussed; but there are an infinite number of others all related to straight lines and other curve lines by certain fixed rules; for example, the course which any point in the circumference of a circle, as a

nail in the felly of a wheel rolling along; takes through the air, is a curve called the *cycloid*, which has many remarkable properties; and, among others, this, that it is, of all lines possible, the one in which any body, not falling perpendicularly, will descend from one point to another the most quickly. Another curve often seen is that in which a rope or chain hangs when supported at both ends: it is called the *Catenary*, from the Latin for chain; and in this form some arches are built. The form of a sail filled with wind is the same curve.

II. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL TRUTHS.

You perceive, if you reflect a little, that the science which we have been considering, in both its branches, has nothing to do with matter; that is to say, it does not at all depend upon the properties or even upon the existence of any bodies or substances whatever. The distance of one point or place from another is a straight line; and whatever is proved to be true respecting this line, as, for instance, its proportion to other lines of the same kind, and its inclination towards them, what we call the *angles* it makes with them, would be equally true whether there were anything in those places, at those two points, or not. So if you find the number of yards in a square field, by measuring one side, 100 yards, and then, multiplying that by itself, which makes the whole area 10,000 square yards, this is equally true whatever the field is, whether corn, or grass, or rock, or water; it is equally true if the solid part, the earth or water, be removed, for then it will be a field of air bounded by four walls or hedges; but suppose the walls or hedges were removed, and a mark only left at each corner, still it would be true that the space enclosed or bounded by the lines supposed to be drawn between the four marks, was 10,000 square yards in size. But the marks need not be there; you

only want them while measuring one side: if they were gone, it would be equally true that the lines, supposed to be drawn from the places where the marks had been, enclose 10,000 square yards of air. But if there were no air, and consequently a mere void, or empty space, it would be equally true that this space is of the size you had found it to be by measuring the distance of one point from another, of one of the space's corners or angles from another, and then multiplying that distance by itself. In the same way it would be true, that, if the space were circular, its size, compared with another circular space of half its diameter, would be four times larger: of one-third its diameter nine times larger, and of one-fourth sixteen times, and so on always in proportion to the squares of the diameters; and that the length of the circumference, the number of feet or yards in the line round the surface, would be twice the length of a circle whose diameter was one-half, thrice the circumference of one whose diameter was one-third, four times the circumference of one whose diameter was one-fourth, and so on, in the simple proportion of the diameters. Therefore, every property which is proved to belong to figures belongs to them without the smallest relation to bodies or matter of any kind, although we are accustomed only to see figures in connexion with bodies; but all those properties would be equally true if no such thing as matter or bodies existed; and the same may be said of the properties of number, the other great branch of the mathematics. When we speak of twice two, and say it makes four, we affirm this without thinking of two horses, or two balls, or two trees; but we assert it concerning two of anything and everything equally. Nay, this branch of mathematics may be said to apply still more extensively than even the other; for it has no relation to space, which geometry has; and, therefore, it is applicable to cases where figure and size are wholly out of the question. Thus you can speak of

two dreams, or two ideas, or two minds, and can calculate respecting them just as you would respecting so many bodies; and the properties you find belonging to numbers, will belong to those numbers when applied to things that have no outward or visible or perceivable existence, and cannot even be said to be in any particular place, just as much as the same numbers applied to actual bodies which may be seen and touched.

It is quite otherwise with the science which we are now going to consider, *Natural Philosophy*. This teaches the nature and properties of actually existing substances; their motions, their connexions with each other, and their influence on one another. It is sometimes also called *Physics*, from the Greek word signifying *Nature*, though that word is more frequently, in common speech, confined to one particular branch of the science, that which treats of the bodily health.

We have mentioned one distinction between Mathematics and Natural Philosophy, that the former does not depend on the nature and existence of bodies, which the latter entirely does. Another distinction, and one closely connected with this, is, that the truths which Mathematics teach are *necessarily* such,—they are truths of themselves, and wholly independent of facts and experiments,—they depend only upon reasoning; and it is utterly impossible they should be otherwise than true. This is the case with all the properties which we find belong to numbers and to figures—2 and 2 must of *necessity*, and through all time, and in every place, be equal to 4: those numbers must *necessarily* be always divisible by 3, without leaving any remainder over, which have the sums of the figures they consist of divisible by 3; and circles must *necessarily*, and for ever and ever, be to one another in the exact proportion of the squares of their diameters. It cannot be otherwise; we cannot conceive it in our minds to be otherwise. No man can in his own mind suppose to himself that 2 and 2 should ever be more

or less than 4; it would be an utter impossibility—a contradiction in the very ideas; and if stated in words, those words would have no sense. The other properties of number, though not so plain at first sight as this, are proved to be true by reasoning, every one step of which follows from the step immediately before, as a matter of course, and so clearly and unavoidably, that it cannot be supposed, or even imagined, to be otherwise; the mind has no means of fancying how it could be otherwise: the final conclusion, from all the steps of the reasoning or demonstration, as it is called, follows in the same way from the last of the steps, and is therefore just as evidently and necessarily true as the first step, which is always something self-evident; for instance, that 2 and 2 make 4, or that the whole is greater than any of its parts, but equal to all its parts put together. It is through this kind of reasoning, step by step, from the most plain and evident things, that we arrive at the knowledge of other things which seem at first not true, or at least not generally true; but when we do arrive at them, we perceive that they are just as true, and for the same reasons, as the first and most obvious matters; that their truth is absolute and necessary, and that it would be as absurd and self-contradictory to suppose they ever could, under any circumstances, be not true, as to suppose that 2 added to 2 could ever make 3, or 5, or 100, or anything but 4; or, which is the same thing, that 4 should ever be equal to 3, or 5, or 100, or anything but 4. To find out these reasonings, to pursue them to their consequences, and thereby to discover the truths which are not immediately evident, is what science teaches us: but when the truth is once discovered, it is as certain and plain by the reasoning, as the first truths themselves from which all the reasoning takes its rise, on which it all depends, and which require no proof, because they are self-evident at once, and must be assented to the instant they are understood.

But it is quite different with the truths which Natural Philosophy teaches. All these depend upon matter of fact; and that is learnt by observation and experiment, and never could be discovered by reasoning at all. If a man were shut up in a room with pen, ink, and paper, he might by thinking discover any of the truths in arithmetic, algebra, or geometry; it is possible at least; there would be nothing absolutely impossible in his discovering all that is now known of these sciences; and if his memory were as good as we are supposing his judgment and conception to be, he might discover it all without pen, ink, and paper, and in a dark room. But we cannot discover a single one of the fundamental properties of matter without observing what goes on around us, and trying experiments upon the nature and motion of bodies. Thus, the man whom we have supposed shut up, could not possibly find out beyond one or two of the very first properties of matter, and those only in a very few cases; so that he could not tell if these were general properties of all matter or not. He could tell that the objects he touched in the dark were hard and resisted his touch; that they were extended and were solid: that is, that they had three dimensions, length, breadth, and thickness. He might guess that other things existed besides those he felt, and that those other things resembled what he felt in these properties; but he could know nothing for certain, and could not even conjecture much beyond this very limited number of qualities. He must remain utterly ignorant of what really exists in nature, and of what properties matter in general has. These properties, therefore, we learn by experience; they are such as we know bodies to have; they happen to have them—they are so formed by Divine Providence to have them—but they might have been otherwise formed; the great Author of Nature might have thought fit to make all bodies different in every respect. We see that a stone dropped from our hand falls to the ground; this

is a fact which we can only know by experience; before observing it, we could not have guessed it, and it is quite *conceivable* that it should be otherwise: for instance, that when we remove our hand from the body it should stand still in the air; or fly upward, or go forward, or backward, or sideways; there is nothing at all absurd, contradictory, or inconceivable in any of these suppositions; there is nothing impossible in any of them, as there would be in supposing the stone equal to half of itself, or double of itself; or both falling down and rising upwards at once; or going to the right and to the left at one and the same time. Our only reason for not at once thinking it quite conceivable that the stone should stand still in the air, or fly upwards, is, that we have never seen it do so, and have become accustomed to see it do otherwise. But for that, we should at once think it as natural that the stone should fly upwards or stand still, as that it should fall down. But no degree of reflection for any length of time could accustom us to think 2 and 2 equal to anything but 4, or to believe the whole of anything equal to a part of itself.

After we have once, by observation or experiment, ascertained certain things to exist in fact, we may then reason upon them by means of the mathematics; that is, we may apply mathematics to our experimental philosophy, and then such reasoning becomes absolutely certain, taking the fundamental facts for granted. Thus, if we find that a stone falls in one direction when dropped, and we further observe the peculiar way in which it falls, that is, quicker and quicker every instant till it reaches the ground, we learn the rule or the proportion by which the quickness goes on increasing; and we further find, that if the same stone is pushed forward on a table, it moves in the direction of the push, till it is either stopped by something, or comes to a pause by rubbing against the table and being hindered by the air. These are facts which we learn

by observing and trying, and they might all have been different if matter and motion had been otherwise constituted ; but supposing them to be as they are, and as we find them, we can, by reasoning mathematically from them, find out many most curious and important truths depending upon those facts, and depending upon them not accidentally, but of necessity. For example, we can find in what course the stone will move, if, instead of being dropped to the ground, it is thrown forward : it will go in the curve already mentioned, the parabola, somewhat altered by the resistance of the air, and it will run through that curve in a peculiar way, so that there will always be a certain proportion between the time it takes and the space it moves through, and the time it would have taken, and the space it would have moved through, had it dropped from the hand in a straight line to the ground. So we can prove, in like manner, what we before stated of the relation between the distance at which it will come to the ground, and the direction it is thrown in ; the distance being greatest of all when the direction is half-way between the level or horizontal and the upright or perpendicular. These are mathematical truths, derived by mathematical reasoning upon physical grounds ; that is, upon matter of fact found to exist by actual observation and experiment. The result, therefore, is necessarily true, and proved to be so by reasoning only, provided we have once ascertained the facts ; but taken altogether, the result depends partly on the facts learned by experiment or experience, partly on the reasoning from these facts. Thus it is found to be true by reasoning, and necessarily true, that *if* the stone falls in a certain way when unsupported, it must, when thrown forward, go in the curve called a parabola, provided there be no air to resist : this is a necessary or mathematical truth, and it cannot possibly be otherwise. But when we state the matter without any supposition,—without any “ *if*,”—and say, a stone thrown

forward goes in a curve called a parabola, we state a truth, partly fact, and partly drawn from reasoning on the fact; and it might be otherwise if the nature of things were different. It is called a proposition or truth in Natural Philosophy; and as it is discovered and proved by mathematical reasoning upon facts in nature, it is sometimes called a proposition or truth in the *Mixed Mathematics*, so named in contradistinction to the *Pure Mathematics*, which are employed in reasoning upon figures and numbers. The man in the dark room could never discover this truth unless he had been first informed, by those who had observed the fact, in what way the stone falls when unsupported, and moves along the table when pushed. These things he never could have found out by reasoning: they are facts, and he could only reason from them after learning them by his own experience, or taking them on the credit of other people's experience. But having once so learnt them, he could discover by reasoning merely, and with as much certainty as if he lived in daylight, and saw and felt the moving body, that the motion is a parabola, and governed by certain rules. As experiment and observation are the great sources of our knowledge of Nature, and as the judicious and careful making of experiments is the only way by which her secrets can be known, Natural and Experimental Philosophy mean one and the same thing; mathematical reasoning being applied to certain branches of it, particularly those which relate to motion and pressure.

III. NATURAL OR EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE.

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY, in its most extensive sense, has for its province the investigation of the laws of matter; that is, the properties and the motions of matter; and it may be divided into two great branches. The first and most important (which is sometimes, on that account, called *Natural Philosophy* by way of dis-

tion, but more properly *Mechanical Philosophy*) investigates the sensible motions of bodies. The second investigates the constitution and qualities of all bodies, and has various names, according to its different objects. It is called *Chemistry*, if it teaches the properties of bodies with respect to heat, mixture with one another, weight, taste, appearance, and so forth; *Anatomy* and *Animal Physiology* (from the Greek word signifying *to speak of the nature* of anything), if it teaches the structure and functions of living bodies, especially the human; for, when it shows those of other animals, we term it *Comparative Anatomy*; *Medicine*, if it teaches the nature of diseases, and the means of preventing them and of restoring health; *Zoology* (from the Greek words signifying *to speak of animals*), if it teaches the arrangement or classification and the habits of the different lower animals; *Botany* (from the Greek word for *herbage*), including *Vegetable Physiology*, if it teaches the arrangement or classification, the structure and habits of plants; *Mineralogy*, including *Geology* (from the Greek words meaning *to speak of the earth*), if it teaches the arrangement of minerals, the structure of the masses in which they are found, and of the earth composed of those masses. The term *Natural History* is given to the three last branches taken together, but chiefly as far as they teach the classification of different things, or the observation of the resemblances and differences of the various animals, plants, and inanimate and ungrowing substances in nature.

But here we make two general observations. The *first* is, that every such distribution of the sciences is necessarily imperfect; for one runs unavoidably into another. Thus, Chemistry shows the qualities of plants with relation to other substances, and to each other; and Botany does not overlook those same qualities, though its chief object be arrangement. So Mineralogy, though principally conversant with classifying metals and earths, yet regards also their qualities

in respect of heat and mixture. So, too, Zoology, beside arranging animals, describes their structures, like Comparative Anatomy. In truth, all arrangement and classifying depends upon noting the things in which the objects agree and differ; and among those things, in which animals, plants, and minerals agree, or differ, must be considered the anatomical qualities of the one and the chemical qualities of the other. From hence, in a great measure, follows the *second* observation, namely, that the sciences mutually assist each other. We have seen how Arithmetic and Algebra aid Geometry, and how both the purely Mathematical Sciences aid Mechanical Philosophy. Mechanical Philosophy, in like manner, assists, though, in the present state of our knowledge, not very considerably, both Chemistry and Anatomy, especially the latter; and Chemistry very greatly assists both Physiology, Medicine, and all the branches of Natural History.

The first great head, then, of Natural Science, is Mechanical Philosophy; and it consists of various subdivisions, each forming a science of great importance. The most essential of these, and which is indeed fundamental, and applicable to all the rest, is called *Dynamics*, from the Greek word signifying *power* or *force*, and it teaches the laws of motion in all its varieties. The case of the stone thrown forward, which we have already mentioned more than once, is an example. Another, of a more general nature, but more difficult to trace, far more important in its consequences, and of which, indeed, the former is only one particular case, relates to the motions of all bodies, which are attracted (or influenced, or drawn) by any power towards a certain point, while they are, at the same time, driven forward, by some push given to them at first, and forcing them onwards, at the same time that they are drawn towards the point. The line in which a body moves while so drawn and so driven, depends upon the force it is pushed with, the direction

it is pushed in, and the kind of power that draws it towards the point; but at present, we are chiefly to regard the latter circumstance, the attraction towards the point. If this attraction be uniform, that is, the same at all distances from the point, the body will move in a circle, if one direction be given to the forward push. The case with which we are best acquainted is when the force decreases as the squares of the distances, from the centre or point of attraction, increase; that is, when the force is four times less at twice the distance, nine times less at thrice the distance, sixteen times less at four times the distance, and so on. A force of this kind acting on the body, will make it move in an oval, a parabola, or an hyperbola, according to the amount or direction of the impulse, or forward push, originally given; and there is one proportion of that force, which, if directed perpendicularly to the line in which the central force draws the body, will make it move round in a circle, as if it were a stone tied to a string and whirled round the hand. The most usual proportions in nature, are those which determine bodies to move in an oval or ellipse, the curve described by means of a cord fixed at both ends, in the way already explained. In this case, the point of attraction, the point towards which the body is drawn, will be nearer one end of the ellipse than the other, and the time the body will take to go round, compared with the time any other body would take, moving at a different distance from the same point of attraction, but drawn towards that point with a force which bears the same proportion to the distance, will bear a certain proportion, discovered by mathematicians, to the average distances of the two bodies from the point of common attraction. If you multiply the numbers expressing the times of going round, each by itself, the products will be to one another in the proportion of the average distances multiplied each by itself, and that product again by

the distance. Thus, if one body take two hours, and is five yards distant, the other, being ten yards off, will take something less than five hours and forty minutes.*

Now, this is one of the most important truths in the whole compass of science; for it does so happen, that the force with which bodies fall towards the earth, or what is called their *gravity*, the power that draws or attracts them towards the earth, varies with the distance from the Earth's centre, exactly in the proportion of the squares, lessening as the distance increases: at two diameters from the Earth's centre, it is four times less than at one; at three diameters, nine times less; and so forth. It goes on lessening, but never is destroyed, even at the greatest distances to which we can reach by our observations, and there can be no doubt of its extending indefinitely beyond. But, by astronomical observations made upon the motion of the heavenly bodies, upon that of the Moon for instance, it is proved that her movement is slower and quicker, at different parts of her force, in the same manner as a body's motion on the earth would be slower and quicker, according to its distance from the point it was drawn towards, provided it was drawn by a force acting in the proportion to the squares of the distance, which we have frequently mentioned; and the proportion of the time to the distance is also observed to agree with the rule above referred to. Therefore, she is shown to be attracted towards the Earth by a force that varies according to the same proportion in which gravity varies; and she must consequently move in an ellipse round the Earth, which is placed in a point nearer the one end than the other of that curve. In like manner, it is shown that the Earth moves round the Sun in the same curve

* This is expressed mathematically by saying, that the squares of the times are as the cubes of the distances. Mathematical language is not only the simplest and most easily understood of any, but the shortest also.

line, and is drawn towards the Sun by a similar force; and that all the other planets in their courses, at various distances, follow the same rule, moving in ellipses, and drawn towards the Sun by the same kind of power. Three of them have moons like the Earth, only more numerous, for Jupiter has four, Saturn seven, and Herschel six, so very distant, that we cannot see them without the help of glasses; but all those moons move round their principal planets, as ours does round the Earth, in ovals or ellipses; while the planets, with their moons, move in their ovals round the Sun, like our own Earth with its moon.

But this power, which draws them all towards the Sun, and regulates their path and their motion round him, and which draws the moons towards the principal planets, and regulates their motion and path round those planets, is the same with the gravity by which bodies fall towards the earth, being attracted by it. Therefore, the whole of the heavenly bodies are kept in their places, and wheel round the Sun, by the same influence or power that makes a stone fall to the ground.

It is usual to call the Sun, and the planets which with their moons move round him (eleven in number, including the four lately discovered, and the one discovered by Herschel), the *Solar System*, because they are a class of the heavenly bodies far apart from the innumerable fixed stars, and so near each other as to exert a perceptible influence on one another, and thus to be connected together.

The *Comets* belong to the same system, according to this manner of viewing the subject. They are bodies which move in elliptical paths, but far longer and narrower than the curves in which the earth and the other planets and their moons roll. Our curves are not much less round than circles; the paths of the comets are long and narrow, so as, in many places, to be more nearly straight lines than circles. They

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differ from the planets and their moons in another respect; they do not depend on the sun for the light they give, as our moon plainly does, being dark when the earth comes between her and the sun; and as the other planets do, those of them that are nearer the sun than we are, being dark when they come between us and him, appearing to pass across his surface. But the comets give light always of themselves, being apparently vast bodies heated red-hot by coming in their course far nearer the sun than the nearest of the planets ever do. Their motion, when near the sun, is much more rapid than that of the planets; they both approach him much nearer, retreat from him to much greater distances, and take much longer time in going round him than any of the planets do. Yet even these comets are subject to the same great law of gravitation which regulates the motions of the planets. Their year, the time they take to revolve, is in some cases 75, in others 135, in others 300 of our years; their distance is a hundred times our distance when farthest off, and not a hundred and sixtieth of our distance when nearest the sun; their swiftest motion is above twelve times swifter than ours, although ours is a hundred and forty times swifter than a cannon ball's; yet their path is a curve of the same kind with ours, though longer and flatter, differing in its formation only as one oval differs from another by the string you draw it with having the ends fixed at two points more distant from each other: consequently the sun, being in one of those points, is much nearer the end of the path the comet moves in, than he is near the end of our path. Their motion, too, follows the same rule, being swifter the nearer the sun: the attraction of the sun for them varies according to the squares of the distances, being four times less at twice the distance, nine times less at thrice, and so on; and the proportion between the times of revolving and the distances is exactly the

same, in the case of those remote bodies, as in that of the moon and the earth. One law prevails over all, and regulates their motions as well as our own; it is the gravity of the comets towards the sun, and they, like our own earth and moon, wheel round him in boundless space, drawn by the same force, acting by the same rule, which makes a stone fall when dropped from the hand.

The more full and accurate our observations are upon those heavenly bodies, the better we find all their motions agreeing with this great doctrine; although, no doubt, many things are to be taken into the account besides the force that draws them to the different centres. Thus, while the moon is drawn by the earth, and the earth by the sun, the moon is also drawn directly by the sun; and while Jupiter is drawn by the sun, so are his moons; and both Jupiter and his moons are drawn by Saturn: nay, as this power of gravitation is quite universal, and as no body can attract or draw another without being itself drawn by that other, the earth is drawn by the moon, while the moon is drawn by the earth; and the sun is attracted by the planets which he draws towards himself. These mutual attractions give rise to many deviations from the simple line of the ellipse, and produce many irregularities in the simple calculation of the times and motions of the bodies that compose the system of the universe. But the extraordinary powers of investigation applied to the subject by the modern improvements in mathematics, have enabled us at length to reduce even the greatest of the irregularities to order and system; and to unfold one of the most wonderful truths in all sciences, namely, that by certain necessary consequence of the simple fact upon which the whole fabric rests, the proportion of the attractive force to the distances at which it operates,—all the irregularities which at first seemed to disturb the order of

the system, and to make the appearances depart from the doctrine, are themselves subject to a certain fixed rule, and can never go beyond a particular point, but must begin to lessen when they have slowly reached that point, and must then lessen until they reach another point, when they begin again to increase; and so on, for ever. Nay, so perfect is the arrangement of the whole system, and so accurately does it depend upon mathematical principles, that irregularities, or rather apparent deviations, have been discovered by mathematical reasoning before astronomers had observed them, and then their existence has been ascertained by observation, and found to agree precisely with the results of calculation.* Thus, the planets move in ovals, from gravity, the power that attracts them towards the sun, combined with the original impulse they received forwards; and the disturbing forces are continually varying the course of the curves or ovals, making them bulge out in the middle, as it were, on the sides, though in a very small proportion to the whole length of the ellipse. The oval thus bulging, its breadth increases by a very small quantity yearly and daily; and after a certain large number of years, the bulging becomes as great as it ever can be: then the alteration takes a contrary direction, and the curve gradually flattens as it had bulged; till, in the same number of years which it

* The application of mathematics to chemistry has already produced a great change in that science, and is calculated to produce still greater improvements. It may be almost certainly reckoned upon as the source of new discoveries, made by induction after the mathematical reasoning has given the suggestion. The learned reader will perceive that we allude to the beautiful doctrine of *Definite or Multiple Proportions*. To take an example: the probability of an oxide of arsenic being discovered is impressed upon us, by the composition of arsenious and arsenic acids, in which the oxygen is as 2 to 3; and therefore we may expect to find a compound of the same base, with the oxygen as unity. The extraordinary action of chlorine and its compounds on light leads us to expect some further discovery respecting its composition, perhaps respecting the matter of light.

took to bulge, it becomes as flat as it ever can be, and then it begins to bulge again, and so on for ever. And so, too, of every other disturbance and irregularity in the system: what at first appears to be some departure from the rule, when more fully examined, turns out to be only a consequence of it, or the result of a more general arrangement springing from the principle of gravitation; an arrangement of which the rule itself, and the apparent or supposed exception, both form parts.

The power of gravitation, which thus regulates the whole system of the universe, is found to rule each member or branch of it separately. Thus, it is demonstrated that the tides of the ocean are caused by the gravitation which attracts the water towards the sun and moon; and the figure both of our earth and of such of the other bodies as have a spinning motion round their axis, is determined by gravitation combined with that motion: they are all flattened towards the ends of the axis they spin upon, and bulge out towards the middle.

The great discoverer of the principle on which all these truths rest, Sir Isaac Newton, certainly by far the most extraordinary man that ever lived, concluded by reasoning upon the nature of motion and matter, that this flattening must take place in our globe; every one before his time had believed the earth to be a perfect sphere or globe, chiefly from observing the round shadow which it casts on the moon in eclipses; and it was many years after his death that the accuracy of his opinion was proved by measurements on the earth's surface, and by the different weight and attraction of bodies at the equator, where it bulges, and at the poles, where it is flattened. The improvement of telescopes has enabled us to ascertain the same fact with respect to the planets Jupiter and Saturn.

Besides unfolding the general laws which regulate the motions and figures of the heavenly bodies forming

our Solar System, Astronomy consists in calculations of the places, times, and eclipses of those bodies, and their moons or *satellites* (from a Latin word signifying an *attendant*), and in observations of the Fixed Stars, which are innumerable assemblages of bodies, not moving round the Sun as our Earth and the other planets do, nor receiving the light they shine with from his light; but shining, as the Sun and the Comets do, with a light of their own, and placed, to all appearance, immovable, at immense distances from our world, that is, from our Solar System. Each of them is probably the sun of some other system like our own, composed of planets and their moons or satellites; but so extremely distant from us, that they all are seen by us like one point of faint light, as you see two lamps placed a few inches asunder, only like one, when you view them a great way off. The number of the Fixed Stars is prodigious: even to the naked eye they are very numerous, about 3000 being thus visible; but when the heavens are viewed through the telescope, stars become visible in numbers wholly incalculable: 2000 are discovered in one of the small collections of a few visible stars called *Constellations*; nay, what appears to the naked eye only a light cloud, as the *Milky Way*, when viewed through the telescope, proves to be an assemblage of innumerable Fixed Stars, each of them in all likelihood a sun and a system like the rest, though at an immeasurable distance from ours.

The size, and motions, and distances of the heavenly bodies are such as to exceed the power of ordinary imagination, from any comparison with the smaller things we see around us. The Earth's diameter is nearly 8000 miles in length; but the Sun's is above 880,000 miles, and the bulk of the Sun is above 1,300,000 times greater than that of the Earth. The planet Jupiter, which looks like a mere speck, from his vast distance, is nearly 1300 times larger than the Earth. Our distance from the Sun is above 95

millions of miles; but Jupiter is 490 millions, and Saturn 900 millions of miles distant from the Sun. The rate at which the Earth moves round the Sun is 68,000 miles an hour, or 140 times swifter than the motion of a cannon-ball; and the planet Mercury, the nearest to the Sun, moves still quicker, nearly 110,000 miles an hour. We, upon the Earth's surface, besides being carried round the Sun, move round the Earth's axis by the rotatory or spinning motion which it has; so that every 24 hours we move in this manner near 24,000 miles, beside moving round the Sun above 1,600,000 miles. These motions and distances, however, prodigious as they are, seem as nothing compared to those of the comets, one of which, when farthest from the Sun, is 11,200 millions of miles from him; and, when nearest the Sun, flies at the amazing rate of 880,000 miles an hour. Sir Isaac Newton calculated its heat at 2000 times that of red-hot iron; and that it would take thousands of years to cool. But the distance of the Fixed Stars is yet more vast: they have been supposed to be 400,000 times farther from us than we are from the Sun, that is, 38 millions of millions of miles; so that a cannon-ball would take nearly nine millions of years to reach one of them, supposing there was nothing to hinder it from pursuing its course thither. As light takes about eight minutes and a quarter to reach us from the Sun, it would be above six years in coming from one of those stars; but the calculations of later astronomers prove some stars to be so far distant, that their light must take centuries before it can reach us; so that every particle of light which enters our eyes left the star it comes from three or four hundred years ago.

Astronomers have, by means of their excellent glasses, aided by Geometry and calculations, been able to observe not only stars, planets, and their satellites, invisible to the naked eye, but to measure the height

of mountains in the Moon, by observations of the shadows which those eminences cast on her surface; and they have discovered volcanoes, or burning mountains, in the same body.

The tables, which they have by the like means been enabled to form of the heavenly motions, are of great use in navigation. By means of the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites, and by the tables of the Moon's motions, we can ascertain the position of a ship at sea; for the observation of the Sun's height at mid-day gives the *latitude* of the place, that is, its distance from the equinoctial or equator, the line passing through the middle of the Earth's surface equally distant from both poles; and these tables, with the observations of the satellites, or moons, give the distance east and west of the observatory for which the tables are calculated—called the *longitude* of the place: consequently the mariner can thus tell nearly in what part of the ocean he is, how far he has sailed from his port of departure, and how far he must sail, and in what direction, to gain the port of his destination. The advantage of this knowledge is therefore manifest in the common affairs of life; but it sinks into insignificance compared with the vast extent of those views which the contemplations of the science afford, of numberless worlds filling the immensity of space, and all kept in their places, and adjusted in their prodigious motions by the same simple principle, under the guidance of an all-wise and all-powerful Creator.

We have been considering the application of Dynamics to the motions of the heavenly bodies, which forms the science of *Physical Astronomy*. The application of Dynamics to the calculation, production, and direction of motion, forms the science of *Mechanics*, sometimes called *Practical Mechanics*, to distinguish it from the more general use of the word, which comprehends everything that relates to motion and force. The fundamental principle of the science, upon which

it mainly depends, flows immediately from a property of the circle already mentioned, and which, perhaps, appeared at the moment of little value,—that the lengths of circles are in proportion to their diameters. Observe how upon this simple truth nearly the whole of those contrivances are built by which the power of man is increased as far as solid matter assists him in extending it; and nearly the whole of those doctrines, too, by which he is enabled to explain the voluntary motions of animals, as far as these depend upon their own bodies. There can be nothing more instructive in showing the importance and fruitfulness of scientific truths, however trivial and forbidding they may at first sight appear. For it is an immediate consequence of this property of the circle, that if a rod of iron, or beam of wood, or any other solid material, be placed on a point, or pivot, so that it may move as the arms of a balance do round its centre, or a see-saw board does round its prop, the two ends will go through parts of circles, each proportioned to that arm of the beam to which it belongs: the two circles will be equal if the pivot is in the centre or middle point of the beam; but if it is nearer one end than the other, say three times, that end will go through a circular space, or arch, three times shorter than the circular space the other end goes through in the same time. If, then, the end of the long beam goes through three times the space, it must move with three times the swiftness of the short beam's end, since both move in the same time; and therefore any force applied to the long end must overcome the resistance of three times that force applied at the opposite end, since the two ends move in contrary directions; hence one pound placed at the long end would balance three placed at the short end. The beam we have been supposing is called a *Lever*, and the same rule must evidently hold for all proportions of the lengths of its arms. If, then, the lever be seventeen feet long, and the pivot, or *fulcrum* (as it is

called, from a Latin word signifying *support*), be a foot from one end, an ounce placed on the other end will balance a pound placed on the near end ; and the least additional weight, or the slightest push or pressure on the far end, so loaded, will make the pound weight on the other move upwards. If, instead of an ounce, we place upon the end of the long arm the short arm of a second beam or lever supported by a fulcrum, one foot from it, and then place the long arm of this second lever upon the short arm of a third lever, whose fulcrum is one foot from it ; and if we put on the end of this third lever's long arm an ounce weight, that ounce will move upwards a pound on the second lever's long arm, and this moving upwards will cause the short arm to force downwards sixteen pounds at the long end of the first lever, which will make the short end of the first lever move upwards, though two hundred and fifty-six pounds be laid on it : the same thing continuing, a pound on the long arm of the third lever will move a ton and three-quarters on the short arm of the first lever ; that is, will balance it, so that the slightest pressure with the finger, or a touch from a child's hand, will move as much as two horses can draw. The lever is called, on this account, a *mechanical power* ; and there are five other mechanical powers, of most of which its properties form the foundation ; indeed they have all been resolved into combinations of levers. The pulley seems the most difficult to reduce under the principle of the lever. Thus the *wheel and axle* is only a lever moving round an axle, and always retaining the effect gained during every part of the motion, by means of a rope wound round the butt end of the axle ; the spoke of the wheel being the long arm of the lever, and the half diameter of the axle its short arm. By a combination of levers, wheels, pulleys, so great an increase of force is obtained, that, but for the obstruction from friction, and the resistance of the air, there could be no bounds to the effect of the smallest force

thus multiplied; and to this fundamental principle Archimedes, one of the most illustrious mathematicians of ancient times, referred, when he boasted, that if he only had a pivot or fulcrum whereon he might rest his machinery, he could move the Earth. Upon so simple a truth, assisted by the aid derived from other sources, rests the whole fabric of mechanical power, whether for raising weights, or cleaving rocks, or pumping up rivers from the bowels of the earth; or, in short, performing any of those works to which human strength, even augmented by the help of the animals whom Providence has subdued to our use, would prove altogether inadequate.

The application of Dynamics to the pressure and motions of fluids, constitutes a science which receives different appellations according as the fluids are heavy and liquid like water, or light and invisible like air. In the former case it is called *Hydrodynamics*, from the Greek words signifying *water*, and *power* or *force*; in the latter *Pneumatics*, from the Greek word signifying *breath* or *air*; and Hydrodynamics is divided into *Hydrostatics*, which treats of the weight and pressure of liquids, from the Greek words for *balancing of water*; and *Hydraulics*, which treats of their motion, from the Greek name for certain musical instruments played with *water* in *pipes*.

The discoveries to which experiments, aided by mathematical reasoning, have led, upon the pressure and motion of fluids, are of the greatest importance, whether we regard their application to practical purposes, or to their use for explaining the appearances in nature, or their singularity as the subjects of scientific contemplation. When it is found that the pressure of water or any other liquid upon the surface that contains it, is not in the least degree proportioned to its bulk, but only to the height at which it stands, so that a long small pipe, containing a pound or two of the fluid, will give the pressure of twenty or thirty tons;

may, of twice or thrice as much, if its length be increased and its bore lessened, without the least regard to the quantity of the liquid, we are not only astonished at so extraordinary and unexpected a property of matter, but we straightway perceive one of the great agents employed in the vast operations of nature, in which the most trifling means are used to work the mightiest effects. We likewise learn to guard against many serious mischiefs in our own works, and to apply safely and usefully a power calculated, according as it is directed, either to produce unbounded devastation, or to render the most beneficial service.

Nor are the discoveries relating to the Air less interesting in themselves, and less applicable to important uses. It is an agent, though invisible, as powerful as Water, in the operations both of nature and of art. Experiments of a simple and decisive nature show the amount of its pressure to be between 14 and 15 pounds on every square inch; but, like all other fluids, it presses equally in every direction: so that though, on one hand, there is a pressure downwards of above 250 pounds, yet this is exactly balanced by an equal pressure upwards, from the air pressing round and getting below. If, however, the air on one side be removed, the whole pressure from the other acts unbalanced. Hence the ascent of water in pumps, which suck out the air from a barrel, and allow the pressure upon the water to force it up 32 or 33 feet, that body of water being equal to the weight of the atmosphere. Hence the ascent of the mercury in the barometer is only 28 or 29 inches, mercury being between 13 and 14 times heavier than water. Hence, too, the motion of the steam-engine; the piston of which, until the direct force of steam was applied, used to be pressed downwards by the weight of the atmosphere from above, all air being removed below it by first filling it with steam, and then suddenly cooling and converting that steam into water, so as to leave

nothing in the space it had occupied. Hence, too, the power which some animals possess of walking along the perpendicular surfaces of walls, and even the ceilings of rooms, by squeezing out the air between the inside of their feet and the wall, and thus being supported by the pressure of the air against the outside of their feet.

The science of *Optics* (from the Greek word for *seeing*), which teaches the nature of light, and of the sensation conveyed by it, presents, of itself, a field of unbounded extent and interest. To it the arts, and the other sciences, owe those most useful instruments which have enabled us at once to examine the minutest parts of the structure of animal and vegetable bodies, and to calculate the size and the motions of the most remote of the heavenly bodies. But as an object of learned curiosity, nothing can be more singular than the fundamental truth discovered by the genius of Newton,—that the light, which we call white, is in fact composed of all the colours, blended in certain proportions; unless, perhaps, it be that astonishing conjecture of his unrivalled sagacity, by which he desiered the inflammable nature of the diamond, and its belonging, against all appearance of probability, to the class of oily substances, from having observed, that it stood among them, and far removed from all crystals, in the degree of its action upon light; a conjecture turned into certainty by discoveries made a century afterwards.

To a man who, for original genius and strong natural sense, is not unworthy of being named after this illustrious sage, we owe the greater part of *Electrical* science. It treats of the peculiar substances, resembling both light and heat, which, by rubbing, is found to be produced in a certain class of bodies, as glass, wax, silk, amber; and to be conveyed easily or *conducted* through others, as wood, metals, water; and it has received the name of *Electricity*, from the

Greek word for *amber*. Dr. Franklin discovered that this is the same matter which, when collected in the clouds, and conveyed from them to the earth, we call *lightning*, and whose noise, in darting through the air, is *thunder*. The observation of some movements in the limbs of a dead frog gave rise to the discovery of *Animal Electricity*, or *Galvanism*, as it was at first called from the name of the discoverer; and which has of late years given birth to improvements that have changed the face of chemical philosophy; affording a new proof how few there are of the processes of nature incapable of repaying the labour we bestow in patiently and diligently examining them. It is to the results of the remark accidentally made upon the twitching in the frog's leg, not, however, hastily dismissed and forgotten, but treasured up and pursued through many an elaborate experiment and calculation, that we owe our acquaintance with the extraordinary metal, liquid like mercury, lighter than water, and more inflammable than phosphorus, which forms, when it burns by mere exposure to the air, one of the salts best known in commerce, and the principal ingredient in saltpetre.

In order to explain the nature and objects of those branches of Natural Science more or less connected with the mathematics, some details were necessary, as without them it was difficult immediately to perceive their importance, and, as it were, relish the kind of instruction which they afford. But the same course needs not be pursued with respect to the other branches. The value and the interest of chemistry is at once perceived, when it is known to teach the nature of all bodies; the relations of simple substances to heat and to one another, or their combinations together; the composition of those which nature produces in a compound state; and the application of the whole to the arts and manufactures. Some branches of philosophy, again, are chiefly useful and interesting to particu-

lar classes, as surgeons and physicians. Others are easily understood by a knowledge of the principles of Mechanics and Chemistry, of which they are applications and examples; as those which teach the structure of the earth and the changes it has undergone; the motions of the muscles, and the structure of the parts of animals; the qualities of animal and vegetable substances; and that department of Agriculture which treats of soils, manure, and machinery. Other branches are only collections of facts, highly curious and useful indeed, but which any one who reads or listens, perceives as clearly, and comprehends as readily, as the professed student. To this class belongs Natural History, in so far as it describes the habits of animals and plants, and its application to that department of Agriculture which treats of cattle and their management.

IV. APPLICATION OF NATURAL SCIENCE TO THE ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE WORLD.

BUT, for the purpose of further illustrating the advantages of Philosophy, its tendency to enlarge the mind, as well as to interest it agreeably, and afford pure and solid gratification, a few instances may be given of the singular truths brought to light by the application of Mathematical, Mechanical, and Chemical knowledge to the habits of animals and plants; and some examples may be added of the more ordinary and easy, but scarcely less interesting observations, made upon those habits, without the aid of the profounder sciences.

We may remember the curve line which mathematicians call a Cycloid. It is the path which any point of a circle, moving along a plane, and round its centre, traces in the air; so that the nail on the felly of a cart-wheel moves in a cycloid, as the cart goes along, and as the wheel itself both turns round its axle and is carried along the ground. Now this curve has

certain properties of a peculiar and very singular kind with respect to motion. One is, that if any body whatever moves in a cycloid by its own weight or swing, together with some other force acting upon it all the while, it will go through all distances of the same curve in exactly the same time; and, accordingly, pendulums have sometimes been contrived to swing in such a manner, that they shall describe cycloids, or curves very near cycloids, and thus move in equal times, whether they go through a long or a short part of the same curve. Again, if a body is to descend from any one point to any other, not in the perpendicular, by means of some force acting on it together with its weight, the line in which it will go the quickest of all will be the cycloid; not the straight line, though that is the shortest of all lines which can be drawn between the two points; nor any other curve whatever, though many are much flatter, and therefore shorter than the cycloid—but the cycloid, which is longer than many of them, is yet, of all curved or straight lines which can be drawn, the one the body will move through in the shortest time. Suppose, again, that the body is to move from one point to another, by its weight and some other force acting together, but to go through a certain space,—as a hundred yards,—the way it must take to do this, in the shortest time possible, is by moving in a cycloid; or the length of a hundred yards must be drawn into a cycloid, and then the body will descend through the hundred yards in a shorter time than it could go the same distance in any other path whatever. Now, it is believed that Birds, as the Eagle, which build in the rocks, drop or fly down from height to height in this course. It is impossible to make very accurate observations of their flight and path; but there is a general resemblance between the course they take and the cycloid, which has led ingenious men to adopt this opinion.

If we have a certain quantity of any substance, a pound of wood, for example, and would fashion it in the shape to take the least room, we must make a globe of it; it will in this figure have the smallest surface. But suppose we want to form the pound of wood, so that in moving through the air or water it shall meet with the least possible resistance; then we must lengthen it out for ever, till it becomes not only like a long-pointed pin, but thinner and thinner, longer and longer, till it is quite a straight line, and has no perceptible breadth or thickness at all. If we would dispose of the given quantity of matter, so that it shall have a certain length only, say a foot, and a certain breadth at the thickest part, say three inches, and move through the air or water with the smallest possible resistance which a body of those dimensions can meet, then we must form it into a figure of a peculiar kind, called the *Solid of least resistance*, because, of all the shapes that can be given to the body, its length and breadth remaining the same, this is the one which will make it move with the least resistance through the air, or water, or other fluid. A very difficult chain of mathematical reasoning, by means of the highest branches of algebra, leads to a knowledge of the curve which, by revolving on its axis, makes a solid of this shape, in the same way that a circle, by so revolving, makes a sphere or globe; and the curve certainly resembles closely the face or head part of a fish. Nature, therefore (by which we always mean the Divine Author of nature), has fashioned these fishes so, that, according to mathematical principles, they swim the most easily through the element they live and move in.*

Suppose upon the face part of one of these fishes a small insect were bred, endowed with faculties sufficient to reason upon its condition, and upon the

* The feathers of the wings of birds are found to be placed at the *best possible angle* for helping on the bird by their action on the air.

motion of the fish it belonged to, but never to have discovered the whole size and shape of the face part; it would certainly complain of the form as clumsy, and fancy that it could have made the fish so as to move with less resistance. Yet if the whole shape were disclosed to it, and it could discover the principle on which that shape was preferred, it would at once perceive, not only that what had seemed clumsy was skilfully contrived, but that, if any other shape whatever had been taken, there would have been an error committed; nay, *that there must of necessity* have been an error; and that the very best possible arrangement had been adopted. So it may be with man in the universe, where, seeing only a part of the great system, he fancies there is evil; and yet, if he were permitted to survey the whole, what had seemed imperfect might appear to be necessary for the general perfection, insomuch that any other arrangement, even of that seemingly imperfect part, must needs have rendered the whole less perfect. The common objection is, that what seems evil *might have* been avoided; but in the case of the fish's shape, it *could not* have been avoided.

It is found by optical inquiries, that the particles or rays of light, in passing through transparent substances of a certain form, are bent to a point where they make an image or picture of the shining bodies they come from, or of the dark bodies they are reflected from. Thus, if a pair of spectacles be held between a candle and the wall, they make two images of the candle upon it; and if they be held between the window and a sheet of paper when the sun is shining, they make a picture on the paper of the houses, trees, fields, sky, and clouds. The eye is found to be composed of several natural magnifiers which make a picture on a membrane at the back of it, and from this membrane there goes a nerve to the brain, conveying the impression of the picture, by means of which we see. Now,

white light was discovered by Newton to consist of differently-coloured parts, which are differently bent in passing through transparent substances, so that the lights of several colours come to a point at different distances, and thus create an indistinct image at any one distance. This was long found to make our telescopes imperfect, insomuch that it became necessary to make them of reflectors or mirrors, and not of magnifying glasses, the same difference not being observed to affect the reflection of light. But another discovery was, about fifty years afterwards, made by Mr. Dollond,—that, by combining different kinds of glass in a compound magnifier, the difference may be greatly corrected; and on this principle he constructed his telescopes. It is found, too, that the different natural magnifiers of the eye are combined upon a principle of the same kind. Thirty years later, a third discovery was made by Mr. Blair, of the greatly superior effect which combinations of different liquids have in correcting the imperfection; and, most wonderful to think, when the eye is examined, we find it consists of different liquids, acting naturally upon the same principle which was thus recently found out in optics by many ingenious mechanical and chemical experiments.

Again, the point to which any magnifier collects the light is more or less distant as the magnifier is flatter or rounder, so that a small globe of glass or any transparent substance makes a microscope. And this property of light depends upon the nature of lines, and is purely of a mathematical nature, after we have once ascertained by experiment, that light is bent in a certain way when it passes through transparent bodies. Now birds flying in the air, and meeting with many obstacles, as branches and leaves of trees, require to have their eyes sometimes as flat as possible for protection; but sometimes as round as possible, that they may see the small objects, flies and other insects, which

they are chasing through the air, and which they pursue with the most unerring certainty. This could only be accomplished by giving them a power of suddenly changing the form of their eyes. Accordingly, there is a set of hard scales placed on the outer coat of their eye, round the place where the light enters; and over these scales are drawn the muscles or fibres by which motion is communicated; so that, by acting with these muscles, the bird can press the scales, and squeeze the natural magnifier of the eye into a round shape when it wishes to follow an insect through the air, and can relax the scales, in order to flatten the eye again, when it would see a distant object, or move safely through leaves and twigs. This power of altering the shape of the eye is possessed by birds of prey in a very remarkable degree. They can thus see the smallest objects close to them, and can yet discern larger bodies at vast distances, as a carcass stretched upon the plain, or a dying fish afloat on the water.

A singular provision is made for keeping the surface of the bird's eye clean—for wiping the glass of the instrument, as it were—and also for protecting it, while rapidly flying through the air and through thickets, without hindering the sight. Birds are, for these purposes, furnished with a third eyelid, a fine membrane or skin, which is constantly moved very rapidly over the eyeball by two muscles placed in the back of the eye. One of the muscles ends in a loop, the other in a string which goes through the loop, and is fixed in the corner of the membrane, to pull it backward and forward. If you wish to draw a thing towards any place with the least force, you must pull directly in the line between the thing and the place; but if you wish to draw it as quickly as possible, and with the most convenience, and do not regard the loss of force, you must pull it obliquely, by drawing it in two directions at once. Tie a string to a stone, and

draw it straight towards you with one hand ; then, make a loop on another string, and running the first through it, draw one string in each hand, not towards you, but sideways, till both strings are stretched in a straight line : you will see how much more easily the stone moves quickly than it did before when pulled straight forward. Again, if you tie strings to the two ends of a rod, or slip of card, in a running groove, and bring them to meet and pass through a ring or hole, for every inch in a straight line that you draw both together below the ring, the rod will move onward two. Now this is proved, by mathematical reasoning, to be the necessary consequence of forces applied obliquely : there is a loss of power, but a great gain in velocity and convenience. This is the thing required to be gained in the third eyelid, and the contrivance is exactly that of a string and a loop, moved each by a muscle, as the two strings are by the hands in the cases we have been supposing.

A third eyelid of the same kind is found in the horse, and called the *haw* ; it is moistened with a pulpy substance (or mucilage) to take hold of the dust on the eyeball, and wipe it clear off ; so that the eye is hardly ever seen with anything upon it, though greatly exposed from its size and posture. The swift motion of the haw is given to it by a gristly elastic substance placed between the eyeball and the socket, and striking obliquely, so as to drive out the haw with great velocity over the eye, and then let it come back as quickly. Ignorant persons, when this haw is inflamed from cold, and swells so as to appear, which it never does in a healthy state, often mistake it for an imperfection, and cut it off : so nearly do ignorance and cruelty produce the same mischief.

If any quantity of matter, as a pound of wood or iron, is fashioned into a rod of a certain length, say one foot, the rod will be strong in proportion to its thickness ; and, if the figure is the same, that thick-

ness can only be increased by making it hollow. Therefore hollow rods or tubes, of the same length and quantity of matter, have more strength than solid ones. This is a principle so well understood now, that engineers make their axles and other parts of machinery hollow, and therefore stronger with the same weight than they would be if thinner and solid. Now the bones of animals are all more or less hollow ; and are therefore stronger with the same weight and quantity of matter than they otherwise would be. But birds have the largest bones in proportion to their weight ; their bones are more hollow than those of animals which do not fly ; and therefore they have the needful strength without having to carry more weight than is absolutely necessary. Their quills derive strength from the same construction. They possess another peculiarity to help their flight. No other animals have any communication between the air-vessels of their lungs and the hollow parts of their bodies ; but birds have it ; and by this means they can blow out their bodies as we do a bladder, and thus become lighter when they would either make their flight towards the ground slower, or rise more swiftly, or float more easily in the air ; while, by lessening their bulk and closing their wings, they can drop more speedily if they wish to chase or to escape. Fishes possess a power of the same kind, though not by the same means. They have *air-bladders* in their bodies, and can puff them out, or press them closer, at pleasure : when they want to rise in the water, they fill out the bladder, and this lightens them ; when they would sink, they squeeze the bladder, pressing the air into a smaller space, and this makes them heavier. If the bladder breaks, the fish remains at the bottom, and can be held up only by the most laborious exertions of the fins and tail. Accordingly, flat fish, such as skates and flounders, which have no air-bladders, seldom rise from the bottom, but are

found lying on banks in the sea, or at the bottom of rivers.

If you have a certain space, as a room, to fill up with closets or little cells, all of the same size and shape, there are only three figures which will answer, and enable you to fill the room without losing any space between the cells; they must either be squares, or figures of three equal sides, or figures of six equal sides. With any other figures whatever, space would be lost between the cells. This is evident upon considering the matter; and it is proved by mathematical reasoning. The six-sided figure is by far the most convenient of those three shapes, because its corners are flatter, and any round body placed in it has therefore more space, less room being lost in the corners. This figure, too, is the strongest of the three; any pressure from without or from within will hurt it least, as it has something of the strength of an arch. A round figure would be still stronger, but then room would be lost between the circles, whereas with the six-sided figure none is lost. Now, it is a most remarkable fact, that *Bees* build their cells exactly in this shape, and thereby save both room and materials beyond what they could save if they built in any other shape whatever. They build in the very best possible shape for their purpose, which is to save all the room and all the wax they can. So far as to the shape of the walls of each cell; but the roof and floor, or top and bottom, are built on equally true principles. It is proved by mathematicians, that, to give the greatest strength, and save the most room, the roof and floor must be made of three square planes meeting in a point; and they have further proved, by a demonstration belonging to the highest parts of Algebra, that there is one particular angle or inclination of those planes to each other where they meet, which makes a greater saving of materials and of work than any other inclination whatever could possibly do. Now, the *Bees* actually make the tops

and bottoms of their cells of three planes meeting in a point; and the inclinations or angles at which they meet are precisely those found out by the mathematician to be the best possible for saving wax and work.* Who would dream of the bee knowing the highest branch of the Mathematics—the fruit of Newton's most wonderful discovery—a result, too, of which he was himself ignorant, one of his most celebrated followers having found it out in a later age? This little insect works with a truth and correctness which are perfect, and according to the principles at which man has arrived only after ages of slow improvement in the most difficult branch of the most difficult science. But the Mighty and All-wise Creator, who made the insect and the philosopher, bestowing reason on the latter, and giving the former to work without it—to Him all truths are known to all eternity, with an intuition that mocks even the conceptions of the sagest of human kind.

It may be recollected, that when the air is exhausted or sucked out of any vessel, there is no longer the force necessary to resist the pressure of the air on the outside; and the sides of the vessels are therefore pressed inwards with violence: a flat glass would thus be broken, unless it were very thick; a round one, having the strength of an arch, would resist better; but any soft substance, as leather or skin, would be crushed or squeezed together at once. If the air was only sucked out slowly, the squeezing would be gradual; or, if it were only half sucked out, the skin would only

* Koenig, pupil of Bernouilli, and Maclaurin, proved by very refined investigations, carried on with the aid of the fluxional calculus, that the obtuse angle must be $109^{\circ} 28'$, and the acute $70^{\circ} 32'$, to save the most wax and work possible. Maraldi found by actual measurement, that the angles are about 110° and 70° . These angles never vary in any place; and it is scarcely less singular, that the breadth of all bees' cells are everywhere precisely the same, the drone or male cells being $\frac{3}{4}$ ths and the worker or female cells $\frac{1}{3}$ ths of an inch in breadth, and this in all countries and times.

be partly squeezed together. This is the process by which *Bees* reach the fine dust and juices of hollow flowers, like the honeysuckle, and some kinds of long fox-glove, which are too narrow for them to enter. They fill up the mouth of the flower with their bodies, and suck out the air, or at least a large part of it; this makes the soft sides of the flower close, and squeezes the dust and juice towards the insect as well as a hand could do, if applied to the outside.

We may remember this pressure or weight of the atmosphere as shown by the barometer and the sucking-pump. Its weight is near fifteen pounds on every square inch, so that if we could entirely squeeze out the air between our two hands, they would cling together with a force equal to the pressure of double this weight, because the air would press upon both hands; and if we could contrive to suck or squeeze out the air between one hand and the wall, the hand would stick fast to the wall, being pressed on it with the weight of above two hundredweight, that is, near fifteen pounds on every square inch of the hand. Now, by a late most curious discovery of Sir Everard Home, the distinguished anatomist, it is found that this is the very process by which *Flies* and other insects of a similar description are enabled to walk up perpendicular surfaces, however smooth, as the sides of walls and panes of glass in windows, and to walk as easily along the ceiling of a room with their bodies downwards and their feet over head. Their feet, when examined by a microscope, are found to have flat skins or flaps, like the feet of web-footed animals, as ducks and geese; and they have by means of strong folds the power of drawing the flap close down upon the glass or wall the fly walks on, and thus squeezing out the air completely, so as to make a vacuum between the foot and the glass or wall. The consequence of this is, that the air presses the foot on the wall with a very considerable force compared to the weight of the

fly ; for if its feet are to its body in the same proportion as ours are to our bodies, since we could support by a single hand on the ceiling of the room (provided it made a vacuum) more than our whole weight, namely, a weight of above fifteen stone, the fly can easily move on four feet in the same manner by help of the vacuum made under its feet.

It has likewise been found that some of the larger *Sea animals* are by the same construction, only upon a greater scale, enabled to climb the perpendicular and smooth surfaces of the ice hills among which they live. Some kinds of *Lizard* have a like power of climbing, and of creeping with their bodies downwards along the ceiling of a room ; and the means by which they are enabled to do so are the same. In the large feet of those animals, the contrivance is easily observed, of the toes and muscles, by which the skin of the foot is pinned down, and the air excluded in the act of walking or climbing ; but it is the very same, only upon a larger scale, with the mechanism of a fly's or a butterfly's foot ; and both operations, the climbing of the sea-horse on the ice, and the creeping of the fly on the window or the ceiling, are performed exactly by the same power, the weight of the atmosphere, which causes the quicksilver to stand in the weather-glass, the wind to whistle through a key-hole, and the piston to descend in an old steam engine.

Although philosophers are not agreed as to the peculiar action which light exerts upon vegetation, and there is even some doubt respecting the decomposition of air and water during that process, one thing is undeniable.—the necessity of light to the growth and health of plants : without it they have neither colour, taste, nor smell ; and accordingly they are for the most part so formed as to receive it at all times when it shines on them. Their cups, and the little assemblages of their leaves before they sprout, are found to be more or less affected by the light, so as to open and

receive it. In several kinds of plants this is more evident than in others; their flowers close entirely at night, and open in the day. Some constantly turn round towards the light, following the sun, as it were, while he makes or seems to make his revolution, so that they receive the greatest quantity possible of his rays. Thus clover in a field follows the apparent course of the sun. But all leaves of plants turn to the sun, place them how you will, light being essential to their thriving.

The lightness of inflammable gas is well known. When bladders of any size are filled with it, they rise upwards and float in the air. Now, it is a most curious fact, ascertained by Mr. Knight, that the fine dust, by means of which plants are impregnated one from another, is composed of very small globules, filled with this gas—in a word, of small air-balloons. These globules thus float from the male plant through the air, and striking against the females, are detained by a glue prepared on purpose to stop them, which no sooner moistens the globules than they explode, and their substance remains, the gas flying off which enabled them to float. A provision of a very simple kind is also, in some cases, made to prevent the male and female blossoms of the same plant from breeding together, this being found to hurt the breed of vegetables, just as breeding in and in spoils the race of animals. It is contrived that the dust shall be shed by the male blossom before the female of the same plant is ready to be affected by it; so that the impregnation must be performed by the dust of some other plant, and in this way the breed be crossed. The light gas with which the globules are filled is most essential to the operation, as it conveys them to great distances. A plantation of yew-trees has been known, in this way, to impregnate another several hundred yards off.

The contrivance by which some creeper plants are

enabled to climb walls, and fix themselves, deserves attention. The *Virginia creeper* has a small tendril, ending in a claw, each toe of which has a knob, thickly set with extremely small bristles; they grow into the invisible pores of the wall, and swelling, stick there as long as the plant grows, and prevent the branch from falling: but when the plant dies, they become thin again, and drop out, so that the branch falls down.

The *Vanilla* plant of the West Indies climbs round trees likewise by means of tendrils; but when it has fixed itself, the tendrils drop off, and leaves are formed.

It is found by chemical experiments, that the juice which is in the stomachs of animals (called the *gastric juice*, from a Greek word signifying *the belly*), has very peculiar properties. Though it is for the most part a tasteless, clear, and seemingly a very simple liquor, it nevertheless possesses extraordinary powers of dissolving substances which it touches or mixes with; and it varies in different classes of animals. In one particular it is the same in all animals; it will not attack living matter, but only dead; the consequence of which is, that its powers of eating away and dissolving are perfectly safe to the animals themselves, in whose stomachs it remains without ever hurting them. This juice differs in different animals according to the food on which they subsist; thus, in birds of prey, as kites, hawks, owls, it only acts upon animal matter, and does not dissolve vegetables. In other birds, and in all animals feeding on plants, as oxen, sheep, hares, it dissolves vegetable matter, as grass, but will not touch flesh of any kind. This has been ascertained by making them swallow balls with meat in them, and several holes drilled through to let the gastric justice reach the meat: no effect was produced upon it. We may further observe, that there is a most curious and beautiful correspondence between

this juice in the stomach of different animals and the other parts of their bodies, connected with the important operations of eating and digesting their food. The use of the juice is plainly to convert what they eat into a fluid, from which, by various other processes, all their parts, blood, bones, muscles, &c., are afterwards formed. But the food is first of all to be obtained, and then prepared by bruising, for the action of the juice. Now birds of prey have instruments, their claws and beaks, for tearing and devouring their food (that is, animals of various kinds), but those instruments are useless for picking up and crushing seeds; accordingly they have a gastric juice which dissolves the animals they eat; while birds which have only a beak fit for picking, and eating seeds, have a juice that dissolves seeds, and not flesh. Nay more, it is found that the seeds must be bruised before the juice will dissolve them: this you find by trying the experiment in a vessel with the juice; and accordingly the birds have a gizzard, and animals which graze have flat teeth, which grind and bruise their food, before the gastric juice is to act upon it.

We have seen how wonderfully the *Bee* works, according to rules discovered by man thousands of years after the insect had been following them with perfect accuracy. The same little animal seems to be acquainted with principles of which we are still ignorant. We can, by crossing, vary the forms of cattle with astonishing nicety; but we have no means of altering the nature of an animal once born, by means of treatment and feeding. This power, however, is undeniably possessed by the bees. When the queen bee is lost by death or otherwise, they choose a grub from among those which are born for workers; they make three cells into one, and placing the grub there, they build a tube round it; they afterwards build another cell of a pyramidal form, into which the grub grows; they feed it with peculiar food, and

tend it with extreme care. It becomes, when transformed from the worm to the fly, not a worker, but a queen bee.

These singular insects resemble our own species in one of our worst propensities, the disposition to war; but their attention to their sovereign is equally extraordinary, though of a somewhat capricious kind. In a few hours after their queen is lost, the whole hive is in a state of confusion. A singular humming is heard, and the bees are seen moving all over the surface of the combs with great rapidity. The news spreads quickly, and when the queen is restored, quiet immediately succeeds. But if another queen is put upon them, they instantly discover the trick, and, surrounding her, they either suffocate or starve her to death. This happens if the false queen is introduced within a few hours after the first is lost or removed; but if twenty-four hours have elapsed, they will receive any queen and obey her.

The labours and the policy of the *Ants* are, when closely examined, still more wonderful, perhaps, than those of the *Bees*. Their nest is a city consisting of dwelling-places, halls, streets, and squares into which the streets open. The food they principally like is the honey which comes from another insect found in their neighbourhood, and which they, generally speaking, bring home from day to day as they want it. Late discoveries have shown that they do not eat grain, but live almost entirely on animal food and this honey. Some kinds of ants have the foresight to bring home the insects on whose honey they feed, and keep them in particular cells, where they guard them to prevent their escaping, and feed them with proper vegetable matter which they do not eat themselves. Nay, they obtain the eggs of those insects, and superintend their hatching, and then rear the young insect until he becomes capable of supplying the desired honey. They sometimes remove them to the strongest

parts of their nest, where there are cells apparently fortified for protecting them from invasion. In those cells the insects are kept to supply the wants of the whole ants which compose the population of the city. It is a most singular circumstance in the economy of nature, that the degree of cold at which the ant becomes torpid is also that at which this insect falls into the same state. It is considerably below the freezing-point; so that they require food the greater part of the winter, and if the insects on which they depend for food were not kept alive during the cold in which the ants can move about, the latter would be without the means of subsistence.

How trifling soever this little animal may appear in our climate, there are few more formidable creatures than the ant of some tropical countries. A traveller, who lately filled a high station in the French government, Mr. Malouet, has described one of their cities, and, were not the account confirmed by various testimonies, it might seem exaggerated. He observed at a great distance what seemed a lofty structure, and was informed by his guide that it consisted of an ant-hill, which could not be approached without danger of being devoured. Its height was from fifteen to twenty feet, and its base thirty or forty feet square. Its sides inclined like the lower part of a pyramid, the point being cut off. He was informed that it became necessary to destroy these nests, by raising a sufficient force to dig a trench all round, and fill it with fagots, which were afterwards set on fire; and then battering with cannon from a distance, to drive the insects out and make them run into the flames. This was in South America; and African travellers have met them in the same formidable numbers and strength.

The older writers of books upon the habits of some animals abound with stories which may be of doubtful credit. But the facts now stated, respecting the Ant and Bee, may be relied on as authentic. They are the

result of very late observations, and experiments made with great accuracy by several most worthy and intelligent men; and the greater part of them have the confirmation arising from more than one observer having assisted in the inquiries.* The habits of *Beavers* are equally well authenticated, and, being more easily observed, are vouched by a greater number of witnesses. These animals, as if to enable them to live and move either on land or water, have two web-feet like those of ducks or water-dogs, and two like those of land animals. When they wish to construct a dwelling-place, or rather city, for it serves the whole body, they choose a level ground with a stream running through it; they then dam up the stream so as to make a pond, and perform the operation as skilfully as we could ourselves. Next they drive into the ground stakes of five or six feet long in rows, wattling each row with twigs, and puddling or filling the interstices with clay, which they ram close in, so as to make the whole solid and water-tight. This dam is likewise shaped on the truest principles; for the upper side next the water slopes, and the side below is perpendicular; the base of the dam is ten or twelve feet thick; the top or narrow part two or three, and it is sometimes as long as one hundred feet.† The

* A singular circumstance occasioned this in the case of Mr. Huber, by far the most eminent of these naturalists: he was quite blind, and performed all his experiments by means of assistants.

† If the base is twelve, and the top three feet thick, and the height six feet, the face must be the side of a right-angled triangle whose height is eight feet. This would be the exact proportion which there ought to be, upon mathematical principles, to give the greatest resistance possible to the water in its tendency to turn the dam round, provided the materials of which it is made were lighter than water in the proportion of 44 to 100. But the materials are probably more than twice as heavy as water, and the form of so flat a dike is taken, in all likelihood, in order to guard against a more imminent danger—that of the dam being carried away by being shoved forwards. We cannot calculate what the proportions are which give the greatest possible resistance to this tendency, without knowing the tenacity of the materials, as well as their specific gravity. It may very probably be found that the construction is such as to secure the most completely against the two pressures at the same time.

pond being thus formed and secured, they make their houses round the edge of it; they are cells, with vaulted roofs, and upon piles: they are made of stones, earth, and sticks; the walls are two feet thick, and plastered as neatly as if the trowel had been used. Sometimes they have two or three storeys for retreating to in case of floods; and they always have two doors, one towards the water and one towards the land. They keep their winter provisions in stores, and bring them out to use; they make their beds of moss; they live on the bark of trees, gum, and crawfish. Each house holds from twenty to thirty, and there may be from ten to twenty-five houses in all. Some of their communities are larger than others, but there are seldom fewer than two or three hundred inhabitants. In working they all bear their shares; some gnaw the trees and branches with their teeth to form stakes and beams; others roll the pieces to the water; others, diving, make holes with their teeth to place the piles in; others collect and carry stones and clay; others beat and mix the mortar; and others carry it on their broad tails, and with these beat it and plaster it. Some superintend the rest, and make signals by sharp strokes with the tail, which are carefully attended to; the beavers hastening to the place where they are wanted to work, or to repair any hole made by the water, or to defend themselves or make their escape, when attacked by an enemy.

The fitness of different animals, by their bodily structure, to the circumstances in which they are found, presents an endless subject of curious inquiry and pleasing contemplation. Thus, the *Camel*, which lives in sandy deserts, has broad spreading hoofs to support him on the loose soil; and an apparatus in his body by which water is kept for many days, to be used when no moisture can be had. As this would be useless in the neighbourhood of streams or wells, and as it would be equally so in the desert, where no water is to

be found, there can be no doubt that it is intended to assist in journeying across the sands from one watered spot to another. There is a singular and beautiful provision made in this animal's foot, for enabling it to sustain the fatigue of journeys under the pressure of its great weight. Besides the yielding of the bones and ligaments, or bindings, which gives elasticity to the foot of the deer and other animals, there is in the Camel's foot, between the horny sole and the bones, a cushion, like a ball, of soft matter, almost fluid, but in which there is a mass of threads extremely elastic, interwoven with the pulpy substance. The cushion thus easily changes its shape when pressed, yet it has such an elastic spring, that the bones of the foot press on it uninjured by the heavy body which they support, and this huge animal steps as softly as a cat.

Nor need we flee to the desert in order to witness an example of skilful structure: the limbs of the *Horse* display it strikingly. The bones of the foot are not placed directly under the weight; if they were in an upright position, they would make a firm pillar, and every motion would cause a shock. They are placed slanting or oblique, and tied together by an elastic binding on their lower surfaces, so as to form springs as exact as those which we make of leather and steel for carriages. Then the flatness of the hoof, which stretches out on each side, and the frog coming down in the middle between the quarters, adds greatly to the elasticity of the machine. Ignorant of this, ill-informed farriers nail the shoe in such a manner as to fix the quarters, and cause permanent contraction of the bones, ligaments, and hoof—so that the elasticity is destroyed; every step is a shock; inflammation and lameness ensue.*

The *Rein-deer* inhabits a country covered with snow

* Mr. Bracey Clarke has contrived an expanding shoe, which, by a joint in front, opens and contracts so as to obviate the evils of the common process.

the greater part of the year. Observe how admirably its hoof is formed for going over that cold and light substance, without sinking in it or being frozen. The under side is covered entirely with hair, of a warm and close texture; and the hoof, altogether, is very broad, acting exactly like the snow-shoes which men have constructed for giving them a larger space to stand on than their feet, and thus avoid sinking. Moreover, the deer spreads the hoof as wide as possible when it touches the ground: but, as this breadth would be inconvenient in the air, by occasioning a greater resistance while he is moving along, no sooner does he lift the hoof than the two parts into which it is cloven fall together, and so lessen the surface exposed to the air, just as we may recollect the birds doing with their bodies and wings. The shape and structure of the hoof are also well adapted to scrape away the snow, and enable the animal to get at the particular kind of moss (or *lichen*) on which he feeds. This plant, unlike others, is in its full growth during the winter season; and the Rein-deer accordingly thrives, from its abundance, at the season of his greatest use to man, notwithstanding the unfavourable effects of extreme cold upon the animal system.

There are some insects, of which the males have wings, and the females are grubs or worms. Of these, the *Glow-worm* is the most remarkable: it is the female, and the male is a fly, which would be unable to find her out, creeping as she does in the dark lanes, but for the shining light which she gives to attract him.

There is a singular fish found in the Mediterranean, called the *Nautilus*, from its skill in navigation. The back of its shell resembles the hulk of a ship; on this it throws itself, and spreads two thin membranes to serve for two sails, paddling itself on with its feet or feelers, as oars.

The *Ostrich* lays and hatches her eggs in the sands: her form being ill-adapted for sitting on them, she has

a natural oven furnished by the sand, and the strong heat of the sun. The *Cuckoo* is known to build no nest for herself, but to lay in the nests of other birds; but late observations show that she does not lay indiscriminately in the nests of all birds; she only chooses the nests of those which have bills of the same kind with herself, and therefore feed on the same kind of food. The *Duck*, and other birds breeding in muddy places, have a peculiar formation of the bill: it is both made so as to act like a strainer, separating the finer from the grosser parts of the liquid, and it is more furnished with nerves near the point than the bills of birds which feed on substances more exposed to the light; so that being more sensitive, it serves better to grope in the dark stream for food. The bill of the *Snipe* is covered with a curious network of nerves for the same purpose; but the most singular provision of this kind is observed in a bird called the *Toucan*, or *Egg-sucker*, which chiefly feeds on the eggs found in birds' nests, and in countries where these are very deep and dark. Its bill is broad and long; when examined, it appears completely covered with branches of nerves in all directions; so that, by groping in a deep and dark nest it can feel its way as accurately as the finest and most delicate finger could. Almost all kinds of birds build their nests of materials found where they inhabit, or use the nests of other birds; but the *Swallow of Java* lives in rocky caverns on the sea, where there are no materials at all for the purpose of building. It is therefore so formed as to secrete in its body a kind of slime with which it makes a nest, much prized as a delicate food in Eastern countries.

Plants, in many remarkable instances, are provided for by equally wonderful and skilful contrivances. There is one, the *Muscipula*, *Fly-trap*, or *Fly-catcher*, which has small prickles in the inside of two leaves, or half leaves, joined by a hinge; a juice or syrup is provided on their inner surface, which acts as

a bait to allure flies. There are several small spines or prickles standing upright in this syrup, and upon the only part of each leaf that is sensitive to the touch. When the fly, therefore, settles upon this part, its touching, as it were, the spring of the trap, occasions the leaves to shut and kill and squeeze the insect; whose juices and the air arising from their rotting serve as food to the plant.

In the West Indies, and in other hot countries of South America, where rain sometimes does not fall for a great length of time, a kind of plant called the *Will-pine* grows upon the branches of the trees, and also on the bark of the trunk. It has hollow or bag-like leaves so formed as to make little reservoirs of water, the rain falling into them through channels which close at the top when full, and prevent it from evaporating. The seed of this useful plant has small floating threads, by which, when carried through the air, it catches any tree in the way, and falls on it and grows. Wherever it takes root, though on the under side of a bough, it grows straight upwards, otherwise the leaves would not hold water. It holds in one leaf from a pint to a quart; and although it must be of great use to the trees it grows on, to birds and other animals its use is even greater.

“When we find these pines,” says Dampier, the famous navigator, “we stick our knives into the leaves just above the root, and the water gushing out, we catch it in our hats, as I myself have frequently done to my great relief.”

Another tree, called the *Water-with*, in Jamaica, has similar uses: it is like a vine in size and shape, and though growing in parched districts, is yet so full of clear sap or water, that by cutting a piece two or three yards long, and merely holding it to the mouth, a plentiful draught is obtained. In the East there is a plant somewhat of the same kind, called the *Bejuco*, which grows near other trees and twines round them,

with its end hanging downwards, but so full of juice, that, on cutting it, a good stream of water spouts from it; and this, not only by the stalk touching the tree so closely must refresh it, but affords a supply to animals, and to the weary herdsman on the mountains. Another plant, the *Nepenthes distillatoria*, is found in the same regions, with a yet more singular structure. It has natural mugs or tankards hanging from its leaves, and holding each from a pint to a quart of very pure water. Two singular provisions are to be marked in this vegetable. There grows over the mouth of the tankard, a leaf nearly its size and shape, like a lid or cover, which prevents evaporation from the sun's rays; and the water that fills the tankard is perfectly sweet and clear, although the ground in which the plant grows is a marsh of the most muddy and unwholesome kind. The process of vegetation filtrates or distils the liquid, so as to produce from the worst, the purest water.* The *Palo de Vaca*, or cow-tree, grows in South America, upon the most dry and rocky soil, and in a climate where for months not a drop of rain falls. On piercing the trunk, however, a sweet and nourishing milk is obtained, which the natives gladly receive in large bowls. If some plants thus furnish drink, where it might least be expected, others prepare, as it were, in the desert, the food of man in abundance. A single *Tapioca* tree is said to afford, from its pith, the whole sustenance of several men for a season.

V. ADVANTAGES AND PLEASURES OF SCIENCE.

AFTER the many instances or samples which have now been given of the nature and objects of Natural Science, we might proceed to a different field, and describe in the same way the other grand branch of human knowledge, that which teaches the properties

* A specimen of this curious plant, though of a small size, is to be found in the fine collection at Wentworth, reared by Mr. Cooper.

or habits of *Mind*—the *intellectual faculties* of man, or the powers of his understanding, by which he perceives, imagines, remembers, and reasons;—his *moral faculties*, or the feelings and passions which influence him; and, lastly, as a conclusion or result drawn from the whole, his *duties* both towards himself as an individual, and towards others as a member of society: which last head opens to our view the whole doctrines of *political science*, including the nature of *governments*, of *policy*, and generally of *laws*. But we shall abstain at present from entering at all upon this field, and shall now take up the subject more particularly pointed at through the course of the foregoing observations, and to illustrate which they have been framed, namely,—the Use and Pleasure of Scientific Studies.

Man is composed of two parts, body and mind, connected indeed together, but wholly different from one another. The nature of the union—the part of our outward and visible frame in which it is peculiarly formed—or whether the soul be indeed connected or not with any particular portion of the body, so as to reside there—are points as yet wholly hid from our knowledge, and which are likely to remain for ever concealed. But this we know, as certainly as we can know any truth, that there is such a thing as the *Mind*; and that we have at the least as good proof of its existence, independent of the Body, as we have of the existence of the Body itself. Each has its uses, and each has its peculiar gratifications. The bounty of Providence has given us outward senses to be employed, and has furnished the means of gratifying them in various kind, and in ample measure. As long as we only taste those pleasures according to the rules of prudence and of our duty, that is, in moderation for our own sakes, and in harmlessness towards our neighbours, we fulfil rather than thwart the purpose of our being. But the same bountiful Providence has endowed us with the higher nature

also—with understandings as well as with senses—with faculties that are of a more exalted order, and admit of more refined enjoyments, than any to which the bodily fame can minister; and by pursuing such gratifications, rather than those of mere sense, we fulfil the most exalted ends of our creation, and obtain both a present and a future reward. These things are often said, but they are not therefore the less true or the less worthy of deep attention. Let us mark their practical application to the occupations and enjoyments of all branches of society, beginning with those who form the great bulk of every community, the working classes, by what names soever their vocations may be called—professions, arts, trades, handicrafts, or common labour.

1. The first object of every man who has to depend upon his own exertions must needs be to provide for his daily wants. This is a high and important office; it deserves his utmost attention; it includes some of his most sacred duties, both to himself, his kindred, and his country; and although in performing this task, he is only influenced by a regard to his own interest, or by his necessities, yet it is an employment which renders him truly the best benefactor of the community he belongs to. All other pursuits must give way to this; the hours which he devotes to learning must be after he has done his work; his independence, without which he is not fit to be called a man, requires first of all that he should have insured for himself, and those dependent on him, a comfortable subsistence before he can have a right to taste any indulgence, either of his senses or of his mind; and the more he learns—the greater progress he makes in the sciences—the more will he value that independence, and the more will he prize the industry, the habits of regular labour, whereby he is enabled to secure so prime a blessing.

In one view, it is true, the progress which he makes

in science may help his ordinary exertions, the main business of every man's life. There is hardly any trade or occupation in which useful lessons may not be learnt by studying one science or another. The necessity of science to the more liberal professions is self-evident; little less manifest is the use to their members of extending their knowledge beyond the branches of study with which their several pursuits are peculiarly conversant. But the other departments of industry derive hardly less benefit from the same source. To how many kinds of workmen must a knowledge of Mechanical Philosophy be useful! To how many others does Chemistry prove almost necessary! Every one must with a glance perceive that to engineers, watch-makers, instrument-makers, bleach-ers, and dyers, those sciences are most useful, if not necessary. But carpenters and masons are surely likely to do their work better for knowing how to measure, which Practical Mathematics teaches them, and how to estimate the strength of timber, of walls, and of arches, which they learn from Practical Mechanics; and they who work in various metals are certain to be the more skilful in their trades for knowing the nature of those substances, and their relations to both heat and other metals, and to the airs and liquids they come in contact with. Nay, the farm servant, or day-labourer, whether in his master's employ, or tending the concerns of his own cottage, must derive great practical benefit,—must be both a better servant, and a more thrifty, and therefore comfortable cottager, for knowing something of the nature of soils and manures, which Chemistry teaches, and something of the habits of animals, and the qualities and growth of plants, which he learns from Natural History and Chemistry together. In truth, though a man be neither mechanic nor peasant, but only having a pot to boil, he is sure to learn from science lessons which will enable him to cook his

morsel better, save his fuel, and both vary his dish and improve it. The art of good and cheap cookery is intimately connected with the principles of chemical philosophy, and has received much and will yet receive more, improvement from their application. Nor is it enough to say, that philosophers may discover all that is wanted, and may invent practical methods, which it is sufficient for the working man to learn by rote without knowing the principles. He never will work so well if he is ignorant of the principles; and for a plain reason:—if he only learn his lesson by rote, the least change of circumstances puts him out. Be the method ever so general, cases will always arise in which it must be varied in order to apply; and if the workman only knows the rule without knowing the reason, he must be at fault the moment he is required to make any new application of it. This, then, is the *first* use of learning the principles of science: it makes men more skilful, expert, and useful in the particular kinds of work by which they are to earn their bread, and by which they are to make it go far and taste well when earned.

2. But another use of such knowledge to handicraftsmen is equally obvious: it gives every man a chance, according to his natural talents, of becoming an improver of the art he works at, and even a discoverer in the sciences connected with it. He is daily handling the tools and materials with which new experiments are to be made: and daily witnessing the operations of nature, whether in the motions and pressures of bodies, or in their chemical actions on each other. All opportunities of making experiments must be unimproved, all appearances must pass unobserved, if he has no knowledge of the principles; but with this knowledge he is more likely than another person to strike out something new which may be useful in art, or curious or interesting in science. Very few great discoveries have been made by chance and by ignorant persons,

much fewer than is generally supposed. It is commonly told of the steam engine, that an idle boy being employed to stop and open a valve, saw that he could save himself the trouble of attending and watching it, by fixing a plug upon a part of the machine which came to the place at the proper times, in consequence of the general movement. This is possible, no doubt; though nothing very certain is known respecting the origin of the story; but improvements of any value are very seldom indeed so easily found out, and hardly another instance can be named of important discoveries so purely accidental. They are generally made by persons of competent knowledge, and who are in search of them. The improvements of the Steam engine by Watt resulted from the most learned investigation of mathematical, mechanical, and chemical truths. Arkwright devoted many years, five at the least, to his invention of spinning-jennies, and he was a man perfectly conversant in everything that relates to the construction of machinery; he had minutely examined it, and knew the effects of each part, though he had not received anything like a scientific education. If he had, we should in all probability have been indebted to him for scientific discoveries as well as practical improvements. The most beautiful and useful invention of late times, the Safety-lamp, was the reward of a series of philosophical experiments made by one thoroughly skilled in every branch of chemical science. The new process of Refining Sugar, by which more money has been made in a shorter time, and with less risk and trouble, than was ever perhaps gained from an invention, was discovered by a most accomplished chemist,* and was the fruit of a long course of experiments, in the progress of which, known philosophical principles were constantly applied, and one or two new principles ascertained. But in so far as chance

* Edward Howard, brother of the Duke of Norfolk.

has anything to do with discovery, surely it is worth the while of those who are constantly working in particular employments to obtain the knowledge required, because their chances are greater than other people's of so applying that knowledge as to hit upon new and useful ideas: they are always in the way of perceiving what is wanting, or what is amiss in the old methods; and they have a better chance of making the improvements. In a word, to use a common expression, they are in the way of good luck; and if they possess the requisite information, they can take advantage of it when it comes to them. This, then, is the *second* great use of learning the sciences: it enables men to make improvements in the arts, and discoveries in philosophy, which may directly benefit themselves and mankind.

3. Now, these are the *practical* advantages of learning; but the *third* benefit is, when rightly considered, just as practical as the other two—the pleasure derived from mere knowledge, without any view to our own bodily enjoyments: and this applies to all classes, the idle as well as the industrious, if, indeed, it be not peculiarly applicable to those who enjoy the inestimable blessing of having time at their command. Every man is by nature endowed with the power of gaining knowledge; and the taste for it, the capacity to be pleased with it, forms equally a part of the natural constitution of his mind. It is his own fault, or the fault of his education, if he derives no gratification from it. There is a satisfaction in knowing what others know—in not being more ignorant than those we live with: there is a satisfaction in knowing what others do not know—in being more informed than they are. But this is quite independent of the pure pleasure of knowledge—of gratifying a curiosity implanted in us by Providence, to lead us towards the better understanding of the universe in which our lot is cast, and the nature wherewithal we are clothed.

That every man is capable of being delighted with extending his information upon matters of science will be evident from a few plain considerations.

Reflect how many parts of the reading, even of persons ignorant of all sciences, refer to matters wholly unconnected with any interest or advantage to be derived from the knowledge acquired. Every one is amused with reading a story : a romance may divert some, and a fairy tale may entertain others ; but no benefit beyond the amusement is derived from this source : the imagination is gratified ; and we willingly spend a good deal of time and a little money in this gratification, rather than in resting after fatigue, or in any other bodily indulgence. So we read a newspaper, without any view to the advantage we are to gain from learning the news, but because it interests and amuses us to know what is passing. One object, no doubt, is to become acquainted with matters relating to the welfare of the country ; but we also read the occurrences which do little or not all regard the public interests, and we take a pleasure in reading them. Accidents, adventures, anecdotes, crimes, and a variety of other things amuse us, independent of the information respecting public affairs, in which we feel interested as citizens of the state, or as members of a particular body. It is of little importance to inquire how and why these things excite our attention, and wherefore the reading about them is a pleasure ; the fact is certain ; and it proves clearly that there is a positive enjoyment in knowing what we did not know before ; and this pleasure is greatly increased when the information is such as excites our surprise, wonder, or admiration. Most persons who take delight in reading tales of ghosts, which they know to be false, and feel all the while to be silly in the extreme, are merely gratified, or rather occupied with the strong emotions of horror excited by the momentary belief, for it can only last an instant. Such reading is a degrading

waste of precious time, and has even a bad effect upon the feelings and the judgment.* But true stories of horrid crimes, as murders, and pitiable misfortunes, as shipwrecks, are not much more instructive. It may be better to read these than to sit yawning and idle—much better than to sit drinking or gaming, which, when carried to the least excess, are crimes in themselves, and the fruitful parents of many more. But this is nearly as much as can be said for such vain and unprofitable reading. If it be a pleasure to gratify curiosity, to know what we were ignorant of, to have our feelings of wonder called forth, how pure a delight of this very kind does Natural Science hold out to its students! Recollect some of the extraordinary discoveries of Mechanical Philosophy. How wonderful are the laws that regulate the motions of fluids! Is there anything in all the idle books of tales and horrors more truly astonishing than the fact, that a few pounds of water may, by mere pressure, without any machinery—by merely being placed in a particular way, produce an irresistible force? What can be more strange, than that an ounce weight, should balance hundreds of pounds, by the intervention of a few bars of thin iron? Observe the extraordinary truths which Optical Science discloses. Can anything surprise us more, than to find that the colour of white is a mixture of all others—that red, and blue, and green, and all the rest, merely by being blended in certain proportions, form what we had fancied rather to be no colour at all, than all colours together? Chemistry is not behind in its wonders. That the diamond should be made of the same material with coal; that water should be chiefly composed of an

* *Children's books* have at all times been made upon the pernicious plan of exciting wonder, generally horror, at whatever risk. The folly and misery occasioned by this error, it would be difficult to estimate. The time may come when it will be felt and understood. At present, the inveterate habits of parents and nurses prevent the children from benefiting by the excellent lessons of Mrs. Barbauld and Miss Edgeworth.

inflammable substance; that acids should be, for the most part, formed of different kinds of air, and that one of those acids, whose strength can dissolve almost any of the metals, should consist of the self-same ingredients with the common air we breathe; that salts should be of a metallic nature, and composed, in great part, of metals, fluid like quicksilver, but lighter than water, and which, without any heating, take fire upon being exposed to the air, and by burning, form the substance so abounding in saltpetre and in the ashes of burnt wood: these, surely, are things to excite the wonder of any reflecting mind—nay, of any one but little accustomed to reflect. And yet these are trifling when compared to the prodigies which Astronomy opens to our view: the enormous masses of the heavenly bodies; their immense distances; their countless numbers, and their motions, whose swiftness mocks the uttermost efforts of the imagination.

Akin to this pleasure of contemplating new and extraordinary truths, is the gratification of a more learned curiosity, by tracing resemblances and relations between things, which, to common apprehension, seem widely different. Mathematical science, to thinking minds affords this pleasure in a high degree. It is agreeable to know that the three angles of every triangle, whatever be its size, howsoever its sides may be inclined to each other, are always, of necessity, when taken together, the same in amount: that any regular kind of figure whatever, upon the one side of a right-angled triangle, is equal to the two figures of the same kind upon the two other sides, whatever be the size of the triangle: that the properties of an oval curve are extremely similar to those of a curve which appears the least like it of any, consisting of two branches of infinite extent, with their backs turned to each other. To trace such unexpected resemblances is, indeed, the object of all philosophy; and experimental science, in particular, is occupied with such

investigations, giving us general views, and enabling us to explain the appearances of nature, that is, to show how one appearance is connected with another. But we are now considering only the gratification derived from learning these things. It is surely a satisfaction, for instance, to know that the same thing, or motion, or whatever it is, which causes the sensation of heat, causes also fluidity, and expands bodies in all directions; that electricity, the light which is seen on the back of a cat when slightly rubbed on a frosty evening, is the very same matter with the lightning of the clouds;—that plants breathe like ourselves, but differently by day and by night;—that the air which burns in our lamps enables a balloon to mount, and causes the globules of the dust of plants to rise, float through the air, and continue their race—in a word, is the immediate cause of vegetation. Nothing can at first view appear less like, or less likely to be caused by the same thing, than the processes of burning and of breathing,—the rust of metals and burning,—an acid and rust,—the influence of a plant on the air it grows in by night, and of an animal on the same air at any time, nay, and of a body burning in that air; and yet all these are the same operation. It is an undeniable fact, that the very same thing which makes the fire burn, makes metals rust, forms acids, and enables plants and animals to breathe; that these operations, so unlike to common eyes, when examined by the light of science are the same,—the rusting of metals,—the formation of acids,—the burning of inflammable bodies,—the breathing of animals,—and the growth of plants by night. To know this is a positive gratification. Is it not pleasing to find the same substance in various situations extremely unlike each other;—to meet with fixed air as the produce of burning, of breathing, and of vegetation;—to find that it is the choke-damp of mines, the bad air in the grotto at Naples, the cause of death in neglecting brewers'

vats, and of the brisk and acid flavour of Seltzer and other mineral springs? Nothing can be less like than the working of a vast steam engine, of the old construction, and the crawling of a fly upon the window. Yet we find that these two operations are performed by the same means, the weight of the atmosphere, and that a sea-horse climbs the ice-hills by no other power. Can anything be more strange to contemplate? Is there in all the fairy tales that ever were fancied anything more calculated to arrest the attention and to occupy and to gratify the mind, than this most unexpected resemblance between things so unlike to the eyes of ordinary beholders? What more pleasing occupation than to see uncovered and bared before our eyes the very instrument and the process by which Nature works? Then we raise our views to the structure of the heavens; and are again gratified with tracing accurate but most unexpected resemblances. Is it not in the highest degree interesting to find, that the power which keeps this earth in its shape, and in its path, wheeling upon its axis and round the sun, extends over all the other worlds that compose the universe, and gives to each its proper place and motion; that this same power keeps the moon in her path round our earth, and our earth in its path round the sun, and each planet in its path; that the same power causes the tides upon our globe, and the peculiar form of the globe itself; and that, after all, it is the same power which makes a stone fall to the ground? To learn these things, and to reflect upon them, occupies the faculties, fills the mind, and produces certain as well as pure gratification.

But if the knowledge of the doctrines unfolded by science is pleasing, so is the being able to trace the steps by which those doctrines are investigated, and their truth demonstrated: indeed you cannot be said, in any sense of the word, to have learnt them, or to know them, if you have not so studied them as to per-

ceive how they are proved. Without this you never can expect to remember them long, or to understand them accurately; and that would of itself be reason enough for examining closely the grounds they rest on. But there is the highest gratification of all, in being able to see distinctly those grounds, so as to be satisfied that a belief in the doctrines is well founded. Hence to follow a demonstration of a grand mathematical truth—to perceive how clearly and how inevitably one step succeeds another, and how the whole steps lead to the conclusion—to observe how certainly and unerringly the reasoning goes on from things perfectly self-evident, and by the smallest addition at each step, every one being as easily taken after the one before as the first step of all was, and yet the result being something not only far from self-evident, but so general and strange, that you can hardly believe it to be true, and are only convinced of it by going over the whole reasoning—this operation of the understanding, to those who so exercise themselves, always affords the highest delight. The contemplation of experimental inquiries, and the examination of reasoning founded upon the facts which our experiments and observations disclose, is another fruitful source of enjoyment, and no other means can be devised for either imprinting the results upon our memory, or enabling us really to enjoy the whole pleasures of science. They who found the study of some branches dry and tedious at the first, have generally become more and more interested as they went on; each difficulty overcome gives an additional relish to the pursuit, and makes us feel, as it were, that we have by our work and labour established a right of property in the subject. Let any man pass an evening in vacant idleness, or even in reading some silly tale, and compare the state of his mind when he goes to sleep or gets up next morning with its state some other day when he has passed a few hours in going through the proofs, by facts and reasoning, of

some of the great doctrines in Natural Science, learning truths wholly new to him, and satisfying himself by careful examination of the grounds on which known truths rest, so as to be not only acquainted with the doctrines themselves, but able to show why he believes them, and to prove before others that they are true;—he will find as great a difference as can exist in the same being,—the difference between looking back upon time unprofitably wasted, and time spent in self-improvement: he will feel himself in the one case listless and dissatisfied, in the other comfortable and happy: in the one case, if he do not appear to himself humbled, at least he will not have earned any claim to his own respect; in the other case, he will enjoy a proud consciousness of having, by his own exertions, become a wiser, and therefore a more exalted creature.

To pass our time in the study of the sciences, in learning what others have discovered, and in extending the bounds of human knowledge, has, in all ages, been reckoned the most dignified and happy of human occupations; and the name of Philosopher, or Lover of Wisdom, is given to those who lead such a life. But it is by no means necessary that a man should do nothing else than study known truths, and explore new, in order to earn this high title. Some of the greatest philosophers, in all ages, have been engaged in the pursuits of active life; and an assiduous devotion of the bulk of our time to the work which our condition requires, is an important duty, and indicates the possession of practical wisdom. This, however, does by no means hinder us from applying the rest of our time, beside what nature requires for meals and rest, to the study of science; and he who, in whatever station his lot may be cast, works his day's work, and improves his mind in the evening, as well as he who, placed above such necessity, prefers the refined and elevating pleasures of knowledge to the low gratification of the senses, richly deserves the name of a True Philosopher.

One of the most delightful treats which science affords us is the knowledge of the extraordinary powers with which the human mind is endowed. No man, until he has studied philosophy, can have a just idea of the great things for which Providence has fitted his understanding—the extraordinary disproportion which there is between his natural strength and the powers of his mind and the force he derives from them. When we survey the marvellous truths of Astronomy, we are first of all lost in the feeling of immense space, and of the comparative insignificance of this globe and its inhabitants. But there soon arises a sense of gratification and of new wonder at perceiving how so insignificant a creature has been able to reach such a knowledge of the unbounded system of the universe—to penetrate, as it were, through all space, and become familiar with the laws of nature at distances so enormous as to baffle our imagination—to be able to say, not merely that the Sun has 329,630 times the quantity of matter which our globe has, Jupiter $308\frac{9}{10}$, and Saturn $93\frac{1}{2}$ times; but that a pound of lead weighs at the Sun 22 lbs. 15 ozs. 16 dwts. 8 grs. and $\frac{3}{4}$ of a grain! at Jupiter 2 lbs. 1 oz. 19 dwts. 1 gr. $\frac{20}{3}$; and at Saturn 1 lb. 3 ozs. 8 dwts. 20 grs. $\frac{1}{11}$ part of a grain! And what is far more wonderful, to discover the laws by which the whole of this vast system is held together and maintained through countless ages in perfect security and order. It is surely no mean reward of our labour to become acquainted with the prodigious genius of those who have almost exalted the nature of man above its destined sphere, when, admitted to a fellowship with these loftier minds, we discover how it comes to pass that, by universal consent, they hold a station apart, rising over all the Great Teachers of mankind, and spoken of reverently, as if NEWTON and LAPLACE were not the names of mortal men.

The highest of all our gratifications in the contem-

plations of science remains; we are raised by them to an understanding of the infinite wisdom and goodness which the Creator has displayed in his works. Not a step can we take in any direction without perceiving the most extraordinary traces of design; and the skill everywhere conspicuous is calculated, in so vast a proportion of instances, to promote the happiness of living creatures, and especially of our own kind, that we can feel no hesitation in concluding that, if we knew the whole scheme of Providence, every part would be found in harmony with a plan of absolute benevolence. Independently, however, of this most consoling inference, the delight is inexpressible of being able to follow, as it were, with our eyes, the marvellous works of the Great Architect of Nature—to trace the unbounded power and exquisite skill which are exhibited in the most minute, as well as the mightiest parts of his system. The pleasure derived from this study is unceasing, and so various, that it never tires the appetite. But it is unlike the low gratifications of sense in another respect: while those hurt the health, debase the understanding, and corrupt the feelings, this elevates and refines our nature, teaching us to look upon all earthly objects as insignificant, and below our notice, except the pursuit of knowledge, and the cultivation of virtue; and giving a dignity and importance to the enjoyment of life, which the frivolous and the grovelling cannot even comprehend.

Let us, then, conclude, that the Pleasures of Science go hand in hand with the solid benefits derived from it; that they tend, unlike other gratifications, not only to make our lives more agreeable, but better; and that a rational being is bound by every motive of interest and of duty, to direct his mind towards pursuits which are found to be the sure path of Virtue as well as of Happiness.

DISCOURSE
OF THE
OBJECTS, PLEASURES, AND ADVANTAGES
OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE.

DISCOURSE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

THE Sciences which form the subject of our most useful study, and which, next to the cultivation of religion and the practice of virtue, are the source of our purest enjoyments in this world, may be divided into three great classes or branches, according to their several objects. Those objects are—the Relations of Abstract Ideas—the Properties of Matter—the Qualities of Mind. All the subjects of scientific research may be classed under one or other of these three heads; and all the sciences may, accordingly, be ranged under one or other branch of a corresponding threefold division.

To the first branch belong the abstract ideas of quantity—that is, of space in its different forms and portions; and of these the science of Geometry treats;—the abstract ideas of number, which form the subject of Arithmetic, general or particular, the one called Algebra, the other Common Arithmetic, the comparison and classification of all ideas, generally, whether abstract or not, and whether relating to matter or mind; and this forms the subject of Logic, or the science of reasoning and classification.

The first branch deals with mere abstract ideas, and has no necessary reference to actual existences; these form the subjects of the other two, which, accordingly, do not, like the former, rest wholly upon reasoning, but depend upon experience also. The one branch relating to matter, its properties and motions,

is termed Physics,* or Natural Philosophy; the other, relating to the nature and affections of the mind, is termed Metaphysics or Psychology,† or Moral or Mental Philosophy.

Physical or Natural Philosophy is subdivided into various branches: one, for example, treating of weight and motion, is called Dynamics, or Mechanics and Statics; another, treating of the heavenly bodies, is termed Astronomy; another, of light, is termed Optics; another, of the qualities and composition of substances, called Chemistry; another, of the properties of living bodies, called Anatomy and Physiology; another, of the classification of substances and animals, called Natural History. To all of these accurate observation and experiment may be applied, and to some of them mathematical principles, by which extraordinary progress has been made in extending our knowledge of the laws of nature.

Moral or Mental Philosophy consists of two great subdivisions: one treating of the powers, faculties, and affections of the mind—that is, its intellectual as well as its moral or active powers—the faculties of the understanding and those of the will, or our appetites and feelings as well as our intellects—and this branch treats of all spiritual existences, from the Great First Cause, the Creator and Preserver of the universe, to the mind of man and his habits, and down to the faculties and the instincts of the lower animals. This division is sometimes called Psychology, when that phrase is not used for the whole of moral science. The other subdivision treats of our duties towards the Deity and towards our fellow-creatures, and is generally termed Ethics.‡ But perhaps the better and more correct division of the whole of Moral Philosophy is to consider it in two points of view—as it treats o

* From the Greek word signifying natural objects or qualities.

† From the Greek word signifying to discourse of the soul or mind.

‡ From the Greek for morals.

man in his individual capacity; and man as a member of society. This last branch is termed Political* Science, and forms the subject of the following Discourse.

We have already adverted to one important circumstance which distinguishes both the two branches of science which treat of actual existences from those which treat of abstract ideas and their relations. The truths of both Natural and Moral Philosophy differ from those of abstract science in this important particular, that they partly depend on experience and not exclusively on reasoning; they are contingent, and not necessary; the world, moral and material, might have been so constructed as to render untrue all things now known to be true respecting it; whereas the truths of abstract science, arithmetic for example, are independent of all contingencies, and do not result from any experience, and could not possibly have been different from what they are. It is easy to conceive a world in which bodies should attract each other by a wholly different law from that of gravitation; but we cannot form to ourselves the idea of any state of things in which two and two should not be equal to four, nor the three angles of a triangle equal to two right angles. It follows that, in the sciences both of matter and of mind, we must be content with evidence of an inferior kind to that which the mathematical sciences employ; and resting satisfied with as high a degree of probability as we can attain, must draw our practical conclusions with the hesitation which such a liability to error naturally prescribes.

The first, or abstract branch, is capable of application to the other two. The precision with which the qualities and the functions of matter are observable, and the ease with which these may be subjected to experiment, enable us to investigate them with great

* From the Greek for city or state—the different communities in Greece having originally been cities and their adjoining territories.

facility, and to draw our general conclusions with much certainty. But this power is greatly increased by the use of mathematical principles, which enable us to deduce general inferences from observed facts, the truth of which facts being admitted, those inferences follow as absolute and necessary, and not as matter of contingent truth. Thus the observations of astronomers show certain appearances of the heavenly bodies; the observations of mechanicians show certain things respecting falling bodies on our globe. But suppose the truth of such observations to be admitted, mathematical reasoning shows, without the possibility of error or of doubt, that the power of gravitation extends to the heavens, and that the planets wheel round the sun as their centre by the same power which makes a stone fall to the ground if unsupported. This inference is a certain and necessary truth, if the facts be true which our observation teaches; and such a mixture of necessary with contingent truths, forms a very large portion of Physics, or Natural Philosophy. But it is only in a few cases that we can obtain the aid of mathematical reasoning to render our inferences certain and necessary from facts observed in the science of mind, as it is also comparatively few observations and experiments that we are enabled to make upon its qualities. Hence there is a far less degree of certainty in this than we can attain in the physical sciences, and hence we ought to be doubly on our guard against dogmatism and intolerance of other men's opinions in all the departments of this less exact philosophy. The controversies which have oftentimes arisen among metaphysicians, strongly illustrate how little the positive dogmatism and exclusive intolerance of men holding one class of opinions towards those who held another, was in proportion to the degree of evidence upon which their inquiries proceeded. Mathematicians who run hardly any risk of error—naturalists who run but little more—have never been so bigoted

and so uncharitable as those whose speculations are fated to be always involved in more or less of doubt; and when we come to political reasoners, we find, beside the intolerance of metaphysicians, a new source of error and of fault in the excitement which the interests of men, real or supposed, lend to their passions.

It would, however, be an equally groundless and a very pernicious error to run from the extreme of dogmatism into the extreme of scepticism, and to suppose that because the evidence upon which our conclusions in moral science rest is inferior to the proofs of mathematical, and even of physical truth, therefore we cannot trust the deductions of ethical principles, or their applications to the affairs of men as members of political communities. The more nice and subtle points of metaphysical philosophy are those upon which the chief doubts prevail. Some portions of psychology are placed above the reach of the human faculties, as indeed are some of the more intimate qualities of matter; and it is eminently improbable that we shall ever be able to ascertain the essential nature of mind; but so no more are we ever likely to ascertain the ultimate cause of gravitation, or to penetrate into the laws which govern the primary combinations of material particles. Still, the more important, because the more practical, subjects of our inquiries into the nature of the human mind, the laws which govern man's habits as an individual, and the principles of human action upon which the structure of society and its movements depend, are not placed on such unapproachable heights. Within certain limits, safe conclusions can be drawn respecting these important matters. Facts may be observed, collected, and generalized, not, certainly, with the perfect accuracy which can be attained in the inductions of physical science, yet still with sufficient correctness to form the groundwork of safe practical inferences. General principles of Moral and Political Science may thus be established,

by reasoning upon the results of experience; and from those principles, rules for our guidance may be drawn, highly useful both in the regulation of the individual understanding, and in managing the concerns of communities of men. To deny that Morals and Politics may be reduced to a science, because the truths of Natural Philosophy rest upon more clear evidence and assume a more precise form, would be as absurd as to deny that experimental science is deserving of the name, because its proofs are more feeble, and its propositions less definite and less closely connected together than those of pure mathematics.

But it is more especially with Political Philosophy that we have now to do; and there are many reasons why its truths should be better capable of clear demonstration and of distinct statement than those of the other branches of Moral or Ethical Science.

1. In the first place, although each individual by his consciousness is continually in a situation that enables him to make observations on the human faculties by attending to the operations of his own mind, yet we know that hardly any habit is later acquired by the few who ever learn it at all, than the habit of turning the observation inwards, and making the mind the subject of its own contemplations. It is a process, indeed, which not one person in a hundred thousand ever thinks of undertaking. But the bulk of mankind are political observers. The operations of government, the habits and proceedings of the people, the conduct of communities, their fortunes and their fate, form the daily subject of reflection with all persons even of an ordinary degree of intelligence in every civilized country, and do not escape the observation of the bulk of the people, even in communities subject to such restraints from the structure of their governments, as to render the open discussion of such matters hardly possible in any class of society. Hence the observation of facts on political subjects is performed almost

universally at all times, whether these facts are collected and classified or not.

2. It follows, in the next place, that the appetite for knowledge of this description is far more generally diffused than for either moral or ethical knowledge; that numberless bodies of men in every country conceive themselves interested in political subjects, who would regard metaphysical speculations as wholly foreign to their concerns; and that there prevails everywhere a strong desire for such information, unless in places where misgovernment may have actually reduced the minds of the community to a state bordering upon the dulness and insensibility of the brute creation.

3. Thirdly. The facts on which Political Science rests are more plain, manifest, and tangible, than those which form the subject of Moral Philosophy in its other branches. Those facts are more obvious; they are perceptible in most cases to the senses; they are reducible to number and measure. The accumulation or diminution of public wealth,—the prosperity or suffering of the people,—the progress of population,—the quiet or disturbed state of a country,—the prevalence of one portion or order of a state over the others,—the effect of a particular form of government,—the changes consequent upon its altered structure; all these are matters of distinct observation, and most of them subject to exact calculation. But these, and such as these, are the facts upon which the doctrines of Political Science are grounded, and these doctrines are the results of reasoning upon such facts.

4. Fourthly. The mere facts themselves connected with political science are far more important and far more interesting than those on which the other branches of moral philosophy rest. The peculiar action of the intellectual faculties, or of the feelings and passions, is not a subject of great extent. All we know of it is soon told, and there is but little variety

in different individuals as far as it is concerned. Different characters may be described, and the history of individuals affords great entertainment, as well as the matter of much interesting reflection; but unless their actions are also comprehended in the narrative, the interest flags, and the story can scarcely go on; and those actions almost always come within the province of Political Science. The intellectual or moral habits of men as individuals, apart from their conduct, form a small and not an extremely interesting chapter in the history of man. But how different are those facts with which the political observer is concerned! The mere history of national affairs—the narrative of those public events which take place—the changes in the condition and fortunes of whole communities—their relations with each other, whether in peace or war—the rise and decay of great institutions affecting the welfare of millions—the progress of a policy upon which the happiness, nay, the very existence of whole nations depends—the varieties in the governments under which they live—the influence of those Governments upon the condition of the people—the effects which they produce upon their intercourse with other countries,—all these are subjects of most interesting contemplation in themselves, as mere facts, wholly independent of any general views to which they may lead, or of any practical conclusions which may be derived from them.

Mr. Hume has written an ingenious and a sound dissertation, to prove that Politics—meaning the branch which treats of the structure of governments—may be reduced to a science; and he illustrates this by deducing from Political History certain general principles which must at all times and in all circumstances hold true. But whether he be right or not, even if there were no means of drawing such strictly and universally true inferences, at least the importance of the facts which the political reasoner deals

with must be confessed, and the great interest which attaches to the mere knowledge of those facts cannot be doubted.

5. Lastly. We may observe that, the facts in question being of a public nature, and so known to the world at large, a better security is afforded for their being accurately observed and truly recorded. History, statistics, the narrative of public events, the details of national affairs,—these are the sources from which the political reasoner draws his facts. Established institutions, bodies of law, universally known customs, wars, treaties, the manifest state of the world in its various regions at different times,—these are the facts upon which the political philosopher reasons, which he generalizes, from which he draws his conclusions, on which he builds his systems. But we shall be the better able to appreciate the peculiar excellence of this study if we now take a survey of the science itself, and thus present, as it were, a map of it to the eye, with the natural limits and boundaries of the various provinces into which it is divided.

The great family of mankind dispersed over the earth occupy its various portions in various bodies or communities, each bound together by certain ties, and bearing in those portions a general resemblance to, or having distinctive features in which they differ from, the rest. These communities differ in their customs, character, and institutions; in their general circumstances and degree of civilization. The nature of their institutions,—of the various establishments for public purposes which exist for the management of their common affairs,—of the regimen under which and the rules by which the members of each community, whether compelled by force, or agreeing voluntarily, continue to live;—in a word, the Domestic Management of each state—forms the subject of the first great branch or province of Political Science. The second relates to the intercourse of different communities with

each other; the mutual relations of the different communities; the principles of rules established for their demeanour towards one another;—in a word, the external affairs of each state, but the national concerns of the whole considered as one general community, the members of which are not individuals, but separate states. The former province is called Domestic Policy—the latter, Foreign or International Policy.

Domestic Policy is subdivided into two branches.

Each community must be subject to some kind of rule, or regimen, or government; some force established for restraining the excesses of individuals, for preventing wrongs and creating and protecting rights, and for superintending those things which are necessary to the public security and conducive to the public benefit, but which, if left to individuals, never could be accomplished at all, and finally, for representing the community in its intercourse with other states. The nature of this rule or government differs in different countries from the accidents of events, and from the peculiarities of natural situation and of national character. The different forms of government,—the distribution in each state of the power by which its people are ruled,—the arrangements which result from these diversities,—their influence upon the security, improvement, comfort, and happiness of the people in each—are the facts from which the principles must be drawn which constitute the Science of Government.

This science, then, forming the first great subdivision of Domestic and National Polity, treats of two important matters,—first, the Principles relating to the establishment of all Government generally, and on which the establishment of the social relation, the formation of any connexion between the ruler and the people, depends; and, secondly, the principles relating to the distribution of power in different states,—in

other words, the different Constitutions or Forms of Government in different countries.

But there is another great subdivision of Domestic Polity, not inferior in importance to the former, and although intimately connected with it, yet easily distinguishable from it. The manner in which men manage their private concerns,—the course they pursue in their dealings with each other,—their way of exerting their industry for their subsistence, or comfort, or indulgence,—these proceedings may take place independent of the form of government under which they live; and, indeed, as no ruler has anything to do with them, if each government did its duty, these proceedings would go on nearly in the same way under all governments, and only be affected incidentally by the difference in the form of each. Although, therefore, the interference of governments directly, and their influence indirectly, may affect men's conduct of their own affairs, still the principles which regulate that conduct, and the effects resulting from it, form a subject of consideration evidently distinguishable from that of government. This subject, then, relates to the wealth, the population, the education, of the people; and the conduct of the government, in respect to these particulars, forms an important part of the discussion. This branch of the subject is termed Economics, or Political Economy, because it relates to the management of a nation's domestic affairs as private economy does to the affairs of a family. The most important subject of Political Economy is the accumulation and distribution of wealth in all its branches, including foreign and colonial as well as domestic commerce. But it also treats of the principles which regulate the maintenance, increase, or diminution of population,—the religious and civil education of the people,—the provisions necessary for securing the due administration of justice, civil and criminal, and, as subservient to

these, the maintenance of police—the measures required for supporting the public expenditure or the financial system—the precautions necessary for the public defence or the military system—and generally all institutions, whether supported by private exertions or by the State, the objects of which are of a public nature.*

Intimately connected with Political Economy, and, indeed, running as it were through all its subdivisions, is Political Arithmetic, or the application of figures to the various subjects of which Political Economy treats,—as the details of public wealth, commerce, education, finance, population, civil and military establishments; all of which may be made more or less the subject of calculation from given facts. Statistics, or the record of all the facts relating to the actual situation of different countries, in these several respects, is, properly speaking, a branch of Political Arithmetic.

The function of making those laws which are required from time to time for the government of a community, is vested in the supreme power of the State; and the important office of Legislation, accordingly, is variously performed in different countries according to the different constitutions of each. In all States a great portion of the law is derived from custom, handed down by tradition and acted upon in practice, through a succession of ages. This is called Common or Unwritten Law, as contradistinguished from Statute or Written Law; and though some nations have from time to time reduced to writing the provisions of the Common Law, thus furnishing themselves with Codes which comprehended all their laws yet in all Systems of Law the distinctions between the two species may be traced; and even where a Code exists, it is known what portions of it were once Custom-

* These subjects may be separated from Political Economy and treated under the head of Functions of Government; they come under what the French call *le Droit Administratif*.

ary or Common Law, because the other, or Statutory enactments, are known to have been first introduced at a particular time, whereas the Common Law had been used before it was reduced into writing. The different laws of each State range themselves under the various heads to which they belong, those heads being the different subdivisions of the two great branches of Domestic Policy—the Political and Economical—already referred to. But there are certain general principles of Legislation which are of universal application, just as there are certain principles relating to Government, and certain principles relating to Economics, which are general, and do not depend upon the particular institutions established, or the particular systems adopted in different countries. The science of Jurisprudence treats of those general principles, and may be reckoned an appendix, but a most important one, to the branch of Domestic Policy.

The other main branch of Political Science considers nations as individuals forming a portion of a larger community—a community of nations; and treats of the principles which ought to govern them in their mutual intercourse. Those views which form the foundation of this science of Foreign or International Policy, are evidently, from their nature, a refinement introduced in a late period of society, because those views assume that communities, each of which is supreme and can have no superior on earth, are willing to regard themselves as subject to certain rules in their intercourse with other nations,—rules which no common chief can enforce, but the observance of which is rendered expedient by the interests of all, and which, therefore, are generally regarded as binding.

These rules are either those of sound policy or those of strict justice. The former class presents certain maxims as useful in regulating the conduct of nations towards each other, in order to provide for the general security, by preventing any one from becoming too

powerful, and thus dangerous to the independence of the others. The latter class acknowledges certain rights as belonging to each community, and denounces the infraction of these rights as a public wrong, giving the injured party a title to seek redress by force. Thus this Second Branch of political science consists of two subdivisions,—the one treats of the principles of *policy* which should guide nations in their mutual intercourse of peace and war, in the negotiation of treaties, the formation of alliances offensive and defensive, the combination of weak States to resist a stronger one, the precautions necessary for preventing too great acquisition of strength by any one State to the derangement of what is termed the general Balance of Power. These principles form the subject of Foreign Policy. The other subdivision treats of the *rights* of nations,—those rights in peace and war which are by common consent admitted to belong to each, because the common interests of humanity, the prevention of war, and the mitigation of its evils when it does occur, require some such general understanding and consent; and the rules relating to this second subdivision are called the Law of Nations or International Law—of which the true description is, that it forms the code by which the great community of nations are governed, or ought to be governed, in their conduct towards each other, as Municipal Law is the code by which the individual members of any particular community are governed in their intercourse with one another. It is a very common error to confound with this branch of law many of the general principles of jurisprudence applicable to all nations, and to term these a portion of the Law of Nations.*

* In the following series the subject of Jurisprudence and International Law will be only treated incidentally, as the other matters to which they relate require, and not under separate heads. The same may be said of the other division of the second branch, namely, Foreign Policy, a conduct prescribed to nations by their mutual interests in their mutual intercourse.

It is obvious that of all sciences which form the subject of human study, none is calculated to afford greater pleasure, and few so great to the student, as the important one of which we have just been describing the nature and the subdivisions. In common with the different branches of Natural Philosophy, it possesses all the interest derived from the contemplation of important truths, the first and the purest of the pleasures derived from any department of science. There is a positive pleasure in that exercise of the mental faculties which the investigation of mathematical and physical truth affords. The contemplation of mathematical and physical truths is, in itself, always pleasing and wholesome to the mind. There is a real pleasure in tracing the relations between figures and between substances, the resemblances unexpectedly found to exist among those which seem to differ, the precise differences found to exist between one finger and another, or one body and another. Thus, to find that the sum of the angles of all triangles, be their size or their form what it may, is uniformly the same, or that all circles, from the sun down to a watch-dial, are to each other in one fixed proportion, as the squares of their diameters, is a matter of pleasing contemplation which we are glad to learn and to remember from the very constitution of our minds. So there is a great, even an exquisite pleasure in learning the composition of bodies, in knowing, for instance, that water, once believed to be a simple element, is composed of the more considerable of two substances, which make, when united with heat in a certain form, the air we burn and the air we breathe; that rust is the combination of this last substance with metals; that flame is supported by it; that respiration is performed by means of it; that rusting, breathing, and burning, are all processes of the same kind; that two of the alkaline salts are themselves rusts of metals, one of these metals being lighter than water, burning spontaneously when

exposed to the air, without any heat, and forming the salt by its combination. To know these things, and to contemplate such relations between bodies or operations seemingly so unlike, is in a high degree delightful, even if no practical use could be made of such knowledge. So the sublime truths of astronomy afford extensive gratification to the student. To find that the planets and the comets which wheel round the sun with a swiftness immensely greater than that of a cannon-ball, are retained in their vast orbits by the same power which causes a stone to fall to the ground; that this power, with their various motions, moulds those bodies into the forms they have assumed; that their motions and the arrangement of their paths cause their mutual action to operate in such a manner, as to make their course constantly vary, but also to prevent them from ever deviating beyond a certain point, and that the deviation being governed by fixed rules, never can exceed in any direction a certain amount, so as to preserve the perpetual duration of the system;—such truths as these transport the mind with amazement, and fill it with a pure and unwearying delight. This is the first and most legitimate pleasure of philosophy. As much and the like pleasure is afforded by contemplating the truths of Moral Science. To trace the connexion of the mental faculties with each other; to mark how they are strengthened or enfeebled; to observe their variety of resemblance in different individuals; to ascertain their influence on the bodily functions, and the influence of the body upon them; to compare the human with the brute mind; to pursue the various forms of animal instinct; to examine the limits of instinct and reason in all tribes;—these are the sources of as pleasing contemplation as any which the truths of abstract or of physical science can bestow; from these contemplations we reap a gratification unalloyed with any pain, and removed far above all risk of the satiety and disgust to which the grosser indul-

gences of sense are subject. But the study of Political Science is equally fertile in the materials of pleasing contemplation. The examination of those principles which bind men together in communities, and enable them to exercise their whole mental powers in the most effectual and worthy manner; the knowledge of the means by which their happiness can be best secured and their virtues most promoted; the examination of the various forms in which the social system is found to exist: the tracing all the modifications which the general principles of ethics and of polity undergo in every variety of circumstances, both physical and moral; the discovery of resemblances in cases where nothing but contrasts might be expected; the observation of the effects produced by the diversities of political systems; the following of schemes of polity from their most rude beginnings to their greatest perfection, and pursuing the gradual development of some master-principle through all the stages of its progress—these are studies which would interest a rational being, even if he could never draw from them any practical inference for the government of his own conduct, or the improvement of the society he belonged to—nay, even if he belonged to another species and was merely surveying the history and the state of human society as a curious observer, in like manner as we study the works of the bee, the beaver, and the ant. How prodigiously does the interest of such contemplations rise when it is the political habits of our own species that we are examining, and when, beside the sympathy naturally felt in the fortunes of our fellow-creatures of other countries, at every step of our inquiry we enjoy the satisfaction of comparing their institutions with our own, of marking how far they depart from the same model, and of tracing the consequences of the variety upon the happiness of millions of beings like ourselves! How analogous is this gratification to the kindred pleasure derived from Comparative Anatomy, which

enables us to mark the resemblances and the differences in structure and in functions between the frame of other animals and our own!

From the contemplation of political truth our minds rise naturally, and by a process also of legitimate reasoning like that which discovers those truths, towards the great Creator of the universe, the Source of all that we have been surveying by the light of science—the Almighty Being who made the heavens and the earth, and sustains the frame of the world by the word of His power. But He also created the mind of man, bestowed upon him a thinking, a reasoning, and a feeling nature, placed him in a universe of wonders, endowed him with faculties to comprehend them, and to rise by his meditation to a knowledge of their Great First Cause. The moral world, then, affords additional evidence of the creating and preserving power, and its contemplations also raise the mind to a communion with its maker. Shall any doubt be entertained that the like pleasing and useful consequences result from a study of Man in his political capacity, and a contemplation of the structure and functions of the Political world? The nice adaptation of our species for the social state; the increase of our powers, as well as the multiplication of our comforts and our enjoyments, by union of purpose and action; the subserviency of the laws governing the nature and motions of the material world to the uses of man in his social state; the tendency of his mental faculties and moral feelings to further the progress of social improvement; the predisposition of political combinations, even in unfavourable circumstances, to produce good, and the inherent powers by which evil is avoided, compensated, or repaired; the singular laws, partly physical, and partly moral, by which the numbers of mankind are maintained, and the balance of the sexes preserved with unerring certainty;—these form only a portion of the marvels to which the eyes of the political observer are pointed, and by which his atten-

tion is arrested; for there is hardly any one political arrangement which by its structure and functions does not shed a light on the capacities of human nature, and illustrate the power and the wonders of the Providence to which man looks as his Maker and Preserver. Such contemplations connected with all the branches of science, and only neglected by the superficial or the perverted, are at once the reward of philosophic labour, the source of true devotion, the guide of wise and virtuous conduct: they are the true end of all our knowledge, and they give to each portion of it a double value and a higher relish.

The last—but in the view of many, probably most men, the most important—advantage derived from the sciences is their practical adaptation to the uses of life. It is not correct—it is the very reverse of the truth—to represent this as the only real, and, as it were, tangible profit derived from scientific discoveries or philosophical pursuits in general. There cannot be a greater oversight or greater confusion of ideas than that in which such a notion has its origin. It is nearly akin to the fallacy which represents profitable or productive labour as only that kind of labour by which some substantial or material thing is produced or fashioned. The labour which of all others most benefits a community, the superior order of labour which governs, defends, and improves a state, is by this fallacy excluded from the title of productive, merely because, instead of bestowing additional value on one mass or parcel of a nation's capital, it gives additional value to the whole of its property, and gives it that quality of security without which all other value would be worthless. So they who deny the importance of mere scientific contemplation, and exclude from the uses of science the pure and real pleasure of discovering, and of learning, and of surveying its truths, forget how many of the enjoyments derived from what are called the practical applications of the sciences, resolve themselves into gratifications

of a merely contemplative kind. Thus, the steam engine is confessed to be the most useful application of machinery and of chemistry to the arts. Would it not be so if steam navigation were its only result, and if no one used a steam-boat but for excursions of curiosity or of amusement? Would it not be so if steam engines had never been used but in the fine arts? So a microscope is a useful practical application of optical science as well as a telescope—and a telescope would be so, although it were only used in examining distant views for our amusement, or in showing us the real figures of the planets, and were of no use in navigation or in war. The mere pleasure, then, of tracing relations, and of contemplating general laws in the material, the moral, and the political world, is the direct and legitimate value of science; and all scientific truths are important for this reason, whether they ever lend any aid to the common arts of life or no. In like manner the mental gratification afforded by the scientific contemplations of Natural Religion are of great value, independent of their much higher virtue in mending the heart and improving the life,—towards which important object, indeed, all the contemplations of science more or less directly tend,—and in this higher sense all the pleasures of science are justly considered as Practical Uses.

But the applications to the common affairs of life, which generally go by that name, are also of great value. The Physical Sciences are profusely rich in these. The speculations of the moralist are also of great value in teaching us the discipline of the understanding, in improving the feelings, and in cultivating virtuous sentiments; they are of still greater service in helping those concerned about the government of men. But the study of Political Philosophy is certainly, of all others, the most fruitful in beneficial results of what is usually called a practical kind. If almost proverbially “the proper study of mankind is

man," the most important application of the doctrines which moral science teaches respecting his nature is unquestionably that whereby we learn his position, habits, interests, rights, and duties as the member of a civil community. The science which treats of the structure of government, which makes the experience of one age or nation benefit another, and save it the price, and inconvenience, and delay of failure, pointing out the errors committed in various systems of civil or commercial polity, showing how these are to be corrected or shunned, and showing how such systems may most effectually and most safely be improved so as to secure the happiness of the people—the science which expounds the best modes of legislation, the true principles of jurisprudence, the more efficacious manner of executing, as well as of making laws—which defines the rights of the people and their duties, as well as those of their rulers, explains the rights of one nation with respect to another, and shows both the duty and the wisdom of combining order with freedom at home, and independence with peace abroad:—surely this science, if it be not, of all others, the most useful to every state, nay to every individual citizen at every period, at least yields to none in real practical importance. The benefits which it helps us to obtain, the errors which it leads us to correct, the dangers which it enables us to avoid, are the most important, because those benefits, and errors, and dangers affect the whole affairs of nations, and nearly concern every individual member of the community directly or indirectly. Nothing can be more plain than this proposition; but incidentally it will derive additional illustration when we now proceed to consider the objections which have been sometimes raised against teaching it. To take only one illustration at present—how nearly does the advantage resulting from the examination of foreign constitutions resemble the benefits derived to human Physiology from studying the anatomy of the lower

animals! This branch of Political Science may be justly termed the Comparative Anatomy of Government; and if studied with a constant regard to general principles of policy, their illustration from the structure and functions of various systems of polity, and the modification they undergo by the diversities of each, this science is calculated to throw useful light on the general subject of Political Philosophy, and lend us valuable improvement to the knowledge of our own system, exactly as the Comparative Anatomy of the body extends our knowledge of Physiology, and improves our acquaintance with the human frame.

No one has ever, in any free state, hardly in any civilized country, denied the advantages of Political Science, or objected to its being learned by certain classes: nothing so absurd was ever yet attempted. But an opinion at one time prevailed, and it still has some adherents, that political subjects are not fit for discussion among the great body of the people, and that, therefore, many who do not deny the propriety of instructing them in other branches of knowledge, have objected to their being taught the doctrines of Political Philosophy. The rich and the powerful might study such matters: the rulers and the lawgivers of the country, or the upper classes of the community, might learn them, and treatises might be written for, or lectures delivered to, them and their children, or addressed to other select circles, upon the great subjects of National Polity: but the people were to care for none of these things,—they might read a newspaper or attend an election meeting; but political knowledge was a thing above their reach and out of their line,—a thing for their betters. and with which it was both useless and périlous for the working classes to meddle. The time is certainly past and gone, never to return, when such preposterous doctrines could find any general acceptance in this country or in France; though in other parts of Europe they still are

found to pass current. Yet even in France, Germany, and England herself, a modification of the same fallacy is to be traced as influencing the judgments of many respectable men, even of some whose general opinions are not bigoted or illiberal: it leads to the entertaining a strong prejudice against the diffusion of political knowledge, to a wish that the people at large could be cured of their taste for it, and to an alarm at the dangers likely to result from it to the peace and good order of society. It becomes a duty, therefore, to examine a little more closely this objection, and see whether it really has any force. Let us begin by stating the argument used by the objectors; but, first of all, let us observe that the main objection is to Politics, as contra-distinguished from Political Economy; that is, to the first subdivision of the great branch of Domestic Policy. Of its other subdivisions, Economic Science, and of the second branch, International Policy, the objectors are more careless, and some would rather have the former of these—Political Economy—taught, provided Politics commonly so called,—that is, the principles, and structure, and functions of government, were exempt from the public scrutiny, and withdrawn from the province of the popular teacher.

The argument of the objectors is this,—No human institution is or can be perfect: and the governments established in all the countries of Europe having their origin in early and unenlightened times, necessarily partake more or less largely of the imperfection incident to the works of man. They present, therefore, many points of objection to those who live in a more refined period of society; nor is it possible to deny that many things would be avoided as absurd or pernicious in the present times, if we had now to frame, for the first time, our political institutions. It thus becomes impossible to examine either our own or other systems of government without pointing out many faults in

them; nor can the sound principles of civil polity be unfolded without leading to inferences disparaging to the system we live under. Nay, it would be impossible, and, if it were possible, it would be dishonest to shun the reference to existing circumstances and the established order of things in explaining the fundamental principles of sound policy, against which the institutions of the state are found clearly to sin. Hence it is argued, that the people, being thus taught, are rendered discontented with their government, and excited to a desire of change.

1. We may begin by observing that much of the real force of this objection is presented against a factious, unfair, exaggerated discussion of political subjects, undertaken in the disguise of a fair and honest course of instruction. That treatises, and still more, lectures to the people, may have a pernicious effect if the teacher abuses his office, and makes himself a partizan or a demagogue, is not denied. But it by no means follows that the science of government may not safely be taught. For, after all, it is a practical, an experimental science. If there be no real mischiefs occasioned by any alleged defects in any given system of polity,—if the evils charged upon it are merely speculative and almost nominal,—if the people do not feel any inconvenience from them,—if they produce no consequences which are generally seen, and by all who observe them freely admitted,—nay, if the evils be not actually felt as well as remarked and confessed,—we may be well assured that the allegation of the defects existing will be received as groundless, because, practically speaking, the arrangement called in question is not defective. No argument in a speech, no exhortation in a treatise or a lecture, can make men think they are oppressed, or ill governed, or suffering in any way, when they are in reality free and happy; or can succeed to a considerable extent in persuading the audience or the disciples that they are uncomfortably

circumstanced, and ought to be discontented, when they know and feel that they are living at their ease and ought to be satisfied.

2. But suppose the defects do exist, and that the people suffer under them, it is fit and proper that the causes of the evil should be probed, and should be pointed out without any reserve. It is certain that the not doing so will never prevent the people from feeling discontented; on the contrary, if they are left to feel the pressure, and do not know distinctly from whence it proceeds, both their discontent is likely to be increased beyond its just amount, and it is likely to take a wrong direction. The lessons taught by honest and skilful instructors will both reduce the complaint within the bounds of moderation, and prevent blame from being imputed to harmless measures, inoffending men, and unexceptionable institutions. If any illustration were wanting of the dangers to which the peace as well as the general prosperity of a country may be exposed from popular ignorance, we might instance the disturbances so often arising in all parts of the world from the popular indignation against the exporters of corn during a scarcity, or the use of machinery in times of manufacturing distress. But ignorance of the nature of government may produce the like mischiefs.

The necessity of some considerable degree of restraint to the well-being of society—the impossibility of the supreme power being left in the hands of the whole people—the fatal effects of disregarding the right of property, the great corner-stone of all civil society—the interest which all classes down to the humblest have in the protection afforded by law to the accumulation of capital—the evils of resistance to established government unless in extreme and therefore very rare cases—the particular interest which the whole people, low, as well as high, must ever have in general obedience to the supreme power in the state—the almost uniform necessity of making

all changes, even the most salutary, in any established institution, gradually and temperately—all these are the very first lessons which every political teacher must inculcate if he be fit for his office, and commonly honest, and he cannot move many steps in any direction through his subject, without finding occasion to illustrate and to enforce these fundamental lessons by the constant experience of mankind. But what are these lessons? They are the very doctrines of good order and of peaceful conduct; they are the most powerful incentives to submission—a submission the more to be relied on, because it is rational, and results from an appeal to men's reason, not from an overruling force—the well-considered submission of well-informed and therefore well-disposed men, not the blind obedience of ignorant slaves. Let the body of the people be kept ever so much in the dark upon the nature of government and the state of their own concerns, the existence of evils being admitted, the smarting under them will come without any teaching; but the more they learn the better they will be able quietly to bear them. Let the people be ever so ignorant, the sense of their own exclusion from a power which they see their superiors exercise, one of the hardest things to bear—the comparison of the poor man's lot with that of his wealthy neighbour, the very hardest portion of their lot, and that which must ever expose society to its greatest perils—will be always sure to strike their minds; and unless they are curbed by an overwhelming force, can never operate without the most mischievous tendency to the peace of society, until foundations of government and the nature of the social compact, as well as the principles of Economical Science, are fully learnt by the mass of the people. There wants no teacher to make a poor man begrudge his powerful and wealthy neighbour both his actual share in the government and his disproportionate share in the good things of this life:

but the teacher must have ill performed his task if he has left any doubt in the mind of the poorest man who hears or who reads him, that the misery of all classes must follow from insurrection and anarchy: that unequal distribution of power is necessary for all government, and unequal distribution of property essential to its very existence, the idea of too much and too little being utterly inconsistent with its very nature; that upon its existence depends the whole fabric of society; and that a general division of possessions would make the country a scene of profligate extravagance for one year, and of universal desolation the next—a bedlam for one short season, and a charnel-house ever after.

3. The contemplation of the structure of other governments as well as of that under which we live, and the comparison of the defects and advantages of our own with those of other systems, can hardly fail to produce a happy effect upon the dispositions of any people in tolerably happy circumstances. Our countrymen, for example, when they perceive the immeasurable superiority of the British over so many other forms of government, cannot avoid drawing from the comparison powerful motives for contentment, and strong reasons why they should bear with subordinate evils rather than run the risk of losing a great good. All foreign experience, too, and all past history, inculcates the necessity of sober and cautious proceeding, where admitted evils are to be removed, or valuable improvements to be introduced. Nor can it escape observation, that many of those things which the superficial and ignorant are prone to regard as improvements, are easily shown, by a deeper examination of the subject, to be either useless or hurtful. Hence untaught men often long after some foreign institution about which they know little; whereas a full and systematic acquaintance with the subject would show them that the different habits and various

circumstances of the foreign nation, in other particulars, render the thing in question beneficial there, which here would be noxious.

4. It would be endless to show in how many particulars a people would be more easily and safely governed, if political knowledge were fully and widely diffused among them. The first instances that occur are drawn from the evil influence of ignorance and prevailing errors upon subjects of Economical Science. The great mischief arising from the labouring part of the community being unacquainted with the nature of *wages*, and the principles on which their rate depends, are well known. The unlimited supply of labour which their imprudent marriages, and repugnance to change their residence or their occupation, are constantly bringing into the market, really is the main cause of the depression of the working classes; for it keeps down their earnings to the very lowest amount of subsistence on which human life can be maintained. Could anything be more happy, both for themselves and for the peace of society, than such a thorough knowledge of this subject as would check the master evil which now pervades all the lower ranks of society?—In like manner, the outcry raised in favour of unlimited provision for the poor, and against the reasonable, indeed the necessary rule which would confine each man to living upon the produce of his own industry, or the income of his own property, never could arise, at least not among the educated; but among the most ignorant of mankind, and, like the strange delusions propagated by some wild visionaries, and by some ill-disposed men, that labour alone gives a right to enjoyment, and that the existence of accumulated capital is a grievance and an abuse, could not have the least success with men who had been taught to reflect that the accumulation of capital is the necessary consequence of the existence of property and its secure possession, and that no classes have a

stronger interest in the protection of capital than the labourers whom it must necessarily always be employed in supporting.—The rage against machinery; the objections to a free export of grain; nay, the exaggerated views of even just and true doctrines, as that which condemns the corn laws; afford additional illustrations of the mischiefs which ignorance of economical science is calculated to produce.—To take one more example, but a very striking one,—the popular prejudice against usury, and the notion that limiting the rate of interest protects distressed borrowers, prevented any attempt to amend the law in that important particular for many years after Mr. Bentham had demonstrated that the distressed borrower suffers far more under this pressure than the wealthy lender, and after the first mercantile authority in the world* had pronounced Mr. Bentham's *Defence of Usury* unanswered, because unanswerable. Nor have the higher classes yet thrown off these prejudices so far as to remove altogether one of the greatest practical defects in our commercial jurisprudence.

But the teaching of other branches of Political Science is equally beneficial to the cause of good government. It may safely be affirmed that no outcry against any impost required for the public service ever could be raised among a people well informed on the necessity of maintaining the establishments required for the public service; and that such schemes as the Excise never could for years have been defeated, and afterwards made for half a century the object of popular hatred, sometimes the ground of insurrection, in a well-informed community. So the vulgar prepossession in favour of law-taxes, as tending to check litigiousness, could only among a very ill-informed people have supported, till a late period, an impost

* The late Sir Francis Baring.

notoriously the very worst that ever was invented, and the direct tendency of which is to prevent justice from being obtained by the poor man.—The cry of sacred chartered rights being violated by a reform in a monopolizing Company's administration of India, drove a ministry from power threescore years ago; and assuredly it could never have seduced any but a very ignorant people. Accordingly, there was just as much violence done to the Company's charter, the year after, by the successors of that ministry, without any kind of umbrage being given to the most sensitive persons in the country.—The classes of society were among the most ignorant of mankind, which about the same time were seized with such an alarm lest Popery should be made, by main force, the religion of the people, that they attempted to fire London, did burn the Catholic chapels in Edinburgh, and drove into retirement the most accomplished member of the Scottish Church,—the illustrious historian whose works shed a lustre on the name of his country.* Nor were these better informed who, thirty years later, helped a party in the state to remove their adversaries from the government, and seize upon their places, upon the outcry of a like danger threatening the religion of the country in consequence of a very insignificant bill, which its adversaries passed into a law a few years afterwards without one word being ever whispered against it.—But let us consider only how many measures every government is compelled to postpone, contrary to its fixed and clear opinions, merely because the public mind will not bear them in its present state of information. Men may differ, for example, as to the propriety of retaining certain colonial possessions at a vast expense, with great loss to our trade, and with considerable risk of hostile operations becoming necessary. But even if all statesmen of any note were agreed

* Robertson.

that those distant possessions should be abandoned, what minister would venture to give up the country where Wolfe gained his victory and met his end,—an event that has consecrated the spot in the affections of the people, and makes them blind to all consequences and deaf to all reason?—So it might be of great benefit to give up Gibraltar; but the people must have learnt many a lesson of political wisdom before it would be safe for any administration to propose its cession, how ample soever might be the benefits of the measure. Lord Chatham was as bold a minister, and one as regardless of consequences when he saw his course clear before him, as ever presided over the affairs of this country;—yet, when, in order to gain the invaluable co-operation of the Spanish branch of the Bourbons, and rescue Europe from the depression consequent upon its disjointed state, he perceived the expediency of offering up Gibraltar for Minorca, a letter from him to our ambassador at Madrid remains, in which he broaches the subject with a degree of fear and trembling that indicates how frightful he deemed the risk he ran of exciting the national feelings of England against him to overwhelm his government. Such alarms could have no place among a people, the bulk of whom, well informed upon political subjects, were accustomed to consult the real interests of the country and incapable of being led astray either by vague apprehensions, or the clamours which designing knaves might raise to delude them.—But of the many evils which popular ignorance creates in human society, there is none so pernicious as its influence upon those national feelings in which commercial restraints, and, above all, wars, have their origin. The fear of benefiting other nations, and aiding our competitors by our trade, is at the bottom of the former; the latter are too frequently occasioned by national animosities, by hatred of our neighbours merely because they are our neighbours; and it may be remarked that both commercial and

political jealousies chiefly operate against those who, for the very reason that they are our near neighbours, are our best customers, and should, for the benefit of both parties, be our firmest friends. The history of our species is a history of the evils that have flowed from a source as tainted as it is abundant. To go no farther back than a century ago,—Walpole was first hurried into a war which its chief supporters afterwards admitted* to have been as groundless as it was impolitic, by a senseless cry against the Spaniards, raised by a few smugglers, who took advantage of our people's ignorance to excite their feelings of honour and revenge, and profligately encouraged by a political party who turned to their own personal advantage the greatest injury they could inflict upon their country.—The most unfortunate and impolitic war ever waged by this country was popular in the extreme at first; and no minister could have stood up against the supremacy of the mother-country over thirteen colonies, while all the ignorant members of the community believed that they had an interest in levying taxes by force from the American colonies in aid of the mother-country.—Nor is it any diminution of the evils which are produced by want of political knowledge, that wars, in themselves just and necessary, may at first be favoured by the people, and then abandoned at a time when the best interests of the state require them to be persevered in. An unreflecting, because an uninformed, nation is at all times liable to commit this error, than which none can be greater excepting that most grievous of all faults, the rushing into a contest without cause.

5. It may be said that there is this peculiar to a course of political instruction, that many of the principles explained in it are those which the existing parties

* Mr. Burke relates this striking instance of the crimes of party : to turn out Walpole, his adversaries raised the war whoop ; they broke the peace of twenty years to obtain power. This those party-leaders admitted to him in discussing this dis-graceful passage of party history.

in the state are at the time appealing to, and disputing about,—many of the illustrations used in expounding those principles are the very topics of most vehement discussion among the practical statesmen and factions of the day. The whole subject, it may be argued, is more or less controversial, and the controversy is one in which, as it involves men's real or supposed interests, and consequently engages their passions deeply, no instructor can easily avoid taking a side, and no audience can help being swayed by the prevailing sentiments of the times; so that instruction becomes difficult, from the interference of party prejudice in both the teacher and the pupil, while a factious spirit is sure to be fostered, and unkindly feelings to be exacerbated, if not engendered. In this remark there is, unquestionably, much truth; it refers to the principal difficulty that attends political instruction. But it can never be allowed to prove that no such instruction should be conveyed; it only warns us to guard as much as possible against falling into the error which it points out. If it were suffered to operate as a conclusive reason against teaching politics, this would follow—that upon the things most necessary to be known ignorance is better than knowledge,—that in proportion as the subject is more interesting to men, they should take the less pains to understand it. But that is not all: it would also follow that, upon topics calculated to excite strong feelings, it is better and safer for the people to be kept in the dark. For by the supposition which forms the ground of the whole objection, you cannot keep the people from taking an interest in these subjects; you cannot help their being excited and split into parties; their being so is the very origin of the remark with which we are dealing. Then, because such excitement and such party differences prevail, is there any common sense in prescribing an entire ignorance of the questions those dissensions relate to, as a likely means of allaying them? Are political

differences the more sure to be reconciled by keeping those who are split by them in ignorance of the subjects under dispute? Are men more likely to agree upon any matter the less they know about it? The people, it seems, feel strongly upon certain subjects, and are much divided in opinion, many being for a certain course of policy, many against it. The argument is, that for the purpose of bringing about an understanding, and making all in its favour, or all join in rejecting it, or all unite in preferring some middle course safely placed at a distance from either extreme, the parties should be prevented from comprehending the nature of the measure in question, and kept in ignorance of all the arguments for it, all the arguments against it, and all the arguments for a middle course. Once upon a time, says the old fable, two gallant knights met upon a plain where a shield stood upright; and one of them having called it a white shield, the other asserted it to be a black, whereupon they prepared to fight after the manner of that age, still somewhat in vogue at the present day. But a dervise or priest came up, and, having learnt the cause of their quarrel, suggested that each had better look at both sides of the buckler—when they found that each knight was right—the one side being pure white, the other jet black. The minister of peace performed his duty wisely; but our objectors, and some of them nominally of the same vocation with the dervise, have no better expedient to propose than that the shield should be covered up from both combatants, and the fight go on.

It must on all hands be admitted that there is no greater evil in any country than party violence—the abuse of that which, if kept within due bounds, is an advantage, and may be the means of preserving public liberty and promoting general improvement, namely, the honest combination of statesmen for patriotic purposes. This becomes an intolerable evil when it is made the mere engine of selfish men for giving power

and profit to themselves at the expense of the public good, and by the subservient agency of the people whose interests are sacrificed to the views of their leaders. Opinions are then assumed, in order to marshal politicians in bands and separate them from others. Place is the real object; principle the assumed pretext. The people, instead of thinking for themselves, are made the dupes and the tools of others,—hurried into all the follies of which thoughtless men are capable, and into as many excesses as their designing leaders dare let them commit consistently with their own safety, and without the least regard for that of their followers. Now, nearly the whole influence of such party chiefs is grounded upon the political ignorance of the people at large; and the permission thus assumed to make and dictate their opinions. In such a state of things Dean Swift's saying is correct, that "Party is the madness of many for the gain of a few;" and such a state of things could not exist among a people politically educated. As the navigators who first visited the South Sea Islands could purchase the lands, goods, and chattels of the natives for a red feather, our ancestors four centuries ago could butcher one another by thousands, and extirpate nine-tenths of the nobility of the country in a few years for a red or a white rose; but the wars of Lancaster and of York could no more be waged in our time, than the South Sea islanders, after being civilized, can be induced to barter their property for nothing; and the day will come when other party differences will be regarded with the same contempt with which we now regard the factions of the Henrys and the Edwards.

6. This leads to the important remark, that the question is no longer left open to us whether the people shall be taught politics or not. Taught they must be; and the only question is, whether they shall be well taught, or ill instructed and misinformed. Do what you will, somebody will take the part of public

instructor. It is an office that any man in a free country may assume, and it is one which almost every one thinks himself qualified to fill. If the people are not taught sound doctrine upon the subject, by calm and tolerably impartial men, they will inevitably listen to guides of a far different description, and will fall a prey to the more violent and the more interested class of politicians, to the incentives of agitators, the arts of impostors, and the nostrums of quacks. If, indeed, a teacher so far violates his duty, as to give partial, inflamed, untrue accounts of the subject he handles—if he keeps out of view the facts which history has stored up in illustration of the tendency of particular systems—if he inflames the passions of an unthinking multitude, and converts a course of instruction into an engine of faction,—then he may do mischief, as all men may who are guilty of fraudulent and mischievous actions upon false pretences. But this possibility only furnishes a reason against misinstructing the people, not against teaching them; it warns us to avoid impostors, not instructors; it shows that politics may be ill and dishonestly taught, as religion, or even morality itself may be; not that politics should be left untaught any more than morals and religion. And assuredly we may rest satisfied of one thing; the difficulty is far greater, of making a course of lectures the means of propagating, by foul means, any system of opinions, than the difficulty of deceiving the people in any other way. The shame, upon the detection of such a design, is far greater, and the chances of its being detected are more numerous. The good dervise, of whom the legend speaks, took the honest and the rational course; he was as fair as well as a wise teacher. Had he, like the Levite in the parable, kept aloof and passed on the other side, while the work of death was going on, he would have been a weak, and a timid, and a selfish man. But had he interfered to prevent the combatants looking on both sides—had he, who saw the

shield in either direction, persuaded each knight that he was in the right, and that the other was in the wrong, he would have been justly execrated as a dishonest guide—his treachery would have been speedily discovered—and both parties would have joined in scorning and in punishing him. Let it not, however, be supposed that any course of political lessons can be given with no leaning to one set of doctrines rather than another. Such a thing is hardly possible, consistently with honesty; and, were it possible, it would not be at all desirable. On a subject like this every one who has well considered it must have formed his opinions; and he must, therefore, conscientiously believe those opinions to be right—nay, to be the only right and safe ones for the people to entertain. It is therefore his bounden duty to declare his sentiments; and it is infinitely more fair, more honest, and more useful, as well as safer, that he should declare them openly, distinctly, and manfully, after stating the whole case, and the reasons on both sides, than that he should give a partial view of the argument, and leave the audience to draw its own conclusions—that is, his own conclusions. He is a teacher, not a partizan; he is fairly to expound the views and the arguments of others with whom he differs; and he is to give his reasons for retaining his own sentiments. From so open and honest a course of proceeding no mischief whatever can be apprehended, and no other course can be called Instruction. Can any one doubt that it is best for the people and safest for the government that this course should be pursued upon all political subjects, and most of all upon those subjects which are the most calculated to excite deep interest and rouse strong feelings? What better means can be devised of showing the public how much it is their interest to inquire and judge for themselves? What better security can be devised against the efforts of violent and intriguing men? What more sure remedy against

the arts of political empirics, whose natural prey is, and ever will be, the ignorant vulgar—but who in vain display their wares before well-informed and reasoning men?

These considerations may serve to show, not merely that the Political Education of the people is attended with none of the danger to the peace of society which the objectors apprehend, but that a positive security is afforded by it against the very worst dangers to which the cause of good order in any community can be exposed. But we must go yet a step farther, and observe that the right of the people to be instructed as to the public interests, and the duty of their superiors to educate them in Political Science, rests upon higher ground than has yet been taken.

The force of public opinion must be acknowledged in every government, save only that of the most purely despotic form. It has more or less a direct influence, according to the nature of the constitution under which the people live; and the momentum with which it acts varies, under the same kind of constitution, according to the degree in which the people are educated. But even in countries that enjoy little constitutional freedom, the public voice, when raised, is effectual; and even the most ignorant nation has a will which its rulers must not venture entirely to disobey: nay, in absolute monarchies, where public opinion forms the only check on misgovernment, and the people seldom exert any influence, yet, when they do interfere, it is oftentimes with terrible effect. Nor is any interposition likely to be withheld merely because, from the popular ignorance, it happens to be uncalled for or exerted in a wrong direction. How important, therefore, is it, with a view to the people's only safeguard, and the ruler's only curb, that they should be well-informed upon their political interests! But how immeasurably more important is it in countries living under a free government, that those whom the constitution recognizes as

sharers, more or less directly, in the supreme power, should have a correct knowledge of the state of their own affairs, and the principles upon which their rights and their interests depend! It must be observed that no government, even the freest, can be in the hands of the people at large; and that grand improvement of modern times, the representative system, by which extent of territory can be safely combined with a popular constitution, still leaves the exercise of supreme power in the hands of persons delegated to govern—even where there are none but elective magistrates, that is, even in republican constitutions. Those delegates, then, be they executive, or judicial, or legislative, require the vigilant superintendence of the community, in order to prevent errors or abuses, to quicken their diligence or to control their faults, during the term of their office. This superintendence is most wholesome if exercised by an enlightened people, and affords the only effectual security for constant good government—the only real safeguard for popular rights. How many fatal errors would rulers of all kinds, and in all ages—whether Consuls and Senates, or Archons and Assemblies of the people, or Monarchs and their Councils, or Kings and their Parliaments, or Presidents and Chambers, have been prevented from falling into; and how many foul crimes, both against the interests of their subjects, and against the peace and happiness of the world, would they have been deterred from committing had the nations submitted to their care been well instructed in the science of public policy, acquainted with their true interests, aware of the things most dangerous to their liberties, and impressed with that sense of duty to their species which an enlarged knowledge of Political Philosophy can alone bestow! Take, again, the instance of war—that game, as has been well said, at which kings could never play were their subjects wise—how melancholy is it to reflect that nearly all the devastation which it has spread

over the earth would have been spared, with the countless mischiefs following in its train, had only the same enlightened views prevailed which have already resulted partly from sad experience, partly from diffused information, and which seem, at the present day, to have, at least for a while, taught men the guilt as well as the folly of war! But experience is a costly as well as an effectual teacher; and the same lesson might have been wholly learnt without the heavy price that has been paid for it. Experience, too, is a teacher whose lessons are forgotten in the course of a little time; as the memory of wounds and the fear of fighting wear out with the pain they occasion. Nothing then, can effectually and permanently instil the sound doctrines of peace and of justice into any people but an extensive Political Education, to instruct them in their interests and their duties. It is the same with the frauds as with the oppressions of statesmen. The sacrifice of the many to the few would be impossible in a well-informed country. That game of party, in which the interests of the people are the counters, and the power and pelf of the gamesters themselves the only thing they play for, though not the only stake they risk, never could be played to the destruction of public virtue and the daily peril of the general good, were the people well acquainted with the principles which should govern the administration of their concerns; and possibly it is an instinctive apprehension of this truth that has made all parties so averse to the general diffusion of political knowledge.

But it is not merely as a control on the mismanagement of their affairs, and a check to encroachments on their rights, that the interposition of the people is required in every country, and is the very life and soul of each constitutional system; they ought to promote the progress of improvement, by urging their rulers to better by all means the condition of those under their care, and, above everything, to amend the errors of

their political system. As all government is made for the benefit of the community, the people have a right, not only to be governed, but to be well governed; and not only to be well governed, but to be governed as well as possible; that is, with as little expense to their natural freedom and their resources as is consistent with the nature of human affairs. Towards this point of perfection all nations ought constantly to be directing their course. But the rulers having no interest of the kind—nay, rather an interest in keeping things as they are, if not making them go backwards—unless the people interfere, little progress will be made in that direction, and some risk always incurred of losing the ground already gained. Surely, then, nothing can be more manifest than that full and sound political information is necessary for those whose strongly pronounced desire of improvement is the best security for the progress of all national reform. The diffused knowledge of the general principles of policy, and an intimate acquaintance with what has been done in other countries, and with the results produced, becomes as sure a source of political improvement as the diffused knowledge of mechanical science, and an acquaintance with the inventions of foreigners, is the source of almost all improvement in the arts. The education of particular classes alone may, no doubt, be better than the general prevalence of political ignorance; but as those classes for the most part have particular interests, and each has its own purposes to serve, the only security for improvements which may benefit the whole body of the people, is for the whole body of the people to understand in what their true interests consist.

In truth a greater absurdity cannot well be imagined, than attempting to keep the bulk of mankind in ignorance of all that appertains to State Affairs. State affairs are their own affairs. An absolute Prince*

* Louis XIV.

once exclaimed, "The State! I am the state!" But the people may most justly exclaim, "We are the State." For them laws are made; for them governments are constituted. To secure their peace, and protect them from injury without and within the realm, rules are appointed, revenues raised, police established, armies levied. To exclude them from the superintendence of their own affairs is as if the owner of an estate were refused the inspection of his accounts by his steward. To prevent them from understanding the principles on which their affairs are administered, is as if the owner of an estate were suffered to know what his steward was doing, but debarred from all understanding of what he ought to do. To prevent them from knowing what are the institutions and the condition of foreign nations, is as if the owner of an estate were precluded from knowing how his neighbour's property was managed, what rent he got for his land, what salaries he paid his agents. In every country, whatever be the form of its government, and however little of a popular cast, this is the amount, and this is the aspect of the absurdity propounded by those who would prohibit the Political Education of the People. But incomparably grosser is the absurdity of keeping the people in ignorance where the constitution of the government is of a popular kind. There, the people are called upon to bear a share in the management of their own affairs, to attend public meetings, to serve in offices, to vote in the choice of lawgivers. There may be some consistency in excluding them from all the knowledge that would fit them for performing those high political functions, while you also exclude them from all exercise of the functions themselves. But to make them political functionaries, and to leave them in ignorance of political subjects, is little less absurd than it would be to keep the owner of an estate ignorant of farming, and expect him to superintend the man-

agement of his farms. But if it be said that there is no occasion for all the community learning Political Philosophy any more than there is for all a land-owner's family inspecting his accounts and understanding agriculture; the answer is obvious, that all the community, and not particular classes, are the parties interested in State affairs; and that if any family can be found in which all the members, servants included, have their several shares in the property of the estate, then, beyond all question, each member down to the humblest menial, however inconsiderable his share of the property, would be entitled to inspect the accounts—would be directly interested in superintending the management—and would be unspeakably foolish to remain in ignorance of the principles on which farms should be managed, and the condition and management of the other estates in the neighbourhood.

Nor can any the least risk arise to the peace and good order of society from the humbler classes occupying themselves with such pursuits; any, the least, risk of their grudging their superiors the benefits and the privileges of their station, or seeking to displace them, and shake the stability of the national system. Imperfect knowledge of Political Philosophy, a superficial acquaintance with what is passing in other countries, and what has, in past times, been the history of their own, may expose them to be misled by designing men, or to become the dupes of their own irregular desires and groundless fancies. Such errors are inseparable from all learning, because they are the consequences of the imperfect information with which learners must begin; they overshadow the dawn of all intellectual improvement; they cloud the mind before the sun has yet arisen; but they offer the same obstacles to knowledge in all its branches, and are as much objections to moral, and even to religious, instruction, as to the study of Political Science.

The risk—the temporary and inconsiderable risk—is admitted; the guarantee is certain, and it is easy. An imperfect light is dangerous. In the twilight men's steps falter; and, as they dimly see, they doubtfully grope their way. Then let in more light! That is the cure for the evil; and that is the answer to the objection. But of one thing we may be well assured: be the dangers ever so great of instructing the people on that which it most concerns them to know—be the hazards arising from the circulation of free opinions and the diffusion of political knowledge among the people a thousand times more imminent than they have ever been painted by alarmed and short-sighted men; we cannot prevent the evil, be it ever so appalling, and are left to apply the only remedy—"Let there be light." In vain you seek to put down such doctrines by force; even to quell the uproar of admitted errors by force is of no avail in maintaining quiet. Rather say, force alone has the power greatly and widely to disseminate falsehood. Doctrines ever so fantastical, ever so wild—tenets as dull as they are groundless, as revolting as they are untrue—systems as rotten as they are deformed—follies which, left to themselves, must quickly die a natural death—all are capable of being forced onward to success by injudicious attack. The rod of power, like the magician's wand, can change deformity into beauty, lend strength to the rottenness, give currency to the dullness, and life to the decay of errors, which nothing else could recommend, or circulate, or preserve. To oppose the progress of truth—to suppress the communication of opinions—to obstruct the diffusion of knowledge—is not so pernicious, but is quite as ineffectual an exercise of the persecuting power.

It remains to mark the most salutary effects of an extensive diffusion of Political Knowledge—the most salutary, because unalloyed by even any the least and most transient inconvenience. An enlarged view of

their own best interests must give the people sound and enlightened feelings respecting the merits of human conduct, and form in them the habit of justly estimating the character and the conduct of the men who guide the affairs of nations. The mischiefs are incalculable which have resulted to our species, from the habitual false judgments formed on this important subject by the bulk of mankind; and it must in fairness be confessed that the great crimes which have been committed by statesmen in all ages, have been mainly caused by the encouragement which the people have given to the criminals. Dazzled by success, subdued by the spectacle of triumphant force, stricken with wonder at the mere exercise of great faculties, and the sight of the events which they brought about, men have withdrawn their eyes from the means used to attain those ends, and lost their natural hatred of vice in their admiration of genius and their sense of power. No disgust at meanness, no scorn of treachery, no horror of cruelty, has hitherto availed against the false lustre shed over despicable and detestable deeds by brilliant capacity crowned with victory. But that is not all the folly committed by unreflecting men. The most absolute disregard to their own interests has been coupled with their misplaced admiration of successful guilt.

The crimes which dazzled them were perpetrated at their cost; the price paid was their own long, and boundless, and bitter suffering. For all that was done amiss and for all themselves admired, they themselves paid. Their own best interests were sacrificed quite as much as principle and duty were violated. They have lavished upon tyrants, and conquerors, and intriguers, who were their worst enemies, their loudest applause; for those pests of the world reserving the fame that should have been kept sacred to virtuous and beneficent deeds; and confining the title of "Great"—the prize that all generous natures strive after—to

those whose lives were spent in working their misery and their ruin. This preposterous combination in which the people have so long been leagued to call things by their wrong names, to praise the wrong men, to suffer that the scourges of their kind, the enemies of peace and freedom and virtue, should not merely escape reprobation, but should monopolize all the places in the Temple of Fame, has been the fruitful source of human misery and national crimes, and it has been the result of nothing but the darkest ignorance. The knowledge of Political Science, which teaches the people their true interests, can alone rescue them from the error of ages—restore public virtue to the pedestal which successful vice has so long usurped—and secure on a lasting foundation the peace and the happiness of the world.

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
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